document should dispel any remaining doubt that the Soviet commander in Cuba, General Pliev, was not given oral authorization to use the tactical nuclear missiles.

The other principal rationale for ANADYR, improving Moscow's position in the strategic balance, is not completely absent from the new operational plan. But it is indirectly expressed. As part of this new version of Operation ANADYR, Khrushchev approved an order that equipped Soviet submarines with nuclear-tipped torpedoes and instructed them to be prepared, upon receipt of an additional order from Moscow, to launch nuclear torpedo attacks on US coastal targets. A list of these targets was appended to this mission statement. It is inconceivable that Khrushchev would have envisioned making nuclear strikes on the US coastline as a means of retaliating for a US strike on Cuba. Certainly, these coastal attacks were designed only to play a part in a general US-Soviet war.

Khrushchev read and approved the revised plan as he did the new tactical deployments. Although the formal date on the document is 8 September, it bears

Khrushchev's signature and the marking 9.7.62 (7 September 1962). Khrushchev was shown this reworked plan in Pitsunda at the same time he formally selected which additional means would be deployed to defend Cuba (Document 1).

Khrushchev's embrace of a nuclear warfighting strategy in September 1962 has widespread implications for understanding the Cold War. Few would have predicted that in response to a US challenge to Cuba that Moscow would put tactical weapons in harm's way. There is no evidence, and there is unlikely to be any, that Khrushchev intended to announce the existence of the Lunas, the FKR cruise missiles and the nuclear payloads for the IL-28s as he was planning to do in the case of the ballistic missiles. The conclusion is inescapable that Khrushchev sent the tactical weapons to Cuba for use in battle, not as a deterrent. In addition, there is much to learn from the celerity with which Khrushchev made this decision about the Soviet Union's willingness to use nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that Malinovskii or the Defense Ministry provided Khrushchev with any military assessment of the implications of placing tactical weapons in Cuba.8 This was not included with the report for Khrushchev. The sequence of events happened too fast. It seems we must come to the conclusion that Moscow placed tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield without any analysis of the threshold between limited and general nuclear war.

The timing of Khrushchev's decision also has interesting implications for students of US foreign policy. Kennedy designed his statement of 4 September for dualpurpose deterrence. He hoped to deter Khrushchev from placing missiles on Cuba-an unlikely event-while deterring (or placating) domestic critics with a stern statement. Now we can say with confidence that Kennedy's maneuver had the opposite effect from what he

had intended. Instead of deterring Khrushchev, Kennedy provoked him to take a greater risk of nuclearizing the superpower conflict over Cuba. The presence of tactical nuclear weapons, which the Soviet leadership intended to use, increased the danger of nuclear war far more than the presence of ballistic missiles, which Khrushchev had always understood to be a deterrent.

9

What should one make of this? In brief, as we demonstrated in One Hell of a Gamble, the Soviet Union in 1962 was both an insecure and a risk-taking power. These two characteristics are the equivalents in international politics of dry wood and gasoline. All that was needed was a spark to set off a conflagration. In his "Long Telegram" of 1946, the father of containment theory, George F. Kennan, argued that Soviet leaders were insecure but unlike Adolf Hitler, they were risk-averse. Paul Nitze, in NSC-68, suggested that the Kremlin was self-confident and prepared to take reasonable risks for world domination. But, as high-level materials from the Cuban crisis make clear, the Soviet Union did not consider itself equal to the United States, or as Khrushchev put it so colorfully, "a member of the World Club": yet Khrushchev was prepared to risk the battlefield use of nuclear weapons to defend his interests in the Caribbean. It is no wonder that Washington proved incapable of predicting Khrushchev's behavior in the summer of 1962.

5

6

Interview with Rada Khrushchev Adzhubei, 5 January 1995. For technical reasons, only two aircraft in the Soviet Air Force, the AN-8 and AN-12, were capable of transporting the missiles and the warheads. The workhorse of the Soviet air force, the larger Ilyushin 114, had the necessary range, 8,000 kilometers, but lacked a cargo opening large enough to move the nuclear weapons and the missiles onto the plane intact. The Defense Ministry calculated that the smaller AN-8 and AN-12 could each carry 2 Lunas and one R-11m. Because these planes were smaller than the IL-114, there would be no room for any additional equipment or the personnel to operate the missiles.

To the Chairman of the Defense Council of the USSR, Comrade N. S. Khrushchev

I am reporting (dokladivaiu)

I. About the possibility of strengthening Cuba by airplane

1. [Numeration follows the original] About the transport by plane of special battle parts (spetsial`nye boevye chasti) [Trans. note: atomic warheads] for the Luna and R-11M rockets.

Training tests have been conducted and practical instructions have been worked out for the transportation of the special battle parts for R-11M rockets on board AN-8 aircraft for two [rockets] and AN-12 for four.

The transport of battle parts for the Luna rocket is practically analogous to that for the R-11M. The transport of special battle parts by TU-114 is not possible for lack of a freight hatch and fasteners.

2. About the transport by plane of R-11M and Luna rockets

The loading, fastening and transport of training R-11M and Luna rockets has been carried out in practice on AN-8 and AN-12 aircraft

3. The size of the freight hold and carrying-capacity of AN-8 (5-8 tons) and AN-12 (7-16 tons) do not permit air transport of launch pads, [etc.]

II. Proposal of the Defense Ministry for reinforcing Group troops on Cuba

In order to reinforce the Group troops on Cuba, send:

1) one squadron of IL-28 bombers in a group of 10-12 aircraft including cargo and guard (countermeasures) (postanovshchiki pomekh) planes, with PRTB (?) of the automobile kind and six atomic bombs (407N), each of 812 kilotons [of explosive] power.

[In Khrushchev's handwriting on top of "II." and "1" above]: Send to Cuba six IL-28s with atomic warheads (atomnymi golovkami). [three words illegible] [signed] N. S. Khrushchev 7.IX.1962.

2) One R-11M rocket brigade made up of three divisions (total 1221 men, 18 R-11M rockets) with PRTB (324 men) and 18 special battle parts which the PRTB is capable of storing/defending(khranit')

3) Two-three divisions of Luna included in separate motorized infantry regiments in Cuba. Each Luna division

7.IX.62

a) Regarding missile forces

The missile forces that form the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and the island of Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow (po signalu iz Moskvy), to deal a nuclear missile strike to the most important targets [ob'ekty] in the United States of America (list of targets included in attachment #1) [Ed. Note: This attachment has yet to be located.]....

d) Regarding the Naval Fleet

The Naval Fleet Group must not allow ships and transport vessels of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the US naval base in Guantanamo and provide cover for their transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.

Nuclear missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, a nuclear missile strike on the most important coastal targets in the USA (list of targets provided in attachment #1).

The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One divisional brigade of high-speed cruisers should be located around Banes.

6. The operational uses of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba should be formulated by 01 November 1962. [Ed. Note: 1 November is written in a different hand from the rest of the document.] Attachments:

1. List of targets for missile forces and nuclear missile submarines for working out flight paths-attached separately.

2. List of the battle composition of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba on 3 pages, r[ecord] r/t #154

3. List of launching mechanisms, missiles and nuclear warheads possessed by the Military Group, on 2 pages, r[ecord] r/t #164.

Zhou Enlai Explains China's Decision to Explode the Second Atomic Bomb

Introduction and Translation by Qiang Zhai

On 16 October 1964, China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, an underground explosion at the Lop Nur test facility. Seven months later on 14 May 1965, Beijing succeeded in testing its second atomic bomb, this one an aerial drop. On May 21, Zhou Enlai made a speech at a war-planning meeting of the Central Military Commission, explaining the party's decision for the explosion of the second bomb. Zhou's remarks are notable for two things: first they highlight Mao Zedong's role in setting the general time frame for the test; second, they demonstrate that Chinese leaders fully considered the pros and cons of the possible effects of the explosion on international. opinion, especially in the Third World, and believed that they could persuade world opinion to support China's action.

Zhou's speech was published in Dangde wenxian (Party Documents), No. 3, 1994. Translation excerpts follow.

Zhou Enlai's Speech at the War-Planning Meeting of the Central Military Commission, 21 May 1965

The current international situation-particularly the national, democratic, and revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—is a developing one. Take a look at Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are incidents everywhere and all of them are the direct results of American imperialism. The United States has created all these problems, causing many of its allies and friends to break away. [Ed. Note: Within the past month, the United States had sent Marines to suppress what it called a communist revolt in the Dominican Republic, arousing heavy international criticism.] The atomic test we have just conducted is the best proof. We decided this year to explode the second atomic bomb. Because the bomb would be air dropped, we decided to carry out the test between April and May. The test could not be done too early. It had to be done between April and May. We chose May. Are we going to encounter more opposition this time than we did last year? Just the opposite. It was a test for us when we set the time during the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. The Chairman [Mao Zedong] made the decision to press ahead with the explosion in anticipation of condemnation. Of course, the specific date of explosion was left for the Special Committee2 to decide. The front command made decisions on specifics, and in the rear I discussed [broader issues] with Luo Ruiqing.3 Politically, this was the moment when the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference met in Ghana.

There is a historical lesson, that is, at the time of the

First Non-Aligned Meeting in Yugoslavia in [autumn] 1961, Khrushchev wanted to test a big atomic bomb in order to show off, to intimidate and frighten people, but he triggered opposition from all over the world. Delegations were sent to the United States and the Soviet Union to appeal for a suspension of the test. Last year, before we exploded our bomb, India asked China not to conduct the nuclear test. But India obtained only two votes and its proposal did not pass. We went ahead with our explosion. Last year, we selected the time of explosion after the Second Non-Aligned Meeting. This time we chose to test before the Second Afro-Asian Conference. We did consider the issue of possible reactions when the AfroAsian Solidarity Meeting was in session. Maybe the situation has changed this time. At the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting, we met a lot of people, who in public expressed regret and advised us to stop testing. But in private they congratulated us. This shows that nationalism has two sides. On the one hand, because nationalist countries oppose imperialism, they support us. Our possession of the nuclear bomb has not only encouraged them but also strengthened their power. On the other hand, pressured by imperialism, induced by the Soviet Union, and influenced by the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [signed by the United States and Soviet Union in the summer of 1963], they expressed regret. Wherever we went, we came across such mixed feelings. But this time we did not expect that so many people would hail our test. This year, only the United States showed little reaction because it wanted to downplay our role. Although it did not respond in public, it was actually worried at heart. This time, the people of the world, including the Japanese people, hailed and congratulated us, and expressed happiness.

I have also conducted a survey: when we were carrying out the nuclear test, two entertainment groups from Japan were in China. Because Japan has been attacked by two atomic bombs and has suffered, it opposes nuclear tests. The members of the two groups were middle-of-the-roaders. Some were to the left of the middle and others to the right of the middle. I had two conversations with them. I said: "When we possess atomic bombs, it means that the Japanese also possess them. We all oppose nuclear bombs. You have been hit by two atomic bombs and you have made contributions to the whole world, because everybody in the world now opposes nuclear war. Without the sacrifice caused by those two atomic bombs, how could international attention be focused? Without the harm done by poisonous gas, how could people come to oppose gas warfare? There is always a price to pay." Chairman Mao has also said that when a heavy price had been paid, people would not dare to use such weapons again. At the moment, there is the atomic bomb [in China's possession]. In the future, there will be the hydrogen bomb as well as long-distance missiles. The United States may employ tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. It may use such weapons against China later. As

Chinese we must be confident that no matter how many people will die in a nuclear war in the future, we will win world peace eventually. Just as Chairman Mao has pointed out, we will win peace, and win the victory of antiimperialist war. If the United States attacks us, it will mean the coming of the time to eliminate nuclear war once and for all. That is because, when the United States drops a nuclear bomb on us and causes damage to part of China, it will alienate the people of the world, including the American people. If the Soviet Union refuses to intervene in such a situation, then it is taking the first step in the direction of sitting on the top of a mountain to watch tigers fight. In that case, the American people need to consider the consequences and so do the Japanese people. When the atomic bomb is shot over their heads toward us, the Japanese will suffer more damages than we will. Japan has a population of one hundred million concentrated on several large islands. It has many industries. At present, Japan is doing the opposite of what we are doing: instead of building an underground railway, it is constructing a railway above ground from Tokyo to Osaka. We can not do that. If we do that, we do not know how much damage we will incur when nuclear war comes. Therefore, we must be prepared to pay a price to win international sympathy and support. As to those visitors from the Japanese entertainment world, most of them are afraid of war. After my talks with them, they felt that they had confidence when they stood beside China. One of them revealed his true feeling. He said that "I was unhappy when I first learned about your test. After hearing your talk, I have come to believe that we should hail your test. We should stand together." This shows that people's minds can be changed. From this perspective, our current prestige in the world has risen.

At present, the Soviet Union is also deliberately underestimating us. In reality, it is afraid of us. At the moment, the United States is afraid of us and so is Britain. France also feels that it is lagging behind. It realizes that it has not developed the manufacturing technique that we have now. Although France has been engaged in its nuclear program for many years, it has only tested a few devices and it can not air drop the atomic bomb. Its uranium-235 factory will not be put into production until 1969. For this reason, the United States has decided to fight a large war and the Soviet Union will participate. But it will take many steps to reach that point. It is not a simple matter. We should be prepared for that eventuality. The more we are prepared, the more the enemy wants to

retreat.

Qiang ZHAI teaches history at Auburn University at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994).

1

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), is by far the best source available in English on the history of China's nuclear weapons program, but its treatment of the explosion of China's second atomic bomb is quite brief (see p. 208).

Since the publication of Lewis and Xue's book, a number of fresh Chinese sources have emerged, adding new detail to the knowledge of the role of such leading figures as Mao, Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, and Song Renqiong in the development of China's nuclear weapons. The most notable among them are: Wei Wei, chief comp., Nie Rongzhen zhuan (Biography of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1994) and Song Renqiong, Song Renqiong huiyilu (Memoirs of Song Renqiong) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1994). Based on party and military archives, Wei's book is the official biography of Marshal Nie Rongzhen and part of the Contemporary China series. Song Renqiong served as head of the ministry in charge of nuclear industry between 1956-1960. Among other revelations in his memoirs, Song described the rise and fall of Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation between 1956-1959. He discussed in detail his participation in Nie Rongzhen's 1957 trip to Moscow, where the two countries signed the New Defense Technical Accord, in which the Soviet Union agreed to provide China with the prototype atomic bomb, missiles, and related data.

This refers to the Fifteen-Member Special Committee, headed by Zhou Enlai, which was created in November 1962 to take charge of China's nuclear program.

3 Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

The Conference on Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis,

International Dimensions

Raymond L. Garthoff

[Co-editor's Note: The following essay by Raymond Garthoff is a first report on the conference "Poland 1980/ 81: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," held in Jachranka/Warsaw on 7-10 November 1997, opening what promises to be a controversial debate on the results of the meeting. Co-organized by the National Security Archive, the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and CWIHP, the conference produced a great amount of new documentation and testimony by participants from all sides of the conflict. The conference was covered in New York Times articles (by Jane Perlez and Tina Rosenberg), the Los Angeles Times (by Malcolm Byrne and Pawel Machcewicz), and the international press. Future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin and CWIHP Working Papers, as well as a comprehensive National Security Archive Document Reader will feature further new evidence and analyses. The conference was made possible by financial support from the Open Society Institute (New York), John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago), the Smith Richardson Foundation (Westport, CT), the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Washington, D.C.), the Committee for Scientific Research (Warsaw), as well as the Batory Foundation (Warsaw). CWIHP is pleased to note the efforts of major contributors to the success of both conferences: Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive), Jim Hershberg (George Washington University), Andrzej Paczkowski, Pawel Machcewicz, Dariusz Stola and Ryszard Zelichowski (all at the Institute of Political Studies/PAS). For further information on the conference, contact Malcolm Byrne at the National Security Archive in Washington, DC. (Fax: 202-994-7005; Tel: 202-994-7000; email: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu) or Andrzej Paczkowski at the Institute of Political Studies in Warsaw (Fax: 48-22252146, email: POLITIC@ISPPAN.WAW.PL).]

The fourth in the series of international conferences on Eastern European "flashpoints" in the Cold War, dealing with the crisis in Poland in 1980-82, was held in Jachranka, Poland, on 8-10 November 1997. The conference was co-sponsored by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. As in the earlier conferences in this series, new documentary sources were made available, mostly before the conference began, and the conference included both participants in the crisis and the scholars studying it. Most of the new archival materials in this instance were Polish, but some very useful new documents were found in other Eastern European and Moscow archives. A number of