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colleagues and subordinates (both fellow soldiers and party officials), and that he went along with efforts to play up his own role in World War II. Nevertheless, these deficiencies hardly amounted to a broad indictment of Zhukov's tenure as defense minister. The activities that Suslov claimed were an attempt by Zhukov to establish a "cult of personality” were not at all unusual in the context of Soviet politics. The routine glorification of Khrushchev in the late 1950s far exceeded anything that Zhukov may have been promoting for himself. Similarly, most of the other problems that were highlighted at the plenum, both in the armed forces as a whole and in the political organs, had long existed. Zhukov may have marginally worsened a few of these problems, but he also seems to have rectified certain key deficiencies, notably by boosting morale and increasing the combat readiness of frontline units. During the one major operation that Zhukov oversaw as defense minister, the large-scale intervention in Hungary in November 1956, Soviet troops accomplished their mission within a few days despite encountering vigorous armed resistance from Hungarian insurgents.
The flimsiness of the allegations against Zhukov undoubtedly accounts for Khrushchev's decision to raise questions about Zhukov's military abilities and accomplishments. Although Khrushchev and Suslov both claimed that they "deeply value Com. Zhukov's performance during the Great Patriotic War,” they also wanted to ensure that Zhukov's legendary reputation and stature would not cause members of the Central Committee to be hesitant about criticizing him. To this end, Khrushchev downplayed Zhukov's role in World War II by arguing that Vasilii Chuikov, not Zhukov, was the "chief hero" of the Stalingrad campaign. Khrushchev also rebuked Zhukov for dwelling solely on the positive aspects of his military career:
flights over one another's territory to monitor compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements. Khrushchev averred that the other members of the Presidium were startled to learn that “the defense minister, of all people, could have favored such a thing," and they “reacted with heated protests against Zhukov's proposal."
84 Khrushchev's efforts to impugn Zhukov's “adventurist” positions on the most important foreign policy issues facing the Soviet Union” (in the phrasing of the plenum resolution) were not altogether different from the attempts in July 1953 to portray Beria's alleged views about Germany in the most unsavory light possible.
Despite the many similarities between the October 1957 plenum and the July 1953 plenum, there was one fundamental difference. Unlike Beria, who was held in prison during the July 1953 sessions and executed five months later, Zhukov was given the opportunity to speak twice at the October 1957 plenum and to interject comments from time to time during others' remarks. His first speech came after the main allegations against him had been laid out, and his second, much briefer (and more contrite) statement came just before Khrushchev's lengthy speech at the fourth session of the plenum, on the evening of October 29. On neither occasion did Zhukov project an air of angry defiance or even take as firm a stand as Molotov did in July 1955, but he defended his record at some length and rebutted the most lurid accusations against him. Overall, he left no doubt that he strongly disagreed with the grounds for his dismissal. At the same time, Zhukov had decided beforehand that it would be best if he accepted responsibility for certain "mistakes" (whether real or not) and indicated his willingness to comply with the party's wishes:
Com. Zhukov, I don't want to disparage your military accomplishments, but you should think about it a bit. You had both your successes and your failures, just as all the other generals and marshals did. Why do you insist on talking only about the successes and victories, and completely glossing over the failures?82
I request that you understand that (my] mistakes were not the result of any sort of deviation from the line of the party, but were the sorts of mistakes that any working official might make. I assure you, comrades (and I think I will receive appropriate support in this regard), that with the help of our party I will be able, with honor and dignity, to overcome the mistakes I have committed, and I absolutely will be a worthy figure in our party. I was and always will be a reliable member of the party.
Zhukov's willingness to acknowledge unspecified shortcomings reinforced the long-standing pattern of civilmilitary relations in the Soviet Union. If the most renowned figure in the Soviet armed forces was willing to submit himself to the discipline of the Communist Party, the norm of civilian supremacy was clearer than ever.
This is not to suggest, however, that the affair was in any way an institutional clash between the party and the military. On the contrary, the declassified plenum materials show, more strongly than ever, that the Zhukov affair was not a confrontation between civilian officials and military commanders. During the plenum, senior military
officers went out of their way to emphasize that
even the officers who had known Zhukov the longestKhrushchev "is not only First Secretary of the CPSU Marshal Semyon Budennyi, Marshal Ivan Konev, and Central Committee, but is also chairman of the Defense Marshal Sergei Biryuzov, among others—disavowed their Council," a position equivalent to commander-in-chief of past
ties with him. 91 After one of the speakers on the first the Soviet armed forces. 86 Although it is now clear that day of the plenum referred to the "special friendship General A. S. Zheltov, the chief political officer in the between Com. Konev and Marshal Zhukov," Konev spoke Soviet Army in 1957, was instrumental in pressing for with Khrushchev and sent a note to the CPSU Presidium Zhukov's ouster, a substantial number of career military insisting that it would be a “profound mistake to believe I officers were also behind the move. (The plenum docu- was ever particularly close to Zhukov.” Konev's denials ments suggest that Zheltov resented Zhukov mainly prompted Khrushchev to begin his own speech at the because Zheltov had been left off the Central Committee at plenum by “correcting the record” along the lines that the 20th Party Congress in 1956, an omission that Zheltov Konev sought: evidently blamed on Zhukov. 87) Zheltov's report at the CPSU Presidium meeting on October 19 was a catalyst for We don't have any basis for suggesting that Com. the final actions to remove Zhukov, but it is clear that the Konev's past relationship with Com. Zhukov should preliminary maneuvering had begun well before then, with
cast any sort of pall on Com. Konev. Com. Konev is a the involvement of senior military commanders.
member of the CPSU CC and a long-time member of Khrushchev was able to secure a political-military
the party, and he always was a loyal member of the consensus on the need to dismiss Zhukov.
party and a worthy member of the CPSU CC. He
vortby The lack of any civilian-military disagreements on
remains so now. this issue is well illustrated by the plenum itself, where not a single military officer spoke in defense of Zhukov. The By highlighting Konev's eagerness to renounce his norm of subordination to party control outweighed any previous ties with Zhukov, Khrushchev underscored the inclination that senior commanders might have had to consensus against the deposed minister and let the full speak even mildly in favor of the deposed minister. 88 All Central Committee see that, despite Zhukov's misdeeds, of Zhukov's military colleagues and subordinates joined high-ranking military officers were no different from other with Khrushchev and Suslov in denouncing Zhukov's “true Communists” in placing party loyalty above personal alleged efforts to foster a “cult of personality” and to “take relationships. control of the army away from the party.” Zhukov's
One final point worth mentioning about the October successor, Malinovskii, expressed regret that Zhukov had 1957 plenum is the valuable light it sheds on the state of allowed problems in the military to become so acute that the Soviet armed forces in the mid- to late 1950s. Intriguthe Central Committee was forced to step in to resolve ing information about this matter can be found not only in matters:
the proceedings, but in the collection of documents
associated with the plenum. These documents consist Comrades, we military officers are very glad that the mainly of various drafts of the plenum resolution and the plenum of the Central Committee is discussing the "Closed Letter” that was eventually distributed to all matter of strengthening party-political work in the CPSU members about the Zhukov affair.93 The letter Soviet Army and Navy. On the other hand, it is
itself adds nothing to the many charges outlined at the regrettable that we, as military officers and members plenum, but one of the other documents released to the of the party, have reached the point where the Central Central Committee, a top-secret "Order of the USSR Committee itself has been compelled to intervene in Minister of Defense,” signed by Zhukov and the chief of this matter. 89
the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, on
12 May 1956, provides an interesting assessment of the Even military officers who had benefited greatly state of military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy" during Zhukov's tenure, such as Fleet Admiral Sergei in the mid-1950s.94 Zhukov and Sokolovskii highlighted Gorshkov, who had been appointed commander-in-chief of problems in the Soviet armed forces that seem remarkably the Soviet navy in 1956, argued that Zhukov's “leadership similar to many of the ills afflicting today's Russian armed of the ministry has created an extremely agonizing,
forces: oppressive, and distasteful situation, which is totally at odds with party and Leninist principles of leadership." Both the army and the navy are plagued by a huge Gorshkov insisted that Zhukov “regards himself as
number of crimes and extraordinary incidents, of absolutely infallible” and “refuses to tolerate views
which the most serious dangers are posed by: cases of different from his own, often reacting with uncontrolled insubordination to commanders and, what is particurage, invective, and abuse."90 Other officers expressed larly unacceptable in the army, the voicing of insults to even stronger criticism, doing their best to side completely superiors; outrageous behavior by servicemen vis-àwith the party hierarchy.
vis the local population; desertion and unexplained So clear was the party's dominance of the military that leaves of absence by servicemen; and accidents and
disasters with aviation transport, combat aircraft, and ships.
The problem of drunkenness among servicemen, including officers, has taken on vast dimensions in the army and navy. As a rule, the majority of extraordinary incidents and crimes committed by servicemen are connected with drunkenness.
CPSU Presidium/Politburo. Those records, unfortunately, are still largely sealed. Yet even if the Politburo archives are eventually made fully accessible, the plenum materials will remain a valuable, indeed indispensable, source. Although the plenum transcripts and supplementary documents must be used with great caution, they provide a wealth of insights into the role of the Central Committee in Soviet policy-making.
The extremely unsatisfactory state of military discipline in many units and formations of the army, and especially in the navy, prevents troops from being maintained at a high level of combat readiness and undermines efforts to strengthen the Armed Forces. 95
Mark Kramer is a senior associate at the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University, and the director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies.
The standards used by Zhukov and Sokolovskii may have been a good deal higher than those used today, and the pervasiveness of “unsavory phenomena" is undoubtedly greater now than it was then. Some of these problems had been known earlier from the testimony of emigres/ defectors and occasional articles in the Soviet press.
96 Nevertheless, it is striking (and comforting) to see that dissatisfaction about the state of military discipline was nearly as great in Moscow some 40-45 years ago as it is today.
This overview of the structure, context, and content of declassified materials from Central Committee plenums shows both the limitations and the potential value of these documents. So long as scholars bear in mind that the Central Committee was not a decision-making body and that the plenums were carefully managed by top CPSU officials for their own purposes, the documents can yield a good deal of useful information. Some of the materials provide fresh insights into key trends and events, including domestic changes in the Soviet Union and important episodes from the Cold War. Other documents are important mainly because of what they reveal about the manipulation of the plenums by senior officials. One of the most salient features of the plenums during the first five years after Stalin's death was the spillover from the leadership struggle. Even when the plenums were supposed to focus on crucial domestic or foreign issues, the divisions among top leaders had a far-reaching effect on the proceedings. By the late 1950s, after Khrushchev had dislodged his major rivals and consolidated his position as CPSU First Secretary, the plenums increasingly were devoted to the growing rift between the Soviet Union and China. This theme continued even after Khrushchev was unexpectedly removed in 1964.
The plenum materials cover only selected portions of Soviet history and Soviet foreign policy. Many topics were barely considered at all by the Central Committee. The plenum documents are no substitute for the vastly more important and far more voluminous records of the supreme decision-making body in the Soviet Union, the
The materials at RTsKhIDNI for Central Committee plenums from 1918 to 1941 are stored in Opis' 2 of Fond 17. Unlike at TsKhSD, the items at RTsKhIDNI do not constitute a separate fond. 2
In the Soviet Russian archival lexicon, the word opis' refers both to a segment of a fond and to the finding aid or catalog that specifies what is contained in that segment. 3.
“Perechen' dokumentov Arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Tsentra khraneniya sovremennoi dokumentatsii, Rossiiskogo tsentra khraneniya i izucheniya dokumentov noveishei istorii, Tsentra khraneniya dokumentov molodezhnykh organizatsii, rassekrechennykh Komissiei po rassekrechivaniyu dokumentov, sozdannykh KPSS, v 1994-1995,” Moscow, 1996. A slightly abridged version of this list was published in Novaya i noveishaya istoriya (Moscow), No. 3 (May-June 1996), pp. 249-253. 4 Conversation in Moscow between the author and Natalya Tomilina, director of TsKhSD, 14 July 1997. This was not the only aspect of the commission's report that was highly misleading. The report contains fond and opis’ numbers of collections that supposedly have been “declassified," but it fails to mention that a large number of dela in many of these opisi are in fact still classified. For example, the commission's list of "declassified documents” includes Opis' 128 of Fond 17 at RTsKhIDNI, which is divided into two volumes. One would expect, based on this listing, that all documents from both volumes of the opis' would be freely accessible, but it turns out that the entire second volume, amounting to 504 dela, is still classified, and even in the first volume only some of the 702 dela are actually available to researchers. (The only way to determine which files in the first volume are really declassified is to ask the head of the RTsKhIDNI reading room before submitting a request.) Similarly, at TsKhSD only a small fraction of the dela in many of the purportedly “declassified" collections are genuinely accessible. Even when files at TsKhSD are nominally "declassified,” they may still be off limits because they supposedly contain “personal secrets" (lichnye tainy), which have to be processed by an entirely separate commission. Because of the barriers posed by classified files and files that allegedly contain personal secrets, very few files from some of the “declassified” opisi at TsKhSD are actually given out. (This problem is compounded when, as in the case of Opisi 22 and 28 of Fond 5 at TsKhSD, only the film reels are lent out. If one delo on a reel is proscribed, all other dela on the reel are also off limits unless a researcher can convince the archivists to have a staff member serve as a monitor for several hours while the researcher uses the "permitted” dela on the reel.)
5 May 1941 (Delo la); 10 October 1941 (Delo 2); 27 January 1944 (Dela 3-5); 11, 14, and 18 March 1946 (Dela 6-8); 21, 22, 24, and 26 February 1947 (Dela 9-20); 16 October 1952 (Dela 21-22); 5 March 1953 (Dela 23-24); 14 March 1953 (Dela 25-26); 2-7 July 1953 Dela 5); September 1953 (Dela 46-61); 23 February2 March 1954 (Dela 62-89); 21-24 June 1954 (Dela 90-109); 25-31 January 1955 (Dela 110-138); 4-12 July 1955 (Dela 139-180); 13
February 1956 (Dela 181-184); 27 February 1956 (Dela 185-187); 22 June 1956 (Delo 188); 20-24 December 1956 (Dela 189-208); 13-14 February 1957 (Dela 209-221); 22-29 June 1957 (Dela 222259); 28-29 October 1957 (Dela 260-272); 16-17 December 1957 (Dela 273-284); 25-26 February 1958 (Dela 285-298); 26 March 1958 (Dela 319-327); 6-7 May 1958 (Dela 304-318); 17-18 June 1958 (Dela 319-327); 5 September 1958 (Dela 328-332); 12 November 1958 (Dela 333-338); 15-19 December 1958 (Dela 339360); 24-29 June 1959 (Dela 361-397); 22-26 December 1959 (Dela 398-448); 4 May 1960 (Dela 449-452); 13-16 July 1960 (Dela 453485); 10-18 January 1961 (Dela 486-536); 19 June 1961 (Dela 537543); 14 October 1961 (Dela 544-548); 31 October 1961 (Dela 549553); 5-9 March 1962 (Dela 554-582); 23 April 1962 (Dela 583587); 19-23 November 1962 (Dela 588-623); 18-21 June 1963 (Dela 624-658); 9-13 December 1963 (Dela 659-696); 10-15 February 1964 (Dela 697-743); 11 July 1964 (Dela 744-747); 10 October 1964 (Dela 748-753); 16 November 1964 (Dela 754-764); 24-26 March 1965 (Dela 765-786); 27-29 September 1965 (Dela 787-805); 6 December 1965 (Dela 806-812); 19 February 1966 (Dela 813-817); and 26 March 1966 (Dela 818-822). 6 See, for example, the standardized form (classified “sekretno") that was circulated along with appropriate transcript pages to each speaker, in TsKhSD, Fond (F.) 2, Opis' (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 268, List (L.) 15. 7
The name of the CPSU CC Politburo was changed to the “CPSU CC Presidium” at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952. The name was changed back to the Politburo just before the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966. 8
See, for example, “Tov. Sukovoi E. N.," 18 March 1958, memorandum on materials to include in the final stenographic account of the plenum held on 28-29 October 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 269, L. 79, as well as the attachment on LI. 80-145. 9
This is in contrast to the plenum documents in Opis' 2 of Fond 17 at RTsKhIDNI. RTSKhIDNI gives out only the microfilms of these documents. 10 Useful compilations of the materials published after Central Committee plenums from 1953 through the late 1980s are available in two sources: Kommunisticheskaya partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s "ezdov, konferentsii, i plenumov TsK, various editions (Moscow: Politizdat, various years); and the 29 volumes of the CPSU yearbook published between 1957 and 1989, Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (Moscow: Politizdat, published biennially until the mid-1960s and annually thereafter). From 1989 to 1991, the new Central Committee journal Izvestiya TsK KPSS featured stenographic accounts of selected plenums, including some from the pre-Gorbachev era. 11
The term "Central Committee” refers here exclusively to the body comprising 200-300 people who convened for plenums. Even when plenums were not in session, many resolutions and directives were issued in the name of the Central Committee, but these were actually drafted and approved by the Politburo or Secretariat, not by the Central Committee itself. Soviet officials also frequently used the term "Central Committee” to refer to the whole central party apparatus, but this, too, gives a misleading impression of the Central Committee's role. The term is used here only in its narrowest sense. 12
See, for example, the marked-up draft “Postanovlenie plenuma TSK KPSS: Ob uluchshenii partiino-politicheskoi raboty v Sovetskoi Armii i Flote,” October 1957 (Secret), in "Materialy k Protokolu No. 5 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS 28-29. 10. 1957 g.," in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 261, Ll. 69-74. 13 The term “circular flow of power” was coined by Robert V. Daniels in “Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," in John W. Strong, ed., The Soviet Union Under Brezhnev and Kosygin (New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1971), p. 20. Daniels had developed the basic interpretation at some length more than a decade earlier in his The Conscience of the Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), and similar views had been elaborated by numerous
scholars such as Merle Fainsod and Leonard Schapiro. 14
On this general problem, see Mark Kramer, “Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls,” Cold War International History Bulletin, Issue No. 3 (Fall 1993), p. 34. 15
For an analysis and translation of these notes and supplementary materials, see Mark Kramer, “Special Feature: New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises," Cold War International History Bulletin, Issue No. 8-9 (Winter 1996/ 1997), pp. 358-410. 16
Almost all of the transcripts that were released in the early 1990s are now accessible in Fond 89 of TsKhSD. For a convenient, crossindexed, and chronological list of these transcripts compiled by I. I. Kudryavtsev and edited by V. P. Kozlov, see Arkhivy Kremlya i Staroi Ploshchadi: Dokumenty po “Delu KPSS”—Annotirovannyi spravochnik dokumentov, predstavlennykh v Konstitutsionnyi Sud RF po “Delu KPSS”, (Novosibirsk: Siberskii Khronograf, 1995). 17
The two most valuable collections put out by the Gorbachev Foundation are Mikhail Gorbachev, ed., Gody trudnykh reshenii (Moscow: Alfa-Print, 1993); and A. V. Veber et al., eds., Soyuz mozhno bylo sokhranit'—Belaya kniga: Dokumenty i fakty o politike M. S. Gorbacheva po reformirovaniyu i sokhraneniyu mnogonatsional'nogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Aprel’-85, 1995). Some relevant items also have appeared in the Foundation's journal Svobodnaya mysl’. The items published in /stochnik (e.g., about the Politburo's immediate reaction to the Chernobyl accident) seem to have been released for the same reason that materials were turned over earlier to the Constitutional Court. 18
In a typical case, Khrushchev attributed to Beria "dangerous and counterrevolutionary” policies that Khrushchev himself had devised only a few weeks earlier for Latvia, Estonia, and Moldavia. See “Voprosy Latviiskoi SSR (Proekt),” 7 June 1953 (Top Secret), "Voprosy Estonskoi SSR (Proekt),” 8 June 1953 (Top Secret), and “Voprosy Moldavskoi SSR (Proekt)," 8 June 1953, all from N. S. Khrushchev to the CPSU Presidium, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 6, Ll. 20-29; F. 5, Op. 15, D. 445, LI. 46, 267-277; and F. 5, Op. 15, D. 443, LI. 29-59, respectively. 19
For the published version, see “Delo Beria," two parts, in Izvestiya TSK KPSS (Moscow), No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 139-214, and No. 2 (February 1991), pp. 141-208. As discussed below, the published stenographic account differs substantially from the verbatim transcript, though the comments here apply just as much to the verbatim transcript. 20
For extensive evidence of this, see my forthcoming article on “The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy-Making." 21
Even a prominent scholar like Amy Knight, who is deservedly skeptical of many of the charges lodged against Beria, uncritically accepts the statements made about East Germany. See her Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 193-200. 22
**Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS, 2-7 iyulya 1953 g.," July 1953 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, Fond (F.) 2, Opis' (Op.) 1, Delo (D.) 29, List (L.) 51. 23
This was the case, for example, with the plenum on 24-26 March 1965. A new, 22-page text was inserted by Mikhail Suslov in place of his original report to the plenum, “Soobshchenie ob itogakh Konsul'tativnoi vstrechi kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,” in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 766, LI. 81-102. Suslov indicated at the bottom of the new version that "[t]his text should be used in place of the stenogram.” 24
Sometimes, the changes that turn up can be both amusing and revealing about events and individual leaders. For example, at the plenum in late October 1957, a few weeks after the Soviet “Sputnik” had been launched into orbit, Khrushchev boasted that “we now have European missiles, which can strike targets all over Europe without leaving our territory.” In the left-hand margin of the verbatim transcript, the first editor wrote a large question mark next to this
Review, Vol. III, No. 17 (April 1960), pp. 14-22. 46
See, for example, the interview with the former head of the Soviet “missile group” in China, General Aleksandr Savel'ev, in Aleksandr Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,” Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow), 13 May 1995, p. 6. 47
For a lively account of the Bucharest session, which includes details omitted from the official transcript, see Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Peking (Baltimore: Penguin, 1963),
passage. The second editor changed it to read: “We now have medium-range missiles, that is, European missiles, which can strikes targets all over Europe after being launched from our territory." See the marked-up verbatim transcript “Rech’tov. N. S. Khrushcheva na plenume TsK KPSS, 29 oktyabrya 1957 goda,” 29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 269, L. 66. 25
Khrushchev's speech, “Doklad Pervogo sekretarya TsK KPSS Khrushcheva N. S. 'Ob itogakh sovetsko-yugoslavskikh peregovorov," is in “plenum TSK KPSS—XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma desyatogo zasedaniya 9 iyulya 1955 g. (utrennego),” July 1955 (Strictly Secret), TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 172, LI. 1-138. 26
Ibid., L. 105. 27
“Plenum TsK KPSS—XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma trinadtsatogo zasedaniya 11 iyulya 1955 g. (vechernego),” July 1955 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 175, Ll. 135-136. 28
Ibid., L. 149. 29
Ibid., Ll. 172-183. 30 Ibid., L. 179.
The sessions on Yugoslavia in July 1955 were designed to inform the Central Committee about actions already taken, not to consult it in advance. This is fully in line with the analysis above of the Central Committee's role in Soviet policy-making. 32
“Deklaratsiya Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii sotsialisticheskikh stran, sostayavshegosya v Moskve 14-16 noyabrya 1957 goda,” Pravda (Moscow), 22 November 1957, pp. 1-2. 33 “Plenum TSK KPSS-XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret'ego i chetvertogo zasedanii plenuma TsK KPSS 16-17 dekabrya 1957 g.," in F. 2, Op. 1, D. 282, LI. 161-182. 34
Ibid., L. 172 35.
“Plenum TsK KPSS-XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret'ego zasedaniya 7 maya 1958 g. (vechernego),” May 1958 (Top Secret), in
7 TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 317, Ll. 57-93. 36
Among numerous other examples of the important ideological role that Yugoslavia played in Soviet policy-making was the close attention that Soviet leaders paid in 1968 Yugoslavia's influence on the reformist officials in Czechoslovakia. See, for example, the plethora of documents in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 60, Dd. 279 and 284. Whenever Soviet leaders detected hints (or what they construed as hints) that “Titoist” ideology was filtering into Czechoslovakia, they raised the issue with the Czechoslovak authorities and discussed the matter at length during CPSU Politburo meetings. 37
See Kramer, “New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises,” pp. 360-362. 38 “Plenum TSK KPSS-XX Sozyv: Stenogramma tret’ego i chetvertogo zasedanii plenuma TsK KPSS 16-17 dekabrya 1957 g.," in F. 2, Op. 1, D. 282, Ll. 173-174. 39 lbid., L. 174. 40
“O poezdke sovetskoi partiino-pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii v Kitaiskuyu Narodnuyu Respubliku,” plus extensive modifications and insertions incorporated by Suslov, in “Materialy k Protokolu No. 15 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS,” 22-26 December 1959 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 447, Ll. 57-91. For background on this trip, see Mark Kramer, “Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split,” Cold War International History Bulletin, Issue No. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 170-186.
“O poezdke sovetskoi partiino-pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii v Kitaiskuyu Narodnuyu Respubliku,” L. 71. The sentence referring to the interception of secret documents and the U.S. government's alleged readiness to surrender Quemoy and Matsu did not appear in Suslov's initial draft. It was added during the revisions shortly before the plenum.
Ibid., L. 80. 43 Ibid., L. 81. 44 Ibid., LI. 88-89. 45
“Long Live Leninism!” was first published in Hongqi (Beijing), No. 8 (16 April 1960), and then republished in translation in Peking
48 “Doklad na plenume TSK KPSS ob itogakh Soveshchaniya predstavitelei bratskikh partii v Bukhareste i ob oshibochnykh pozitsiyakh rukovodstva TsK KPK po nekotorym printsipial'nym voprosam
marksistsko-leninskoi teorii i sovremennykh mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii,” 13 July 1960 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 472, L1. 2-74. 49
For a useful account of this process by a participant, see Mikhail A. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in Red China (Montreal: International Publishers Representatives, 1964), esp. pp. 164-188. See also Dolinin, “Kak nashi raketchiki kitaitsev obuchali,” p. 6. 50 --Ob itogakh Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,” in “Materialy k Protokolu No. 18 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS, 10-18 yanvarya 1961 g.," January 1961 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 495, LI. 11-85. The quoted passage is on L. 12. 51
Ibid., L. 33. 52 Ibid., LI. 55-57. 53 lbid., L. 45 54 Ibid., LI. 65-66. 55 Ibid., LI. 78, 87. 56
See the marked-up versions of the presentations in “Materialy k Protokolu No. 6 zasedaniya plenuma TsK KPSS, 13 dekabrya 1963 g.: O deyatel’nosti Prezidiuma TsK KPSS po ukrepleniyu edinstva kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya, postanovlenie Sekretariata TsK KPSS ob izdanii tekstov vystuplenii na plenume Tsk Ponomareva B. N., Andropova Yu. V., i Il’icheva L. F., rechi sekretarei TSK KPSS Ponomareva, Andropova, Il’icheva, i Khrushcheva N.S.,," 9-13 December 1963 (Strictly Secret), F. 2, Op. 1, D. 665. 57 -- Vypiska iz protokola No. 90/257gs zasedaniya Sekretariata Tsk ot 16.XII. 1963 g.," 16 December 1963 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 693, L. 4. 58 “Ob itogakh Soveshchaniya predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii," LI. 61-62. 59
“Rech' Sekretarya TSK KPSS tov. Andropova Yu. V. na dekabrskom (1963 g.) plenuma TSK KPSS,” No. P2002, (Top Secret), 9-13 December 1963, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 665, L. 30. 60
“Bor'ba KPSS za splochennost' mirovogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya: Doklad tovarishcha M. A. Suslova na plenume Tsk KPSS 14 fevralya 1964 goda,” P. 480, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 731, L. 158ob. 61
Romanian Press Agency, Statement on the Stand of the Romanian Workers' Party Concerning Problems of the World Communist and Working Class Movement (Bucharest: Agerpres, 1964). 62 «Soobshchenie ob itogakh Konsul'tativnoi vstrechi kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii,” Ll. 98-99. 63 Ibid., Ll. 105-106. 64
For an excellent analysis of the Zhukov affair written long before the archives were opened, see Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 175-195. Colton's account holds up very well in the light of the new evidence. 65
“Plenum TsK KPSS 28-29 oktyabrya 1957 g. XX Sozyv: Stenogramma vtorogo zasedaniya,” 27-29 October 1957 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 266, L. 57. 66
One item that has been released in the materials gathered for the plenum, a letter from the Soviet minister of culture, Nikolai Mikhailov, to the CPSU Presidium, indicates that Zhukov's ouster