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discussion of the German question" while "along with all of you" introducing "initiatives at the Presidium aimed at the correct solution of issues, such as the Korean one, the German one." A year-and-a-half later, at the January 1955 CC CPSU Plenum, Beriia's ally in 1953, Malenkov, now under attack by Khrushchev and Molotov, “admitted" that he had been wrong in 1953 when he held the view that "the task of socialist development in Democratic Germany" was "incorrect." "Today I admit that I essentially took a wrong position on the German Question."40

Additional evidence is provided by secondary figures such as KGB operative Pavel Sudoplatov, a close collaborator of Beriia. In his memoirs Special Tasks, Sudoplatov recounts that as early as April, "[p]rior to the May Day celebration in 1953, Beriia ordered me to prepare topsecret intelligence probes to test the feasibility of unifying Germany. He told me that the best way to strengthen our world position would be to create a neutral, unified Germany run by a coalition government. Germany would be the balancing factor between American and Soviet interests in Western Europe. East Germany, the German Democratic Republic, would become an autonomous province in the new unified Germany." According to Sudoplatov, Beriia intended to air the idea through his intelligence contacts in Central Europe and “begin negotiations with the Western powers."41 Similarly, Vladimir Semenov, who, as head of the responsible division within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, participated in the key meetings of the Soviet leadership on Germany (as) well as the later meetings with the SED leaders), charges in his 1995 memoirs that Beriia was pursuing a line on Germany which would have "disrupted the continuity of our policy on the German question and aimed at shocking the Soviet Union and eliminating the GDR." Semenov reports that during a Presidium meeting "in the second half of May, 1953," Beriia, once called on, “took a paper out of his jacket pocket, without haste, as if he was the master of the house, put on his glasses and read his own draft on German policy. It differed fundamentally from the one which I carried in my bag.”42

Serious doubts, however, have been raised about the existence of a "Beriia plan." Thus far, the evidence on Beriia's role in the decision-making process within the Kremlin is fragmentary, biased and contradictory. The transcript of the May 27 Presidium meeting at which Beriia supposedly made his proposal remains classified in the Presidential Archive in Moscow. Mention of Beriia's alleged initiative on the German question was first made by his opponents at the July 1953 CPSU Plenum that condemned him, following his arrest on June 26.43 It is probable that the charges about Beriia's views on the German question, made by Khrushchev and others at the Plenum, were motivated largely by a desire to portray Beriia in most sinister ways and to characterize him as a traitor to the socialist cause, as a Western agent and provocateur. United in their fear of the brutal KGB chief and desirous to eliminate a strong competitor in the

struggle for supremacy within the Kremlin, Beriia's opponents might well have fabricated, distorted or 44 exaggerated any difference of opinion on his part."

The documents presented here suggest a somewhat different interpretation. They certainly reflect Beriia's activism in the foreign policy field, especially on the German question. What is striking, however, is the fact that Beriia managed to gain Presidium approval for the demarche to the Soviet Control Commission, which in turn, with its May 18 critique of the SED's indifference and mishandling, set the tone for the May 27 meeting and the June 2 "New Course" document. Beriia's initiative in early May thus turned into a Presidium-approved SCC investigation into and review of the situation in Germany which most likely forced the Foreign Ministry to take a much more critical attitude towards the SED's policy. At least initially, therefore, Beriia's views on Germany apparently corresponded with the thinking within the SCC and were not blocked within the Presidium. Beriia's continued prominence in foreign affairs after the May 27 meeting see his active participation in the discussions with the German and Hungarian leaders — also lends weight to this argument.

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The available documentation through May 27, of course, does not preclude the possibility that Beria put forth a more drastic approach to the German problem at the Presidium meeting. Whether he did so or not, within days the Council of Ministers agreed on a draft resolution, which was adopted as an order "On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR," dated June 2. Thus far, only draft versions of the document and 45 its German translation have been available to scholars." For the first time, an English translation of the original Russian version is printed below. Sharply criticizing the "incorrect political line" of forced construction of socialism in the GDR, the resolution called for an end to the "artificial establishment of agricultural production cooperatives" and to the prohibitive taxation of private enterprise, for support of small and medium-size enterprises, for an increase in mass consumption production at the expense of heavy industry as well as for the elimination of the ration card system. The resolution also recommended strengthening democratic rights in East Germany, changing the excessively punitive criminal code, ending the crude interference in church affairs, and "eradicating" the brutal administrative methods by which the SED regime had been ruling. Significantly, the order also emphasized that it was necessary to put the "tasks of the political struggle to reestablish the national unity of Germany" at the center of attention.

The same day, the Moscow leaders expressed their concerns about the GDR to an arriving East German delegation, composed of Ulbricht, GDR Premier Otto Grotewohl and Fred Oelßner, confronted it with the resolution and, after Oelẞner had translated the document, asked for a response by the next day. According to Grotewohl's fragmentary notes, the East German propos

als, half-heartedly drafted during the night and tabled the next day in their meetings with Malenkov, Beriia, Molotov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoian, Kaganovich, Semenov and Grechko, apparently fell short of Soviet expectations. "Our document is a reversal, yours is [just] reform," an exasperated Kaganovich exclaimed.46 According to the memoirs of SED Politburo member Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of the party organ Neues Deutschland, the SED leaders had to take quite a beating as all of the Soviet comrades rejected the superficial draft. Beriia displayed particular aggressiveness, allegedly throwing the documents at Ulbricht across the table with the words: "This is a bad remake of our document!"47

The Soviet leaders acknowledged that "we all have made mistakes" and that the recommendations were not

stood for the accelerated socialization program. Following
their return to Berlin on June 5, however, discussion
within the SED Politburo of how and when to publicize
the New Course document quickly turned into criticism of
Ulbricht's dictatorial leadership style. During SED
Politburo meetings on June 6 and 9, fellow Politburo
members vented their dissatisfaction with the Ulbricht's
personality cult and management of the Secretariat.
Semenov, who had returned with the SED delegation from
Moscow and participated in the sessions, seemed increas-
ingly inclined to support Ulbricht's critics.54 Arguing
against any great celebration planned for Ulbricht's 60th
birthday (June 30) during the forthcoming 13th Central
Committee Plenum, Semenov recommended that the SED
leader celebrate the way Lenin did his 50th birthday, by

meant as “accusations," but insisted that "everything has to "inviting a few friends to drop in for dinner."55 The

be based on a change in the conditions in the G.D.R."
Demanding that the SED leaders should "not worry about
[their] prestige," Malenkov warned that "if we don't
correct [the political line] now, a catastrophe will happen."
The Soviet leaders appealed to the Germans to "correct
fast and vigorously.” “Much time has been lost. One has to
act quickly." And in a manner, as Molotov curiously
added, "that all of G[ermany] can see it.
48

The June 2-4 talks with the East German leaders have to be viewed against the background of a larger effort by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership to halt and mitigate some of the worst excesses of Stalinist rule in East Central Europe. Similar talks, which, in each case, resulted in the announcement of a "New Course" program were held with the Hungarian leadership (13-16 June 1953)49 and the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha later that month.50 The transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian talks on June 13-16,51

are instructive for several reasons: Much fuller than the

fragmentary Grotewohl notes,52 the transcript of the
Soviet-Hungarian meeting is striking for its similarities: as
in the German case, the discussion focused on the "auda-
cious" industrialization and socialization drive and the
abuses of power (especially by the security police), though
cadre questions received considerable attention, too. As
before with the East Germans, the Soviet leaders "ur-
gently" demanded changes and warned that “a catastrophe
will occur if we do not improve the situation." Once again,
Malenkov and Beriia were harshest and most "passionate"
in their criticism, though Molotov and Bulganin did not
lag behind. Unlike the earlier talks with the German
leaders, however, Soviet criticism was vented primarily at
premier and party chief Matyas Rakosi, the leading
proponent of Stalinist rule in Hungary. Criticism of
Rakosi's rule, his personal involvement in most political
issues, and his "personality cult" quickly produced
changes within the leadership: within days of their return
from Moscow, Rakosi resigned from the premiership
which was given to the agrarian specialist Imre Nagy
(though Rakosi stayed on as party leader).53

Grotewohl's notes of the June 2-4 Kremlin meetings do not reflect any personal criticism of Ulbricht, who had

Politburo finally decided to draw up a comprehensive
statement on "the self-criticism of the work of the Polit-
buro and the Secretariat" which would be presented to the
CPSU Central Committee Presidium. It also resolved to set
up a commission, composed of Ulbricht, State Security
chief Wilhelm Zaisser, Oelßner, Herrnstadt, and Berlin
SED boss Hans Jendretzky, to "prepare an organizational
reform of the working methods of the Politburo and
Secretariat." 56

A recently declassified report to the USSR Minister of
Internal Affairs, S. Kruglov by the KGB deputy resident in
Berlin, Ivan Fadeikin, throws new light on the events
within the SED Politburo. In a June 30 conversation with
Soviet officials, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply
Curt Wach reported on the opposition which the New
Course instructions from Moscow, particularly the shift of
resources from the heavy to consumer goods industries,
had encountered within the SED Politburo on June 9. Just
about everybody seemed to oppose a plan tabled by the
Minister of Machine Construction, Hermann Rau accord-
ing to which 1.3 billion marks would be reallocated to
light industries. Key members of the SED leadership -
Rau himself, Wilhelm Leuschner, Chairman of the State
Planning Commission, Fritz Selbmann, Minister for the
Ore-Mining Industry, Fred Oelẞner, Anton Ackermann
opposed the plan to cut back on heavy industry. According
to Wach, Ulbricht most vehemently spoke out against the
plan, arguing that "[w]e cannot free up such resources.
Rau's plan disorganizes the national economy, and our
economy is already disorganized as it is." With the GDR
lacking sufficient resources, Ulbricht instead favored a
different approach. Shifting the burden to the Soviets, who
after all, had decreed the policy shift, he argued that "we
should turn to the Soviet government with the request that
they lower the reparations payments." A fellow Politburo
member succinctly pointed to the thought that must have
been on everybody's mind: the only way "to get out of this
catastrophic situation and improve our position" was for
the Soviet Union to "[render] us the same help that the
USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall
Plan." As Wach recounted, "[n]oone reacted to this

statement."57

Most Politburo members agreed that the announcement of the New Course program warranted careful preparation of the party and the population at large, but Semenov urged speedy implementation of Moscow's instructions. When, on the evening of June 10, Herrnstadt pleaded with Semenov to give the SED two week's time to prepare the policy change, the High Commissioner insisted that "the communiqué has to be in the paper tomorrow, warning the Neues Deutschland editor that "you may not have a state for much longer."58

Heeding Semenov's order, the Politburo announced the "New Course" liberalization program in Neues Deutschland on June 11. As expected by Herrnstadt and others, the communiqué with its frank admission of past mistakes came as a surprise to many in and out of the party. Reports from local party organizations, carefully monitored by the SED headquarters in Berlin indicated with great candor the widespread disappointment, disbelief, confusion and shock within party ranks as well as the populace. To many, the communiqué signaled the SED's final bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise. Party members felt betrayed and “panicky," others even called for Ulbricht's resignation. Many thought the SED retreat from crash socialization resulted from pressure by the West German government under Konrad Adenauer and the Western powers, evidenced by such reports as the one from the small town of Seehausen where "the entire village is in the bar, drinking to the health of Adenauer.” To make matters worse, the only segment of the population which seemed to have been excluded from the New Course liberalization were paradoxically- - the workers: the raised work norms arbitrarily imposed on May 28 remained in force. Labor dissatisfaction was further fueled when the SED regime, groping to maintain its authority, confirmed the controversial norm increases on June 13.59

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The internal events in East Germany from the New Course announcement through the first days of the uprising have been treated elsewhere.60 Suffice it to say

that the riots and demonstrations, which climaxed on 17 June, eventually engulfed more than 350 cities and villages in the GDR, and more than 500,000 people throughout the GDR marched in defiance of the regime. Both the SED leaders and the Soviets were surprised by the extent of the uprising. Underestimating the crisis situation and eager not to precipitate bloodshed, the Soviet Berlin commandant, General Dibrova, balked when East Berlin police chief Waldemar Schmidt requested authority on the morning of June 16 to clamp down on the demonstrators. 61 Complaining about the hesitant, even passive, initial response on the part of the Soviets, Schmidt later charged that “if we had taken strong action immediately, the whole thing would have been forgotten."62 Fearful of wider unrest the next day and a statewide general strike, Soviet troops did finally, in the early morning hours of June 17, enter East Berlin, and by 1 p.m. that day, Soviet military authorities

declared martial law. In the evening, Berlin's citywide traffic was interrupted and the East sector sealed off.

The reaction to the crisis by Soviet diplomatic and military observers in East Germany can now be documented in detail.63 What is striking about the reports is how quickly the Soviet representatives assumed that the uprising had been instigated by the West. As early as the evening of June 16, High Commissioner Semenov and General Grechko, in reporting on the day's events, pointed to the fact that persons from West Berlin participated in the demonstrations in increasing numbers. According to Semenov and Grechko, "large crowds started arriving from West [Berlin]" late on June 16, and it was "mainly West Berliners" who were rioting in the streets of Berlin. Citing the evening edition of the local newspaper Der Abend, they concluded that it was "clear from the reports of the West German press and radio that the above-mentioned hostile actions have been organized from West Berlin."64 The next day, Grechko cabled to Bulganin that “[i]t may be considered that a special organization based in West Berlin has directed the strikes in East Berlin." "Analyzing the situation," Grechko continued, “I have also come to the conclusion that the provocation was prepared in advance, organized and directed from the Western sectors of Berlin. The simultaneous actions in the majority of the big cities of the GDR, the same demands of the rebels everywhere as well as the same anti-state and anti-Soviet slogans have proved such a conclusion."65 KGB sources soon provided details on alleged Western subversion, mentioning in particular the activities of the Berlin-based anti-Communist organization "Fighting Group Against Inhumanity."66 General Vasilii Sokolovskii, deputy USSR defense minister confirmed this judgement the day after his arrival in Berlin. Given that the disorders had erupted simultaneously in Berlin and other major cities and that “the same tactics of action were used everywhere," the uprising had to have been "prepared beforehand on the entire territory of the German Democratic Republic and aimed at making a coup d'état."67

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Considering the perception that the West had instigated the crisis, Soviet authorities in Berlin as well as the Soviet leadership in Moscow were carefully monitoring Western troop movements on the GDR border. Semenov remembers that during those days, "the telephones kept ringing. Khrushchev called several times, even more often did Molotov and others."68 The Soviets knew that U.S., British and French troops in the Western sectors of Berlin had been put on higher alert status on June 17. In the early morning hours of June 18, Soviet military intelligence learned that the 7th U.S. Army and the 12th Air Force unit in Western Germany, as well as NATO headquarters, were put on alert. Within three hours, however, Grechko could reassure Moscow: The alert of U.S. forces had been cancelled.69 Given the restrained and passive Western response to the events in the East sector, it must have been evident to Soviet authorities that Western troop alerts had likely been defensive in nature.

According to Semenov, Sokolovskii in turn ordered the state of alert for Soviet border troops canceled and took precautions to avoid unintended incidents, which could have caused a military confrontation with the West. As Semenov put it in his memoirs in rather dramatic terms: "The danger of events developing into a Third World War had been banished."70

For days if not weeks Soviet military authorities remained concerned about continuing signs of resistance - in particular continuing strikes - throughout the GDR, and arrests continued in high numbers through the end of June. Yet as early as June 19, Moscow was receiving clear signals that the immediate danger to the SED regime had passed. That day, Grechko informed the Soviet leadership that "street disorders on the territory of the GDR have ended everywhere." A growing number of workers were resuming work, and SED activists were back in the factories, propagandizing the SED's interpretation of the riots. Much to the Soviet observers' satisfaction, more and more people were distancing themselves from the disturbances. By July 4, the Soviet High Commission was even considering easing travel restrictions between the Eastern and Western sectors in Berlin and reopening the sector border. 71

While for the Soviet observers, the peak of the crisis seemed to have passed by June 19-20, tensions were mounting within the SED regime. "This is not a Politburo, but a madhouse," one GDR minister had characterized the situation within the top party committee as early as June 9.72 The uprising paralyzed the SED leadership and froze the discussion on internal renewal. In the early morning hours of June 17, Semenov ordered the SED Politburo to evacuate to the more secure Soviet headquarters, cynically commenting that "it is almost true" when RIAS allegedly 73 reported that the GDR government had fallen apart. After the acute crisis had passed, dissensions within the SED leadership heightened dramatically. Key SED functionaries, such as Fred Oelßner, who had just accompanied Ulbricht and Grotewohl to Moscow, now mounted criticism against the party chief. According to Fadeikin's report, Oelẞner stated in conversations with Soviet officials on July 1 that "Ulbricht most of all has not understood the erroneousness of his conduct. He has not understood that as a matter of fact he lost touch with the masses and that his methods of dictatorial leadership were one of the serious reasons that errors were committed." Despite Moscow's New Course instructions, "Ulbricht had not changed and continued to work as before," though Oelẞner noted that he had become somewhat more passive. But he was still inclined to create an atmosphere of pomp around his person." With telling understatement, Oelẞner revealed to his Soviet interlocutors that "no complete unity of views existed in the Politburo.'

,,74

Another one of Ulbricht's close collaborators, Hermann Matern, registered his views with the MVD [KGB predecessor] the next day. Reflecting the paralysis and catharsis prevalent within the SED in the aftermath of

the uprising, Matern argued that the party was lacking militant leadership. Politburo meetings were "disorganized" and not well attended, and the body had “made almost no practical decisions." The work of the secretariat had come to a standstill after Ulbricht left for Moscow in early June and left much wanting in general. In Matern's opinion, the "secretariat has been turned from a political organ into Ulbricht's personal office, and its members "nodded their heads in agreement with all the proposals of the secretary-general." Matern also complained about the state of local and regional party leadership, which, not used to independent decision-making, totally depended on direction from above. Communications with the central leadership were difficult since, as Matern explained, on Ulbricht's orders, "telephone operators did not connect them [the local party leaders] with him." All of this "was the result of the defective leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht whose motto was "No one can do anything without me."" Matern announced that he would speak out against Ulbricht at the forthcoming Central Committee Plenum.75

The opposition to Ulbricht within the Politburo crystallized around the issue of the leadership structure. On June 25, the "organization commission," set up on June 6 to improve the workings of the Politburo, met for the first time and discussed key issues such as the dualism of Politburo and Secretariat, collective decision-making, and Ulbricht's leadership methods. The results of the discussion, tabled at the second meeting on July 2, called for an elimination of the post of secretary general - Ulbricht's position and an enlargement of the Politburo which, following the Soviet model, would henceforth be called the "Presidium of the Central Committee." While the secretariat of the Central Committee would be dissolved, a 4-man “Permanent Commission of the Presidium" would direct the implementation of the New Course according to Soviet instructions.76

The organization commission's recommendations were similar to proposals which Semenov, Sokolovskii and ludin sent to Moscow on June 24/25.77 Besides calling for additional aid to the GDR to improve the food supply of the population, a sharp reduction of GDR exports and occupation expenses, and greater internal party democracy, the Soviet representatives in Germany also favored a reorganization of the GDR government. The Soviet High Commissioner and his colleagues considered it necessary to "liquidate the Ministry of State Security" and to "relieve com[rade] Ulbricht of the responsibility of deputy prime minister of the GDR so as to enable him to concentrate his attention on the work of the C[entral] C[ommittee of the] SED." At the same time, the position of general-secretary should be abolished, the secretariat itself should be limited in its functions, re-staffed, and reduced in size. The proposals suggested to "radically renew the personnel of the Politburo," removing from it those who do not "demonstrate the necessary capabilities" required for the leadership of the party and state in the current circum

stances. The People's Chamber should take on the responsibility for dismissing "less capable and less popular ministers" and replacing them with more popular personalities, "drawing more widely from among representatives of other parties." Semenov, Sokolovskii, and Iudin also called for investigations into the union leadership, a strengthening of the People's Police and changes in the Free German Youth. In order to raise its international and domestic prestige, the new GDR regime should be invited to Moscow for an “official visit.”78 According to

Semenov's memoirs, Molotov's overall reaction to the report was "positive," but "as far as Ulbricht is concerned, Semenov has drifted to the right.”79

Molotov's reaction, if reported correctly, spoke not only of his commitment to Ulbricht but also might have indicated the shifting balance of forces in Moscow in the latter's favor. The day after the organization commission's meeting, on June 26, Beriia was arrested in Moscow. Most likely, the arrest had little to do with Beriia's views on Germany, but his more flexible position on socialism in the GDR, if he indeed had taken such a position, was quickly seized by his opponents within the Kremlin to justify the action. Beriia's arrest probably brought any discussion and reassessment of Soviet policy towards Germany to an abrupt halt. By the second meeting of the organization commission on July 2, B. Miroshnishchenko, who was participating in the meeting on Semenov's behalf,80 objected to any immediate changes to the secretariat structure, thus indirectly reinforcing Ulbricht's position. Semenov himself apparently withdrew some of his earlier recommendations. About the same time, moreover, a Foreign Ministry subcommittee headed by first deputy Foreign Minister Andrej Vishinskii, "canceled" or postponed the implementation of key measures in the Semenov-Sokolovskii-ludin report, particularly those which affected Ulbricht's control of state and party.

Grotewohl's notes on the night session of the Politburo on July 7-8, shortly before he and Ulbricht were to leave for Moscow, reflect the volatile balance of forces within the SED Politburo.81 There was still considerable criticism of Ulbricht, led by Zaisser's statement that, while Ulbricht was "no more responsible for the wrong course than we all," he was to blame for the brutal administrative methods which had “spoiled the Party." To leave the party apparatus in Ulbricht's hands, Zaisser argued, would "be catastrophic for the new course." Several Politburo members sided with Zaisser. Hermann Rau, for example, doubted that Ulbricht had the will to change his working methods and favored a change at the top. Anton Ackermann argued that the party had to recover but could not do so with Ulbricht in the leadership. Alluding to the divisions within the Politburo, Fred Oelẞner stated that “U. has considered all of us as stupid. W. has not learned his lessons." There would not be “any need for a first secretary." Faced with such criticism, Ulbricht acknowledged that the criticism was correct and his behavior regarding the ostentatious birthday celebration mistaken. He pro

fessed that he did not have to be first secretary: "This takes confidence which has to be renewed."

Yet Ulbricht called the elimination of the secretariat "dangerous" and considered Zaisser's nomination of Herrnstadt as first secretary "the logical consequence," thus reneging on the "agreement" that had been reached in the organization commission. Moreover, some members now spoke up in his defense. Arguing that Ulbricht's resignation would "cause damage to the party," Erich Honecker objected to blaming Ulbricht alone for the situation, and Hermann Matern flatly stated that “U. must be first secretary." Playing for time, Ulbricht announced that he would "take a stand in the C[entral] C[ommittee]" plenum scheduled for later that month.

In Moscow on July 8, Ulbricht and Grotewohl apparently learned about Beriia's arrest and his alleged plans for the GDR. It is likely that Ulbricht turned the Beriia affair to his advantage, using his short presence in Moscow to garner support for his position. It may not have been by accident that on the following day, Vyshinskii was informed of the cancellation of several of Semenov's, Sokolovskii's and Iudin's recommendations. In any case, upon his return to Berlin, Ulbricht, probably backed by the Soviets, went on the offensive, turning first against Zaisser and Herrnstadt. Ulbricht used the resolution on "The New Course and the Renewal of the Party," drafted in June by Herrnstadt in preparation of the forthcoming 15th SED Plenum, to launch a massive attack against both Herrnstadt and Zaisser when the Central Committee met on July 2426. Accusing Herrnstadt and Zaisser of behavior "hostile to the Party" and alleging a connection between both of them and Beriia, Ulbricht managed to achieve the expulsion of his two opponents from the Politburo.82 By late July, Ulbricht had weathered the most dangerous challenge to his leadership thus far.

Ulbricht's survival did not only mean the survival of his hard-line policies and Stalinist practices, many of which were gradually reintroduced in the following months. With the decision to continue the support for Ulbricht and the East German regime, Moscow shed the last ambiguities in its German policy. In the following months, the Soviets took steps to boost the East German regime's economic viability and internal support, first by agreeing to provide East Berlin with an extensive economic aid package, and later by an official termination of the reparations' payments. In the international arena as well, Moscow sought to raise the prestige of its client regime. In August, the Soviet leadership announced its decision to turn the High Commission into an embassy. In March 1954, Moscow officially announced the GDR to be a “sovereign state." The road was set for the "twoGermany doctrine,” espoused by Khrushchev in 1955, which guided Soviet policy in Germany until 1989.

Although the documents presented below shed much new light on the 1953 crisis, the documentary record is fragmentary at best. While we have a pretty clear sense of what went on in the SED Politburo, the decision-making

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