The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast AsiaYale University Press, 1977年9月10日 - 254 頁 James C. Scott places the critical problem of the peasant household—subsistence—at the center of this study. The fear of food shortages, he argues persuasively, explains many otherwise puzzling technical, social, and moral arrangements in peasant society, such as resistance to innovation, the desire to own land even at some cost in terms of income, relationships with other people, and relationships with institutions, including the state. Once the centrality of the subsistence problem is recognized, its effects on notions of economic and political justice can also be seen. Scott draws from the history of agrarian society in lower Burma and Vietnam to show how the transformations of the colonial era systematically violated the peasants’ “moral economy” and created a situation of potential rebellion and revolution. Demonstrating keen insights into the behavior of people in other cultures and a rare ability to generalize soundly from case studies, Scott offers a different perspective on peasant behavior that will be of interest particularly to political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and Southeast Asianists. “The book is extraordinarily original and valuable and will have a very broad appeal. I think the central thesis is correct and compelling.”—Clifford Geertz “In this major work, … Scott views peasants as political and moral actors defending their values as well as their individual security, making his book vital to an understanding of peasant politics.”—Library Journal James C. Scott is professor of political science at Yale University. |
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第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 45 筆
第 19 頁
... Micro Aspects of Development ( New York : Praeger , 1973 ) , pp . 3–12 . 19. Chayanov , Peasant Economy , p . 134 , emphasis added . under with N is over 25 percent while the comparable ECONOMICS OF THE SUBSISTENCE ETHIC 19.
... Micro Aspects of Development ( New York : Praeger , 1973 ) , pp . 3–12 . 19. Chayanov , Peasant Economy , p . 134 , emphasis added . under with N is over 25 percent while the comparable ECONOMICS OF THE SUBSISTENCE ETHIC 19.
第 20 頁
... percent while the comparable figure for T is less than 4 percent . Our hypothetical example is not far removed from the real world of peasant choice . In an attempt to apply the " safety - first " principle to the choice of technique in ...
... percent while the comparable figure for T is less than 4 percent . Our hypothetical example is not far removed from the real world of peasant choice . In an attempt to apply the " safety - first " principle to the choice of technique in ...
第 29 頁
... percent of the crop in a good year is likely to meet less explosive resistance than a rent of 20 percent after a particularly poor year . The peasant's criterion will be what is left after outside claims have been met — whether it is ...
... percent of the crop in a good year is likely to meet less explosive resistance than a rent of 20 percent after a particularly poor year . The peasant's criterion will be what is left after outside claims have been met — whether it is ...
第 31 頁
... percent from peasant incomes . Although the peasant may resent any such claim , it is the claim that most often threatens the central elements of his subsistence arrangements , that most often ex- poses him to subsistence crises , that ...
... percent from peasant incomes . Although the peasant may resent any such claim , it is the claim that most often threatens the central elements of his subsistence arrangements , that most often ex- poses him to subsistence crises , that ...
第 43 頁
... percent of the land in Tonkin and Annam was communal land , and in Quang Tri and Quang Binh provinces the figure was over 50 percent of paddy land.23 Some of this land was allotted more or less on the basis of need to poor villagers ...
... percent of the land in Tonkin and Annam was communal land , and in Quang Tri and Quang Binh provinces the figure was over 50 percent of paddy land.23 Some of this land was allotted more or less on the basis of need to poor villagers ...
內容
1 | |
13 | |
35 | |
3 The Distribution of Risk and Colonial Change | 56 |
4 The State as Claimant | 91 |
5 The Depression Rebellions | 114 |
Reciprocity and Subsistence as Justice | 157 |
7 Revolt Survival and Repression | 193 |
Index | 241 |
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常見字詞
A.O.M. Indochine NF agrarian Agricultural Annam areas Asian average balance of exchange baskets Cao Dai capitalist capitation tax cash Central Java Central Luzon chap claim Cochinchina colonial regime context costs crop failure cultivator culture Déclaration Delta districts economic elites example exploitation fiscal fluctuations force green revolution guarantees Ha-Tinh harvest head tax hectare Ibid Iglesia Ni Cristo Java land rates landlord landowners legitimacy less Lower Burma marginal minimal moral economy Nam Dan needs Nghe-An Nghe-Tinh normative obligations officials owners paddy party patronage pattern peasant peasant society peasantry percent Philippines piastres political poor population Press production reason rebellion reciprocity region relationship represent resistance revolt rice right to subsistence risks rural Saya San Settlement share sharecropping smallholders social Southeast Asia structure subsistence ethic subsistence security surplus tenants tion Tonkin traditional Upper Burma Vietnam Vietnamese village Vinh wage labor yield