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prepare a summit meeting and a working group on a peace
treaty, and it was approved by the Prime Minister of Japan
and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet side honestly
fulfilled the obligations it had taken upon itself, seriously
preparing for the meeting of the working group in Tokyo
and made a statement on all of the issues which constitute
the concept (poniatie) of a peace treaty. We counted on
the same approach from the Japanese side.

Unfortunately, I am obliged to state that from you we
heard only a statement on the so-called “territorial issue.”
I am left with the impression that you are avoiding the use
of the term “peace treaty." We also did not hear what the
Japanese conception is, (that is) your understanding of a
peace treaty. We consider that this will be a serious study,
and hope that the Japanese side will make its answer at the
next session of the working group.

Of course, there still remains the meeting with Mr. Uno. This is the high point of our entire work here, I mean both the consultations and the meeting of the working group. So far we have nothing about which to inform Moscow, aside from the fact that we heard the old Japanese theses on the territorial issue." The question arises: how has the preparation for the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs benefited, let alone a summit meeting? It seems to me that our Japanese colleagues themselves will

make their own assessment of the scale of this benefit.
[Ed. note: The May 1989 Uno-Gorbachev meeting is
covered in A.S. Cherniaev's memoirs, excerpted elsewhere
in this Bulletin.)

I want to assure you that the Soviet side will make efforts toward normalizing relations with Japan. I agree that as a result of the meetings we have begun to understand each other's positions better and in this sense have deepened our mutual understanding.

Deep differences remain on the issue which you call "territorial.” We will await your thoughts on the subject of our statement today after you study it.

On behalf of my comrades I want to thank you sincerely for your attention, for your hospitality, for organizing our trip around the country, and finally, for creating (good) work conditions. And on the subject of when I will meet with you, Mr. Kuriyama, we will agree separately. I mean the next meeting of the working group on the peace treaty.

Kuriyama. I agree.

(Source: Obtained by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. Translated by
Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.)


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Research Notes

New Evidence on Soviet Intelligence

The KGB's 1967 Annual Report
With Commentaries by Raymond Garthoff and Amy Knight

[The State Seal]

Fifth Directorate was created in the Committee of State Top Secret. Extremely Sensitive Security and fifth bureaus, divisions and departments in

territorial branches of the KGB. Committee of State Security (KGB]

In the interests of increasing the level of agent work of the Council of Ministers

(agenturno-operativnoi raboty) in the local branches of the of the USSR

KGB, Chekist organs were created in regions and cities TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF CC CPSU that in recent years have grown economically or acquired

important military significance and have therefore now 6 May 1968

Comrade L.I. BREZHNEV. become objects of intelligence interest for the enemy. The no. 1025-Alov

local party organizations gave positive marks to the Moscow

intensification of the Chekist work in those regions. At the

present time, the Committee is examining a number of On the results of the work of the Committee of State proposals from the CCs of Communist Parties of the Security of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Union Republics, area [krai] and regional (oblast') party its local branches during 1967. committees forwarded during 1967 to create KGB offices

in other cities and districts where this is dictated by

interests of state security. [For information-P.B. Ulanov)

Implementing the instructions of the CC CPSU, the [Signatures: L. Brezhnev, A. Kosygin, D. Polianskii, A. Committee of State Security carried out a set of measures Pel’she, K. Mazurov, Podgornyi, Suslov, Kuusinen) aimed at increasing the struggle with the anti-Soviet

activities of the Chinese splitters (raskolniki] and at Guided by the decisions of the 23rd

Congress of the ensuring the reliable protection of the borders of the USSR Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and by the with the PRC. To this end, we set up a Trans-Baikal instructions of the CC CPSU, the Committee of State border district, organized new detachments, maritime Security and its local branches took measures during the units, checkpoints of the border troops and battalions of year (covered in this) report to raise Chekist work to a government communications troops. In the KGB branches level adequate for the needs flowing from the present of the (Union) republics, areas and regions bordering on international situation and the interests of communist the PRC, we organized intelligence subdivisions, and in construction in our country. [Ed. Note: The original KGB the frontier areas we created several new city and regional founded in 1917 was known as the Chrezvychainyi komitet offices of the KGB. or Extraordinary Committee, from which comes the

The improvement of the operational and service acronym ChK. One who worked for the ChK was known activities of the KGB branches and troops has also been as a "Chekist.")

ensured through administrative measures aimed at further In accordance with the tasks set by the June (1967) perfection of their structure and personnel. In particular, to CC CPSU plenum, the main attention of the KGB has been achieve more efficient use of operative equipment we devoted first and foremost to strengthening foreign

transformed the second department of the Operationalintelligence, so that it could actively contribute to the Technical Directorate into a separate department of the successful implementation of Soviet foreign policy and Committee. We carried out some required structural could reliably ensure the timely discovery, foiling and changes in the subdivisions of the KGB in charge of unmasking of subversive plans of imperialist countries and engineering, cryptography and the development of new their intelligence services. One of the first-priority

special devices. We set up several special departments in measures in this regard was the reinforcement of the the KGB in connection with the establishment of new and intelligence services by experienced KGB professionals in the deployment of existing large formations and large units the central apparat, as well as in the KGB stations abroad. (ob'edineniia i soedineniia) of the Soviet Army. We set up

In the period under review, special attention was given an Inspectorate under the Chairman of the KGB with the to the organization of active countermeasures against the purpose of improving the system of control and inspection enemy's ideological diversions. Following the decree of of activities of the Chekist offices and units of the KGB the CC CPSU on this issue, passed on 17 June 1967, a troops.

In the period under review the branches of State the intelligence services of socialist countries. They also Security had to fulfill their prescribed tasks in an aggra- uncovered 42 double agents planted by the enemy. vated operational situation. The governments and intelli- The main attention in improvement of counterintelligence services of the USA and other imperialist states have gence work inside the country was focused on its further intensified their aggressive policies and subversive

perfection so as to ensure more efficient struggle with activities with respect to the socialist countries. They military, economic and political espionage. made intense efforts to take advantage of this jubilee year Fulfilling this task in practical terms, the counterintelin the life of the Soviet people [Ed. Note: 50th anniversary ligence branches directed their efforts at carrying out of the 1917 Revolution) to carry out ideological operations measures to gain agents’ access to intelligence and other and to organize large-scale anti-Soviet propaganda.

special services of imperialist states. During 1967 to this In view of the developing situation, the intelligence end the KGB arranged the planting of 31 agents in the service of the KGB carried out a number of measures to enemy's intelligence; of them 12 were located by the help promotion of foreign policy and other initiatives of enemy's special services and subjected to their intense the Soviet Union, to unmask aggressive plans of imperial- scrutiny, which creates preconditions for the accomplishist states, to compromise policies of the American govern- ment of these “plants” in the future. Measures were also ment and the most dangerous enemies of the Soviet state carried out to ensure agents' access to foreign centers that as well as to foil subversive ideological operations targeted plan and implement ideological diversions, and also to by the enemy at the 50th anniversary of Soviet power. anti-Soviet nationalist and religious organizations. Seven The intelligence service of the KGB attributed

agents were planted into their leadership structures. primary significance to the timely acquisition of secret

In order to intercept and control channels of penetrainformation on subversive plots of the enemy and took tion by the enemy into our country, (the KGB] continued measures to develop agents' access, primarily in the USA working on successful accomplishment of operational and other countries of the main enemy, but also took games. Currently, 9 such games are being conducted, measures to create intelligence potential for operations including 4 games with the intelligence of the USA, 8 against the Chinese splitters. During 1967 (the KGB] games with the center of the (Russian émigré organization] recruited 218 foreigners, among whom 64 possess opera- NTS and 2 games with the centers of Ukrainian nationaltional capacities for work against the USA.

ists abroad. Reinforcement of agent networks of the intelligence

As a result of these measures we succeeded in service contributed to obtaining important information on uncovering the encroachments of the enemy intelligence political, military and scientific-technological problems. services in some regions of the Soviet Union, particular in

During 1967 the KGB stations abroad received and the Far East, the Baltic, frontier areas of Ukraine, as well acted on a total of 25,645 informational materials. Beside as at a number of enterprises and scientific research that, the intelligence services of socialist countries sent institutes. We also succeeded in obtaining data on some 7,290 materials in the course of informational exchange. modes of communication between the enemy's intelliDuring 1967 the KGB carried out operations of clandes- gence and agent networks in spotting specific intelligence tine pilfering of secret documents from intelligence officers engaged in enemy activities against the USSR, and services of the enemy. These and other measures resulted in passing to the enemy advantageous information and in obtaining the codes of seven capitalist countries and in disinformation, (even) regarding operational activities. implanting eavesdropping radio-devices at 36 installations More successful fulfilment of the task of penetrating of interest for Soviet intelligence.

the enemy's special services has been facilitated also by On the basis of the data obtained by the intelligence measures of recruiting foreigners. During 1967, 42 agents services, there were prepared and sent to the CC CPSU were recruited, among them 8 diplomats. 4,260 informational reports, to the CC CPSU depart

The counterintelligence service carried out special ments—4,728, to the Foreign Ministry of the USSR- measures which resulted in photocopying 54 documents of 4,832, to the Ministry of Defense and the GRU (Military ambassadors from member countries of NATO, annual Intelligence] of the General Staff of the Soviet Army- reports of some embassies, reports of military attachés, 4,639. The Politburo CC CPSU members received 42 and other classified materials on political, militarybulletins of foreign intelligence information. At the same economic, operational and other matters. In addition, we time we sent to various ministries and agencies of the worked out ciphers and codes in 11 embassies of capitalist USSR 1,495 informational reports, as well as 9,910

countries, which will allow us to decode their corresponmaterials and 1,403 samples of foreign technology. This dence. year, at the request of the Military-Industrial Commission, Among the personnel of diplomatic missions as well we obtained 1,376 works on 210 subjects and over 330 as tourists, businessmen and members of various delegamost recent samples of foreign technology.

tions arriving in the USSR (in 1967 their numbers came up In carrying out measures of counterintelligence, KGB to more than 250 thousand), we spotted over 270 foreignstations prevented the compromise of 22 officers and ers suspected of links to the enemy's special services. On agents of the KGB and GRU and 8 officers and agents of the charges of intelligence activities, participation in acts

of ideological diversion, smuggling, illegal currency operations and violations of the norms of behavior, (the KGB] deported from the USSR 108 foreigners and brought 11 foreigners to justice. The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB, jointly with the organs of security of the GDR, unmasked 17 agents of Western intelligence services who conducted espionage work against the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

In the course of counterintelligence countermeasures with regard to enemy intelligence officers under diplomatic cover and other foreigners under suspicion of being affiliated to the enemy's special services, a number of Soviet citizens who established contact with the aim of passing secret information were discovered and unmasked. Among those persons brought to justice were a senior economist of the scientific research institute of the MVT [Foreign Trade Ministry of the USSR Salov, a senior engineer of the all-union association "Stankoimport” of the MVT of the USSR Seregin, and a technician from an installation of special significance of the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building (cover for the Atomic Energy Program] Malyshev.

While organizing ever more effective struggle with military and economic espionage, the counterintelligence branches of the KGB took measures to reinforce the regime of secrecy, to bring to further perfection the protection of state secrets from the radio-technical and aerial-space means of reconnaissance of the enemy and to foil the enemy's attempts to use for reconnaissance purposes the expansion of the scientific-technical exchange between the USSR and capitalist countries.

The organs of military counterintelligence of the KGB did significant work on camouflaging rocket launching pads, depots of nuclear weapons and other objects from the enemy's space reconnaissance. They worked hard on spotting and prevention of violations in concealed control and command of troops and operating means of communication, as well as on the counterintelligence support of military exercises and maneuvers, and transfers of military equipment.

A place of high visibility in counterintelligence activity went to the measures taken along the lines of trips of Soviet citizens abroad, with the purposes of their protection from machinations of the enemy's intelligence services and for the solution of other operative tasks. As part of delegations, tourist groups and exhibition participants in 1967 the KGB sent 378 operatives to the capitalist countries, and also over 2,200 agents and 4,400 personsin-confidence (doverennykh lits). With their help we spotted 192 foreigners affiliated or suspected of being affiliated with special services of the enemy, thwarted 60 attempts to work on Soviet citizens [to persuade them) not to return to the Motherland; disclosed 230 persons who compromised themselves through incorrect behavior (18 of whom were recalled early to the USSR).

The establishment of subdivisions of the so-called fifth line in the structure of the KGB branches allowed us

to concentrate the needed efforts and means on the countermeasures to fight ideological diversions from outside and anti-Soviet manifestations inside the country. The measures taken in this regard succeeded in general in paralyzing the attempts of enemy special services and propaganda centers to carry out in the Soviet Union a series of ideological diversions, time-linked with the halfcentury anniversary of Great October. Along with unmasking a number of foreigners who arrived in the USSR with assignments of a subversive character, materials were published in the Soviet and foreign press disclosing subversive activities of the enemy's special services, and over 114 thousand letters and banderoles containing anti-Soviet and politically harmful printed materials were confiscated in the international mail.

Since the enemy, in its calculations to unsettle socialism from inside, places its stake mainly on nationalistic propaganda, the KGB branches carried out a number of measures to disrupt attempts to conduct organized nationalist activities in a number of areas of the country (Ukraine, the Baltics, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Armenia, Kabardino-Balkar, Chechen-Ingush, Tatar and Abkhaz Autonomous SSRs).

The measures to spot and undercut the hostile activity of anti-Soviet elements, including church officials and sectarians, were carried out with consideration of the existing data on the growth of hostile and ideologically harmful activity by religious and Zionist centers. To uncover their plots and to foil their subversive actions under preparation, and serve other counterintelligence tasks, the KGB dispatched 122 agents abroad. We also managed to suppress and disrupt hostile activities by the emissaries of foreign religious centers who were sent to the USSR, and to unmask and bring to justice for illegal activity a number of active sectarians.

In 1967 the distribution of 11,856 leaflets and other anti-Soviet anonymous documents on the territory of the USSR was registered. In addition, in the Armenian SSR we confiscated and prevented distribution of another 6,255 leaflets. During the year the KGB established the identity of 1,198 anonymous authors. The majority among them did this because of their political immaturity, and also because of shortcomings in required educational work at the collectives where they work or study. At the same time some select hostile elements chose this way to struggle against Soviet power. Because the number of anonymous authors who distributed malicious anti-Soviet documents owing to hostile convictions increased, there was an increase of those convicted for this type of crime: in 1966 there were 41 of them, and in 1967–114.

An integral part of the activities of KGB military counterintelligence in maintaining combat readiness of Soviet Armed Forces is the prevention of ideological diversions in smaller and larger units of the Army and Navy, to sever in a timely manner the penetration channels of bourgeois ideology. During 1967 we aborted 456 attempts at distribution among military personnel of

manuscripts, foreign magazines and other publications with anti-Soviet and politically harmful content, as well as 80 attempts to set up among the troops various groups of hostile character.

In the system of measures undertaken to better resolve counterintelligence tasks there were important initiatives aimed at reinforcing agent networks. During 1967 the branches of the KGB recruited 24,952 agents, i.e. a figure constituting 15% of the total network personnel, the overall size of which did not change substantially during the year owing to the dropping of others. At the same time forms and methods of “shadowing” (naruzhnoe nabludenie) and operations equipment were improved. Special attention was paid to the development of state-ofthe-art special devices and their supply to the units of intelligence and counterintelligence. Work in this direction is being conducted keeping in mind that the intensification of struggle with an enemy who is equipped with state-of-the-art science and technology requires a wider employment in Chekist work of modern technological devices and therefore a drastic improvement of technological level in the KGB branches which, in turn, leads to a considerable increase in material expenditures for this purpose.

In assessment of the state of operational cases [operativnikh uchetov] of the KGB, one should note that they continued to decrease quantitatively, although only to a small degree. According to the statistics on January 1 of this year, counterintelligence offices of the KGB are working on 1,068 persons, searching for 2,293 persons, and shadowing 6,747 persons.

In 1967 the KGB branches brought to justice 738 persons, 263 for particularly dangerous, and 475 persons for other state crimes. Among those who were convicted for criminal offenses, 3 carried out diversion operations, 121 are traitors and war criminals from the GermanFascist occupation, 34 were indicted for treason to the Motherland and for treasonous plotting, 96 persons-for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, 221 persons—for illegal crossing of state borders, 100 persons-for embezzlement of state and public property in large amounts and for corruption; 148—for illegal smuggling of goods and for violations of currency operations rules; and one foreigner and one Soviet citizen have been arrested for espionage.

During this year the Committee of State Security took a number of effective measures to strengthen legality in the work of the state security organs. Investigation of criminal cases was conducted according to the norms of legal procedures. The cases prepared by the KGB organs in 1967 led to 13 court trials with wide public participation. KGB investigators, acting upon citizen appeals, reviewed 6,732 criminal cases involving 12,376 persons; in 3,783 cases the conclusion was reached to close them.

Great importance was attached to measures of a prophylactic character aimed at prevention of state crimes. In 1967 the KGB branches subjected to prophylactic

treatment 12,115 persons, most of whom revealed manifestations of an anti-Soviet and politically harmful character without hostile intent.

Great importance was attached to further improvement of the protection of the state borders. As before, the borders with Turkey, Iran and Norway were guarded with high-density concentrations of forces and measures. The concentration of forces guarding the borders with the PRC has been almost tripled. To ensure border control along the seacoasts of the Arctic Ocean, a separate Arctic borderguards detachment and a separate air wing were formed.

The borderguard troops in 1967 processed through the borders more than 7.8 million persons, including over 3.5 million foreigners; they did paperwork on and searched 815,564 vehicles; detained 2,026 violators of state borders, among whom they discovered 2 enemy agents and 3 traitors to the Motherland.

In 1967 the border-guard troops at frontier checkpoints and the investigative personnel of the KGB confiscated from smugglers and currency-traders about 30 kilograms of gold bullion and coins, artifacts in precious metals and stones, foreign and Soviet currency and other goods totaling 2,645,000 rubles.

A special service of the KGB carried on interception of encoded communication from 2,002 active radio stations of 115 countries of the world. The units of radio counterintelligence of the service worked on 24 radiocenters of intelligence services of capitalist countries which maintained communications to 108 agent points. 3 new agents' radio-transmitters were detected in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. No agent radiotransmissions were found on the territory of the Soviet Union. The search squads established the addresses of 500 owners of unregistered radio-transmitters in the USSR.

As a result of decoding and deciphering work we read communications in 152 cipher-systems of 72 capitalist countries; in 1967 we broke 11 cipher-systems, and decoded 188,400 telegrams overall.

For the needs of ministries and agencies of the USSR, [the KGB) created 217 codes and other means of handciphering, prepared 1,241,113 key- and recyclable cipher pads, 29,908 copies of codes and code tables, and 305,182 copies of other special documents. All current requests from ministries and agencies of the USSR have been entirely fulfilled. Industry supplied to the lines of communications 8,785 sets of cipher-making and scrambling equipment, which accounted for 100.6% of the planned amount. Tests of operational quality in 217 ciphering bodies and the departments of classified communications of ministries and agencies of the USSR were carried out, and also in 190 ciphering units in Soviet institutions abroad. Random radio-surveillance of 200 radio-networks of public communications and of 102 secret lines of communications of ministries and agencies of the USSR was carried out.

Cooperation of the organs of the KGB with the

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