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[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 463, l. 163-174. Published in Istochnik, 4 (1994), 4-8. Translated by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

lated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

[The following excerpt is from a 4 July 1953 telephonogram from Soviet High Commission officials Miroshnichenko and Lun'kov to High Commissioner V. Semenov. 168

"In connection with the events of June 17, the movement of all types of transport and pedestrians across the sector border between East and West Berlin, as well as between the GDR and East Berlin through West Berlin, was halted.

At present in East and West Berlin, the metro, the city railroad and the tramway run separately, which causes dissatisfaction on the part of the GDR and East Berlin population. Up to June 17, 83 thousand workers and white-collar workers, who live on GDR territory adjacent to the western sector of Berlin but work in East Berlin, used the city railway. Now they use a bus, steam train or some other form of transport to get to their place of work, making several stops on the way. Such trips, which previously took 30-40 minutes, now require up to 2 or 3 hours one-way.

Workers and white-collar workers and other strata of the population express serious discontent with these circumstances, and turn to the government of the GDR with the request that it change the existing transport system. In connection with this we consider it expedient to carry out the following measures on the morning of July 6:

1. In the morning and evening hours, to organize electric train traffic from the GDR to East Berlin and back without stops in the western sectors of the city.

2. In order to improve the travel of the populace living in western sectors and working in the eastern sector of Berlin, and vice versa, to open five check-points on the sector boundary in addition to the existing three points.

3. For the residents who live in communities in the GDR located close to the western sectors of Berlin but work in West Berlin, to organize electric train traffic from the GDR to certain stations of West Berlin.

[Our] friends (com. Ulbricht) fully agree with the measures we are proposing and request that they be informed about the decision taken on these proposals today, in order for them to be able to announce the decision on the radio and to calm the population.

In relation to the decision by the SED Politburo to request the High Commissioner of the USSR in Germany to open the sector border, Ulbricht stated that this issue could be examined after the implementation of the aforementioned measures.

We ask for your instructions."

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p.280, Il.61-62. Trans

O. Grotewohl's Handwritten Notes on the SED CC Politburo Meeting 8 July 1953

Politburo 7/8/53

Grotewohl: reports on 2 commission sessions of the reorganization commission

Herrnstadt: refuses to take office of first secretary Honecker: one cannot blame Ulbricht alone. It would damage the Party if U[lbricht] would resign as Gen[eral] Sec[retary] and as First Secretary. Proposal for supplementing Wandel-Winzer.

Zaisser: my suggestion [is] Herrnstadt since he was more in tune with the people than we [were]. Proposal is not an ideal solution. My argument is: W.U. is no more responsible for the wrong course (2nd Party Conference) than we all are. His fault is the rigid administering-wrong education of the cadres etc. That has spoiled the Party, the New Course cannot be implemented with this attitude. He therefore has to be kept at a distance from the party apparatus. [To leave] the apparatus in the hands of W.U. would be catastrophic for the New Course.

Ulbricht: The proposal by Herrnstadt + Zaisser for the elimination of the secretariat is dangerous. The proposal by Zaisser to name Herrnstadt as First Sec[retary] is the logical consequence.

Zaisser: protests against [this]. U. had agreed on the elimination of the Secretariat.

Herrnstadt: likewise

Rau: U.'s work methods inhibit the Party. Does U. have the will to change this? The past weeks have not shown this. If somebody other than Walter takes over the party organization and becomes first secretary, this would be better.

Ackermann: one also has to change the cabinet. Gr[otewohl] has to be obligated to express in [illegible] that no decisions had yet been made.

The Party has to recover but not with W.U. Ebert: for secretaries. It would be a gain for the Party if Com. W.U. would state himself that somebody else had to be first secretary.

E. Schmidt: I was completely frightened, welcome the free and serious presentation by Zaisser. You [Ulbricht] cannot remain any longer at the top of the party.

Matern: U. must be first secretary.

Oelẞner: H[errnstadt]'s and Zaisser's appearance signifies the existence of factions. U. has considered all of us stupid. W. has not learned his lessons. One has to work as a collective. There is no need for a first secretary. Instead collective decision-[making].

Jendretzky: W. has learned nothing.

Mückenberger: there was no central leadership for the districts. Everybody is overworked.

Gr[otewohl]: I can not make a final statement in

Moscow

W.U.: To acknowledge the criticism was correct. My behavior [regarding the ostentatious celebration of my] birthday [was] mistaken. I will take the stand in the C[entral] C[ommittee]. I am not of the opinion that I have to be first secr[retary]. This takes confidence which has to be renewed again.

U: Proposals by H[errnstadt] and Zai[sser] i[n] [the] committee were an experiment. I will make a statement before the CC.

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In the last few days, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply, Com. Wach, [and] the members of the Politburo of the SED CC, Coms. Oelẞner and Matern71 in conversations with the executives of the apparatus of the MIA of the USSR in Germany, informed them on their own initiative of several noteworthy facts about the situation in the Politburo of the SED CC after the June events in the GDR.

1. In a 30 June conversation with the head of the apparatus division, representative com. Popov, com. Wach shared his impressions about the meeting of the Politburo of the SED CC of 9 June 1953, at which the report of the deputy prime-minister Rau72 on the redistribution of capital investment was presented.

Rau proposed to save 1,300 million marks of capital investment in heavy industry and to direct them toward the financing of light and other branches of industry which supply the needs of the populace, but he stated at the same time that he personally disagreed with cutting expenditures on capital investment in heavy industry.

said:

Speaking at the meeting of the Politburo, Ulbricht

"I do not agree with the planned sum of 1,300 million

marks. We cannot free up such resources. Rau's plan disorganizes the national economy, and our economy is already disorganized as it is. I have been to a series of enterprises and have established that the workers are worried not so much by rises in the output norms as by the disorganization of the economy, [and] the lack of a normal food supply. Industrial enterprises cannot work normally if they are supplied with raw materials and materials to [only] 40% of their needs. Rau's project must be reexamined, in particular on the issues of external trade." In his address, the chairman of the State Planing Commission, Leuschner73 also noted that Rau's plan was unrealistic. This plan, he pointed out, relied on the resources that were supposed to be freed up as a result of limiting expenditures on heavy industry, but all of these resources had already been used to meet other needs and there were practically no funds available. Leuschner also pointed out that Rau, in introducing his proposals, did not agree on them with the members of the commission created to locate resources for financing the measures projected in the government decree of 25 June.

At the meeting, the Minister of Ore-Mining Industry Selbmann74 stated:

"I believe that we must not curtail expenditures on heavy industry. It is incomprehensible to me why it is necessary to close down the construction of enterprises temporarily if 50% of the work is not yet completed. If resources are refused to me, I will have to reduce the output of steel, and that will be reflected in light industry: the output of machines will be reduced, mines will stop working, workers will have to be laid off, not to mention that stopping work in some mines will lead to their flooding with water."

The Minister for Machine Construction, Ziller75, sharply objected to the withdrawal of 100 million marks previously designated for capital investment in energy production. "I ask," he said, "who is supposed to, and at the cost of what resources, carry out the Republic's program of energy-supply? You yourselves have said a lot about the necessity of carrying out this program. Such a plan as that proposed by Rau cannot be carried out. If it is taken as a basis [for action], then I cannot deliver the necessary machines for light industry and am not in a condition to fulfill the plan on the supply of electrical equipment."

Oelßner, Elli Schmidt,76 Ackermann, 77 Strassenberger,78 and others also spoke in opposition to Rau's plan.

The Minister of State Security Zaisser noted on the subject: "From listening to the statements by our comrades, one gets the impression that capital investment in heavy industry not only must not be cut, but, quite the opposite, must be further increased. But where can the resources be taken from? Rau gave no answer on this issue."

Ulbricht spoke a second time, saying: "In my opinion, we should turn to the Soviet government with the request

that they lower the reparation payments."

In support of Ulbricht, the Director of the State Administration for Material Supply, Binz, said: "I believe that we will be able to get out of this catastrophic situation and improve our position only if the Soviet Union renders. us the same help that the USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall Plan." No one reacted to this statement by Binz.

During the break the Minister for External Trade of the GDR, Gregor,79 characterized the situation at the Politburo meeting, saying: “This is not a Politburo, but a madhouse."

2. Politburo member, Com. Oelßner, with whom a conversation took place on the first of July of this year, believes that the Politburo committed a mistake when it announced the Politburo's and Government's New Course program in a very brief form without announcing the reasons for the party's policy change beforehand. In his opinion, it would have been better to put the New Course into operation step by step, accompanying this with broad propagandistic-explanatory work.

Com. Oelẞner further criticized the party leadership for not heeding the signals of discontent among the populace earlier and for not understanding that this discontent could have serious consequences.

In the opinion of com. Oelßner, the measures which are currently being carried out by the party and the government to improve the living standard of the populace have not yet yielded the expected results. The workers, in his words, continue to take a wait-and-see position, not yet trusting the party.

In the words of com. Oelßner, they can take such a wait-and-see position for a month or a month and a half. If in that time the party does not eliminate the mistakes which have occurred, then the situation could worsen again.

In the opinion of com. Oelßner, the admission of mistakes by the leading officials of the party and government had an unhealthy effect. Speaking before workers, they try to admit to as many errors as possible and, to an extent, such expressions of atonement provoke mistrust on the part of the workers. At the same time, they themselves still have actually not recognized the full depth of the erroneous actions by leaders of the party organs in the past. In com. Oelẞner's opinion, com. Ulbricht most of all has not understood the erroneousness of his conduct. He has not understood that as a matter of fact he lost touch with the masses and that his methods of dictatorial leadership were one of the serious reasons that errors were committed. In his practical activity, Ulbricht had not changed and continued to work as before; of note was only the fact that he had become more passive. Ulbricht was still inclined to create an atmosphere of pomp around his person.

Thus, for example, through his wife, Lotte Kuhn, who is a member of the committee organizing the celebrations for his 60th birthday, Ulbricht demanded that a celebration

be held in the most majestic circumstances. At the same time, when com. Pieck, during a conversation with Ulbricht in Moscow, drew his attention to the undesirability of such excessive ceremonies, Ulbricht replied that he knew nothing about the plans being made for the celebration, and that if something was being planned, it was without his participation.

At the conclusion of the conversation, com. Oelẞner stated his opinion that at present there was no complete unity of views in the Politburo.

Thus, he recounted that when he recently went into Grotewohl's office where Zaisser and Herrnstadt were sitting, those present were embarrassed and quickly ended their conversation. Previously, com. Oelẞner noted, nothing of the sort had been apparent.

3. Politburo member com. Matern, with whom a conversation took place on 2 July of this year, stated his opinion that the party at present did not have a really militant leadership and, related to this, that its work was disorganized. The Politburo meetings which took place in June were on the whole-of an elemental and unorganized character. The Politburo made almost no practical decisions. In a series of meetings less than half of the members and candidates of the politburo were present.

The executive party members, including the members of the Politburo, did not have a concrete idea of how to proceed at the 15th Plenum of the SED CC, which is planned in the near future. Up to this point, the fundamental documents had not been assigned.

The secretaries of the SED CC, after the arrival of com. Ulbricht in Moscow at the beginning of June, were not really doing any work; meetings of the secretariat were not being held. Com. Ulbricht had not explained the reason for the halting of work.

Touching on the work of the secretariat, com. Matern stated that, in his opinion, this work was incorrectly organized. The secretariat has been turned from a political organ into Ulbricht's personal office. The members of the secretariat did not take any personal responsibility for their separate spheres of work, but only prepared materials at the direction of Ulbricht and "nodded their heads in agreement with all the proposals of the secretary-general." Com. Matern believe that the secretariat should become the basic executive organ of the party and should carry out all of its practical work. In connection with this, the secretariat should be reduced to be composed of approximately 5 persons who were also members of the Politburo and bear responsibility for precisely defined spheres of work.

Com. Matern pointed out the poor leadership on the part of the SED CC of the district, regional, and local party organizations. The chairmen of the district parties' governing boards did not receive concrete principled instructions from the SED CC. Lately they did not even have the chance to communicate with com. Ulbricht by telephone, since, on his orders, the telephone operators did not connect them with him.

For this reason, the leaders of the district organizations were obliged to deal only with members of the secretariat-Axen80 and Schön,81-who, however, could not give them concrete instructions and usually limited themselves to statements about the fact that they did not know anything and that the leaders of the organizations had to make decisions as they saw fit. At the same time, com. Matern noted, the party organizations, given existing practice, were not versed in independent work.

In the opinion of com. Matern, the party workers had lost the ability to look at life with their own eyes, to take stock of circumstances independently, [and] were afraid to take decisions at their own risk, even if this was urgently called for. During the June events, for instance, not one of the leaders of the local party organizations held a meeting, explaining this by an absence of instructions.

All of this, com. Matern observed, was the result of the defective leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht, whose motto was "No one can do anything without me.”

At the upcoming plenum of the SED CC, com. Matern is determined to speak out, particularly with a criticism of these leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht.

Touching on the disorganization in party work, com. Matern cited the following example: Ulbricht, Grotewohl and Oelẞner, who were in Moscow at the beginning of June of 1953, sent a telegram to the SED CC with the order to take all literature touching on the work of the second party conference82 out of libraries and commercial circulation. On the basis of this telegram, the Central Committee sent a directive to the local party organizations which initiated a mass confiscation of the specified literature. The matter went so far that in the central library of Leipzig all of the works of Ulbricht which referred to CC directives were removed.

In the opinion of com. Matern, the party is at present disunited, once more sectarian tendencies were emerging. Com. Matern divides all of the members of the party into three groups:

1. communists with a longstanding record of service who understand the New Course of the party and support it;

2. young party members who entered the party after 1945, many of whom do not understand the New Course of the party, consider it a step back from the construction of the foundations of socialism and for that reason do not agree with it;

3. former social-democrats, who consider that if the former social democratic party still existed, the events of 17 June would never have happened. Com. Matern noted that he knew of a whole series of cases where former social democrats demanded the party leadership to return their membership cards to the social democratic party. In the opinion of com. Matern, Buchwitz,83 one of the

veterans of the Social Democratic Party, is the leader of this third group.

Com. Matern believes that so far the mood of the population has not changed decisively. One of the reasons

for this, in his opinion, is the continuation of the policy of embroidering the truth by the party. The CC delegates who travel to the factories promise the workers everything they demand. Moreover, every [official] making a report considers it his duty to surpass the promises of his predecessor. As there is still no practical fulfillment of promises, the workers have again stopped believing in them.

In conclusion, com. Matern noted that correcting the errors that have been made and strengthening the party will in large part depend on what position com. Ulbricht will take at the 15th plenum of the SED CC, on whether he will admit his mistakes and find the courage for selfcriticism. Ulbricht's current passive behavior, in the words of com. Matern, does not inspire optimism in this respect.

Leader of the First Chief Directorate of the MIA of the Union of SSR Fedotov

Representative of the MIA USSR in Germany

Fadeikin

5 July 1953

[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 925, II. 156-165. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

[The following excerpt is from a secret 9 July 1953 memorandum from MID German affairs specialist Georgii Pushkin to first deputy foreign minister Andrei Vyshinskii, 85 indicating the measures taken in response to Sokolovskii's, Semenov's and Iudin's proposals regarding the situation in the GDR .86]

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3. In order to create a stable economic situation in the Republic and to raise the standard of living of the GDR's populace to that of West Germany's populace, to examine the issue of halting the delivery of goods to the Soviet Union and Poland and of counting the export of goods to the USSR as revenue for the Soviet enterprises in the GDR from the first half of 1953 with the aim of applying these goods toward the development of the GDR's external trade and the satisfaction of the internal needs of the Republic.

To preserve reparations in marks on the scale necessary to assure the normal function of A/O "Wismut."

The MVVT is preparing proposals on the Soviet Union's
renunciation of reparations

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