Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative PowerCambridge University Press, 2000年6月19日 - 292 頁 With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government. |
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103rd Congress 80th Congress accept actors administration analysis bill's breakdown rates Bush Chapter Clinton Committee configuration Congress passed Congressional Quarterly CQ Almanac cut point deadline effect decision theory Democrats divided government Eisenhower empirical enactments equilibrium example face of power failed override Figure Ford game theory gress House important legislation incomplete information interbranch bargaining landmark legislative productivity legislative significance logit minor legislation model of veto model predicts overridden override attempt override model patterns period pocket veto policy concessions policy reputation Political Science president and Congress president vetoes president's presidential veto rational choice theory Reagan repassage rates repassed Republicans round second face second offer Senate sequential veto bargaining solution concept split party Congress statistical status quo strategy SVB model t₂ Table tion Truman unified and divided unified government University Press variable veto chains veto override player veto rate veto threats vetoed bills vetoed the bill