12-268 O EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE VOLUME XIII PART 1 EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION 1961 MADE PUBLIC APRIL 1984 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON SESSIONS OF 12-268 O VOLUME XIII PART 1 EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION 1961 MADE PUBLIC APRIL 1984 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1984 New presidential administrations offer the hope of a fresh start. They bring new people, methods, and perspectives to a host of old problems. They also represent times of testing, as both adversaries and allies measure the stature and commitment of new leaders. In 1961, when newly-elected President John F. Kennedy formed his administration, the lines of American international relations were already well defined. East-West tensions of the Cold War had dominated American foreign policy since the days of the Truman administration. National independence and neutralism among Third World countries had also blossomed into a recognizable reality in international calculations. As President Dwight D. Eisenhower briefed his successor on world affairs, Laos, Cuba, Berlin, and the Congo were all troublespots high on the agenda. The members of the new administration proceeded vigorously. The early hearings included in this volume reflect their confidence and self-assurance. Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified frequently before the Foreign Relations Committee, as did Under Secretary Chester Bowles and Assistant Secretary G. Mennen Williams. John J. McCloy and Arthur Dean brought word of the nuclear test limitation talks in Geneva, which would lead to the test ban treaty two years later. Vice President Lyndon Johnson reported on his tour of Southeast Asia, with assurances that American troops would not be required in Vietnam. Indeed, 1961 was a tumultuous year that inaugurated a difficult decade. Barely had the new administration gotten underway before it stumbled seriously with its abortive invasion of Cuba. The Foreign Relations Committee then conducted extensive hearings into the Bay of Pigs debacle, not so much to determine blame as to understand how the decision-making processes had failed so miserably. Because of their sensitive nature, most of these hearings were held in closed-door executive sessions. The testimony of diplomatic, intelligence, and military witnesses on the Cuban situation does not make for edifying reading, as one after another sought to spare himself and his agency from blame. "Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan," President Kennedy commented at the time, and these hearings give ample support to his observation. Ultimately, the responsibility for the Bay of Pigs fell squarely on the shoulders of the new President, but public opinion rallied to his support nonetheless. Of particular concern to committee members was their exclusion from prior knowledge of, or consultation on, the proposed invasion. Only the committee chairman, Senator J. William Fulbright, had been invited to attend any of the pre-invasion strategy sessions, and then only after he had learned independently of the venture |