provision of the secret protocol was a clear violation of Article IV of the Portsmouth Treaty, which reads:

"Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria."

DO THE JAPANESE SHUT THE OPEN DOOR IN

MANCHURIA?

In the eyes and judgment of these gifted writers, evidently, this act of China of having a British company build a competing line of railway parallel to the South Manchuria line, the interest of which she had solemnly pledged her word of honor to protect-more than that, this act of China of having a line of railway built for her which she had promised not to build, was simply one of the general measures which all countries take for the development of their commerce and industry.

Perhaps this is not the point which has called down the condemnation of eminent critics. Perhaps they denounced Japan's protest against building competing lines to the South Manchuria Railway by anybody and everybody who wished to do so, as a sin against the “Open Door" policy. Perhaps their interpretation of the "Open Door" and "equal opportunity" was just what the school dictionaries said these phrases meant. Therefore it was simply outrageous for Japan to protest when the British interest wanted to build a line parallel to the South Manchuria. Perhaps that is the point upon which the full weight of their denunciation fell. They are quite right, too-if-IF the two famous phrases quoted above happen to be nothing more than mere academic expressions in a text-book on pure logic.

Just one trouble about all this is that-they are not. They are very much of the actual workaday world of

ours. They stand for living facts in the realm of intensely practical politics-and in the pretty trying realm of Chinese practical politics at that.

STANDARD OIL COMPANY'S CONCESSION CITED

The meaning of phrases should always be defined in the light of actual facts. For example, an agreement dated February 10th, 1914, by which the Standard Oil Company of New York received from China the right to exploit certain Chinese oil fields. Article Fourth of this reads:

"Fourth.-The Chinese Government hereby promises the Standard Oil Company of New York that the working of Petroleum in the Yen-Chang, Yen-An-Fu, and adjoining fields in Shensi Province and Chengtehfu (Jehol) and adjoining fields in Chihli Province shall be exclusively entrusted to the American-Chinese Corporation mentioned above, to develop, refine and market, and that the Chinese Government will give every assistance and protection in doing the same and furthermore will undertake not to give monopoly of Petroleum territories to any other foreigners but agrees that no concession whatever for petroleum-bearing properties in China be given to other foreigners until the proposed Corporation's workings prove satisfactory to the Chinese Government and the Standard Oil Company of New York, which period shall not exceed one year from date of signing contract.

"This Agreement is for 60 years from the date of signature during which term the Chinese Government promises that no other Foreign individual or Corporation will be allowed to produce Petroleum or any of its products in the said districts."

There seems to be a good deal of exclusiveness and closed-door policy about the above. No American writer, however, has ever held up this American-Chinese contract

to the condemnation of the world as a fragrant example of the violation of Secretary Hay's doctrine. For it isn't. Nobody would be foolish enough to invest a couple of million dollars merely to test a new oil field in China in order that some outsiders-without risking a centmight rush in to gather a golden harvest the moment he proved the field profitable through his expensive tests. A degree of protection in the shape of exclusive rights must of necessity go with all development enterprises in a new field like China or Manchuria. Even while Secretary Knox was championing the cause of the ChinchouAigun concession in the name of the preservation of the principle of the open door the terms of that very concession carried the provision that at least half of the construction materials must be no other than American. There was no open market for all nations to sell their construction materials as far as the requirements of this particular Chinese line were concerned.

In a note exchanged April 28th, 1899, between Great Britain and Russia we find the following:

"Great Britain and Russia, animated by a sincere desire to avoid in China all cause of conflict on questions. where their interests meet, and taking into consideration the economic and geographical gravitation of certain parts of that Empire, have agreed as follows:

"1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government."

Perhaps Great Britain had no less friendly regard for Japan, her ally at the time, than she had for Russia. Perhaps the British Government thought that the invasion by the British-built railway into the region north of the Great Wall was quite as unpleasant to the power

which had succeeded to the Russian interests there as to Russia herself. Perhaps these were the reasons. It is just barely possible, too, that the British Government did not take the same view of the incident as the wise anti-Japanese writers took. Anyway, it did not support the contention of the British firm against the protest of Japan, so the Fakumen-Hsinmintun Railway project found its grave in its very cradle. If the wise critics were right, then the British Government failed-and failed ignominiously-in a cardinal function of government: namely to protect the legitimate rights of its nationals. The indictment of these writers was therefore even more severe against the British Government than against Japan.

AMERICA AND JAPAN IN MANCHURIA

American interest in Manchuria took a dramatic turn in 1909. It came before the world under the name of Secretary Knox's "neutralization plan of Manchurian railways." The British interest connected with the Hsinmintun-Fakumen concession combined with a group of American bankers and secured from China the concession for building a railway from Chinchou to Aigun on the Amur, on the northern boundary of Manchuria, by way of Chengchiatun, Taonan, and Tsitsihar, a line of some 960 miles. The preliminary agreement was signed between them and the viceroy of Manchuria October 2d, 1909, at Mukden. Its text is given in Appendix 24. An Imperial edict of January 21st, 1910, approved the agreement.

China had watched the steady Japanese economic expansion in Manchuria following the Russian war with nervous distaste. She did not have the strength herself to curb it. Here, as so often in the past, the traditional Chinese method of making a foreign power fight her

battles against another foreign power came to the fore. Without a clear understanding of this ancient Chinese tactic, the reader will find it difficult to see just why China should have given the concession for a ChinchouAigun line at the time when the Hsinmintun-Fakumen proposition was killed through a Japanese protest.

It was largely in connection with this concession, given partly to a syndicate of American bankers headed by J. P. Morgan and Company, that Secretary Knox developed his plan for "neutralizing" the Manchurian railway lines, which is set forth in the following statement of his in a memorandum presented to the British Foreign Office in November, 1909:

SECRETARY KNOX'S NEUTRALIZATION PLAN

"Perhaps the most effective way to preserve the undisturbed enjoyment by China of all political rights in Manchuria and to promote the development of those provinces under a practical application of the policy of the open door and equal commercial opportunity would be to bring the Manchurian highways and the railroad under an economic and scientific and impartial administration by some plan vesting in China the ownership of the railroads through funds furnished for that purpose by the interested Powers willing to participate. Such a loan should be for a period ample to make it reasonably certain that it could be met within the time fixed, and should be upon such terms as would make it attractive to bankers and investors. The plan should provide that nationals of the participating Powers should supervise the railway system during the terms of the loan, and the Governments concerned should enjoy for such period the usual preferences for their nationals and materials upon an equitable basis inter se. . . .

"The advantages of such a plan to Japan and Russia