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coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the Danube ship industry, the Yugoslav-Soviet Bank, and, in the future, lumber and cellulose-paper industry), as well as for Soviet technical assistance in many branches of the Yugoslav economy (in electrical, food, textile, chemical and metal-working industries, in the production of construction materials, and in agriculture,),33 and for an understanding to follow this with the signing of a concrete agreement on supplying the Yugoslav army through a long-term loan and shipments for the Yugoslav military

industry. 34

With regard to Yugoslav-Albanian relations, Stalin, judging from the records of the meeting, stated his endorsement of the closest possible alliance between Albania and Yugoslavia and even for Belgrade's patronage towards Tirane, but clearly strove to avoid Albania's direct inclusion in the Yugoslav federation. The archival documents obtained up to now do not clearly answer the question whether his arguments for postponing unification until the resolution of the Trieste question were a true reflection of the Soviet position or merely a tactical ruse, in actuality concealing the desire to obstruct completely Albania's unification with Yugoslavia. In either case, as a result of the Moscow negotiations, the question of unification was, for the time being, removed from the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given its consent to the Treaty of Peace and Mutual Assistance and to an agreement for close economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and Albania, notified the Albanian government of its support for the signing of these agreements and “for orienting Albania toward closer ties with Yugoslavia," and facilitated the signing of the aforementioned YugoslavAlbanian documents in July 1946.35

The Soviet and Yugoslav records demonstrate that during the meeting with Stalin, Tito argued his position against a federation with Bulgaria. But the Yugoslav record does not contain Stalin's disagreement with Tito's position, while the Soviet record directly states that Stalin insisted on the importance of such a federation, though he believed that at first one could limit oneself to the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. It is unlikely that the Soviet record would contain something which Stalin did not actually say; thus, in this instance it is probably true to fact. However, it remains a mystery why Stalin rejected Molotov's observation at the meeting that it would be better to postpone the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty until the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. Indeed, Molotov's remark was invariably the Soviet position both before and after the meeting. 36 Perhaps the answer to this mystery will be found in further research.

As for the discussion of “general political questions," mentioned by Tito before the trip, they were also touched upon: during the Kremlin meeting itself there was a discussion on a possible strategy with regard to the handling of the Trieste question in Paris, the current and future status of Yugoslav relations with Hungary and Greece, and, during further conversation at the evening

dinner in Stalin's dacha that followed the Kremlin meeting (and which is absent from the Soviet record but sparsely summarized in the Yugoslav version), among other things, problems of strengthening of the Soviet bloc, relations between Communist parties, the situation in Greece and Czechoslovakia, the Italian “craving for revenge,” and the question of the Polish-Czechoslovak dispute over Tesin (Cieszyn) were mentioned. Judging by the handwritten notes made by Tito during the return-trip from Moscow, the visit also included a discussion of Austria, Yugoslav

a Austrian relations and Yugoslav relations with the other Slavic countries. 37

However, as with much of the dinner discussions at Stalin's dacha, the contents of these are not mentioned in the document.

As for the Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting on 10 February 1948, this took place exclusively on the basis of Moscow's demands. The reasons were Stalin's strong dissatisfaction with the foreign policy moves of Sofia and Belgrade, undertaken without Soviet permission or even in defiance of Kremlin directives. 38 There had been three such moves. The first was the public announcement by the governments of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in early August 1947 that they had agreed upon (i.e., were on the verge of signing) a treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. This was done in direct defiance of Stalin's orders which specified that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty had to wait until a peace treaty with Bulgaria had come into effect. Following a sharp, though not public, outcry from the Kremlin, Dimitrov and Tito, in a display of disciplined submission, acknowledged their mistake. However, in January 1948 two more moves were undertaken without Moscow's consent. First was Dimitrov's statement to the press regarding the possibility of a federation and a customs union of East European “people's democracies,” even including Greece, in which such a regime would be established. The other move was Tito's appeal to Hoxha for consent to deploy a Yugoslav division in Albania. In this appeal, to which Hoxha responded positively, the Yugoslav leader warned of a Westernsupported Greek invasion of Albania, but Djilas later maintained that in fact Tito wanted to use the deployment of forces to fortify the Yugoslav position in Albania, fearing a loss of ground as a result of growing Soviet participation in Albanian affairs. In either case, the Yugoslav move was taken without consultation with the Soviet leadership, which, having learned of the plans to send a division to Albania, sharply condemned such

a actions via Molotov's telegrams to Tito. Although subsequently the Yugoslav leader halted the deployment of the division, high-ranking Yugoslav representatives were swiftly sent to Moscow. At the same time, Bulgarian emissaries were also being sent there in connection with the aforementioned statement by Dimitrov, which had already been publicly condemned by Pravda, and subsequently Dimitrov himself went to the Soviet capital.

As for the course of the meeting in Moscow, sufficient coverage is provided by the Djilas report printed below

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with the aforementioned corrections and additions from mentioned statement to the press in January 1948. This other records included in the footnotes. However, certain prompts the suspicion that the Soviet leader, in speaking of points of the 10 February 1948 meeting merit clarification three federations, was in actuality only pursuing the goal or additional commentary. 39

of sinking Dimitrov's proposal. It is perhaps significant, in The first and perhaps the most important is the

this regard, that Stalin said nothing at all specific about continual Soviet insistence throughout the meeting that the either the Polish-Czechoslovak or the Hungarian-Romaaforementioned foreign policy moves undertaken by nian federations, mentioning them only in the most Belgrade and Sofia without Kremlin consent constituted abstract form. Moreover, he spoke much more specifically serious mistakes, insofar as they might be used by the USA of the federation of Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania. and Britain against the interests of the USSR and the Clearly, only the latter of these was the immediate goal of “people's democracies.” In particular, as evidenced by the his comment on federations, while the reference to the record of the meeting, Stalin placed special significance on previous two seems more plausible as a strictly tactical the fact that these misguided moves might bolster the move, used to camouflage his true intentions. As for the position of supporters of a more hard-line policy against question of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav-Albanian federation, the Soviet Union and its East European underlings, according to both the Djilas report, printed below, and the possibly enabling them to achieve success in the upcoming Soviet record of the meeting, Stalin stated that a union elections for the U.S. Congress and President in fall 1948. between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia must come first, only How much did this contention reflect the actual Soviet then followed by the inclusion of Albania into this desire to avoid an unfavorable reaction in the West? And Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation (the Bulgarian records do was there not some deliberate fomenting of fear on the part not contain such a statement). It is apparent that such a of the Soviets, as a means of precluding any kind of plan fundamentally differed from Belgrade's intentions to attempt at independent action, without consultation with merge Albania with Yugoslavia, and was therefore put Moscow, on the part of Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders? forth as a counterbalance to these intentions. Finally, the At this time researchers do not have at their disposal the Djilas report, as well as all the other records (though the Soviet documents which would provide a clear answer to Soviet record is not as direct as the others on this point), these questions. Undoubtedly, the Soviet leadership was notes Stalin's statement that the creation of the Yugoslavsufficiently aware of potential Western reactions to

Bulgarian federation ought not be delayed. This raises the particular statements or actions of either the Kremlin itself question: Did he really favor such a development, and if or the “people's democracies.” Nevertheless, while

so, why? Documents currently at our disposal do not accusing Sofia and Belgrade of making moves leading to provide a clear answer. After 1948, the official Yugoslav an undesirable deterioration in relations with the West, the version always maintained that Stalin was attempting to Soviet side at the same time considered it entirely accept- force a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation as a means, using able to implement its own plans, which were obviously the more obedient government of Bulgaria, more effecfraught with a potential escalation of conflict with the tively to control Yugoslavia. However, no documentary Western powers. It is sufficient to recall the Soviet

evidence was ever given in defense of this, while historiinduced Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February ography contains numerous and entirely different readings 1948, or (to an even greater degree) Soviet measures to of his statements in favor of a swift unification of Bulgaria limit access to Western sectors in Berlin three months later, and Yugoslavia. 40 which led to the Berlin blockade crisis. It seems that the The third point is, how did the question of the Greek basis for Soviet condemnation of the Yugoslav and

partisan movement come up during the February 10 Bulgarian initiatives was, in the final analysis, the dissatis- meeting? All records note that its discussion arose in faction with the independence of the decisions themselves, connection with the question of Albania. However, undertaken by Sofia and Belgrade without sanction from according to the Djilas report and—though not so diMoscow, although it is entirely possible that at the same rectly—the Soviet report, Stalin began to express his time the Kremlin was genuinely apprehensive of possible doubts concerning the prospects of the guerrilla war in Western reactions to these moves.

Greece in response to Kardelj's conclusions regarding the The other significant point was the question of the threat of an invasion of Albania, while the Bulgarian origin of Stalin's statement at the February 10 meeting of records do not note such a connection. According to the the possibility of creating three federations in East Europe: Soviet record, still prior to the discussion of the Albanian Polish-Czechoslovak, Hungarian-Romanian, and Bulgar- question, Dimitrov was already asking Stalin concerning ian-Yugoslav-Albanian. As of now, historians do not have the prospects of future assistance to the Greek partisans. at their disposal documents which would provide a direct In any case, it is not clear from any of the records whether explanation for this. However, according to all records of Stalin had planned before the meeting to discuss the future the February 10 meeting, in speaking of the possibility of of the Greek partisan movement or whether the Greek three federations, Stalin set this idea in opposition to the question popped up spontaneously. proposal for a federation or confederation of all East

Finally, the fourth point is the manner in which Stalin European countries, put forth by Dimitrov in the afore- raised the question of the importance of signing protocols

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pp. 45-46.

of commitment to mutual consultation between the USSR and Bulgaria and the USSR and Yugoslavia on foreign policy questions. The Djilas report states that this proposal was advanced by Stalin and Molotov within the context of accusations directed at Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for not informing Moscow of their projected foreign policy activities. At the same time, the Bulgarian and Soviet records portray the matter in an entirely different light: Stalin proposed to sign such a protocol in response to Dimitrov’s complaint that Moscow gave out little information regarding its position on important foreign policy questions. Here, as in the case with the Greek partisan movement, we do not have at our disposal documents to determine whether Stalin was actually planning to raise this question, or whether he was simply availing himself of the opportunity provided by Dimitrov's statement.

The records printed below of Stalin's meetings with Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaders constitute an important source for historical study and point out directions for further archival research.

Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute of Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and most recently the coeditor (with Norman Naimark) of The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 (Westview Press: Boulder, 1997).

7 Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation; APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 397, listy (11.) 107-110. 8

“Poslednii vizit I. Broza Tito k I.V. Stalinu" ([J. Broz Tito's final visit to J.V. Stalin), Istoricheskii arkhiv 2 (1993), pp. 16-35. 9

AJBT KMJ, 1-3-b/651, pp. 33-40. Minutes of the CPY Politburo meeting on 19 February 1948 are in Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia: henceforth AJ), fond 507, CK SKJ, III/ 31 a (copy). 10 AJBT, KMJ, I-3-b/651, 11

Kostov's stenographic record, or more specifically its deciphered version in Bulgarian, was also included in Georgii Dimitrov’s journal, stored in the same archive: Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv (documents from the former Central Party Archives (TSPA), henceforth TSDA-TSPA), f. 146, op. 2, arkhivna edinitsa (a.e.) 19, 11. 103-128. The rights to the journal now kept in the archive, including Kostov's stenographic record, are held by Georgii Dimitrov's adopted son Boiko Dimitrov, to whom I am deeply grateful for giving me a copy of the text of this record. 12 TSDA-TSPA, f. 147, op. 2, a.e. 62, 11. 5-35 (manuscript). Kolarov also noted in Russian some statements by Stalin and Molotov (ibid., 11. 1-4). 13 The archive has a typewritten copy. 14 Minutes of conversation of Zorin and Gerashchenko, department heads in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of USSR, with Kardelj and the chief Yugoslav military envoy in Moscow, Velimir Terzic, 23 November 1944. Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, henceforth, AVP RF), f. 0144, op. 28, papka (p.) 114, d. 4, 11. 220-221. 15

Copy of Kardelj's letter to Tito, dated 28 May 1945, AJ, f. Edvard Kardelj, kutija (box) "Sabrana dela”, t. IX (X), No. 9, p. 82; the USSR Embassy memorandum to the Yugoslav government (May 1945) in AJBT, KMJ, 1-3-b/616. 16 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Hebrang on 17 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 26; memorandum "Economic Relations Between the USSR and Yugoslavia,” 22 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 11. 6-7. 17 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Hebrang on 16 April and between Lavrent'ev and Hebrang on 17 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 11. 20-21; Hebrang's letter to Kardelj, dated 17 April 1946, AJBT, KMJ, 1-3-b/623, 1. 1. 18

Hebrang's letter to Kardelj, dated 17 April 1946, AJBT, KMJ, 1-3-b/623, pp. 1-3. 19 The letter still remains in Tito's archive: see previous footnote. 20

Copies of minutes of these Politburo meetings, AJ, f. 507, CKSKI, III/17; III/18. The decision was secret, and it was published only when the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict broke out in 1948; see Borba (Belgrade), 30 June 1948. 21 Minutes of conversation between Tito and Lavrent'ev, 18 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 31.

| Editor's Note: The May 27/28 meeting only lasted 90 minutes before breaking up for an early morning snack. Stalin was a night owl and many of his summits (including the 1948 meeting included here) should be “double-dated," although for convenience, the earlier day is often used to identify meetings. On the abolition of nocturnal summons under Khrushchev, see John Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford, 1997) p. 206. 2 Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju (Josip Broz Tito: Materials for Biography] (Belgrade, 1953), pp. 447453, 497-504. For a slightly different version, in English translation, see Tito Speaks (London, 1953) and Tito (New York, 1953). 3 Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), pp. 114-120 (in Yugoslavia this could only be published almost three decades later: Milovan Djilas, Razgovori sa Staljinom (Belgrade, 1990), pp. 111-118); Edvard Kardelj, Borba za priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957: Secanja [The Struggle for Recognition and Independence of New Yugoslavia 1944-1957: Memoirs) (Belgrade-Ljubljana, 1980), pp. 112-117. 4

Thirty years later Dedijer himself admitted this selectiveness, explaining that this was entirely due to the fact that he was writing the book from the perspective of the Yugoslav government. Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita [New Materials for Josip Broz Tito's Biography), vol.3 (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 283-284, 291-293. 5

While dictating his memoirs, Kardelj asked to verify, corroborate and expand many of his recollections on the basis of archival documents. See Edvard Kardelj, Borba, p. 14. 6

Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavihe (henceforth AJBT, KMJ), 1-1/7, pp. 6-11.

22 Ibid.

23 Memorandum “On the creation of an industrial infrastructure for the production of ammunition in Yugoslavia,” 27 May 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 11. 19-20. 24

Copy of minutes of this Politburo meeting, AJ, f. 507, CKSKJ, III/16. 25

Minutes of conversation between Tito and Lavrent'ev, 18 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 31. 26

Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 29 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 62.

27 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 7 May 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 76. 28 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Kardelj, 23 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 45; also see footnote 28. 29 Memorandum, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 11, 1-3. 30 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Tito, 20 May 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 100. 31 I considered this problem in my “Balkanskii uzel” [The Balkan Knot), in 0.A. Rzheshevskii, ed., Vtoraia mirovaia voina: Aktual'nye problemy [The Second World War: Contemporary Problems] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 96-101. 32 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 22 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 11. 39-41. 33

Copy of “Agreement on Economic Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia," 8 June 1946, Arkhiv Ministerstva vneshnikh economicheskikh sviazei Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation)), fond: Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, 11. 17-19. 34

Negotiations for a concrete agreement were being carried out by a special Yugoslav military-trade delegation which arrived in Moscow in fall 1946. The type and the amount of materials designated for shipment to Yugoslavia were determined by the Soviet side on the basis of a Yugoslav procurement application, the first of which was handed over at the time of Tito's visit. See, e.g., the correspondence between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow during November 1946-March 1947; AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, 11. 121, 125, 132-143; ibid., op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, 1. 23. 35 Minutes of conversations between Lavrent'ev and Enver Hoxha (the latter had arrived in Belgrade by then), 24 June 1946, and between Lavrent’ev and Hysni Kapo, Albanian Minister in

Yugoslavia, 1 July 1946: AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 11. 167-168; and ibid., d. 16, 1. 1. 36 See L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Problemy mezhdunarodnopoliticheskogo strukturirovaniia Vostochnoi Evropy v period formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka v 1940-e gody” [Problems of East European International-Political Structuring during the Period of the Formation of the Soviet Bloc during the 1940s), in M.M. Narinskii et al., eds., Kholodnaia voina: novye podkhody, novye dokumenty (The Cold War: New Approaches, New Documents) (Moscow, 1995), pp. 103, 105, 106-107. 37 These notes, untitled and undated, can be found in AJBT, KMJ, 1-1/7, pp. 51-52. 38 I have examined this episode elsewhere in more depth on the basis of Russian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian archival materials. See, e.g., “The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Formation of the Socialist Camp'Model," in Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989 (London & New York, 1994), pp. 30-39; “The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform," in Giuliano Procacci et al., eds., The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/ 1949 (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli: Annali, Anno Trentesimo) (Milano, 1994), pp. 469-472, 474. 39 Detailed analysis of this meeting can be found in: L.Ya. Gibianskii, “K istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 19481953 gg.: sekretnaia sovetsko-yugoslavo-bolgarskaia vstrecha v Moskve 10 fevralia 1948 goda” (On the History of the SovietYugoslav Conflict of 1948-1953: The Secret Soviet-YugoslavBulgarian Meeting in Moscow on 10 February 1948), Sovetskoe slavianovedenie (since 1992 Slavianovedenie) 3 and 4 (1991) and 1 and 3 (1992). For a shorter analysis see my “The 1948 SovietYugoslav Conflict...," pp. 40-42. 40 For more details see L. Ya. Gibianskii, “K istorii...." Sovetskoe slavianovedenie no. 1 (1992), pp. 55 ff.

For further documentation on:

• the Soviet-Yugoslav split

• the 1956 Hungarian Crisis

• Stalin as a Statesman

visit the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin at:

CAP.si.edu

I. Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946

A. The Soviet Record:

Record of Conversation of Generalissimus I. V. Stalin with Marshal Tito

27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours 1

Secret Present: from the USSR side – [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M. Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrent'ev;

from the Yugoslav side - Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General K. Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V. Popovich.2

At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city suburbs, and which status would be better - along

3 the lines of Memel (Klaipeda, Lithuania] or those of Danzig (Gdansk, Poland).4 Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation showed in the discussion of the question of the ItalianYugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris, 5

Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable.

Com. Stalin asked Tito about the industrial and agricultural situation in Yugoslavia.

Tito replied that all land had been sown the intermediate crop was awaited, and that industry was working well.

After which, com. Stalin invited Tito to present the group of questions which the Yugoslav delegation wished to discuss this evening.

Tito put forth the following questions: economic cooperation between USSR and Yugoslavia, military cooperation, and Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

6 Regarding the question of economic cooperation, Tito said that Yugoslavia did not want to turn to the United States for credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this would be tied to demands for political concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not have the means for further industrial development. The Yugoslav government would like to receive assistance from the Soviet Union, in particular, through the establish

ment of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations. Yugoslavia has a fair amount of mineral and ore deposits, but it is in no position to organize production, since it does not possess the necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia has oil deposits, but no drilling machines.

Com. Stalin said: “We will help."

Regarding com. Stalin's questions, whether Yugoslavia was producing aluminum, copper and lead, Tito answered in the affirmative, noting that Yugoslavia had many bauxite and ore deposits for the production of these metals.

Com. Stalin noted that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had informed Yugoslavia of its readiness to participate in talks regarding the establishment of mixed associations, but no final answer had been received from Yugoslavia. As a result, the impression was created that Yugoslavia was not interested in forming such associations. 7

Tito objected, stating that on the contrary, he had spoken several times with ambassador Sadchikov8 about the Yugoslav government's desire to create mixed SovietYugoslav associations.

Regarding com. Stalin's note whether it will not be necessary to allow other powers into the Yugoslav economy following the formation of mixed SovietYugoslav associations, Tito answered that the Yugoslav government had no intention of allowing the capital of other powers into its economy.

Subsequently, com. Stalin summarized, saying that in this way the Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation was being conceptualized on the basis of forming mixed associations.

Tito affirmed this, stating that he was intent on presenting the following day his proposals, in written form, on this subject.9

With respect to the question of military cooperation, Tito said that the Yugoslav government would like to receive shipments from the Soviet Union to supply the military needs of Yugoslavia, not in the form of mutual trade receipts, but in the form of loans. Yugoslavia has a small military industry which could produce grenade launchers and mines. In a number of places there were cadres. But there were no corresponding arms, since the Germans carried them away. The Yugoslav government would like to receive some machinery from Germany as reparations for the reconstruction of certain military factories. But Yugoslavia cannot by itself provide for all of its military needs, and in this regard, the Yugoslav government is hoping for assistance from the Soviet Union.

Com. Stalin said that Yugoslavia ought to have certain military factories, for example, aviation (factories), for Yugoslavia may produce aluminum given the presence of rich bauxite deposits. In addition, it was necessary to have artillery munitions factories.

Tito noted that (artillery) gun barrels may be cast in the Soviet Union and then further assembly may be done in Yugoslavia.

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