網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

July 13

Suslov. Com. Ponomarev will speak today for our delegation.

Speech by the representative of the CPSU Com. B. N. Ponomarev:

brought it up again today. What do you need it for?...

We would also like to remind our forgetful Chinese comrades about some facts and about the assistance the USSR has given to the economic development of the PRC. Do not the 198 modern industrial enterprises built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the scientificresearch institutes which it set up, and the technical cadres trained in the USSR, bear witness to the commitment by the CPSU to fraternal friendship with People's China? Up until 1959 almost a half of all the cast iron was produced, more than half of all the steel was smelted, and more than half of the rolled iron was made in the metallurgical enterprises constructed in China with help from the USSR. Such new branches of industry as the automobile, the tractor, and the aviation industry have been developed in China with the help of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union gave the PRC 21 thousand sets of scientifictechnical documentation, including more than 1400 plans of whole enterprises...

Deng Xiaoping. Perhaps tomorrow we rest for a day? The day after tomorrow we will speak according to his principle. (He turns to Com. Andropov).

Suslov. Fine, until ten o'clock, yes?
Deng Xiaoping. Fine, we agree...

July 12

יל

Deng Xiaoping. Under the influence of your unrevolutionary line on peaceful transition, the People's Socialist Party of Cuba at one time fell to attacking the armed struggle led by Com. Fidel Castro, calling it "putschism,” “adventurism," and "terrorism.” It accused Com. Castro of the fact that the armed struggle led by him was a “total mistake” (sploshnaya oshibka], "caused by a petty-bourgeois nature, and that its leaders do not rely on the masses.” It even openly demanded of Com. Castro that he renounce “putschistic activities,” and “the erroneous path of armed struggle, leading to a rupture with the people."

Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Algerian communist party from 1957 fully renounced armed struggle and, moreover, began to propagandize the “danger” of national-liberationist war, advocating the attainment of independence through compromise, and in doing so fully wasted its place in the political life of the country.

. Under the influence of your un-revolutionary line on peaceful transition, the Communist party of Iraq renounced the correct line, which it at one time had implemented, and began dreaming about the realization of a peaceful transition in Iraq. This led revolution in Iraq to serious failures and to defeat. During the counterrevolutionary coup of 8 February 1963 the Communist Party of Iraq found itself in a condition of complete unpreparedness and suffered heavy losses...

Comrades, yesterday we heard the second address by the head of the Chinese delegation. Our delegation cannot hide the fact that we came out of the meeting feeling deep sorrow and distress. Of course, this was not because the address allegedly contained criticism, which is what Deng Xiaoping had in mind when he talked about “bitter, but necessary medicine.” We communists are steadfast people, and more than once have come across not only groundless criticism, but also malicious slander.

No, that was not what left us with a bitter taste. The second address by Com. Deng Xiaoping confirmed our worst fears, formed toward the end of his first speech. It is becoming clearer and clearer that the delegation of the CC of the CCP came here not to find agreement and to eliminate our differences. Your design, evidently, is different — to bring a whole load of dirt (privezti...tselyi voz griazi) to Moscow, to dump it on us, to do everything, not shying away from any tactics (ne stesniaias' v sredstvakh), to defame the policies of the CPSU and thereby further worsen the relations between our two parties and countries...

Ponomarev. Fabrication Number 4. You fabricated an undoubted falsehood to the effect that the USSR did not aid the Algerian people's war of liberation. Here are the facts. In the most decisive period of the war, from 19601962, we supplied free to the People's Liberation Army of Algeria 25 thousand rifles, 21 thousand machine guns and sub-machine guns, 1300 howitzers, cannons and mortars, many tens of thousands of pistols and other weapons. Over 5 million rubles' worth of clothes, provisions and medical supplies were supplied to Algeria by Soviet social organizations alone. Hundreds of wounded from the Algerian Liberation Army were saved and treated in the Soviet Union. Soviet wheat, sugar, butter, conserves, condensed milk, etc., streamed into Algeria.

Finally, Fabrication Number 5. You again and again repeat your lying version of Soviet policy towards Poland, Hungary and Cuba. Who are you (to set yourselves up) as judges in these matters, if the party and governmental leaders of these three countries fully, decisively and publicly for the whole world reject your insinuations and declare to you that it is impermissible for representatives of a communist party to try and split the USSR, Poland and Hungary through fabrications? Com. Fidel Castro in speeches in the USSR and on returning (to Cuba] clearly described the internationalist policies of the CPSU. By the way, why didn't you publish these speeches? They would have shown the Chinese people that your position during the Caribbean crisis [Ed. note. This is what the Russians

call the Cuban Missile Crisis.) was erroneous and contradicted the interests of the Cuban, Soviet and Chinese peoples...

Andropov. As for you, you long ago ceased any sort of consultation with us. In 1958, the Chinese side did not inform us in a timely fashion about its intentions to carry out the shelling of the coastal islands in the Taiwan straits which was carried out soon after Com. N.S. Khrushchev left Beijing. According to the later admission of Com. Mao Zedong, during Com. N.S. Khrushchev's presence in Beijing the Chinese comrades had already decided on this operation and had prepared it, but you did not consider it necessary to inform the Soviet government about it. Despite this, during a dark hour for the Chinese government, the head of the Soviet government informed the US President Eisenhower that an attack on China would be taken as an attack on the Soviet Union.

Over the last several years the government of the PRC has completely failed to inform the government of the USSR about the Chinese-American negotiations that have been going on since 1955 at the ambassadorial level in Warsaw. Judging by the press reports, over 100 meetings were held there. Since May 1958 you have twice sharply changed your political course on relations with Japan, and, in both cases, despite the Treaty of 1950, you

did so without consulting with us...

Kang Sheng. In your criticism of Stalin, you do not take the position of seeking the truth and do not use methods of scientific analysis, but resort to demagogy, slanders and abusive language.

Comrades from the CPSU call Stalin “a murderer,” “a criminal,” “a bandit,” “a gambler," "a despot like Ivan the Terrible," "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia," "a fool," "shit," "an idiot" (ubiitsa, ugolovnik, bandit, igrok, despot tipa Ivana Groznogo, samyi bol'shoi diktator v istorii Rossii, durak, govno, idiot).

All of these curses and swear words came from the mouth of Com. N.S. Khrushchev.

Trying to justify Com. N.S. Khrushchev, in your address of 10 July you stated that allegedly he gave Stalin an "objective and all-around assessment," that allegedly he adhered to the "heart of the matter" (printsipial noe otnoshenie). Is this not the same as telling cock-and-bull stories with your eyes shut (nesti nebylitsy s zakrytymi glazami)?

Frankly speaking, we cannot understand at all why the leadership of the CPSU feels such a fierce hatred for Stalin, why it uses every kind of the most malicious abuse, why it attacks him with more hatred then it shows its enemies?

From your statements it emerges that allegedly the great Soviet people lived for thirty years under the tyranny of "the greatest dictator in the history of Russia." Can it really be that such a great leader who for many years enjoyed the general recognition of the Soviet people really turned out to be “the greatest dictator in the history of Russia?" Can it really be that the experience of the first

state in the world to be a dictatorship of the proletariat, which the Soviet people shared with the peoples of the whole world, has been the Soviet people's experience of existence in the conditions of tyranny under some "dictator?”

From what you have said it appears as if the first socialist country in the world was built thanks to the fact that a “fool” headed the leadership. Can it really be that the achievements of the national economy and the development of the latest technology in the Soviet Union during several decades have been attained under the leadership of some sort of “fool?” Can it really be that the basis for the development of nuclear weapons and missile technology in the Soviet Union has been laid down under the leadership of some sort of "fool''?

From what you have said it appears as if the Supreme Commander of the great Soviet Army turns out to have been some sort of “idiot.” Can it really be that the great victory of the Soviet Army during World War II was won under the command of some sort of “idiot”?

From what you have said it appears as if the great CPSU was in the position of having some sort of “bandit" at the head of its leadership for 30 years. Can it really be that the CPSU which for a long time had the love and respect of the revolutionary peoples of the whole world had a “bandit” as its great leader for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the ranks of the international communist movement which grew and became stronger from year to year were under the leadership of some sort of “shit.” Can it really be that communists of all countries considered some sort of “shit" to be their flag-bearer for several decades?

From what you have said it appears as if the great proletarian leader for whom imperialists and reactionaries of different countries felt fierce hatred for a long time has turned out to be all-in-all some sort of "gambler.” Can it really be that the Soviet people and the revolutionary peoples of all countries struggling against imperialism and reaction considered their teacher some sort of “gambler”'?...

Comrades, you, so to speak, having picked up the stone, have thrown it on your own feet. How can you treat Stalin in such a way? Your actions in this regard not only go counter to historical reality, but also put you in a very awkward position.

In depicting Stalin as such a bad man, you also blacken the entire leadership of the Soviet state and the CPSU; and, at the same time, as comrades who then took part in the leadership of the state and the party, you cannot justify yourselves by saying that you do not carry your portion of responsibility for the "crimes" you talk about.

Let us take, for example, Com. Khrushchev. He heaped all of the errors of the period of Stalin's leadership, especially the excesses committed on the issue of counterrevolutionary elements, on Stalin alone while he presented himself as being completely clean. Can this really convince people? If the memory of men is not too short,

views by both sides in this circle where the representatives of the two parties have been meeting is very useful for mutual understanding, for gradually finding a common language, for searching out a way to eliminate disagreements and strengthen cohesion. For that reason we consider that it serves as a good start...our delegation is introducing a proposal temporarily to adjourn the current meeting; the representatives of the CCP and the CPSU, both sides, can continue their meeting at another time. The time and place of the next meeting will be set through a consultation between the Central Committees of our two parties...

Our delegation once again expresses the sincere hope of our party that we and you will not spare our efforts towards an all-around, repeated, and most careful discussion of the disagreements existing between our parties. If a single meeting is not enough for this, it is possible to hold a second meeting, and if two meetings do not suffice, a third can be held...

20 July

they will be able to recall that during Stalin's leadership Com. Khrushchev more than once extolled Stalin and the policy he was then carrying out of struggling with counterrevolutionary elements.

Com. Khrushchev constantly praised Stalin, calling him “a close friend and comrade-in-arms of Lenin,” “a very great genius, teacher, great leader of humanity," "a great marshal of victories,” “a friend of peoples in his simplicity," "one's own father” [rodnoi otets) and so on and so on.

On 6 June 1937 in his report at the 5th party conference of the Moscow oblast', Com. Khrushchev said: "Our party will mercilessly crush the band of betrayers and traitors, will wipe all the Trotskyist-rightist carrion from the face of the earth... The guarantee is the unshakable leadership of our CC, the unshakable leadership of our great leader, Com. Stalin... We will annihilate our enemies without a trace to the last one and will scatter their ashes in the wind.”

Later, for example on 8 June 1938, while speaking at the 4th party conference of the Kiev oblast', Com. Khrushchev said: “Yakiry, balitskie, liubchenki, zatomskie” [Ed. note: Famous purge victims) and other bastards wanted to bring Polish nobles (Pol'she pany) to the Ukraine, wanted to bring German fascists, landowners and capitalists here... We have destroyed quite a few enemies, but not all. For that reason one must keep one's eyes open. We must firmly remember the words of Com. Stalin, that as long as capitalist encirclement exists, they will send spies and provocateurs (diversanty) to us...

Frankly speaking, on the issue of criticism and selfcriticism you are inferior to Stalin. Having made mistakes, Stalin sometimes still practiced self-criticism. For instance, Stalin gave some mistaken advice relating to the Chinese revolution. After the victory of the Chinese revolution, he recognized his mistakes before Chinese comrades and friends. And how are you acting? You know well that you slough off (svalivaete] all of your mistakes onto others and ascribe all successes to yourself...

Suslov. Our delegation states a decisive protest against the distortion, falsification and slanders made in relation to the leadership of our party and to Com. N.S. Khrushchev, against our party and the decisions of its Congresses.

The delegation of the CPSU also states its protest against the sort of propaganda that has begun in the last few days on Peking radio. We consider that the entire responsibility for these actions rests with the leadership of the CCP...

Deng Xiaoping. Com. Suslov has expressed some sort of protest. If we are talking about protest, then we have an even greater basis for voicing even more protests...

Already two weeks have gone by since our meeting began. At the meeting both sides exchanged their views. Although as of yet it has been difficult to attain a unity of both sides' views right away, still, a frank exposition of

Suslov. We will give you an answer tomorrow...

Deng Xiaoping. In conclusion I would like to say a few words.

However great the disagreements between us may be, we hope that we can gradually find the way to eliminate those disagreements, since unity between us is too important.

Despite the fact that in the course of the discussion both our sides have stated more than a few views with which the other side does not agree, and despite the fact that you have said that our words are not pleasant to the ear, and that we have also said that your words are not pleasant to the ear, despite all of this, our current meeting will serve as a good start. Moreover, we have agreed with you to publish a communiqué on the continuation of our meetings. We consider this a good thing.

We have come to the agreement that it is necessary to continue our meetings and that the time and place of the next meeting will be agreed by the Central Committees of our parties.

Here I would like to express in passing the following hope of ours: if your delegation, if the CC of the CPSU agrees, then we would like to invite the delegation of the CPSU to Beijing for the continuation of the meeting. That issue, of course, could be agreed upon separately.

Suslov. This is also a question for discussion between our Central Committees. Finished [vse). Will I see you (later] today?

Deng Xiaoping. At six?
Suslov. Yes, at six.

[Source : SAPMO Barch JIV 2/207 698, pp. 187-330 (in Russian); obtained by Vladislav Zubok; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

Cold War Endpoints?: Beginning the Debate

by David Wolff

C

hronology and periodization are the bread and
butter of the historical profession, so it is no

surprise to see the proper dating of the beginning and the end of the Cold War under discussion. 1945 is often favored, for how could a cold war be an age's dominant feature, while a hot war was still going on? Churchill's Fulton speech is also mentioned as an important turning point, but so is the Marshall Plan, the Cominform, the Truman Doctrine, the Soviet bomb, NSC68, the Lublin Poles and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Clearly this discussion will go on for a long time. I

Similar disagreements are also evident regarding the end of the Cold War. As we approach 1999 and the activities planned to commemorate the tenth anniversary of Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain collapse, we will certainly hear more on this topic. Although 1989, like 1945 at the beginning, has many commonsensical advantages to recommend it, different causal emphases in analyzing the end of the Cold War will produce different chronologies. If Gorbachev's appointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the beginning of the end, then 1985 looms large. If the Reagan build-up and Star Wars drove the Soviets to bankruptcy and despair, then the early 1980s grow in importance. Specialists who give primacy in their analytical priorities to either the fall of Leninism or the rise of nationalism are likely to pick the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union.

This section of CWIHP Bulletin 10 begins with a remarkable essay by the director of the National Security Archive, Thomas S. Blanton, with accompanying Russian documents. It seems that on Christmas Eve 1989, with state authority crumbling in Romania and the Ceausescus only a day away from the firing squad, the United States proposed that the Russians send a peacekeeping mission to the area. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister I. Aboimov, in refusing the offer, made a “Christmas gift” of the Brezhnev doctrine to the American ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr. This seems to have been the first direct American request for increased Soviet military activity in Eastern Europe since 1945. As such, it represented a sea change in comparison with the fears and concerns of the Cold War era. Of course, what was a key moment of mutual self-recognition for the superpowers was relatively insignificant in Romania's end of Cold War, since no Soviet troops were actually sent.

As this final comment makes clear, the Cold War ended differently in different places, since the historical chronologies of countries and regions overlap and diverge. In the second part of this section, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa introduces new archival evidence on Soviet-Japanese

relations in the late Cold War period that suggest that in Asia the endpoint may not yet have been reached. This implies that this relatively neglected field has much to offer as we refine analytical tools for the study of the Cold War. Unfortunately, until recently, little documentation was available. The working group transcripts are a remarkable study in Soviet-Japanese stalemate, one of the great "givens" of late twentieth-century history. Change is more exciting to study, but enduring continuities are no less important. The tit for tat back and forth of the diplomatic dialogue demonstrates one of the more arcane uses of history, too. Of course, the American role in the ties between the US's most important economic "partner," Japan, and its most important security "concern," Russia, has also been understudied, although a National Security Archive initiative on US-Japanese security relations run by Robert Wampler has recently begun to remedy that situation.

Both the Romanian and Soviet-Japanese revelations fall among that group of cases where the availability of East-bloc evidence has outpaced the more systematic and expansive declassification process in the West. Up until 1968-69, the opening of Western holdings has followed the thirty-year

rule, for most classes of documents, to outnumber the East-bloc counterparts. Starting from 1969, the reverse is, by and large, true with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) offering sole recourse.2 If Blanton's FOIA fails, the Matlock instructions and conversation will only emerge from the American vault in the year 2014. The fact that Blanton was able to corroborate the Russian documents with Matlock's recollections points out one of the distinguishing characteristics of Cold War studies and contemporary history, in general - the importance of oral history. When combined with and tempered by documents, these two genres of testimony are most revealing.

Keeping this in mind, perhaps there ought to be a mechanism to accelerate release of documents deemed crucial to the learning of historical lessons from the recent past, at least for already non-existent East European regimes whose archives are open, and before the surviving participants leave us for good. These are, after all, the lessons with deepest and most immediate bearing on the present.

If the Cold War ended at different times in different places, then it is entirely possible that it is not quite over yet in some places. This is a statement of great practical import for the Cold War International History Project and all scholars associated in the endeavor of excavating the Cold War. Wherever the documents are least accessible, some strain of ongoing Cold War mentality is probably

still present. In this sense, the archival openness work of CWIHP, through relations with scholarly and archival authorities in many countries, indirectly measures the Cold War's lasting legacy. Success in obtaining documentation on a given topic is the ultimate proof that that moment of Cold War can finally be made into history, one more thread in the new international history of the twentieth century.

connection with a major CWIHP-sponsored international conference, scheduled for late 1998. The Yugoslavia section of this Bulletin has a first installment from the Stalin project. Additional conversations with Stalin will go up on the CWIHP website ( cwihp.si.edu ) in the course of 1998.

Russian archives are an exception on the East-bloc side with post1969 documents emerging only in special cases. On the American side, extensive declassifications have taken place on certain post1969 topics due to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suits that generated the National Security Archive's foreign policy series. These include: Afghanistan, 1973-80; El Salvador, 1977-84; Iran, 1977-80; Iran-Contra Affair, 1983-88; Nicaragua, 1978-1990; Phillipines, 1965-86; South Africa, 1962-89; US Nuclear NonProliferation, 1945-91. 3 For an insightful discussion and demonstration of "critical oral history” with reference to the Cuban Missile Crisis, see James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink (New York, 1989).

1 One of the few things that all of these events have in common is that Stalin's thoughts on them were decisive in shaping Soviet policies viewed simultaneously as international actions and reactions. In order to broaden and deepen this discussion of Cold War origins, CWIHP has begun a project on “I. V. Stalin as a Cold War Statesman.” Transcripts and memcons of Stalin's meetings with foreign leaders are being collected for future publication and research in

When did the Cold War End?

by Thomas Blanton

hen the Cold War memorial rises on the Mall in

Washington D.C., what exactly will be the date VV carved therein as the end of the Cold War? Ambassador Robert Hutchings writes that “Americans of an earlier generation knew when V-E Day and V-J Day were; there were dates on the calendar marking victory in Europe and victory over Japan in 1945. But the Cold War ended on no certain date; it lacked finality.... The end of the Cold War thus evoked among the American public little sense of purpose fulfilled—and even less of responsibility for the tasks of postwar construction.”!

Other commentators have picked the obvious candidate—25 December 1991, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.2 Yet this date is far too neat, since by any rational measure the Cold War was already over by then. Well before December 1991, the Cold War featured many symbolic and substantive markers of its demise. Among these, and on the basis of new archival evidence from Soviet files, this article nominates Christmas Eve 1989– when a hitherto somewhat obscure U.S.-Soviet meeting in Moscow discussed the violent revolution then taking place in Romania—as a strong contender for the title of Cold War finale.

The process of carbon dating the end of the Cold War benefits from having December 1991 as the latest outer limit of the period. Similarly, the literature gives an earliest limit as well. This occurred on 1 June 1988, when then- Vice-President George Bush, on vacation in Kennebunkport, reacted to President Reagan's bouyant May 31 stroll through Red Square in Moscow by telling reporters dourly, "The Cold War's not over."3

By the end of the year, many Cold Warriors disagreed with President-elect Bush. On 7 December 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev made his famous speech at the United Nations, which Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan summed up as follows: "In December 1988, Gorbachev went to the General Assembly

of the United Nations and declared, 'We in no way aspire to be the bearer of ultimate truth.' That has to have been the most astounding statement of surrender in the history of ideological struggle."4

For other observers of Gorbachev's speech, it was not so much the ideological concessions as the unilateral military cutbacks that most impressed. Retired Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, a former NATO commander and top aide to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, called the cuts “the most significant step since NATO was founded” and said they opened the way to broad military reductions on both sides.

5 The stream of Soviet eulogies for the Cold War continued throughout 1989. In January 1989 in Vienna, for example, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze greeted the opening of the Conventional Forces in Europe talks by saying that disarmament progress "has shaken the iron curtain, weakened its rusting foundations, pierced new openings, accelerated its corrosion."6 Then, on 6 July 1989, Gorbachev told the Council of Europe in his famous Strasbourg speech that the “common European home .... excludes all possibility of armed confrontation, all possibility of resorting to the threat or use of force, and notably military force employed by one alliance against another, within an alliance, or whatever it might be.”7

And on 25 October 1989, as Communist governments began to tumble in Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's spokesman, Gennadii Gerasimov, coined the most memorable phrase of all, when he told reporters with Gorbachev in Helsinki, Finland, that the “Frank Sinatra Doctrine" had replaced the Brezhnev Doctrine for the Soviets, referring to the singer's signature ballad, “I did it my way.”8

From the U.S. perspective, the most important signals were not so much the rhetorical flourishes of Gorbachev's "new thinking" (since contradictory rhetoric could be found in the official Soviet press throughout this period),

« 上一頁繼續 »