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imperialist forces. I know, for example, that during the should not remain in such a government any longer and conversation, com. Tito stated: “What sort of revolutionary that they should rely on the laboring masses and resist is Nagy? What sort of communist is he if leading workers, reaction in the most decisive manner. There is no need to communists and public figures were hanged and shot with remind you that from the very beginning, and also his knowledge?"
throughout our entire conversation, we expressed our In light of these facts, we are truly astonished and doubts as to the consequences of open help from the perplexed by the fact that the leaders of the Yugoslav Soviet Army. But bearing in mind that, in accord with government have sheltered the anti-people group headed your evaluation that such help had become unavoidable, by Nagy in the walls of the Budapest mission.
we considered that nonetheless it would be necessary to do Micunovic once again repeated that he did not dissent everything possible in order to minimize harm to the task from our assessment of Nagy. However, it is not necessary of socialism. You recall that we first stated our opinion to create additional difficulties for the new Hungarian that in such a position it would be best of all to create a government and provoke the excitement and dissatisfac- government there in which people who had not comprotion of the Hungarian and Yugoslav population, as well as mised themselves during the regime of Rakosi would take additional unpleasantness in the UN and in worldwide part, and at the head of which would be comrade Kadar as public opinion through certain actions relating to Nagy and a prominent communist who enjoys influence among the his group, by which he meant that at present they are not Hungarian laboring masses. We considered that it would taking part in any political activity and are keeping quiet. be good if this government made a public appeal, and
I informed Micunovic that he would be received at subsequently this was done. We agree with this appeal and 18:00 for a conversation with com. Khrushchev.
for this reason in our public statements we gave full
support to the government and the program which it
D. SHEPILOV. announced. We believed that you agreed with this, that Attested: [signature] [...]
only such a government could once again restore contact with the laboring masses and gradually eliminate at least
the serious [riazhelye) consequences of the events in Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU
Hungary. You yourselves could see here su nas] that in all with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the of our arguments we were guided only by deep concern UCY on the events in Hungary
that the victories of socialism be preserved in Hungary and
that the restoration of the old order, which would have had 8 November 1956, Brioni
far-reaching consequences for all countries located in this
part of Europe, including Yugoslavia, be prevented. In To the first secretary of the CC CPSU,
particular, in connection with all of this we put forward comrade KHRUSHCHEV
our thoughts on trying to keep communists, and perhaps Dear comrades!
Nagy himself, out of this government, in which different We received your letter in which you stated the point
anti-socialist elements were located and which for this of view of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on the issue of very reason was not in a condition to halt the [forces of] Imre Nagy and others who took refuge in our embassy in reaction on their path to power. Comrades Khrushchev Budapest. We understand some of your arguments which
nd Malenkov did not reject these thoughts. On the are put forward in the aforementioned letter, and (wel
contrary, they agreed with them, with some exceptions as consider them logical, but all the same we must sincerely to Nagy. We considered that in this government and say that in your letter we were deeply moved by the lack around it there were honest communists who could be very of understanding of our position and, especially, the lack
useful in creating the new government of Janos Kadar and of understanding of our readiness to resolve this issue in in liquidating the activity of anti-socialist forces. On the the spirit of reciprocal friendly relations, and not to the basis of this conversation at Brioni, we took some meainjury of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sures in Budapest on the afternoon of Saturday, 3 Novemsovereign country. You agreed with us that Yugoslavia
ber of this year. plays and in the future should play a very useful role in the On November 2, Zoltan Szanto spoke with our world thanks to the reputation which it has acquired.
representative in Budapest. In the course of this conversaWe will explain in detail to you here, which circum
tion, Szanto expressed the desire that he and some commustances led to the current state of affairs, so that our
nists, if it were possible, could leave the building of the position on this issue becomes clearer to you.
government and the CC and could find sanctuary in our It is true that, during our conversations at Brioni, we
embassy, since their lives were being threatened by agreed on the assessment that the weakness of Imre Nagy's reactionary bands of rioters. In the spirit of this conversa
tion, our representative answered Szanto that we were government and the series of concessions made by that government to reactionary forces led to the risk of the
ready to give them shelter if they made their escape destruction of the existing socialist achievements in
immediately. We expected that they would answer on Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists
Sunday, the fourth of the month. However, on the morning
of the same day, the Soviet Army began its actions, and our conversations were ended. Instead of that, early in the morning of the same day, on the basis of previous conversations, Nagy and 15 other leaders of the government and the party together with their families arrived at our embassy. When we received the first report about this event from Budapest, we did not know whether the announcement which had been read, which you cite in your letter, was in fact Nagy's announcement or whether it was published without his knowledge. And so, Nagy and his group arrived on the basis of the conversations which had taken place earlier, before we from Belgrade could react to his announcement, for the authenticity of which we had no proof. As soon as we received word that Nagy and the others had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, comrade Kardelj invited the counselor to the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, comrade Griaznov, and told him this fact. Despite the absence of such information, all the same, we then considered that an appropriate announcement by Nagy, if essentially in favor of the Kadar government, could still assist an easing of the situation in Hungary, as we proposed to you. Having not received an urgently requested reply from you in this regard throughout November 4, we refrained from further actions in that direction.
If attention is paid to all of this, then it becomes obvious that only as a result of the speed of events, matters were not clarified and problems were created, which it is now necessary to resolve. We believe that the question of whether our embassy in Budapest behaved correctly or not is now irrelevant, but that it is important that we jointly resolve the problem in the spirit of friendly relations, which we have already restored between our countries and our parties, since (the problem) in the final analysis appeared as a result of our conversation in Brioni, although, because of events which occurred during the night from Saturday to Sunday, things have developed in a different way than we proposed. After this, essentially, only their personal issue in regard to their request for asylum will remain to be decided.
We do not dispute some of your arguments as to the fact that granting asylum in Yugoslavia to members of the former Hungarian government, whose chairman has not resigned, could be negative, and do not think that we do not realize that all of this has also brought us some unpleasantness and complications. As we see from your letter, you have not accepted our proposal that Nagy and the rest of the group be transported, with your permission, to Yugoslavia, and that puts us, understandably, in a very difficult position. Specifically on that point, we would like you to treat the search for a joint way out of all of this with great understanding, since neither by the stipulations in our constitution on the granting of the right of asylum, nor by international custom, nor by other considerations which we cited earlier, can we break the word we have given and simply hand over these people. Here we must especially emphasize that such an action by us would provoke far
reaching consequences in our country.
In your letter you say that this could have negative consequences for our relations as well, but we consider that this should not hinder the development of friendly relations between our parties and countries, [relations) which of late have already brought significant results. We consider that this issue can be resolved in such a way that it not harm either our country, or the Soviet Union, or the development of socialism in Hungary. We consider that the very friendship which exists between our two countries demands that the government of the Soviet Union regard the international prestige of Yugoslavia with great understanding, as it regards the prestige of the Soviet Union itself. If we did not behave in this way, the masses of our people could not understand either the politics of the Soviet Union or the politics of their own Yugoslav government. If we regard matters in this way, then we must believe that with the aid of the good will of both countries it is necessary to find a resolution which would not have a harmful influence on our friendly relations.
Bearing in mind such a state of affairs, it is difficult for us to believe that you, despite this, will not try to find another solution, all the more since we consider that, aside from transportation to Yugoslavia, there are also other possibilities for resolving this problem in keeping with international law, like, for instance, amnesty or something similar. We hope that you in the spirit of everything we have set out will once again examine your position.
In conclusion we would like once again to return to one argument from your letter. Despite the fact that some malevolent persons can interpret our relationship to Nagy and to the rest of the group in Budapest, we want to emphasize that we have absolutely no connection with this group, nor with the events in Hungary. Moreover, we reject the hint about our imaginary connection with the Petöfi club. Yugoslavia exists just as it is, with all its revolutionary past, with all its experience and understanding of socialist construction. If separate people in Hungary spoke about her [i.e. Yugoslavia), that does not give anyone the right to impute responsibility to Yugoslavia for internal events which have entirely different sources and other culprits. Precisely because we saw all of the dangers hidden in the stormy (events) in Hungary, we were extremely restrained and did all we could to act in a calm manner. This is evidenced by the arrival in Yugoslavia of the delegation of the Hungarian Workers' Party headed by Gerö. On the same principle we agreed with you in your assessment of the course of events in Hungary and publicly gave our support to the revolutionary workerpeasant government headed by comrade Kadar from the very first day. Accordingly, if someone now tries to accuse Yugoslavia of the events in Hungary, for which it bears not the slightest responsibility, we consider in such a case that it is in our common interest, and in the interest of socialism to repudiate such rumors. With a comradely greeting
On behalf of the Central Committee
of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia (I.B. Tito)
[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 486, II. 61-67. Copy: TsKhSD. f. 89. per 45. dok. No. 38. Obtained by the National Security Archive and CWIHP. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]
Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute for Slavonic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and has published widely on Soviet-Yugoslav relations.
Practically nothing was changed in this sense by the publication of a collection of documents on Yugoslavia's policies towards Hungary in connection with the Hungarian revolution in 1959: Politika Jugoslavije prema Madarskoj i slucaj Imre Nada (Belgrade, 1959). It was compiled and published in connection with the trial that took place in 1958 in Hungary of the group of participants in the prominent revolutionary events of 1956 headed by Imre Nagy. The publication had a propaganda aim: to disprove the accusations made in the course of the trial of Yugoslavia's participation in statements against the pro-Soviet communist regime in Hungary. Although the collection, which consisted largely of newspaper publications, also included fragments of individual archival documents, as a result of the careful selection that had been exercised in its compilation, it lacked materials which would have exposed the behind-thescenes dimension of Soviet-Yugoslav contacts in connection with the Hungarian revolution of 1956. 2 Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970, 1971). I used the corrected Russian original of the recollections, which was published in the Moscow journal Voprosy istorii in 1990-1995 under the title of “Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev." 3
Veljko Micunovic, Mockovske godine 1956-1958 (Zagreb, 1977); in this article the second edition (Belgrade, 1984) is cited. For an English-language edition, see Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary (London, 1980). 4
Leonid Gibianskij, Magyarorsag, 1956: Hruscsov es Tito titkos levelezese. - Koztarsasag, 1992, 25 szm, pp. 74, 76-77, 80-81; 26 szam, pp. 74, 76-77, 80-81; 27 szam, pp. 29-32; Leonid Gibianskij, “Le trattative segrete sovietico-jugoslave e la repressione della rivoluzione ungherese del 1956,” Storia Contemporanea (Roma), 1994, no. 1, pp. 57-82. I touched on this problem briefly in: Leonid Ja. Gibianski, Witali, Ju. Afiani, Aleksandr S. Stykalin, “Zur sowjetischen Außenpolitik im Herbst 1956," in Inge Kircheisen, ed., Tauwetter ohne Frühling: Das Jahr 1956 im Spiegel blockinterner Wandlungen und internationaler Krisen (Berlin, 1995), pp. 42-44. 5 of the most essential publications of documents, see: “Hungary, April-October 1956: Information of Iu.V. Andropov, A.I. Mikoian, and M.A. Suslov from Budapest,” Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), 1993, No. 4, pp. 103-142; “Hungary, OctoberNovember 1956: From the archives of the CC CPSU," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1993, No. 5, pp. 132-160; "Hungary, November 1956 - August 1957: From the archive of the CC
CPSU,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1993, No. 6, pp. 130-144; A "Jelcindosszie”: Szovjet dokumentumok 1956 - rol. (Budapest, 1993); Hianyzo lapok 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KB leveltarabol (Budapest, 1993); Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956: Az allami- es partkapcsolatok rendezese, az oktoberi felkeles, a Nagy Imre-csoport sorsa. Dokumentumok (Budapest, 1995); “How the Hungarian issues' were resolved: Working notes of the meetings of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, JulyNovember 1956," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 2, pp. 73-104 and No. 3, pp. 87-121. For an English translation, commentary, and annotation of the CC CPSU Presidium meetings on the 1956 Hungarian (and Polish) crises, see Mark Kramer, “Special Feature: New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises" and Mark Kramer, trans, and annot., “The `Malin Notes' on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956," in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 358-384, 385-410. 6 In Moscow I researched documents in the former archive of the CC CPSU, now the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (henceforward TsKhSD); in Belgrade, I worked in the former archive of the CC of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, which now is a fond in the collection of the Archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije (henceforward - AJ], f. 507), and in the archive of the former united secretariat on Yugoslav foreign affairs (Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove, Politicka arhiva (henceforward ASSIP-PA]). I also used xerox copies of some archival materials kindly provided by my colleagues from the Institute of Slavic Studies and Balkanists of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vyacheslav Sereda and Aleksandr Stykalin, the latter of which I also thank for his help in translating documents from Hungarian. 7
See footnote 5. 8 For the transcript of this meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium, see “How the Hungarian issues' were solved,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 2, pp. 82-83. For the discussion at the meetings of the CC CPSU Presidium on 28-31 October on the issue of whether to resort to a repeat operation by Soviet troops or to refrain from this, see ibid., pp. 88-95, 97-102; No. 3, pp. 87, 90. The working notes of the said meetings confirm the circumstance mentioned in Khrushchev's memoirs, that the discussion of this issue in the CC CPSU Presidium was conducted in close connection with the negotiations between the Soviet leadership and the delegation of the CC of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which was in Moscow from 23-31 October to examine the events in Poland and Hungary (see: “Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev," Voprosy istorii, 1992, No. 11-12, pp. 83-84). In keeping with the data published in recent years in China, on 30 October 1956, the Chinese Politburo telegraphed a message to the delegation in Moscow to transmit Beijing's opinion to the Soviet leadership, that the Soviet troops should not be withdrawn from Hungary and should support communist power in that country. On 31 October, the Chinese delegation informed Khrushchev about this; see Chen Jian, “Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," paper presented to the International Conference “Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence,” Budapest, 26-29 September 1996, organized by the National Security Archive, the Institute for the History of the
1956 Hungarian Revolution, and the Cold War International
“Hungary, October-November 1956,” p. 146. 10 “Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev,” Voprosy istorii, 1994, No. 5 (hereafter - Khrushchev's Memoirs), pp 75-76; "How the ‘Hungarian issues' were resolved,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 3, p. 92. 11 On 31 October in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, a telegram confirmed by the CC CPSU was sent from Moscow, in which Khrushchev proposed a secret meeting with Tito at any location in Yugoslavia or the USSR “in connection with the situation which had arisen in Hungary.” On the same day, Moscow was informed in a telephonogram from the embassy that Tito agreed to a meeting and would prefer to conduct it in his residence on the island of Brioni, where he was then residing. See “Hungary, October-November 1956," p. 146; “How the 'Hungarian issues' were resolved," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 3, p. 91. 12 Khrushchev's Memoirs, p. 77. 13 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 157, 164. 14 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-91 (st. sign. 1-1/63), p. 4. 15 Khrushchev's Memoirs, p. 77; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine,
39 TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, 11. 4-5; published in Hungarian in Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 210-211. 40 Nagy demonstrated a decisive rejection of compromise with the Kadar government and the Soviet side, and in relation to sending him to Romania, gave a categorical refusal to the Romanian representative, Walter Roman, who visited him ten days later. Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 195, 285286. 41 Ibid., pp. 192-193, 210; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, 11. 4-5. 42 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 196-203, 230-232. 43 Ibid., pp. 233-240; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, 11. 3-4. 44 On these negotiations, see Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 241-257, 259-275. 45 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 184-191, 195-199, 200201. 46 TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, 1. 4; ibid., d. 3, 1. 11. 47 Ibid., d. 5, 11. 19-26. 48
AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-83; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 4, 11. 24-33. See CWIHP Electronic Bulletin. 49 The available documents so far do not permit an explanation of the extent to which differences inside the Yugoslav leadership might have played a role here. 50 Obviously, the struggle within the CC CPSU Presidium is also expressed here. Its more conservative members, above all Molotov and Kaganovich, in the course of the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, spoke against any even purely declarative criticism of the Rakosi regime by Kadar, and in reply to the objections of Khrushchev and a series of other officials in the Soviet leadership, scared them with the danger of the Kadar government's slide on “the Yugoslav path.” See “How the "Hungarian issues' were resolved,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 3, pp. 111-112, 114-117. 51 The Soviet letter of 10 January 1957, signed by Khrushchev, is in TsKhSD, f. 39, per. 45, dok. 83; AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/192. The Yugoslav response of 1 February 1957, signed by Tito, is in AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-95, 1. 1-35, 58-76, and TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84. See CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.
16 AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 11971-78, 1. 2; 119-95, 1. 7-8,
Khrushchev's Memoirs, p. 77; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, p. 159. 18 TsKhSD, f. 89, per, 45, dok. 84, s. 18; AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-95, 1. 61; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 159-160. 19 Khrushchev's Memoirs, pp. 77, 78; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 159-161; AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-78, 1. 3. 20 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 160-161. 21 AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-77, 1. 1; 119/1-78, 1. 2-3; 119/192 (st. sign. 1-1/64), 1. 3; TsKhSD, f. 89, per, 45, dok. 83, p. 4. 22
Gibianskij, Magarorsag, 1956... - Koztarsasag, 1992, 25 szam,
23 See footnotes 53 and 54. 24 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, III/67. 25 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-78, 1. 3; 119/1-95, 1, 14, 64-65; TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84, p. 21; “Hungary, OctoberNovember, 1956," p. 149. 26 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, p. 159. 27 Ibid., p. 160. See Cable from Firiubin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 4 November 1956, printed below. 28 “Hungary, October-November 1956,” p. 119. Printed below. 29
Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 160-161. 30 “Hungary, October-November 1956," pp. 149-150. 31 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-76. 32 About this telegram, see AJ, f. 507, CD SKJ, IX, 119/1-77, 1. 1; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 171-174. 33 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-77, 11. 1-4. 34
“Hungary, October-November 1956,” pp. 151-153. 35 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-78, 11. 1-7. Printed below. 36 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, p. 190.
. 37 Ibid., p. 191. 38 On the Soviet reply, see. ibid., pp. 194, 210; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, 11. 4-5; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, p. 178; AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-80 (st. sign. 1-1/57), 1. 3.
In the final analysis, three main courts will pass judgement on the actions of our Parties. First of all, the masses, secondly, the communist parties, which in the course of their practical existence must figure out what is going on, and in the third instance, time and
history, which makes the final conclusions.
General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in conversation with Soviet Ambassador S. V. Chervonenko (12 September 1960)
By David Wolff
leadership had moved to seaside Beidaihe to escape the Beijing summer heat. Therefore, Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, joined them there and met with Mao on August 10. In referring to the Soviet Union, Mao was livid.
Khrushchev can cooperate with America, England and France. He can cooperate with India and Indonesia. He can even cooperate with Yugoslavia, but only with China is it impossible on the grounds that we have divergent opinions. Does that mean that his views are identical with America, England, France and India to allow whole-hearted cooperation? [He] withdraws the experts from China and doesn't transfer technology, while sending experts to India and giving technology. So what if China doesn't have experts? Will people die, I don't believe it.
eng may have had something more philosophical in mind, but, his ultimate arbiter, history, is the
daily output of the historians. This section of the Bulletin aims to provide enough archival material for historians of Chinese, Russian, and Communist history to begin a debate on the role of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) in Sino-Soviet relations during the years 1956-1963, a period that witnessed both the final years of cooperation between the two communist powers and the emergence of tensions that finally split the alliance. Although the late paramount leader of the People's Republic of China is best remembered for the tremendous, though uneven, reforms that he introduced and oversaw during the last twenty years of his life, his earlier achievements should not be neglected
Within weeks of the conversation from which the epigraph is drawn, Deng arrived in Moscow for ideological jousting at the highest levels with Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's "gray cardinal.” And Deng always gave as good as he got. Of course, by 1963, when again Deng and Suslov headed the delegations, the level of vituperation had risen sharply. When Deng returned from this last encounter, the whole CCP Politburo, headed by Mao, Zhou, and, Lin Biao turned out at the airport to applaud him, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng.2 Vlad Zubok, in an insightful and provocative introductory essay, speculates that the services Deng rendered Mao in his battle with the Soviet “older brother” may have saved his life when the Cultural Revolution swept others away. Chen Jian's “Rejoinder" only strengthens this impression, while providing a fuller Chinese politics context. Both the 1960 and 1963 talks, together with seven memoranda of conversations between Deng and Soviet representatives, are excerpted in this Bulletin. Additional materials can be found at the CWIHP website: cwihp.si.edu.
The fall of 1960 was a special time in other respects, for the USSR had just withdrawn its experts from the PRC, occasioning bewilderment, hardship and ill-will.3 Although the Soviet Union was well enough informed about affairs in China to sense the variety of reactions, newly released materials are only now making clear the depth of division. Only a few weeks after the withdrawal, the CCP
Ho's reaction was: “That's a pretty strong statement."-4
In sharp contrast to this explosion, four days earlier on August 4, Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, had met with Ambassador Chervonenko and insisted that "speaking as one Communist to another," a full break between the parties was not a possibility.5 But what does this divergence of messages reveal? It is possible that in light of the disastrous famine that accompanied the “Great Leap Forward" and would claim upward of 15 million Chinese lives in 1959-61, Mao had ordered his subordinates to show restraint and moderation in the hope of continuing aid from the Soviets. After all, where else would it come from? On the other hand, it is also possible that the Chinese leadership, influenced by the same perception of China's dire straits, collectively opted for a moderate policy, despite Mao's rancor and radicalism. If this is indeed the case, we will find Deng among the moderates, placating the Soviets right up into 1962, if not further. But only additional documentation, especially from the Chinese side, can answer these critical questions.
The search for a current of moderation in a period usually identified with deepening estrangement in SinoSoviet relations is exactly the kind of refinement that document-based studies of the Cold War can offer. An October 1997 gathering on “Sino-Soviet Relations and the