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Alliance: 10

a

aging dictator to help salvage the deteriorating Grand documentation is far from complete.

Research Notes on Soviet intelligence and documents on nuclear

weapons in Cuba and China, among others, President Truman had sent him (Hopkins) to have the conclude Bulletin 10. Andropov's 1967 report, his first as kind of frank talk with Marshal Stalin that we all know KGB Chairman, gives us an inside overview of the world's Marshal Stalin liked to have.

largest intelligence agency charged with both domestic and

foreign responsibilities. For millions, the Cold War is The two Stalin conversations in this Bulletin show the synonymous with nuclear terror. In this Bulletin the dictator in two moods, in two roles. Other talks show other moment of purest dread (at least for Americans) comes on facets. Scholars in possession of transcripts, memcons, page 227, when the Soviet rocket forces on Cuba are reports and memoir materials in any language on Stalin's ordered to be prepared, following a signal from Moscow, meetings with top leaders in the period 1939-1953 are to deal a nuclear missile strike to the most important invited to contribute and send them to CWIHP by mail or targets in the United States of America." FAX. The 3-4 October 1997 Stalin Workshop in Budapest The next to last article leads off a series of CWIHP and the 19-20 March 1998 Moscow Workshop will be publications dealing with Ukraine. Together with the followed by other Stalin events.

Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, CWIHP The section on the End of the Cold War is also the has begun a Kyiv initiative. It was almost axiomatic overture to a larger project, jointly planned with the among sovietologists that the Soviet Union could not National Security Archive at George Washington Univer- survive the loss of Ukraine. Khrushchev, who served as sity and leading to commemorative activities and publica- Party boss there in the 1930s and 1940s, and then went on tions in 1999-2001. The nearness of the events to be to become General Secretary in Moscow, certainly thought covered will almost certainly inspire controversy.11 This so. In his concluding remarks to the July 1955 CC CPSU issue of the Bulletin aims only to raise the thorny question plenum, Khrushchev exclaimed: 12 of dating the Cold War's demise by publishing two sets of documents that offer divergent perspectives from different someone set us such conditions: to separate the regions of the world, Southeast Europe and Northeast

Russians from the Ukrainians or Belorussians, what Asia. The Soviet Foreign Ministry's presentation to the would we say? We would say, without pausing for American Ambassador of the “Brezhnev doctrine" as a gift thought: You take your proposals to the mother of God on Christmas Eve, 24 December 1989, bears note as a key (k bozhei materi). symbolic turning point. The Cherniaev excerpt, previously available to Japanese readers only, reveals the long and The first installment on the Ukrainian initiative is Mark laborious process by which Gorbachev tried to change the Kramer's presentation of the diary of Politburo member, insular nature of Soviet-Japanese relations, but he ran out Petro Shelest, who served simultaneously as Ukrainian of time.

Communist Party First Secretary. This top-level source The Deng section invokes the memory of the late adds a whole new subplot to the history of the Prague paramount leader of the PRC by shedding light on his role Spring, while highlighting the largely unexplored imporin Sino-Soviet affairs between 1956 and 1963, the very

tance of Ukraine (and Slovakia) in the Cold War. 13 years when fraternal relations were breaking down. Was renewed entente possible even as late as 1962? Did a group within the CCP leadership favor this option, even counter to Mao Zedong's views? These are crucial

1997 has been a busy year at the Cold War Project. In questions for understanding the ultimate end of Sino

addition to serving as organizer or lead co-organizer of Soviet cooperation, the origins of the Cultural Revolution

conferences/workshops in Beijing, Budapest, Warsaw and and the prehistory of the Strategic Triangle. Just as Washington, CWIHP put up a new website at: Bulletins 6–9 and the CWIHP conference at the University of Hong Kong in January 1996 focused attention on Sino

cwihp.si.edu. Soviet disagreements regarding the Korean War, even at the height of the two regimes' intimacy, Bulletin 10 and The ease and availability of web use as a reference tool has the October 1997 Beijing conference co-sponsored by risen greatly in the past five years. Furthermore, as CWIHP (See pp. 150–151) highlight documents on

CWIHP-published materials multiply, the information persistent themes and practices of unity, where the powers becomes much more accessible via electronic search than of hindsight would emphasize ineluctable discord. Once

in print. The inclusion below of the Gromyko-Vance talks again, access to East-bloc documents shows that these of 28-30 March 1977 illustrates the division of labor. One historical processes were much more complex and multi- printed Bulletin page is devoted to excerpts and overview, sided than previous analysts have portrayed them (or while the Electronic Bulletin carries the twenty-page full indeed, could portray them in the absence of archival

text. Of course, those who want to read hardcopy should access). Of course, many aspects are still unclear and the

feel free to download and reproduce. CWIHP is committed

to helping all those who want to read our electronic publications up onto the web.

It is traditional at this point to make acknowledgements, although I know I do not have enough space to name all those who have contributed to this Bulletin and Electronic Bulletin. First of all, I want to thank Dean Anderson, George Bowen, Joe Brinley, Sam Crivello, Rob Litwak, John Martinez, Michael O'Brien, and the Smithsonian Institution, without whom the website would have never happened. Christian Ostermann was the best Co-editor and Associate Director one could wish for. Christa Sheehan Matthew deserves full credit for the greatly improved appearance, layout, and French translations. I am grateful to Andrew Grauer for putting up with some unusual scheduling. Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie is the name that appears most often in this Bulletin, because he translated much more than his share. Without Tom Blanton, CHEN Jian, Leo Gluchowski, Mark Kramer, Odd Arne Westad, and Vlad Zubok, I might have despaired of finally getting the Bulletin out. Without Jim and Annie Hershberg, I certainly would have.

Wishing everybody happy archival hunting in 1998.

Poland and Hungary, see Mark Kramer, “New Evidence on
Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian
Crises” CWIHP Bulletin 8-9, pp. 358-410. This is also the longest
CWIHP Bulletin article of all time.
7

Of course, we should not forget that if Khrushchev, in attacking Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov can allow himself to mock the whole Soviet diplomatic corps by saying, “that is what it means to be a diplomat-he sees, and I don't see anything. (laughter in the hall)," any bickering over foreign policy issues may actually mask a personal attack on the Foreign Minister or his institutional stronghold, the “MID.” For quote, see p. 42 below. 8

To a certain extent, it appears that the Soviet Presidium was trying to replicate its own “collective” nature in other East-bloc countries by removing the Stalinist party chieftains, who had ruled the fraternal parties in a dictatorial manner. In the Hungarian document, Matyas Rakosi, Hungary's mini-Stalin, was forced to humble himself with such comments as: “Regarding hubris, that's an illness that one can not detect, just like one can not smell one's own odor.” On the scope of change, Molotov was most direct : “The comrades had a chance to become convinced that even though we are talking about Hungary, this issue is not only Hungary, but all the peoples' democracies." (See pp. 85, 83 below.) 9

This is not to say that Stalin was loquacious. It is unimaginable that Stalin would speak for hours impromptu like Khrushchev (pp. 44ff. below) or Gorbachev (pp. 196 ff.). 10 On the Hopkins mission, see William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy : From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York, 1982), pp. 101, 103-7. The Harriman quote comes from a memorandum of conversation for the 26 May 1945 meeting between Hopkins and Stalin held in Box 179 of the Harriman Papers in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The editor is grateful to Jim Hershberg for locating and providing this document. 11 Examples of such discussions are: “The Kramer-Blight et al. Debate on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Cuba” (Bulletin 3), “The Sudoplatov Controversy on Atomic Espionage(Bulletins 4, 5), and “The Cumings-Weathersby Exchange on Korean War Origins" (Bulletin 6-7). 12

43 below. 13 In Summer 1997, a CWIHP delegation consisting of Jim Hershberg, Mark Kramer, David Wolff and Vladislav Zubok visited the archives of Chisinau (Kishinev), Kyiv, Riga, and Vilnius, where over 8000 pages of materials (often unavailable in Moscow) were gathered. These will be an important resource in the preparation of planned CWIHP Bulletins on "Intelligence and the Cold War,” “Nationalism and the Cold War," and "The End of the Cold War,” as well as for additional publications on Cold War crises in Central and Eastern Europe.

David Wolff, Editor
CWIHP Bulletin and CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.

See p.

1

A. I. Mikojan, the longest serving member of the Presidium/ Politburo (1926-1966), wrote these words in reaction to the presentation to the Presidium of the (P.N.) Pospelov report, the first detailed, documented study of Stalin's mass slaughter of Party cadres. For more on this, see Naumov and Gluchowski articles below. Mikoian's Memoirs are cited as Presidential Archive of the Russian Federation (AP RF), f. 39, op.3, d. 120, although it appears that the file has actually already been transferred to the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Contemporary Documentation (RTsKhIDNI) in preparation for declassification. 2

Stalin was a night owl and, therefore, so were his minions. On the abolition of nocturnal summonses under Khrushchev, see John Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford University Press: New York, 1997), p. 206. 3

On the assassination plans, see p. 137 below. 4

The materials of the March 1953 plenums can be found in TsKhSD (Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation), f.2, op.1, dd.23-26; Additional materials are available on Reel 7 of the Volkogonov papers in an article draft entitled “Smert' Stalina” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Collection); Qualified medical personnel had become scarce after Stalin took to torturing his doctors, an ultimately effective, though indirect, way for one of history's greater tyrants to hasten his own end. 5

Vojtech Mastny has recently argued in his Beer-prize winning book (see p. 74 below) that only “irresistible Western pressure" coinciding with internal crisis might have caused significant change in the Kremlin's policies. See Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press: New York, 1996), p. 190. 6 V. N. Malin was head of the General Department of the CC CPSU under Khrushchev and kept detailed notes of Presidium discussions and decisions. For his notes on the crises of 1956 in

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