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10 The outcome of the visit was announced in a joint communique: “The government of USSR agreed to equip the Yugoslav Army with weapons, ammunition, etc. on conditions of long-term credit, as well as to assist in the reestablishment of the Yugoslavian military industry.” (Pravda, 12 June 1946.) However, no concrete agreement had been signed at this point. It was to be worked out in special negotiations. Even during Tito's visit, the Yugoslav General Staff forwarded requests, on the basis of which the Soviet General Staff determined the type and quantity of materiel to be shipped to Yugoslavia, and a portion of the shipments began to arrive even before the forthcoming agreement. (See AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, ll. 132-134; ibid., op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, l. 23.; ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 968; ibid., 1947 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 1881.)

11 Enver Hoxha (1908-1985) - first secretary of the CC CPA [Com. Party of Albania], chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania. Kochi Dzodzej - organizational secretary of CC CPA, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs, the number-two man in the Albanian government at the time. In 1948 he lost in the power struggle against Hoxha, was stripped of all posts, arrested, and executed in 1949. 12 In February 1946 the CC CPA Plenum resolved to call the First CPA Congress on 25 May 1946. However, the Congress was not called until November 1948.

13 The memorandum "On Yugoslav-Albanian Relations," put together by the director of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Balkan sector, A.A. Lavrishchev, in preparation for Tito's visit to Moscow, labelled the completion of the YugoslavAlbanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance “useful and important," and contained only the recommendation to avoid mentioning Italy in the treaty, adopting instead the wording from the Yugoslav-Polish treaty signed in March 1946, which could be used against Italy if it tried to "renew aggression." (The Yugoslav-Polish Treaty provided for mutual military and other assistance using all available means, if one of the countries "is drawn, as a result of invasion, into military operations against either Germany, a country which had been allied with Germany during the last war, or any other country which had directly or by any other means allied with Germany or its allies in such an aggression.") As for the “discussion of incorporating Albania into the Yugoslav Federation," the memorandum recommended to put this off, "in order not to exacerbate the international positions of Yugoslavia and Albania." It further specified that it be put off until peace treaties were signed with Italy and Austria, and Albania was included into the UN. “By the same reasoning" it advised to refrain from signing a secret military agreement between Yugoslavia and Albania, and to “simplify the border situation without signing a special agreement, so as not to attract British and American attention to this matter." (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 1. 3.)

In his meeting with Tito, Stalin stayed close to this strategy. However, it is unclear whether his arguments to put off federation for the time being were an actual expression of the Soviet policy or simply a tactical ploy, intended to shield the real Soviet efforts to prevent Albania's unification with Yugoslavia altogether, which later became one of the reasons for the 1948 conflict. As a result of the 1946 Moscow talks, the question of direct Albanian unification with Yugoslavia was for the time being removed from the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given Tito the "okay" for the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Close Economic Cooperation with Albania, informed the Albanian government that it had come out in favor of these agreements and of further "Albanian orientation toward

14

closer relations with Yugoslavia." This had an influence on the Albanian position and in particular on Hoxha, who arrived in Belgrade in late June 1946, where he consulted with Lavrent'ev before signing the corresponding Yugoslav-Albanian documents in early July. (Ibid., d. 15, ll. 167-168; ibid., d. 16, l. 1.) Already since late 1944, the leadership of the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, having come to power, began talks on uniting both countries into a federation. The talks were sanctioned, if not even initiated, by Stalin himself, who at the time was in favor of expediting the creation of such a body. Apparently, he had intended this as a means to significantly strengthen the "people's democracy" in Bulgaria: first, with the help of the more stable communist regime in Yugoslavia, and second, reckoning that by uniting with Yugoslavia a member of the anti-Hitler coalition-Bulgaria would successfully shed its status as a vanquished nation and consequently escape U.S. and British prerogatives stemming from their participation in the establishment of allied control. In early 1945, however, the Western allies, exercising these prerogatives, vetoed the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. And when Stalin in turn decided to have Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for now sign only a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the veto was extended to this as well. The matter had to be put off to follow the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. See L. Ya. Gibianskii, "U nachala konflikta: balkanskii uzel" ["The Beginning of Conflict: the Balkan Knot"], Rabochii klass i Sovremennyi mir 2 (1990), pp. 172-173.

In early 1946, although the peace treaty was still far off, the Bulgarian side began to pose the question to the Soviet and Yugoslav governments of resuming the Bulgarian-Yugoslav talks on federating, broken off a year ago. This was done mainly in January 1946, during the Moscow visit of the Bulgarian primeminister and the ministers of foreign and internal affairs. In his reply Molotov pointed out the importance of holding off on federation and the Treaty of Alliance until a more opportune moment. (ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-1, Str. Pov. 433, 434.) Nevertheless, in April the Bulgarian envoy in Belgrade posed the same question to Tito and Lavrent'ev. Tito, like Molotov, told the Bulgarian envoy that such steps, if taken prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria, would cause harm. Nevertheless, in relating this to Lavrent'ev, the Yugoslav leader stated “in a significantly decided tone that he cannot currently support the idea of establishing a federation with Bulgaria,” as the latter continued to remain a formal monarchy, and in particular because the communist party influence in Bulgaria was "incomparably weaker" than in Yugoslavia. However, certain that Bulgaria would once again raise this question, Tito asked the Soviet ambassador to ascertain Moscow's position on signing the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, II. 39-41, 47-48.) And in the discussion with Lavrent'ev a week before his visit to the USSR, speaking on the agenda for the Moscow talks, he pointed out the importance of examining Yugoslav relations not only with Albania, but with Bulgaria as well. (Ibid., 1. 100.)

The Yugoslav position coincided with the Soviets', as reflected in the MFA USSR report by Lavrishchev, "On Relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria." The report was completed on 27 May 1946, the day of Tito's arrival in Moscow and his reception by Stalin. Its accompanying suggestions for talks with the Yugoslav leader stated that although "the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation would correspond to the interests of both countries," it would be a mistake to undertake its creation, as well as to conclude the Treaty of Friendship and

Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria and resolving “difficult internal-political questions" within both countries. (Ibid., d. 10, II. 13-17.)

15 It is unclear why, contrary to the previous Soviet position expressed in Lavrishchev's report and in Molotov's statements during the meeting, Stalin suddenly announced that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty could be concluded prior to signing the peace treaty with Bulgaria. However, at the meeting with Stalin a few days later, which, along with Tito and accompanying Yugoslav officials, also included the Bulgarian leaders Georgii Dimitrov, Vasil Kolarov and Traicho Kostov, it was decided that the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty would be signed after concluding the peace treaty with Bulgaria. In addition, it was provided that the matter would involve the closest cooperation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. See N. Ganchovskii, Dnite na Dimitrov kakvito gi vidyakh i zapisyakh (Sofia: 1975), vol. 1, p. 220.)

16 The reference is to the regime that appeared in Poland in July 1944 with the arrival of Soviet forces, and which was established by the Soviet Union and Polish communists relying on its military presence. On 21 April 1945, when the treaty between USSR and this regime was concluded, the Western allies continued to recognize the Polish government in exile. 17 Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971) - General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, deputy prime-minister. 18 The question of Yugoslav territorial claims on Hungary was raised by the Yugoslav representatives to the Soviet government already towards the end of the war. In particular, Hebrang, assigned by Tito to visit Moscow in January 1945 (see introduction), put forth to Stalin claims to the region of the city of Pecs and the "Bais triangle." Stalin at the time replied that such a question could be put before the allied powers only in the event that the Yugoslav population in these regions started to “clamor” for unification with Yugoslavia. The question of possibly posing Yugoslav territorial demands to Hungary and relocating Hungarians from Yugoslavia was discussed in April-May 1946 by Yugoslav and Soviet representatives of various ranks. In late April 1946, Tito also discussed the matter with Rakosi, who had come to Belgrade. The Yugoslav leader expressed readiness not to put the territorial demands on Hungary before the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference, but with the condition that the Yugoslav minorities in Hungary be granted ethnic rights and Yugoslav economic interests be ensured in border regions. Rakosi agreed. (See AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p.53, d. 872, 1. 16; ibid., f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, 1. 6; ibid., d. 13, II. 19, 22-23; ibid., d. 15, ll. 39, 64-65.)

19 Reference is to the Council of Foreign Ministers (see note #5).

20 Pseudonym of Aleksandr Rankovic.

21 Koca Popovic.

22 Vladimir Popovic.

23 According to Dedijer's account given in his book, Stalin said this when Tito began to introduce to him members of the Yugoslav delegation, and Molotov nodded his head in agreement with Stalin's words. See Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju [Josip Broz Tito: Materials for a Biography] (Belgrade, 1953), p. 448.

24 Ivan Subasic (1892-1955) - June 1944-March 1945 primeminister of the Yugoslav monarchy's government in exile, signed an agreement with the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia with Tito at its head and took the post of foreign minister within the national coalition government formed by Tito in March 1945. Resigned in fall 1945, stating that his agreement

with Tito had not been fulfilled by the ruling regime. Afterwards lived in Zagreb under surveillance by state security organs. 25 Milan Grol (1876-1952) - during the war, member of the monarchy's government in exile, in March 1945 took the post of vice-premier in Tito's united government. Resigned in August 1945, accusing the ruling regime of being in the hands of the CPY and thus in violation of the Tito-Subasic agreement, and became one of the leaders of the legal opposition formed in fall 1945. Following the first elections to the skupscina (parliament) in November 1945, when the opposition was defeated and was practically destroyed, Grol retired from politics and devoted himself to the theater.

26 Following the 1945 elections, the opposition parties were in effect liquidated, while the parties comprising the People's Front, run entirely by the CPY, began to take on an increasingly fictitious and deceptive character.

27

Regions that do not export foodstuffs, particularly bread, and are even unable to support themselves.

28 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. 29 Eduard Kardelj (1910-1979) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Oversight Commission of Yugoslavia; Milovan Djilas (b. 1911) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, minister without portfolio.

30 Reference made to Molotov's support at the CFM meeting in Paris, 25 April - 16 May 1946 (see note #5). 31 Known deposits of non-ferrous metals. 32 The gulf on Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast.

33 Such a formulation was not contained in the YugoslavCzechoslovak, but in the 1946 Yugoslav-Polish agreement on friendship and mutual assistance (note 13). The agreement of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation in peacetime, signed by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1946 made no mention of former German wartime allies. It stated that the signing parties would render each other military and other assistance using all available means, if one of them “is brought into conflict with Germany, the latter having repeated its aggressive policies, or with any other country which had aligned itself with Germany for the purpose of aggressive action.”

34 Tito was obviously being sly, as evidenced by the following reply from Rankovic, who referred to both the CC CPA Plenum which had expelled Maleshov from the government (see introduction), and the clear criticism by a number of Albanian Politburo members toward first Party secretary and head of government Hoxha.

35 The Soviet Union's assistance to Albania, in particular military assistance using Yugoslavia as a go-between, was undertaken immediately following the war. When in summer 1945, during the first Moscow visit by the Albanian government delegation, the question of arming and equipping the Albanian army was being discussed, the USSR government enacted a resolution to send shipments of arms and other military materiel to Albania "via the government of Yugoslavia," that is, within the context of shipments to Yugoslavia. (See "New documents on the Great Fatherland War," Kommunist [The Communist] 7 (1975), p. 52.) On the eve of Tito's visit to Moscow in May 1946, Kardelj expressed to Lavrent'ev the opinion that USSR trade operations in Albania must be carried out by mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises, once these were established. See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, l. 108.

36 Seifulla Maleshov (b. 1900) - member of the CC CPA Politburo in charge of economic policy; expelled from the Politburo by the CC CPA Plenum in February 1946.

37 See note 19.

38 Petko Stainov (1890-1972) - Bulgarian foreign minister 1944-1946, activist in the union “Zveno”—a party belonging to the Fatherland Front controlled by the Communist party. In early June 1946, during a meeting with Dimitrov, Kolarov and Kostov (see note 15), Stalin announced that “you must show your teeth to the rightist Zvenists" and that another prominent member of "Zveno," Damyan Velchev, must be removed from the post of Minister of War. (See Tsentralen d'rzhaven arkhiv - Sofiia (Central State Archives - Sofia), former Tsentralen partien arkhiv [hereafter TSDA-TSPA] under TsK on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, 1. 134.) Stalin's orders were carried out in both cases.

39

See note 19. Pechui-Serbian name for the city of Pecs in Hungary.

40 Judging by handwritten notes made by Tito upon his return from Moscow, during the visit the Soviet side had discussed, along with the aforementioned topics, the question of Austria and Yugoslav-Austrian relations, as well as Yugoslav relations with other Slavic countries. (See AJBT-KMJ. I-1/7, II. 51-52.)

41 Palmiro Togliatti (1893-1964) - general secretary of the Italian Communist party.

42 Maurice Thorez (1900-1964) - general secretary of the French communist party; Jacques Duclos (1896-1975) - member of the Politburo, secretary of CC F[rench]CP, second in rank at the time. Dedijer's description of the meeting with Stalin on 27 May 1946 states that "the leader" had mentioned a “great deficiency" in Thorez. "Even a dog that doesn't bite, said Stalin, shows its teeth when he wants to scare someone, but Thorez can't do even that..." Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.

43

Jose Diaz (1895-1942) - general secretary of the Spanish Communist party, died in the US.

44 Pseudonym of Dolores Ibarruri (1895-1990), who became the general secretary of the Spanish Communist party following J. Diaz's death.

45 Wilhelm Pieck (1876-1960) - leader of the German communist party, became one of the two chairmen of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) following the April 1946 merger of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Social-Democratic party into the SED in the zone of Soviet occupation. It is unclear who the writers referred to by “F.”

Dedijer's account of the evening dinner mentions that Stalin, in characterizing the leaders of foreign Communist parties, expressed his opinion, alongside those already mentioned, regarding the chairman of the Czechoslovak communist party Klement Gottwald and the general secretary of the Communist Party of Great Britain Harry Pollit. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.

46 The phrase obviously referred to the impossibility of reestablishing the Comintern. Apparently Stalin told the Yugoslav delegation the same thing he had said ten days earlier in his meeting with Dedijer, Kolarov and Kostov, of which an unidentified record has been preserved, written most likely by Kostov. According to this account, Stalin told the Bulgarian delegation: "We will never reestablish the old style of the [Communist] International. It was created with the example provided by Marx, who expected that revolution would take place concurrently in all countries. However, this does not correspond to our current ideology." In additional remarks, Stalin criticized the Comintern, stating that its directives had tied the hands of the Communist party, which “we untied" "when we dissolved the Comintern." (See TSDA-TSPA under CC on BCP, f. 1, op. 5, A.e. 3, 1. 138.) In reality, Comintern directives were issued by Stalin himself. And even following the announced

dissolution of the Comintern in 1943, Stalin by no means had given up on administering via directives to the leadership of Communist parties-only the organizational forms and the concrete mechanism of such administration were changed. Thus, in speaking of the impossibility of reestablishing the "old style of [the Communist] International,” he spoke only within that context. At the same time he discussed with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian guests his plan to set up a new organizational structure for the international communist movement: an informational bureau which would unite a number of communist parties. According to the Yugoslav delegation members' accounts reported by Dedijer, the question of establishing the information bureau was raised by Stalin during a conversation with Tito, and later during the joint meeting with the Yugoslav and Bulgarian delegations, when he emphasized that the new organ must maintain an informational character and its decisions would not be binding on a communist party which disagreed with the decision. (See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, pp. 453, 471.) That the question was put forth in this manner is supported by the handwritten notes Tito made a few days after returning from Moscow. (See AJBT-KMJ, I-3-s/11, II. 1-2.) Most likely these remarks, including the statement that there "can be no talk" of reestablishing the Comintern, were a tactical move intended to help his interlocutors "swallow" his idea to create the Informbiuro (Cominform) as some kind of entirely different “democratic" organ of which they had no reason to be wary. Possibly the reference is to the Greek referendum to be held on 1 September 1946 to decide whether to continue the monarchy, which was a focus of intense political struggle.

47

48 Greece was at the time the arena of a sharp and intensifying confrontation which in the second half of 1946 began to erupt into an armed struggle between the partisan forces and the Greek government, with the former having been created under the leadership of the Greek Communist party and receiving assistance from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and the latter relying on military support from Great Britain and, later, the USA.

49 Eduard Benes (1884-1948) - president of Czechoslovakia. Attempted in the years immediately following the war to navigate between the USSR and the West, but was forced into resignation following the de facto coup carried out in February 1948 by communists relying on Soviet political support. 50 Zdenek Firlinger (1891-1976) - one of the officials in the Czechoslovak Social-Democratic party, head of the Czechoslovak government in 1945-1946, actively supported the communist party, including during the coup in February 1948.

51

Reference is made to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry announcement delivered on 24 April 1946 to the ambassadors of USSR, USA, Great Britain and France, which officially put forth territorial claims on Poland for the so-called border region of Teshinskaya Silesia. The Czechoslovak-Polish dispute regarding Teshin continued for some time following the end of World War II and reached its peak around late April-May 1946, on the eve of the first post-war parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia, held on May 26, a day before Stalin's meeting with Tito. From the record of conversation published herein, it follows that Stalin regarded the Czechoslovak announcement entirely as a preelection maneuver. The question of Teshin was obviously raised by the Yugoslav guests, for even on May 7, in his discussion with Lavrent'ev, Tito inquired as to Moscow's opinion of the Czechoslovak demarche and informed him that the Polish ambassador to Belgrade had addressed him, Tito, with a request to influence the Czechoslovak government to renounce these

claims. AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 77. 52 According to Dedijer's account, Stalin had spoken about the Slovenian intelligentsia with Kidric, himself a Slovenian, using a play on words "podlaya [sycophantic] intelligentsia" and "podlinnaya [genuine] intelligentsia." See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 452.

53 Dedijer's book mentions that Stalin advised the Yugoslavs to plant eucalyptus, as this is the best tree for ship-building, and related how many years ago he had read in a book that this tree grows well in South America. So having received the seeds, he undertook to plant them in the Crimea where it took root very successfully and grew very quickly. Stalin promised to send eucalyptus seedlings to Yugoslavia. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, pp. 452-453.

54

In Dedijer's account of the 27 May 1946 meeting these words are tied to an episode where, following a lengthy period during which the guests had sat at the dinner table, Stalin stood, walked over to the record player in the corner, and began to play record after record—all Russian folk songs. While listening to one of the records, he started to sing along and dance. Molotov and others present met this with exclamations of how robust Stalin was, from which followed Stalin's response about the laws of physiology, which dictated that he would not live long. Stalin added that Tito must take care of himself in order to be there for Europe. And further, according to this account, Stalin looked at Molotov and noted: "Viacheslav Mikhailovich will remain here...." He then proposed to Tito to drink to "bruderschaft" [brotherhood] (and then to all the other Yugoslav guests); they clinked glasses, embraced, and then "the leader" with the exclamation "I still have strength left!" grabbed the Yugoslav leader by the armpits and lifted him three times. (See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 452.) However, the Yugoslav political and cultural activist Josip Vidmar later maintained that, upon returning from accompanying Tito to Moscow, Kidric told of a different scene at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo: it was he, Kidric, who grabbed and lifted Stalin, and that the latter laughed and spoke compliments. See J. Vidmar, Obrazi (Ljubljana, 1980), p. 396.

55 Prime-minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill (18741965), having met Tito in August 1944 in Italy, said this to Stalin during his visit to Moscow in October 1944. In actuality, Stalin by this point had already met Tito in person, when the latter secretly visited Moscow in late September.

56 Djido-Djilas' pseudonym. Stalin knew from Tito that Djilas

suffered from headaches.

57 Ernest Bevin (1881-1951) - one of the leaders of the Labor party and a trade-unionist in Great Britain, foreign minister during the early years following World War Two. Gustav Noske (1868-1946) - German Social-Democratic activist, member of government following the November 1918 revolution in Germany, became famous as one of the organizers of the suppression of revolutionary action taken by the radical wing of the German labor movement.

58 L.P. Beria (1899-1953) - member of CC VKP(b) Politburo, vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Dedijer's account states that Stalin joked about Beria and Rankovic, both in charge of security organs in their respective countries—who will subvert whom? According to this account, also present among the Soviet participants at the evening dinner at Kuntsevo, aside from Stalin and Molotov, were A. A. Zhdanov, Beria and N.A. Bulganin. See Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito, p. 451.

Report of Milovan Djilas about a secret Soviet-Bulgarian-Yugoslav meeting 10 February 19481

Kardelj and Vacaric arrived in Moscow on Sunday, February 8, and until Tuesday, February 10, nobody gave them any news. On Tuesday before noon Baranov phoned to say that Kardelj and the others should stay put, because in the evening, at nine o'clock we would be invited to the Kremlin. Lesakov told us that the Bulgarians arrived on Monday, but stressed that these were "the top guys" from Bulgaria-Dimitrov, Kolarov and Trajco Kostov.

Indeed, we were invited to the Kremlin at nine o'clock in the evening. We arrived punctually, but since the Bulgarians were late, we sat for 10-15 minutes in Stalin's reception room, and when they joined us, we walked in [to Stalin's office].

So, the meeting took place on Tuesday, February 10, at 9:15 Moscow time, and it lasted about three hours. When we entered [the room], Soviet representatives were already there. Those present at the meeting were: Stalin (at the head of the table), Molotov, Malenkov, Zhdanov, Suslov and Zorin (to the right side from Stalin along the table), and Dimitrov, Kolarov, Kostov, Kardelj, Djilas, Vacaric (to the left side from Stalin along the table).

Molotov spoke first. At first, he stressed that this was already a matter of serious disagreement between them [the Soviets] and Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. These disagreements were inadmissible both from the party and the state point of view. As examples of the serious discord he gave three: firstly, the conclusion of the YugoslavBulgarian Treaty of Union- lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the other hand; secondly, the declaration of Dimitrov about a Federation of East European and Balkan countries, including Greece - lack of coordination between the USSR, on one side, and Bulgaria, on the other; thirdly, the introduction of a Yugoslav division into Southern Albania (Korcha)3 lack of coordination between the USSR, on one hand, and Yugoslavia, on the other. As to the first point, he stresses that the Soviet government informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments-and they agreed to this-that one should not conclude a treaty with Bulgaria until the expiration of limitations imposed by the Peace Treaty [with Bulgaria in 1946]. However, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments concluded the treaty, and the Soviet government learned about it from the newspapers. With regard to the second point he stresses that comrade Dimitrov grew too fond of press conferences. Meanwhile, if Dimitrov and Tito make announcements for the press, the whole world believes that such is also the view of the Soviet Union.4

At this moment, Stalin cut in to remind [us] that the Poles who were in Moscow in those days, spoke against [the Federation]. That means that the Soviet representatives first asked them what they thought of Dimitrov's declaration. And they said that they agreed, but when

Stalin told them that the Soviet Union was against it, they also said that they were against, but they had previously believed that this was a position and request of Moscow.5 Stalin adds that the subsequent clarification by Dimitrov (he probably had in mind the announcement of the Bulgarian telegraph agency) explained nothing. Stalin quotes from this announcement that says how AustriaHungary had thwarted a customs union between Bulgaria and Serbia, and adds that it means-the Germans had worked against a customs union, and now we do (i.e. the Soviet Union). Stalin adds that Dimitrov diverts attention from domestic issues to foreign affairs-Federation, etc. .7

Then Molotov passes to a third point of disagreement and stresses from the very beginning that they [in Moscow] accidentally learned about the entry of the Yugoslav troops into Albania. The Albanians told the Russians that they thought that the entry of the Yugoslav troops had been coordinated with the Soviet Union, and meanwhile it was not so. At that moment Molotov began citing some sort of dispatches, and Stalin told him to read them aloud. He asks Stalin which message he should read. Stalin leans [over] and points out [one]. Molotov reads a message from [Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia] Lavrent'ev about his meeting with Tito. From this reading, it becomes clear that the message is an answer to the question of the Soviet government if there is a decision about the entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, and it says that such a decision-coordinated with Hoxha-really exists, that the motive comes from the notification about a probable attack against Albania; then the message points out that Tito said that he does not agree with Moscow that in case of an entry of Yugoslav troops into Albania, the Anglo-Americans would intervene beyond a campaign in the press. Tito, according to the message, said that, if it came to anything serious, Yugoslavia and the USSR would sort it. out [raskhlebivat kashu] together, however, after the Soviet demarche about this issue he would not send a division [to Albania]. At the end, Molotov points out that Tito did not inform them about his disagreement with Moscow. He stresses that disagreements are inadmissible both from the party and state viewpoint and that disagreements should be taken out [for discussion], and not concealed, and that it is necessary to inform and consult. One must be cautious with regard to press conferences.8

Following Molotov, Dimitrov spoke. He, as well as the other Bulgarians and Kardelj (he was the only one among the Yugoslavs who spoke), did not give his reasons coherently, because Stalin kept interrupting him. He said that what Yugoslavia and Bulgaria publicized at Bled was not a treaty, but only a statement that a future treaty had been agreed upon. Soviet representatives affirm that they learned about this affair from newspapers, etc." Dimitrov stresses that Bulgaria's economic difficulties are so serious that it cannot develop without cooperation with other countries. It is true that he got carried away at a press conference. 10 Stalin interrupts and tells him that he wanted to shine with a new word, and that is wrong, and it

is a mistake because such a Federation is not feasible.11 Dimitrov says that he did not target the USSR by his assertion that Austria-Hungary had blocked a BulgarianSerb customs union. He stresses, at last, that there are essentially no disagreements between the foreign policies of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.

Stalin interrupts and asserts that there are substantial differences and there is a practice of the Leninists—to recognize differences and mistakes and to liquidate them. Dimitrov says that they make mistakes because they are only learning foreign policy, but Stalin replies to this that he [Dimitrov] is a senior political figure who had been engaged in politics for forty years, and in his case it is not mistakes, but a different perception [than the USSR's] (he [Stalin] said it two or three times during the meeting, addressing Dimitrov). 12 As to the repeated emphasis by Dimitrov on the fact that Bulgaria must get closer with other countries for economic reasons, Stalin says that he agrees if one speaks of a customs union between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but if one speaks of Romania (later, as I recall, he also mentioned Hungary), then he is against it. In general, when he spoke about such ties of Bulgaria with which the Soviet Union disagreed, most often [he] cited Romania as an example. It happens as a result of a clause about the customs union in the Bulgarian-Romanian treaty and because, I believe, that the joint Bulgarian-Romanian communique calls for coordination of plans between Romania and Bulgaria. These issues were raised at the meeting and often referred to by Soviet representatives. They have in mind a forthcoming conclusion of the treaties between Bulgaria and Hungary, and [Bulgaria and] other countries. Thus, Soviet criticism of Romanian-Bulgarian relations touches on future Bulgarian-Hungarian relations, and, obviously, on the relations of Yugoslavia with Hungary and Romania.

Then Kolarov began to speak. He says about this part from the Bulgarian announcement regarding a customs union between Serbia and Bulgaria, where nobody meant to hint at the USSR, and as to the customs union between Romania and Bulgaria, the Romanians are also all for it. Besides, the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty had been earlier sent to the Soviet government and it already made only one amendment so that an article [on the joint defense] against any aggressor would be replaced by an article against Germany or a power that could be in alliance with it, and there were no comments on the Bulgarian-Romanian customs union. Then a brief exchange between Stalin and Molotov occurs. Molotov confirms what Kolarov says. Stalin stresses again that he is against the BulgarianRomanian customs union, although Bulgarians have a reason to think otherwise, on the basis of dispatches. He stresses that he did not know that there was an article about a customs union in the Romanian-Bulgarian treaty that had been previously sent to the Soviet government. Dimitrov says that that it was the very cause why in his statement he went further than necessary. 13

Stalin says to him that he [Dimitrov] wanted to

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