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9 April 1962
12th anniversary was held in Moscow, and asked that thanks be conveyed to the CC CPSU for the attention paid to the Chinese people's holiday.
The candidate of the secretariat of the CC CCP, Yang Shangkun, translators for the CC CCP apparatus, Yan Mingfu and Zhu Ruizhen, as well as the counselor to the embassy, F.V. Mochul'skii, were present during the conversation.
Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC
On April 5, in keeping with instructions from the Center, I turned to the CC CCP with a request to meet with Mao Zedong, or with a person to be named by him, in order to inform the Chinese side of the negotiations of com. A.A. Gromyko with (US Secretary of State] D[ean] Rusk on the German issue. After a silence lasting for four days, they replied to us that Deng Xiaoping had been instructed by the CC CCP to meet with the ambassador.
I visited Deng Xiaoping in the CC CCP building. In connection with Deng Xiaoping's question about my trip to Moscow, I told him in detail about the work of the March Plenum of the CC CPSU. Deng Xiaoping then handed me a letter from the CC CCP of 7 April 1962, which is an answer to the CC CPSU letter of 22 February 1962.
Since these letters by the CC CCP are long, Deng Xiaoping stated that he would not read it. The basic content of the letter of the CC CCP to the CC CPSU, he continued, is that, no matter what, the CPSU and the CCP must close ranks and, in a spirit of unity, resolve their problems....
Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC (S. CHERVONENKO)
“28" March 1962 and "8" May 1962
[Source: AVP RF. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]
Transcripts of the Conversations (Excerpts)
1 March 1962
At the beginning of the meeting, Deng Xiaoping and CC CCP Secretariat candidate member Yang Shangkun were cautiously reserved, noticeably nervous, and evidently ready to receive a document of a different character.
[Deng said] “...We draw your attention to the fact that your letter talks about the necessity of improving relations with Albania. In the end, the larger party should take the initiative on such issues. Issues of prestige do not exist for a large party and a large country. In the past we had disagreements with other parties and we have experience in resolving them, as we told com. Khrushchev. As we told you earlier, we have experience in relations with Korea. The CPSU has much experience in relations with Poland. For this reason, given a desire to improve relations, of course, a resolution will be found.” ...
The meeting, which continued for about an hour and a half, took place in an even, calm tone. After the Chinese comrades had acquainted themselves with the contents of the CC CPSU's letter, their reserve (skovannost') disappeared; they acted more freely and cordially. In parting with us, Deng Xiaoping said: “Your letter calls for solidarity—and that is good."
Deng Xiaoping. Well as for today, perhaps I should speak?
Suslov. Please, Igo ahead]...
Speech by the CCP delegation head Com. Deng Xiaoping.
Deng Xiaoping. First of all, I want to announce that our delegation at the request of the CC of our party came to this meeting in Moscow of representatives of the CCP and USSR with the sincere intention of removing discord and strengthening unity...
20th Congress of the CPSU, beginning in 1956, at meetings of an internal sort (vnutrennego poryadka), the leading comrades of our party criticized your errors in a moderate form more than once. In his statement comrade Suslov said that we kept quiet for 7 years. There are no grounds for saying that.
In fact, both on the issue of Stalin and on the issue of the form of transition, that is peaceful transition, the leaders of the CCP presented their views more than once to the leaders of the CPSU. And these views are well known
In the past we never spoke about this openly, because we were taking into account the situation you were in. We only mentioned that the disagreements which have arisen in the past few years in the international Communist movement were provoked by the violation of the Declaration of 1957 by comrades from several fraternal parties... We have always considered and still consider that the 20th Congress of the CPSU put forward positions on the issues of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition which went against Marxism-Leninism. Especially serious are two issues: the issue of the so called "peaceful transition" and the issue of the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin under the pretext of the so called “struggle with the cult of personality”...
Here I want just briefly to say the following: a criticism of some errors by Stalin is necessary; taking off the lid, so to speak, and ending superstition is a good thing. However this criticism must be correct both from the point of view of principles and from the point of view of methods.
Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the facts demonstrate that the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin is a serious step undertaken by the leading comrades from the CPSU with the aim of laying out the path to the revision of Marxism-Leninism on a whole series of issues... After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin, the wave of an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign was provoked around the whole world...
The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.
We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the CPSU took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them to itself by means of coercion and even tried to resort to military force. We consider that such a method is
a not only evidence of great-power chauvinism in relation to fraternal countries and to fraternal parties, but also evidence of adventurism.
Following this, the counterrevolutionary mutiny in Hungary took place. The Hungarian events by their character differ from the events in Poland. In resolving the issues associated with the events in Poland, which were issues of an internal order (vnutrennego poriadka), between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, the comrades in the CPSU resorted to coercive methods, even trying to resort to military force.
And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary? The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to
of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and to us. I do not want to dwell on them greatly... After the
Back in April 1956, Com. Mao Zedong stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin in a discussion with Com. Mikoian and also after that, in a discussion with Ambassador Com. Iudin.
Com. Mao Zedong emphasized that it is incorrect to think that "Stalin's errors and contributions are divided into equal halves;” “whatever happened, all the same Stalin's contributions are greater than his errors. One must evaluate it as follows, that his contributions make up 70 percent, and his mistakes30 percent. It is necessary to make a concrete analysis and to give an all-around [vsestoronnaya) assessment."... In October 1956, Com. Zhou Enlai also stated our views about Stalin in a discussion with Com. Ponamarev, who was then a member of the CPSU delegation present at the eighth Congress of our (CCP) party. In discussion with Com. Ponomarev, Com. Zhou Enlai criticized the mistakes by comrades from the CPSU: first, “no preliminary consultation was carried out with fraternal parties"; secondly, "an all-around historical analysis was completely lacking” in relation to Stalin; thirdly, the leading comrades from the CPSU “lacked selfcriticism”. These are the three points which Com. Zhou Enlai talked about.
On 23 October 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again talked with Com. Iudin about the issue of Stalin. Com. Mao Zedong then said that it was necessary to criticize Stalin, but that in relation to critical methods we hold to another opinion, and also have a different opinion about some other issues. Com. Mao Zedong also said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one's own feet (podniav kamen' brosit' ego sebe na nogi).
On 30 November 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again received Com. Iudin and in a conversation with him said that the basic course and line in the period of Stalin's leadership was correct and that one must not treat one's comrade like an enemy.
On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other
hand, was connected with mistakes committed by the leadership of the CPSU in its criticism of Stalin. In discussion Com. Zhou Enlai again set out the aforementioned three points on this issue to the leadership of the CPSU: the lack of an all-around analysis, the lack of selfcriticism and the lack of consultation with the fraternal countries.
Both Com. Mao Zedong on the 29 October 1957, on the eve of his departure for Moscow, in a conversation with Com. Iudin, and Com. Zhou Enlai during the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961, in a conversation with Com. Khrushchev, stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin.
It should be further noted that when the events in Poland arose, Com. Liu Shaoqi, heading the delegation of the CCP, arrived in Moscow for negotiations, during which he also talked about the issue of Stalin and criticized comrades from the CPSU for committing the same mistakes during the events in Polandmistakes of greatpower chauvinism which took place during Stalin's leadership as well... From that very time, you, considering that your internal problems have already been resolved, started to direct the cutting edge (ostrie) of your action against Marxism-Leninism against fraternal parties defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism and began to engage in activities directed against the CCP, against the PRC, and this activity is of a serious character.
What has been done by you over this period? Let us cite some of the facts, so as to make things clear.
From April to July of 1958 the CPSU put to China the issue of the creation of a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet, trying thereby to bring China under its military control. But we guessed your intentions and you were not able to attain your goals.
Following that you started both in statements and in actions to carry out anti-Chinese activities in an intensified manner. You continually spoke out attacking the internal policies of the CCP, in particular on the people's commune.
By way of example one can refer to the conversation by Com. Khrushchev with the American Congressman [Hubert] Humphrey in December 1958 and to the speech by Com. Khrushchev in a Polish agricultural cooperative
a in July 1959.
In June 1959 you unilaterally annulled the agreement on rendering help to China in developing a nuclear industry and in producing atom bombs.
Following this, on 9 September 1959, TASS made an announcement about the incident on the Chinese-Indian border and displayed bias in favor of the Indian reaction, making the disagreements between China and the Soviet Union clear to the whole world for the first time.
In November of that year Com. Khrushchev openly accused China of having acted “stupidly” and “regrettably” in a conversation with a correspondent of the Indian daily “New Age.”
At the last meeting at Camp David which was held in
September 1959, Com. Khrushchev began to preach to the whole world of a "world without arms, without armies, without wars”, (look good in all sorts of different ways) made the leader of American imperialism, considered peaceful coexistence the task of all tasks, and propagandized the idea that, supposedly, the American-Soviet friendship decides the fate of humanity. All of this practically signified a sermon to the effect that the nature of imperialism had already changed, that MarxismLeninism was already obsolete.
During this very period you started to propagandize the so called “spirit of Camp David" everywhere. Incidentally, Eisenhower did not recognize the existence of any "spirit of Camp David".
During this very period you, counting on some "spirit of Camp David,” clutched at the straw extended by Eisenhower and began mounting attacks upon China in your statements without restraint.
On 30 September 1959, in his speech at a banquet held by us on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the creation of the PRC, Com. Khrushchev stated that one must not test the firmness of a capitalist power with force.
On 6 October 1959 in his speech in Vladivostok, Com. Khrushchev stated that allegedly we were looking for war, like cocks for a fight (kak petukhi k drake).
On 31 October 1959 in his report to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Com. Khrushchev said that some, similarly to Trotskii, want “neither war nor peace.” On 1 December 1959 in his speech at the 7th Congress of
1 the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, Com. Khrushchev demanded “a checking of watches.” In that same speech he stated that "if the leadership of this or that country becomes conceited, then that can play into the hands of the enemy."
In February 1960 during the meeting of the Political Consultative Council of the participating countries of the Warsaw Pact, Com. Khrushchev spoke rudely using an expression like "old galoshes." Meanwhile, the CC CPSU in its oral presentation to the CC CCP accused China of committing such mistakes as a “narrowly-nationalist approach," and of acting on "narrowly-nationalist interests," in relation to the issues of the Indian-Chinese border.
The sense of all these statements and speeches is understood by you and by us, and also by our enemies... In such circumstances we could not remain silent any longer. We published three articles"Long live Leninism!" and others, in which we defended Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration, and exposed some revisionist and opportunist views to criticism. But in these three articles, we as before directed the brunt of our struggle for the most part against imperialism and Yugoslavian revisionism without open criticism of comrades from the CPSU.
Following this, such events occurred as the intrusion of the American “U-2" plane into the USSR's airspace, the collapse of the meeting of the heads of government of the four powers in Paris and the collapse of the entirely non
existent so-called “spirit of Camp-David.” All of this proved the error of the views of our comrades from the
You failed to consult with fraternal countries on such CPSU and the correctness of our views...
an important issue. You daily speak about the danger of In June 1960 in Bucharest, the leadership of the CPSU thermonuclear war. But in the given case you rashly mounted a sudden attack on the CCP, disseminated the played with nuclear weapons. Informational Note of the CC of the CPSU which contains You justify your actions by saying that you wanted to an all-around attack on the CCP, and organized a campaign obtain some sort of promise" from the USA, and you say by a whole group of fraternal parties against us...
that you truly received such a “promise.” On 16 July 1960 the Soviet side unilaterally decided But what are the facts? The facts are that under threat to withdraw between 28 July and 1 September over 1,300 from the United States you were obliged to remove your Soviet specialists working in China. Over 900 specialists missiles. By all sorts of means you tried to convince Cuba were recalled from [extended] business trips and contracts to agree to so-called "international inspection,” which and agreements were broken...
encroaches upon their sovereignty and constitutes interferOn 25 August 1962, the Soviet government informed ence in their internal affairs. Besides that, you also China that it was ready to conclude an agreement with the conduct propaganda among the peoples of the world, USA on the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear convincing them to believe in some sort of promise by weapons. In our view, you were pursuing an unseemly Kennedy, and thereby you adorn (priukrashivaete] goal in coming to such an agreement, namely: to bind American imperialism. China by the hands and feet through an agreement with the In his letters to Kennedy of the 27 and 28 October USA.
1962, Com. Khrushchev wrote: “You are working toward After India started a major attack on the border the preservation of peace” and “I express my satisfaction regions of China in October 1962, the Soviet Union began and recognition of your manifestation of a sense of to supply India with even larger quantities of military moderation and an understanding of the responsibility materiel, to do its utmost to give [India] an economic which now rests on you for the preservation of peace in the blood transfusion, to support Nehru by political means, whole world.” and to spur him on to the struggle against China.
But the question remains did the USA in the end give Your position on the issues of the Indian-Chinese some sort of promise? Let us look at [US Secretary of border conflict received praise from the USA. The U.S. State Dean] Rusk's statement of 11 January 1963. Rusk Assistant Secretary of State (Averell] Harriman, said: “I stated: “To whatever extent President Kennedy took on consider that the maintenance of relations that are as obligations not to encroach on Cuba at the moment of the friendly as possible between India and Moscow serves its Cuban crisis, these obligations have not come into force.” own interests well and also serves our interests well." He further said: “In general no such obligations exist.”... Harriman made this statement on 9 December 1962.
At the Congresses of these parties another strange Further, on 18 December 1962 in conversation with a phenomenon was observed: on the one hand at these Japanese correspondent, Harriman also stated that the USA Congresses they attacked the CCP and completely rewanted to see the Soviet Union help India in the matter of moved the Albanian Workers' Party, and on the other hand, supporting its defense capabilities.
they forcibly dragged the Titoist clique in Yugoslavia into On the issue of Chinese-Indian relations you went too the ranks of the international communist movement and far. With all (bad) intention, you spoke out together with tried to rehabilitate that clique. In addition, at the ConKennedy and Nehru against China. Where then did the gress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, there was spirit of proletarian internationalism, which existed under noise, whistling, and stamping right at the time when our Lenin and Stalin, go?
representative subjected Yugoslav revisionism to criticism In October 1962 there was a crisis in the region of the on the basis of the Moscow Declaration by citing the Caribbean Sea. During these events we consider that you Moscow Declaration verbatim. committed two errors: in shipping the missiles to Cuba you What do the facts we have cited above, which took indulged in adventurism, and then, showing confusion in place after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, testify to? the face of nuclear blackmail from the USA, you capitu- These facts testify to the fact that comrades from the lated.
CPSU have taken further steps to create a split in the ranks People understandably [zakonno) ask why you began
of the international communist movement, and, moreover, to ship missiles to Cuba. In this regard we have our own have done so in an increasingly sharp, increasingly experience. Judging by our experience, your actions in extreme form, in an increasingly organized (way), on an this regard remind us in their character of your efforts to increasingly large scale, trying, come what may, to crush develop a long-wave radar station and a joint fleet in
others. China. For Cuba's defense no missiles are necessary at all. I would like to note that using such methods is a And so, in shipping missiles to Cuba, did you want to help habitual affair for you. You began using such methods as her or to ruin her? We have become suspicious that you, in far back as the Bucharest conference. During the bilateral shipping missiles to Cuba, were trying to place her under meeting between the representatives of our two parties in
1960, I said that it was fortunate that Com. Peng Zhen went to the Bucharest meeting; he weighs approximately 80 kilograms, and for that reason he endured; if I had gone, and I weigh only a bit over 50 kilograms, I could not have endured. After that it was just as well that Com. Wu Xiuquan, who weighs more than 70 kilograms, went to the GDR, and was able to endure. Frankly speaking, such methods do not help matters. You cannot prove by such methods that you are in the right; you cannot prove that the truth is on your side. Quite the opposite; the use of such methods is an insult to the glorious Marxist-Leninist party.
Ponomarev. And Com. Grishin weighs 70 kg. After all, this started before Bucharest, in Beijing. That was the start of and the reason for the Bucharest Conference.
Deng Xiaoping. I understand you.
Peng Zhen. Wait. You will have (your) time; you will be able to say as much as you want then. We are ready to hear you out...
Deng Xiaoping. I have already taken 5 hours in my statement, and on that I end it. Are we going to continue the session today, or will we continue it tomorrow?
Suslov. We propose a break until the day after tomorrow, at 10 AM. We must acquaint ourselves with your statement.
Deng Xiaoping. We agree. Who will speak the day after tomorrow, you or we?
Suslov. By the order it will be our turn.
Deng Xiaoping. That is Com. Andropov's invention [izobretenie)...
unequal rights in the relations between socialist countries which took place during that period by the fault of Stalin. How could the 20th Congress, which abolished these elements of unequal rights and fully restored the principle of respecting national sovereignty, be reason for dissatisfaction on the part of the Hungarian people?
You are now trying to accumulate capital by speculating on these events and by proving that allegedly the Soviet Union committed errors, and that by your interference you almost managed to save the situation.
This is a strange and monstrous accusation to lay at the feet of the CPSU and a more than strange pretension (pretenzija) on the part of the Chinese leaders. Did our country not pay with thousands of its sons' lives in order to preserve the socialist order in fraternal Hungary; did it not come to the aid of the friendly Hungarian people in its difficult hour?...
Throughout the whole period of existence of the PRC, the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet government invariably gave help to China in creating and strengthening the defense of the country. The 24 defense enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union were the basis for the creation of corresponding branches of Chinese industry. Another 33 defense enterprises are being built. At one time, 60 infantry divisions were equipped with arms and military-technical property supplied from the USSR, and from 1955-1956 the modernization of the Chinese army with more modern types of armaments and materiel was carried out. In past years our country has given the PRC a large quantity of technical and technological documentation by which China was able to organize the production of MIG-17, MIG-19, MIG-21-F, and TU-16 airplanes, MI-4 helicopters, air-to-air," "ground-to-air," "ground-to-ground," "air-to-ground," and “ship-to-ground" missiles, naval materiel, submarines, and cutters of various types. The Soviet Union helped the PRC develop the basis for a nuclear industry...
Several words on the issue you raised about the socalled "joint construction of a naval fleet.” Com. Deng Xiaoping stated that apparently our party tried to stick China with the joint construction of a naval fleet and that by doing so we allegedly encroached upon the sovereignty of the PRC. Com. Deng Xiaoping, after all you were present at the discussion between Com. Khrushchev and Com. Mao Zedong on 31 July 1958 and took part in it. Have you really forgotten the following statement made by Com. Khrushchev in the course of the conversation. “Never have we at the CC of the CPSU even had the thought of jointly building a fleet. You know my point of view. During Stalin's reign I was against the “joint companies (smeshannve obshchestva)." Later, N.S. Khrushchev announced: “We considered it necessary to talk about the issue of building a fleet, but we neither thought about or considered it necessary to construct a joint factory or a joint fleet.” In response to this Com. Mao Zedong stated that: “If it is so, then all the dark clouds have dispersed.” There is no issue, but you have
Suslov. Again, as in 1960, you are putting in motion the practice, which has already been condemned by communist parties, of personal attacks on Com. N.S. Khrushchev. Such a practice in the past did not provoke anything but indignation in any true communist, and will do the same now.
Com. N.S. Khrushchev is our recognized leader. Reflecting the collective will of the CC CPSU, he has gained unlimited authority for himself in our party, in the country, in the whole world through his selfless devotion to Marxism-Leninism and through his truly titanic struggle to build communism in the USSR, to preserve peace in the whole world in defense of the interests of all working people...
For obviously demagogic ends you are trying to connect the decisions of the 20th Congress with the wellknown events in Poland and also with the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary in 1956... We do not plan to examine these issues anew. We will simply note the complete groundlessness of your assertions to the effect that the decisions of the 20th Congress led to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary. One of the reasons for those events, as is shown by materials of the fraternal parties, comes from the errors of the previous leadership of Hungary connected with Stalin's actions: elements of