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All of these belong to the raw-material class except bean oil; and the Manchurian bean oil is not at all refined in the sense America or Europe understands the term. In short, the character of Manchurian trade is essentially of colonial type. The list of her exports paints her as a great agricultural state, as we have already seen; and the story of her export trade is largely the epic of her humble bean. No prophet or historian can correctly read the meaning of this simple statement, however, unless he can vision clearly to what extent beans enter into the food articles in the Far East in general and in Nippon and Chosen in particular. This is the aspect which we have already treated at length in other chapters. From all of which it is not difficult to see why it is that Nippon places so much emphasis on the possibilities of Manchuria-on the economic development of that country. American and British writers who cannot see Manchuria except from a political angle miss the point entirely as far as the real meaning of Nippon's activities in the Eastern Three Provinces is concerned.

GROWTH OF THE MANCHURIAN TRADE

In 1898, when Yingkou was the sole port opened to foreign trade, Manchuria exported goods to the value of 18,949,602 Hk. taels. Her imports totaled 21,389,940: the total business of 40,339,542 Hk. taels for the year. As early as that Japan was the heaviest buyer of Manchurian goods: her purchases amounted to 6,684,

732 Hk. taels. Second to Japan came Shanghai; but her importation of Manchurian goods did not amount to much more than one half of the Japanese purchases3.498,488. Great Britain bought exactly 5,415 Hk. taels' worth of the Manchurian goods that year, and Russian Manchuria's share was 1,601 Hk. taels. All other foreign countries combined managed to bring their purchases to 15,270 taels. It was not that the famous Manchurian beans were undiscovered in those days. On the contrary, the beans, bean cakes, and bean oil made up 14,880,641 Hk. taels out of the total of 18,949,602.

Ten years later, in 1908, the total imports and exports of Manchuria rose to 95,812,627 Hk. taels. It was more than doubled within the decade. Yingkou was no longer monopolizing the international trade of Manchuria. The great port of Dairen was open then; so were Antung, Manchuli, Suifenho, and Tatungkou. The Manchurian trade made a sensational jump in the very following year, 1909: it increased by more than 50,000,000 Hk. taels over the sum of 1908. Just one thing accounted for it all: the soya beans and their products, bean cakes and oil. It was in 1908, as has already been retailed in a former chapter, that the first trial shipment of the soya beans was made to England. The almost instant conquest of its customers in Europe placed Manchuria on the map of the trade world for the first time in history. When the World War broke out, like the international business of the other countries, Manchurian overseas trade suffered a setback, but it was very slight indeed: the loss did not amount to 8,000,000 Hk. taels, compared to the preceding year. Compared to the trade losses of other countries, it was nothing to talk about. It did not take Manchuria long to see that the War opened markets for her products which had never entered into the wildest dreamings of any of her friends. By 1916 the trade was on its way to new records.

By 1918 the exports and imports of the one port of Dairen alone amounted to 181,614,600 Hk. taels, which is nearly twice the value of the total foreign trade of the whole of Manchuria ten years before that.

Meanwhile a number of ports and towns were opened to international trade and residence. The port of Dairen was actually opened in July, 1907, with the establishment of the Chinese customs office there. Manchuli in February of the same year; and Antung, which had been declared opened through the Sino-American treaty of 1903, was actually opened to business in March, 1907. Tatungkou in October of the same year; Suifenho (at which the Chinese Eastern line leaves Manchuria and enters the Maritime Province of Siberia on its way to the Port of Vladivostok) in February, 1908; and Hunchun on the border of Northern Chosen in January, 1910. In addition to these, such towns as Tiehling, Tungkiangtsu, and Fakumen, were declared open by China in September, 1906; Hsinmintun in October of the same year; Changchun, Kirin, Harbin, Tsitsihar, in January, 1907; Fenghwancheng, Liaoyang, Ninguta, Sansing, Hailar, and Aigun in July, 1907. Mukden was opened through the commercial treaty of October 8th, 1903, between the United States and China, which also opened the Port of Antung on the Yalu.

JAPAN'S POSITION IN THE MANCHURIAN TRADE

The total foreign trade which passed through the three ports of South Manchuria, the ports of Dairen, Antung, and Yingkou, in 1922 (and they handled an overwhelming proportion of the entire trade of Manchuria and practically all her trade with the foreign countries except Russia) amounted to Hk. taels: 234,534. Of that sum Japan's share stood at 151,769,000 Hk. taels.

Japan stands pre-eminent among the customers of Manchuria. There is no second to her. She outdistances all the rest to such an extent that there is no rivalry possible. The above-mentioned amount does not take in the share of Chosen-which of course is a part of Japanese trade with Manchuria. The country that came nearest to disputing Japanese trade supremacy in Manchuria in 1922 was the United States, and the total of her import and export trade with Manchuria amounted to 20,354,007 Hk. taels. The year 1922, it should be remembered, also, was one of the bad years with the foreign trade of Nippon-the post-war depression was scraping bottom in Japan in the unhappy days of that year. That means that the extraordinary position Japan held in that year's Manchurian trade was nothing exceptional with her. In fact, the year before that, 1921, her peerless position in the Manchurian trade was much more emphasized: the figure for that year stood at 161,333,572, against which the American showing was almost pathetic-15,334,996. This has been so even in the pre-War years: in 1914 out of the total imports through the four major ports of Manchuria, of less than 49,373,500 Hk. taels, Japan's share amounted to 34,904,056. In her exports Japan's position was still more dominant: out of the total of Hk. taels 48,612,847, the Japanese portion was 39,746,108. Which meant that out of the total trade of Manchuria for that year of Hk. taels 97,986,301, Japanese business with her amounted to 74,650, 164, which is more than 76 per cent. of the total. In that year the United States was again only second to Japan, though her Manchurian trade totaled only 5,750,088 Hk. taels.

Nothing miraculous or unnatural about this showing of Japan in Manchuria. About the only thing to see in it all is that it is rather modest when one takes everything into consideration. With the South Manchuria

Railway falling into her hands at the close of the Russian war, she has received the trunk trade artery through the most populous section of Manchuria-through the heart of business and productive Manchuria. With the establishment of Dairen as the greatest port in North China, outranking even Tientsin, and second only to Shanghai among all the continental ports of China, Japan was simply fated to be the mistress of the international business of Manchuria whether she wished it or not. For practically all the great financial and industrial interests. in Dairen are in the hands of the Japanese. The Japanese were the actual creators of that port, as far as its commercial life and activities were concerned.

Aside from these, however, there are one and a thousand other reasons. Since the Sino-Japanese war Japan has been the chief buyer of the greatest export commodity of Manchuria, beans and bean cake. She sends her ships to get the Manchurian beans and bean cakes, and the ships must have some cargo for Manchuria if they mean to carry on a profitable business. They are in position to make attractive rates for Japanese exporters' goods for Manchuria. And they are quite willing to make them, for they would rather have some cargo at cheaper rates than send their ships in ballast. What is still more important than that is the financial aspect of the thing. A great and lasting business can never be built on a one-sided basis. It is always easy to sell to a country where one buys much. The exchange is favorable: the credit machinery is already established to handle the business. The Japanese are Orientals themselves. They understand the trading psychology of the FarEastern customers. Geography and freight rates fight their battles for them constantly. Many are the advantages Japanese exporters enjoy over the American and especially the European competitors. But the one and paramount reason which drives the Japanese to suc

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