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Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia's water borders, com. Stalin said that, for the purpose of safeguarding them, it was important to have a good naval fleet. You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored boats. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this regard, we will nevertheless, in the words of com. Stalin, help you. 10 Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the
. internal political situation in Albania was unclear. There were reports that something was happening there between the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There had been a report that Kochi Dzodzejl1 wants to come to Moscow in order to discuss certain questions prior to the party congress. 12 Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire to come to Moscow together with Dzodzej.
Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he knows anything about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania.
Tito, appearing unacquainted with these questions, replied that Hoxha's visit to Belgrade was being proposed for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the reply to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej's and Hoxha's proposed visit to Moscow will be examined following Hoxha's visit to Belgrade.
Com. Molotov noted that we were trying to hold back the Albanians' efforts to come to Moscow, but the Albanians were determined in this.
Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians' visit to Moscow might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and America, and this would further exacerbate the foreign policy situation of Albania.
Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of Yugoslavia.
Tito replied in the affirmative.
Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste.
Tito agreed with this.
As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia.
Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania.
Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer
Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done.
Tito agreed with this.
Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a former enemy.
14 Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance.
For example, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries.
Further, com. Stalin summarized the meeting, saying that what the Yugoslav government is looking for in economic questions and in military matters can be arranged. A commission must be established to examine these questions.
Tito informed com. Stalin of Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi's 17 visit to Belgrade. Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the question of Yugoslavia's territorial demands against Hungary (demands on the Ban'skii triangle (“Baiskii triangle," the region along the HungarianYugoslav border centered on the city of Baia.])18 in the Council of Ministers.19 Tito expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's signing of an agreement with Hungary on reparation payments.
Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support these endeavors, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia's primary difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.
Recorded by Lavrent'ev.
[Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 397, 11. 107-110. Published in Istoricheskii arkhiv, No. 2, 1993. Translated by Daniel Rozas.)
B. The Yugoslav Record
Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I. V. Stalin
Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946
27. V.46* 23:00 hours.
[*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.)
Com. Stalin touched on the question of including
Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation.
Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though) with the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party.
[Translator's note: the brackets used in the text are from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by "trans."]
[Present:) Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent'ev, Tito, Marko,
20 Kocha,21 Vlado, 22 Kidrich, Neshkovich.
Stalin: "Beautiful people, strong people."
(Stalin: "A hardy nation."
Stalin (chuckling, ironically): “How is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Shubashich?" Tito (similarly) [says), he is in Zagreb, in the coop.
24 And also Grol. 25
Stalin (similarly): “And how is my friend' [Russian word used in text] Grol?”
Tito (similarly): "He's in Belgrade"...
[Tito:) “We always had measures to suppress them. The parties exist only formally, though in fact they don't exist. In reality, only the Communist party exists."26
Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this.
have?” Tito: “An especially good one. The land has been well sown. In the passive regions27 it will be good. The assistance of UNRRA28 will not be needed. There will be lots of fruit."
Stalin: "Have you sown everything?"
Stalin: "What is your plan? What would you like to raise [for discussion]?"
Tito: puts forth economic and military questions.
Stalin during the whole time: "We'll help!" [Stalin) “How are Kardelj and Djilas?”:29 * Here a line was moved from below where it is denoted by *]
Tsito]: "Well. We couldn't all come, and so only half of the government is here."
S[talin): “The English and Americans don't want to give you Trieste!" (chuckling).
Tsito]: thanked for the support, (said that the people send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, (speaks) of the great political significance (of Soviet support).
Molotov: “But you still do not have Trieste...”.
T[ito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support) is of great pol[itical] importance...
* During the time that Tito [...]*.
ite." T[ito explained where the deposits were, as well as the locations Bora, Trepcha and Rasha31 - and that we have good coal, but not coke for house ovens.
3) M[olotov said that] one of the Italian economic arguments for receiving Rasha is the fact that without it Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand.
4) The army.
S[talin): "This is right, that in the event of war, because of the difficulty of supply, that there ought to be] as much military industry in the country as is possible. It would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the rich bauxite deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging ought to be done within the country.”
S[talin): “For coastal defense, you need to build formations of fast, light, and mobile ships, for Italy will be left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two squadrons)."
Tsito): “... In Boka Kotorska32 ships of 30,000 tons can be stationed.”
S[talin): "These days they build ships of 60,000 tons. Currently we are having great difficulties in naval fleet construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist you with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories. We will also assist you with cadres, who will help to organize officer improvement schools, which would in 1-2 years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the Frunze (Academy]).
Shipments for the Y[ugoslav] A[rmy) will be made outside the framework of trade agreements - that is, free and on credit.
It is very important that you have a naval fleet. We will assist you in the construction of shipyards and bases and corresponding nav(al] cadres.
We will assist you with the extraction of oil. Together with munitions factories, it is important to reestablish arsenals, with which we will also assist you. It is necessary to examine the possibility of constructing aviation-engine factories."
[Further, two lines are crossed out:"S[talin): "What do you think of [doing) with Albania?"
Tsito]: “Sign...”.]T[ito] (with regard to the naval fleet): “We must know whether our border will be along Albania or the coast.”
S[talin): "What exactly are you proposing?"
Tsito): “To sign one good treaty to help Albania - a treaty to defend independence, this will help both in the given situation and with regard to the naval threat."
S[talin): “This is a new formulation, but it ought to be examined and worked out. You worked out a good treaty with Czechia and found a new formulation: not only against Germany and its allies during the war, but also against its future allies.33 But one needs to think about it more and find an appropriate formulation.
Right now is not the time for a federation (not with Bulgaria either). Most important now is the question of Trieste, and this must be decided first. But if you want a
23:00 h. [** Recorded by K. Popovich.)
...1) S[talin): “On our part we made a proposal to your comrades, responsible for eco[nomic) questions, whether you would agree to the establishment of joint enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you decline. Poland, for ex[ample), declined on the grounds that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of establishing joint enterprises."
Tsito): "No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of other leaders - (on the contrary, we think] it is necessary.”
2) S[talin): “...I agree to the establishment of these enterprises as you see fit...”. (M[olotov): “In those fields that are more beneficial both for you and for us...")
S[talin): expressed interest in where our oil and bauxite deposits are located. “You have very good baux
treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time" (at this he chuckled).
Tsito]: "Three times we put off Enver Hoxha's visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agreement with Albania assuring (its—trans.) “sovereignty."
bourgseois) parties, the monarchy and the Bulg(arian]
S[talin): "Correct, but they must be offered help."
Tsito): "We have no territ[orial] demands. Since the int[ernal] politsical] situation has been corrected there, we have dropped our territ[orial] demands in accordance with
[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked
******.]S[talin): “Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?**** (**** Further text is crossed out: “They were trying to visit us, but they do not want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him." This phrase is printed in a slightly altered form further below.) Is he a communist? Are there any internal problems of their own - what is your information on this?”
T[ito): “I did not see Enver Hoxha (sic--trans.), he is a young man, but in the course of the war he became popular...
****** We will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater closeness."
S[talin] agreed. ******
Tsito): "...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as we know, there aren't any kind of special problems.”34
S[talin): “They were trying to come here, but they do not want to send Enver alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to come with him - as some kind of restraint. What do you know of this?”
T[ito): “We are not aware (of this) nor of the presence of some kind of disagreements.”
S[talin): “We are constantly putting off their visit. What do you think, should we receive them? We think that there is no need."
T[ito): “Yes, we can take care of everything with them."
S[talin): “Right now it would be inconvenient for us and for them. Better if we help them through you."35
S[talin): after this, expressed the opinion that something is amiss in the Alb[anian] Politburo.
Marko: "Comrades in the Politburo do not see Env[er] Hoxha as a sufficiently solid party member, and thus they always insist on him being accompanied by Kochi Dzodzej as the most senior party member in the Politburo. At the April plenum they discussed the question of the party line, especially with regard to Yugoslavia and the S[oviet] Union, and ascertained certain mistakes, and excluded Seifulla Maleshov 36 from the Politburo as a bearer of these mistakes. Since then, the leadership has been more consistent.”
T[ito): “We can resolve this question with them.”
S[talin): "Are you currently in favor of a federation with Bulgaria?"
Tsito): “No. Now is not the time. For they have not yet definitively resolved many things: the army, the
S[talin): “Right. If you have good relations with your northern) neighbor, then Greece will also look at you differently... And does Greece raise any demands with regard to Yugoslavia?"
Tsito): "There were provocations against us, but not in recent times.”
S[talin): "The Eng(lish) maintain an army there in order to prop up the reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well.”
Tsito]: (laughs): “We have demands against them: Aegean Maced(onia) and Salonikki."
M[olotov): “Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the Aegean sea.”
S[talin): “Damn it* [*Russian words used in document.) Many comrades have gone to Bulg(aria), but things are not moving, not developing as they should. The com[munists) have influence, but they do not hold corresponding positions in the state apparatus. We should have told them to remove Stainov.38 Currently we have there the Sec[retary) of the Min[istry) of For[eign] Affairs."** (**Russian word used in document.]
[ Tsito]: "I later explained to Rakosi that we demanded
because of strat[egic) reasons and in order to help the Hung(arian] communists, since the reactionary forces were beginning to raise their heads.” S[talin): "And did they really believe you?.."
40 S[talin): "And what further plans have you for tonight?"
Tsito): "We don't have sa plan)."
S[talin] (laughing): "Leadership, but without a state* [*Russian word used in document.) plan!" (laughing).
Vlado: “We accommodated ourselves to meet with you."
S[talin): “Then we can have a snack."** [**Russian word used in text and alongside in brackets an explanation in Serbo-Croatian is given: “to eat something”.]
M[olotov): “If you are inviting us, then with great pleasure."
At the villa***
[*** Russian words used in text with explanations in Serbo-Croatian alongside in brackets.)
S[talin). Regarding Togliatti41: theoretician, journalist, can write a good article, a good comrade, but to gather people and guide" them - this he cannot do; he has difficult circumstances there. Torres (Thorez) and Duclos: good comrades.
42 Jose (Diaz)43 was good, intelligent. Passionaria44 is
Warlike people are trying to draw in the Greeks. 48
“Do you want another war, to have your backs beaten again, to have Slavs lose another ten million? - If you do not want this, then the Slavs must unite in a single front with the Sovsiet Union."
The idea of revenge in Italy.
Realism and idealism of Benes:49 realist, when shown strength, but would be an idealist if he felt he was in possession of strength (this is an answer to Tito's remark: Benes is an English person, though a realist).
“Firlinger will go with the communists."
Relations between Czechia and Poland: Entertaining as a pre-election maneuver; fact is, they did not undertake any dip[lomatic] steps. 51
Yugoslavia is a democracy* (*further crossed out: “new”] of a special type (non-Soviet type), different from all others.
"We are Serbs, Molotov and I ... we are two Serbs..."** [**Phrase composed of Russian words.)
"Slovenian*** (***Russian word used in text.)
[ mercenary intelligentsia.":52
“Tito must take care of himself, that nothing would happen to him ... for I will not live long ... laws of physiology..., but you will remain for Europe..."
»54 Churchill told him about Tito..., that he is “a good man." - St[alin): “I don't know him, but if you say so, that means he must be good. I will try to meet him."55
Let Djido come, so I could rest under his care... “I will cure my migraine under his care.":56
“Bevin - an English Noske":57
Vlado inquired about Marko, and after Marko, about Vlado...
“Berija - Marko - who will subvert whom?”:58
USSR Soviet of Ministers, member of the Politburo, secretary (essentially general secretary) of the Central Committee (CC) of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) (TSK VKP(b)); Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) - chairman of the Council of Ministers of Yugoslavia, general secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY); V.M.Molotov (Skriabin: 1890-1986) - vicechairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Foreign of Affairs, member of TSK VKP(b) Politburo; A.I. Lavrent'ev (1904-1984); Aleksandr Rankovich (1909-1983) - Politburo member, secretary of CC CPY, in charge of organizational and cadre affairs; Kocha Popovic (b.1908); Blagoe Neshkovich (b. 1907), also CC secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty) of Serbia; Boris Kidrich (1912-1953), at the 7 May 1946 meeting of the CC CPY Politburo was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Economic Council and Minister of Industry and Trade (AJ-CK SKJ.III 19) in place of Hebrang (see introduction), the official appointment took place in June after returning from Moscow; Vladimir Popovic (1914-1972).
Only the more important Yugoslav activists who had arrived in Moscow were present at the meeting with Stalin. In addition to those noted above, the delegation accompanying Tito in his visit to USSR included the assistant Chief of the General Staff Rade Khamovich, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Zdenko Ulepich, directors of the departments of the Navy and of Military Industry in the Ministry of People's Defense of Yugoslavia, Srechko Manola and Miyalko Todorovich, commander of the People's Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (state security force) Jovo Vukotich, member of the Union Planning Commission Zvonko Morich, author Radovan Zogovic, in charge of cultural policy affairs and CC CPY agit[ation)-prop[aganda). See Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 2, 11. 169-170; Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (Josip Broz Tito Archives, Be rade), F. Kabinet Marsala Ju vije (hereafter AJBT-KMJ), 1-1/7, L.1.) 3
The majority of the Trieste population was Italian, while the adjoining region (oblast'] was settled primarily by Slovenians and Croatians. Yugoslavia, with the USSR's support, claimed this entire territory, which had been included as a part of Italy following World War I. The Yugoslav proposal was to grant Trieste the status of a separate federal unit, within the parameters of the Federated Yugoslav state, while granting the port of Trieste the jurisdiction of a free port. The Western powers came out against transferring Trieste and its adjoining regions to Yugoslavia. Western diplomats were discussing possible compromises by granting Trieste and its adjoining regions the special status of a "free city.” Later, by the end of June 1946, such a proposal was made by France. 4
Under the Versailles treaty of 1919, Danzig (Gdansk) and an adjoining region, up until that time under claim by Poland from Germany, were given a special status under the protection of the League of Nations. Danzig had the status of a demilitarized free city with its own laws and government organs, while control of its foreign relations and its water and rail transport lines was held by Poland, to whose customs system it also belonged. Memel (Klaipeda) and its adjoining region, until 1919 having also belonged to Germany but now claimed by the new Lithuanian state, was at first put under the control of the Entente, and then transferred to Lithuanian authority under the conditions of the special convention of 1924. It stipulated significant autonomy for Memel in its internal affairs, laws and executive organs, but which nevertheless had to operate under the parameters of the Lithuanian constitution. 5
The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the USSR, USA,
(Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita. Fond Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije. 1-18. L. 6-11. Original. Manuscript. Document obtained and translated into Russian by L. Gibianskii; translated into English by Daniel Rozas.)
According to the register of persons received by Stalin, the meeting lasted from 23:00 hours, 27 May 1946, to 00:30 hours, 28 May 1946. Note by Yu.G. Murin, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), Fond (f.) 45, Opis' (op.) 1, Delo (d.) 416, List (1.) 95 ob. 2 1. V. Stalin (Djugashvili; 1879 (1878)-1953 - chairman of the
Great Britain, France and China was created by the decision of the Potsdam conference in preparation for a peace treaty with Germany and its former European allies. At the CFM meeting in Paris during 25 April - 16 May 1946, where, among other things, the peace treaty with Italy was being drafted for later examination by the Paris peace conference, a central point of discussion became the establishment of a new Italian-Yugoslav border, in connection with the problem of Trieste and its adjoining territory. The Soviet delegation under Molotov's leadership actively supported Yugoslav territorial claims. 6
During the meeting with Lavrent'ev on 18 April 1946, Tito announced his intention to visit Moscow to discuss economic cooperation, and also noted that such cooperation must also include the sphere of military industry.” (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 31.) Yugoslavia, having received from the USSR during 1944-46 large-scale shipments of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and military machinery (including equipment for 32 infantry divisions, several aviation divisions, tank and artillery brigades), had made similar requests previously. Since the summer of 1945, Yugoslavia had been sending requests to the Soviet government for captured factories, workshops, and materials for the production of ammunition, mainly from Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria. The Soviet side tried to fulfill these incoming requests in part. (Ibid., d. 10, 11. 18-19; ibid., f. 144, op. 5, p. 5, d. 2, 11. 44, 46, 4950; ibid., op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, 1. 43.) However, Tito, who had proposed even in January 1946 to send a military delegation to Moscow for the purpose of agreeing on a general plan for the training and equipping of a 350-400,000 men-strong Yugoslav army, tried to get the USSR to render broader assistance in the construction of the Yugoslav military industry, possibly through mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises. (Ibid., f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 11. 19-20.) On April 9, during an expanded meeting of the CC CPY Politburo, the members of the military delegation which was to go to USSR for negotiations were mentioned: K. Popovic, Z. Ulepic, S. Manola, M. Todorovic (Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade), F. SKJ, CK SKJ [hereafter AJ-CK SKJ] III/16), that is, the same people who later accompanied Tito to Moscow. 7
Stalin was referring to the situation as of mid-April 1946 (see introduction). However, following this, the trade delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Trade Petrovic, which visited Moscow during the first half of May, was assigned the task, in addition to preparing an agreement for mutual shipments of goods, of also holding negotiations to draft agreements on economic cooperation, including the establishment of joint enterprises. Thus, these questions were discussed by the delegation during its negotiations with the Soviet partners prior to Tito's arrival. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, 1. 5; ibid., d. 15, 11. 38, 90.) On the question of joint enterprises, there were disagreements, which had emerged already during late April, when separate negotiations commenced in Belgrade on the first of these, an aviation enterprise: the Yugoslav delegates considered the Soviet version of the agreement on this enterprise unacceptable to Yugoslavia. The examination of this question was transferred over to the Moscow talks on the general problems of organizing future enterprises. Both sides expressed mutual dissatisfaction with each other's position with regard to the negotiations on the aviation enterprise. (See ibid., d. 10, 11. 6-7; d. 15, 11. 89-90; Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove SFRJ (Archives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the SFRY (Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia), Belgrade), Politicka arhiva (hereafter ASSIP-PA), 1948 god. F-I, Pov. 1535; V. Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita (New
Materials for Josip Broz Tito's Biography), T. 3 (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 244-245.)
I.V. Sadchikov (b. 1906), USSR ambassador to Yugoslavia from March 1945 to February 1946. He was replaced by Lavrent'ev. 9 On the following day Tito proposed that in order to make comments the Yugoslav delegation should take the draft of the agreement put together by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 119.) As a result, on 8 June 1946, concurrently with the inter-government agreement on mutual shipment of goods for 1946 (Historical-Foreign Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties of the Russian Federation, f. Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, 11. 14-16), Mikoian and Petrovic signed an agreement on economic cooperation. This agreement provided for the creation of eight Soviet-Yugoslav joint-stock enterprises in Yugoslavia: extraction and refinement of crude oil, extraction of bauxite and production of aluminum, extraction and production of lead, exploration and extraction of coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the Danube shipping company, and the Soviet-Yugoslav bank. It also provided for further examination of the proposed lumber and paper-cellulose enterprise. The agreement contained the overall equal-term scheme for enterprise organization, while the actual establishment of each of these was to be formulated by separate concrete agreements. (See ibid., 11. 17-19.) In addition to the establishment of enterprises, the agreement provided for Soviet technical assistance to Yugoslavia in areas of electrical, food, textile, chemical, and metal forging industries, as well as the production of building materials and in agriculture (ibid., 1. 17). Like other documents signed during this visit, the agreement on economic cooperation was not published. The joint communique issued in connection with the visit stated only that “decisions were made concerning close economic cooperation between both friendly countries." Pravda, 12 June 1946.
But the carrying out of the agreement met with difficulties. By February 1947, an agreement had been reached only with regard to the establishment of two enterprises: civilian aviation and the Danube shipping company. As for the others, the main stumbling block was tied to the production of Yugoslav mineral resources: Yugoslavia insisted that the value of mineral deposits be counted as part of their share of the investment, while the Soviet side maintained that the overall value of mineral deposits could not be counted as investment. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16, 11. 75, 109-110.) This was discussed by the CC CPY Politburo in late September 1946, where frustration with the Soviet position was voiced, with some members, as Lavrent'ev later found out, going so far as to compare this to the “capitalist countries'" mining of Yugoslav mineral resources before the war. (See AJ-CK SJK. III/21; AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16. 11. 75-76.) And when in early 1947 the Yugoslav government sought decisive action from Molotov and even Stalin himself for the swift establishment of the planned enterprises on the basis of Yugoslav proposals, Stalin, during a 19 April 1947 meeting with Kardelj, announced that there must be no further establishment of enterprises and proposed instead to assist Yugoslav industrialization through Soviet shipments of complex machinery and materials, access to blueprints and technical documentation, and the dispatch of specialists on terms of credit. (See ASSIP-PA, 1947 god, F-IV, Str. Pov. 125, 1234, 1238; AJBT-KMJ, 1-3-6/639, 11. 2-3; ibid., 1-3-6/646, 11. 9-11.) Yugoslavia agreed, and the corresponding agreement was signed in Moscow on 25 July 1947.