The observations which I have now the honor to resent to your Excellency, and which I venture to hope nay prove as convincing to your Excellency's Governent as they are convincing to my own, have reference to the plan in its widest sense, but they are, I should add, no less applicable to the scheme in its more restricted form, since the two plans in principle are the same and differ only in degree.”

France supported Russia in her contention against the American proposal and in Russia's wish to be consulted by China before any railway-construction concession in North Manchuria should be granted.

British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, speaking in Parliament June 15th, 1910, is reported to have said: "If Japan had taken the line of stating that she wished to have a railway monopoly in Manchuria, that would have been a distinct breach of the open door. If she made use of her position there by giving preferential treatment to her own people as against others, that again would be a breach of the open door. But for Japan to say that after all that has passed she has an interest in Manchuria which justifies her in wishing for participation in railways which may to some extent compete with the railway which is already in existence-not, I say, in opposing them in principle, but in asking for participation in them-it would be going too far for us to declare that that is an unreasonable demand to make, and to take active diplomatic steps at Peking to press for the granting of this concession."

Thus passed Secretary Knox's scheme. The British Government did not even see the wisdom of supporting the Chinchou-Aigun railway project with any aggressive measures in the face of the Russian objections. But the American proposal and the activities of American bankers did not pass as a shadow on the water. They brought forth a decidedly important fruit. For one thing, they