The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast AsiaYale University Press, 1977年9月10日 - 254 頁 James C. Scott places the critical problem of the peasant household—subsistence—at the center of this study. The fear of food shortages, he argues persuasively, explains many otherwise puzzling technical, social, and moral arrangements in peasant society, such as resistance to innovation, the desire to own land even at some cost in terms of income, relationships with other people, and relationships with institutions, including the state. Once the centrality of the subsistence problem is recognized, its effects on notions of economic and political justice can also be seen. Scott draws from the history of agrarian society in lower Burma and Vietnam to show how the transformations of the colonial era systematically violated the peasants’ “moral economy” and created a situation of potential rebellion and revolution. Demonstrating keen insights into the behavior of people in other cultures and a rare ability to generalize soundly from case studies, Scott offers a different perspective on peasant behavior that will be of interest particularly to political scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and Southeast Asianists. “The book is extraordinarily original and valuable and will have a very broad appeal. I think the central thesis is correct and compelling.”—Clifford Geertz “In this major work, … Scott views peasants as political and moral actors defending their values as well as their individual security, making his book vital to an understanding of peasant politics.”—Library Journal James C. Scott is professor of political science at Yale University. |
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第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 45 筆
第 1 頁
... region . In the best of times , the culti- vated land in Tonkin barely sufficed to feed its own population . The Japanese and their Vichy allies , nevertheless , converted much paddy land to jute and other war - machine crops . After ...
... region . In the best of times , the culti- vated land in Tonkin barely sufficed to feed its own population . The Japanese and their Vichy allies , nevertheless , converted much paddy land to jute and other war - machine crops . After ...
第 13 頁
... regions will ( if there are no alternatives ) work unimaginably hard and long for the smallest increments in production - long after a pru- dent capitalist would move on . Chayanov calls this " self - exploitation . " When this pattern ...
... regions will ( if there are no alternatives ) work unimaginably hard and long for the smallest increments in production - long after a pru- dent capitalist would move on . Chayanov calls this " self - exploitation . " When this pattern ...
第 20 頁
... regions where their adopion courts disas- ter . In deciding whether or not to grow cash crops , it appears that cul- tivators near the subsistence margin apply essentially the same test . There is almost always some increment of risk in ...
... regions where their adopion courts disas- ter . In deciding whether or not to grow cash crops , it appears that cul- tivators near the subsistence margin apply essentially the same test . There is almost always some increment of risk in ...
第 22 頁
... region have em- phasized , in one form or another , the subsistence orientation which structures economic decisions . In his landmark study of cultivation pat- terns in Indochina , Pierre Gourou put the matter succinctly : “ Agricul ...
... region have em- phasized , in one form or another , the subsistence orientation which structures economic decisions . In his landmark study of cultivation pat- terns in Indochina , Pierre Gourou put the matter succinctly : “ Agricul ...
第 26 頁
... regions , the risk is enormous . Even after the wisest technical precautions , the peasant family must somehow survive those years when the net yield or resources fall below basic needs . How do they make do ? In part , they may tighten ...
... regions , the risk is enormous . Even after the wisest technical precautions , the peasant family must somehow survive those years when the net yield or resources fall below basic needs . How do they make do ? In part , they may tighten ...
內容
1 | |
13 | |
35 | |
3 The Distribution of Risk and Colonial Change | 56 |
4 The State as Claimant | 91 |
5 The Depression Rebellions | 114 |
Reciprocity and Subsistence as Justice | 157 |
7 Revolt Survival and Repression | 193 |
Index | 241 |
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常見字詞
A.O.M. Indochine NF agrarian Agricultural Annam areas Asian average balance of exchange baskets Cao Dai capitalist capitation tax cash Central Java Central Luzon chap claim Cochinchina colonial regime context costs crop failure cultivator culture Déclaration Delta districts economic elites example exploitation fiscal fluctuations force green revolution guarantees Ha-Tinh harvest head tax hectare Ibid Iglesia Ni Cristo Java land rates landlord landowners legitimacy less Lower Burma marginal minimal moral economy Nam Dan needs Nghe-An Nghe-Tinh normative obligations officials owners paddy party patronage pattern peasant peasant society peasantry percent Philippines piastres political poor population Press production reason rebellion reciprocity region relationship represent resistance revolt rice right to subsistence risks rural Saya San Settlement share sharecropping smallholders social Southeast Asia structure subsistence ethic subsistence security surplus tenants tion Tonkin traditional Upper Burma Vietnam Vietnamese village Vinh wage labor yield