explanatory memorandum on the Korean unification issue. The resolution called for a resumption of talks between the South and North of Korea based upon their Joint Communique of July 4, 1972. and a conference of all the parties directly concerned leading to more fundamental peace arrangements to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement (TIAS 2782; 4 UST 234). It called on both sides to exercise restraint so as to create an atmosphere conducive to peace and dialogue.

The explanatory statement called attention to a proposal that had been made by the United States on July 22, 1976, to meet with the parties directly concerned to seek an agreed new legal structure for the armistice during the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York and elsewhere. It stated that the only response had been the submission on August 16, 1976, by North Korean supporters of a confrontational draft resolution calling, inter alia, for withdrawal of all foreign forces under the U.N. flag and unconditional dissolution of the U.N. Command.

For the draft resolution and explanatory memorandum presented by the United States and 18 other countries with a request for inclusion in the agenda of the 31st General Assembly, see U.N. Doc. A/31/194, Aug. 20, 1976. For the Aug. 16 resolution submitted by North Korean supporters, see U.N. Doc. A/31/192. The two resolutions were withdrawn by their respective sponsors on Sept. 21, 1976, just prior to the convening of the 31st General Assembly.

Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, summarized the U.S. position on Korea on September 1, 1976, in testimony before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and International Political and Military Affairs of the House International Relations Committee. Excerpts from his statement follow:

The Korean Peninsula has been in an armed truce since 1953, with the political problems that caused the Korean hostilities still unresolved and two heavily armed forces facing each other across a 4-kilometer-wide demilitarized zone. Over the past 23 years of the armistice the consistent goal of the United States has been to prevent the outbreak of new hostilities and contribute to stability in an area where the interests of four great powers-ourselves, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and the People's Republic of China-all intersect. The security of Korea remains vital to peace in Northeast Asia and is closely linked to the security of Japan, a major ally.

Our position in Korea is clear:

• We urge the resumption of serious South-North discussions which both sides agreed to in 1972 and which North Korea has broken off.

• If North Korea's allies are prepared to improve their relations with South Korea, we are prepared to take reciprocal steps toward North Korea.

• We continue to support proposals that the United Nations give full membership to both South and North Korea, without prejudice to eventual reunification. And

We are prepared to negotiate a new basis for the armistice or replace it with more permanent arrangements in any form acceptable to all the parties concerned.

Dept. of State News Release, Sept. 1, 1976.

Regional Peacekeeping

U.S. Sinai Support Mission

On January 13, 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11896, establishing the U.S. Sinai Support Mission to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the U.S. Government to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" (TIAS 8155, 8156; 26 UST 2271, 2278) in connection with the interim agreement between Egypt and Israel on disengagement, signed on September 4, 1975, and its annex. The work of the Mission is made "subject to broad policy guidance received through the Assistant to the President for national security affairs, and the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State."

Fed. Reg., Vol. 41, No. 9, Jan. 14, 1976, pp. 2067-2069; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1913, pp. 232-233.

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South Africa

Military Sanctions

Arms Embargo

On October 19, 1976, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France vetoed a draft resolution in the U.N. Security Council which would have declared the situation in Namibia a threat to the peace and, under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, would have imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa for its failure to withdraw from Namibia in compliance with U.N. resolutions. In explanation of the U.S. vote, Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, stated in the Security Council:

[W]hile the sensitive process of consultation is going on it does not serve a useful purpose for the Security Council to take new initiatives on the Namíbian question. After many years of frustra

tion in trying to bring Namibia to independence, we have now for the first time the prospect of results. Substantial progress has been made toward reaching a peaceful settlement to the Namibian problem in consultation with South Africa and the interested African parties. We have in sight the possibility of independence for Namibia, which this Council has sought so persistently for so many years. We do not feel that the measures called for in the resolution before us will improve the chances to gain a free and independent Namibia. In fact, they could just do the opposite. It would be tragic if the delicate fabric of negotiations were to be torn asunder by any precipitate move at this time.

...The United States has continued to enforce its own arms embargo towards South Africa. We initiated this embargo in 1962, even before the Security Council called for a voluntary embargo against South Africa in the following year.

[T]he United States has made clear to South Africa the urgent need for unqualified independence for Namibia. We are keeping Secretary-General Waldheim informed of the progress of our negotiations and we will continue to do so and are in regular contact with the front line Presidents. The United States will not flag in these efforts.

Press Release USUN-119(76), Oct. 19, 1976. The draft resolution on the situation in Namibia (S/12211) received 10 votes in favor, 3 against, with 2 abstentions. It was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of 3 permanent members of the Security Council. For the text of the vetoed resolution, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1950, Nov. 8, 1976, pp. 594-595.

On November 9, 1976, the U.N. General Assembly approved Resolution 31/6D by a vote of 110-8 (U.S.), with 20 abstentions, requesting the Security Council once more to take action under chapter VII for a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and calling on France, the United States, and the United Kingdom to "adopt a positive policy" so the Council could act under chapter VII. Rev. Robert P. Hupp, U.S. representative, in explanation of vote. stated:

We have voted against the draft resolution concerning the "Arms Embargo Against South Africa" . . . since we are not convinced that the invocation of chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against South Africa for its apartheid policies is ap propriate at this time. We object strongly to those paragraphs which allege that the United States is sending weapons to South Africa. As the General Assembly well knows, the United States has continued to impose its own arms embargo against South Africa since 1962, and has urged other nations to impose voluntarily an embargo of military equipment. Recently, it was discovered that a U.S. company had illegally shipped arms to South Africa. The shipment was made as a result of misrepresentation by a company employee. That employee subsequently has been prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to jail. Let me make this clear so that no one doubts the strength of our commitment. We have jailed an American citizen for facilitating an arms shipment to South

Africa. The U.S. Department of Justice is continuing to investigate reports of illegal arms sales to South Africa involving American arms manufacturers.

Press Release USUN-191(76), rev. 1, Dec. 22, 1976,

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p. 26.

Arms Control and Disarmament

Nuclear Weapon Tests and Peaceful
Nuclear Explosions

The Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (the "Threshold Test Ban Treaty"), signed on July 3, 1974, provides in article I that

Each party undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under its jurisdiction or control, beginning March 31, 1976.

On March 31, 1976, Robert L. Funseth, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations, made available to newsmen the following U.S. statement:

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed on July 3, 1974, and scheduled to take effect on March 31, 1976. However, article III of that treaty calls for the United States and U.S.S.R. to negotiate a separate agreement governing the conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE's). At the time of signing the TTBT and on several subsequent occasions, we stated that in view of the close relationship between the verification of a threshold on nuclear weapon tests and the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions, we would not present the TTBT to the Senate for ratification until a satisfactory PNE agreement had been concluded.

The negotiations for a PNE agreement began in October 1974 with the agreed objective of insuring that peaceful nuclear explosions would not be conducted so as to provide weapons-related benefits that were otherwise precluded by the TTBT. The two sides have made considerable progress in completing an agreement, and the negotiations are continuing in Moscow to resolve the few remaining issues.

The two sides hope that a satisfactory agreement can be concluded within the next several weeks. During this period, we expect that neither side will conduct weapons tests above the threshold of 150 kilotons. For the immediate future, we have no plans for high-yield weapons tests above the threshold of 150 kilotons.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1921, Apr. 19, 1976, p. 507. For the text of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, see the 1974 Digest, pp. 728-731; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXI, No. 1831, July 29, 1974, p. 218.

On July 29, 1976, President Ford transmitted to the Senate two interrelated treaties with the Soviet Union aimed at controlling the danger of nuclear weapons: The first, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, with Protocol, known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), was signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, but ratification was not immediately sought because it would have been incomplete without the second, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE Treaty). The latter was signed at Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976. The treaty limiting weapons testing establishes a nuclear "threshold," prohibiting tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent to 150,000 tons of TNT). The parallel treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's) places exactly the same limit of 150 kilotons on the yield of any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, such as might be conducted as part of an engineering project. The companion treaties were needed because of lack of any essential distinction between the technology of a nuclear explosive device that could be used as a weapon and a nuclear explosive device used for a peaceful purpose. Article III of the TTBT specifically excluded PNE's from its provisions and called for negotiation of a separate treaty to govern them.

In his letter of transmittal to the Senate President Ford described the treaties, in part, as follows:

The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty contain numerous provisions to ensure adequate verification, including some concepts, more far-reaching than those found in previous arms control agreements, which are not only important in themselves but which will have significant precedential value as well. For example, the Limited Test Ban Treaty is verified only by national technical means. The TTB and PNE Treaties add requirements for exchange of specific information in advance to assist verification by national technical means, and the PNE Treaty establishes procedures for on-site observation under certain conditions on the territory of the party conducting the explosion.

The TTB Treaty provides for an exchange of data on the geography and geology of nuclear weapon test sites as well as the yields of some actual weapons tests conducted at each site. The PNE Treaty requires that the party conducting any underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes provide the other party in advance with data on the geography and geology of the place where the explosion is to be carried out, its purpose, and specific information on each explosion itself. These requirements are related to the yield of the explosion and become more detailed as the magnitude of the explosions increase.

In addition to the limitation on individual nuclear explosions of 150 kilotons, the PNE Treaty provides for an aggregate yield