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process in Moscow still remains elusive. Key documents, such as the transcripts of the May 27 USSR Presidium meeting or the June 2-4 meeting with the SED leadership, have not yet been declassified by Russian archival authorities. Little is yet known about Malenkov's, Beriia's or Khrushchev's reaction to the events of June 16-17 or their conversations (if any took place) with Ulbricht and Grotewohl in early July. What role exactly did Semenov or Sokolovskii play? Fuller documentation from the Russian archives might allow for more conclusive answers to these questions.
1 Kurt Gregor, GDR Minister for Foreign and Inner-German Trade, during the 9 June 1953 SED Politburo meeting. See Note from S. Kruglov to Malenkov with an accompanying communication from the representatives of the MIA USSR P. Fedotov and I. Fadeikin (printed below). 2
Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter, Stefan Wolle (eds.). Der Tag X. 17. Juni 1953 (Berlin, 1995). 3
See the path-breaking work by Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989 (Chapel Hill, 1997), 36-38. 4
Armin Mitter/Stefan Wolle, Untergang auf Raten (Berlin, 1993). 5
See D.M. Stickle (ed.), The Beriia Affair (New York, 1992); Delo Beriia. Plenum Ts KPSS. Ijuli 1953 goda. Stenograficeskij otcet, Izvestija Ts KPSS 1 (1991), 139-214; 2 (1991), 141-208. 6
Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years (New York, 1996), 180. 7
On Churchill's initiative. see Klaus Larres, Politik der Illusionen (Göttingen, 1996). 8 Christian F. Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering, the United States and the East German Uprising of 1953,” German Studies Review 19:1 (March 1996), 61-89. 9
“Stenographic transcript of the meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders on 5 December 1980 in Moscow," Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), DY 30 J IV 2/2 A-2368; Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke (ed.), “Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifen" Die SED contra Polen 1980/81 (Berlin, 1995), 170. 10 The best surveys to date are Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter, Stefan Wolle (eds.). Der Tag X. 17. Juni 1953 (Berlin, 1995) and Manfred Hagen, DDR. Juni '53. Die erste Volkserhebung im Stalinismus (Stuttgart, 1992). 11 For a survey of the current state of the debate, see IlkoSascha Kowalczuk, “Die Ereignisse von 1953 in der DDR,” Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung (1996), 181186; and Torsten Diedrich, “Zwischen Arbeitererhebung und gescheiterter Revolution in der DDR,” Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung (1994), 288-305. 12
Amy Knight, “Beria the Reformer," New York Times, 3 November 1993. 13
For a report on the conference, see Ruud van Dijk, “Der 17. Juni als Krise im Kalten Krieg,” Deutschland Archiv 1 (1997), 291-293; CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996/97), 355-357. 14 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation (Cambridge, MA, 1995). 15
Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt? Die Reparationsleistungen der SBZ/DDR 1945-53 (Berlin:1993). 16 See CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 34-35, 48, for an English
translation of both Russian and German versions of the 7 April 1952 conversation. For an excellent recent treatment of this problem, Stefan Creuzberger, "Abschirmungspolitik gegenüber dem westlichen Deutschland im Jahre 1952,” Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik in der Ära Adenauer, ed. Gerhard Wettig, (Bonn, 1997), 12-36. 17 See SED leader Wilhelm Pieck's notes on the meeting with Stalin, as published in Wilfried Loth/Rolf Badstübner (eds.), Wilhelm Pieck – Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 19451953 (Berlin, 1994), 396-397. 18 Vladislav Zubok. “Unacceptably Rude and Blatant on the German Question.” The Succession Struggle after Stalin's death, Beriia and the significance of the debate on the GDR in Moscow in April-May 1953.” Paper presented at the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996, 5. 19
Hope Harrison, “Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996; Gerhard Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung, ber Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953,” Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins (Berlin, 1994), 190; James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum,” Europe-Asia Studies 4 (1993), 677. 20 Printed below. 21 Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow. Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission 1939-1991 (Berlin: 1995), 290. 22
AVP RF, f. 6, op. 12, p. 16, por. 261, 11. 6-7. The document was provided and translated by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College) for the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe,” Potsdam, November 1996. See the conference document reader The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17 June 1953 Uprising in East Germany: The Hidden History, ed. Christian F. Ostermann (Washington, DC, 1996). On 28 May, the Soviet Control Commission was indeed dissolved and replaced by a Soviet High Commission, which, at least in name, resembled its Western counterparts. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 291.
Zubok, "Unacceptably Rude and Blatant on the German Question,” 5-6. 24
Gerhard Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953,” Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins (Berlin, 1994), 183-197. 25
Report is quoted, without source reference, by David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin (New Haven, CT, 1997), 156. 26
Refugee numbers had significantly declined from 1950 to 1952 but almost doubled in 1953 (1953 total: 408,100). For an in-depth analysis of the East-West German migration see Helge Heidemeyer, Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZ/DDR 1945) 1949-1961 (Düsseldorf, 1994). 27
Report No. 44/B, Beria to CPSU Presidium, 6 May 1953, Archives of Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki (SVRA), file 3581, vol. 7, quoted in David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin, 157-158. 28 Printed below.
Semenov hints at his uneasy relationship with Chuikov in his Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 293. 30
Radio in the American Sector.
31 Printed below. 32
On the succession struggle, see the remarkable presentation by Mark Kramer on “The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Soviet Bloc: New Courses, Upheavals and the Beriia Affair” at the conference “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996. A revised published version of the presentation is forthcoming. 33
See “Delo Berija," 2 (1991), 144. 34 Nikita Khrushchev, “Die Aktion," in Vladimir F. Nekrassow (ed.), Berija. Henker in Stalins Diensten. Ende einer Karriere (Berlin, 1992), 323-324; Albert Resis (ed.), Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago, 1993), 334-335. 35
Resis, Molotov Remembers, 335. See also Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 180. 36
James Richter, Reexamining Soviet Policy towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum. CWIHP Working Paper No.3 (Washington, DC, 1992), 15-16 37
Vladislav Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence: The 'Small Committee of Information, 1952-1953,” Diplomatic History 19 (1995), 45372 (first published as CWIHP Working Paper No. 4 (Washington, DC, 1992)). 38
Vladislav Zubok/Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War (Cambridge, MA 1996), 159-162. 39 Printed below. 40 Stenographic Report of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, 31 January 1955, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 127, 11. 6566. Other excerpts from this and other CC CPSU plenums appear in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. 41 Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Gerold L. and Leona P. Schecter, Special Tasks, The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness A Soviet Spymaster (New York, 1994), 363-365. For a review of Sudopltov's memoirs see Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953,” 196-197; and Valdislav Zubok, “Atomic Espionage and Its Soviet “Witnesses***) CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 50, 52-53. 42 Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow', 290-291. SED functionary Karl Schirdewan, who headed the Department of “Leading Organs of the Party and the Mass Organizations," writes in his 1995 memoirs that at that time, “Soviet comrades” told him that “your party will have to solve a great and difficult task and prepare for free and secret elections.” Aufstand gegen Ulbricht (Berlin, 1995), 47-48.
For details on Beriia's arrest, see Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant. (Princeton, 1993). 44
See statements by A. Filitov at the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996. 45
Rolf Stöckigt, “Ein Dokument von großer historischer
Document printed in full below.
Herrnstadt, Herrnstadt-Dokumeni, 59. 48 Document printed in full below. 49 Document printed in full below. 50
Enver Hoxha, The Artful Albanian, ed. Jon Holliday (London, 1986), 147-151. 51 Printed below. 52
Unfortunately, it is still hard to follow exactly the dialogue, as for political reasons, the statements by the Soviet leaders were recorded separately from those of the Hungarians. 53
György Litvan, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Reform, Revolt and Repression 1953-1963 (London, 1996), 24-25.
Curiously, the East German crisis was not mentioned in the talks with the Hungarian leadership. 54 Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, 65. 55
Hope Harrison, “Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe,” Potsdam, November 1996. 56
Grotewohl Notes, SAPMO-BArch, NY 90/699; “Protokoll Nr. 33/35 der außerordentlichen Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 6. Juni 1953,” SAPMO-Barch J IV 2/2/287; Elke Scherstjanoi, “Wollen wir den Sozialismus?' Dokumente aus der Sitzung des Politbüros des ZK der SED am 6. Juni 1953," in Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 33:5 (1991), 658-680; Nadja Stulz-Herrnstadt, Das HerrnstadtDokument. Das Politbüro der SED und die Geschichte des 17. Juni 1953 (Hamburg, 1990), 74. 57 Printed below. 58 Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, 74. 59
One the events leading up to the June 16/17 uprising, see Christian Ostermann (ed.), “New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953," CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 10-20. 60
See note 1. 61 Heinz Brandt, The Search for a Third Way, (Garden City, NY, 1970), 212; Fritz Schenk, Im Vorzimmer der Diktatur (Cologne, 1962), 203-204; see Harrison, “Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe,” 7. 62
Brandt, The Search for a Third Way, 225. 63
See the documentation printed below. 64
Semenov and Grechko to Malenkov, Berija, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 16 June 1953, Archives of the Russian General Staff (AGSh), f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, 11. 1-3.
Grechko and Tarasov to Malenkov, Berija, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 17 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, 11. 12-14. 66
Report by Col. Fadeikin to Sokolovskii, 19 June 1953, AGSh, f.16. o. 3139, d. 155, 11. 217-222. 67 Sokolovskii and Govorov to Malenkov, Berija, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 18 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16. op. 3139, d. 155, 1. 4-5. 68
Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 294. 69
Grechko and Tarasov to Malenkov, Beriia, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 18 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16. op. 3139, d. 155, 11. 19-20. 70
Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 295. 71 Memorandum, Miroshnichenko and Lun’kov to Semenov, 4 July 1953, courtesy National Security Archive (Washington, D.C.). 72
Note from S. Kruglov to Malenkov with an accompanying communication from the representatives of the MIA USSR P. Fedotov and I. Fadeikin, AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 925, 11. 156-165. (Printed in full below.) 73
Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, 74. 74 Printed below. 75
See also the memoirs of SED leader Karl Schirdewan, Aufstand gegen Ulbricht (Berlin, 1995), 49. 76 Wilfriede Otto, “Dokumente zur Auseinandersetzung in der SED," Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 5:32 (1990), 655-672
Soviet Foreign Ministry Memorandum
ON FURTHER SOVIET MEASURES ON THE
The report, published in excerpt by the Cold War International History Project in 1995, was completed and most likely sent on 24 June. See Christian Ostermann, "New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953," 10-21. Semenov maintains that the report was sent 25 June. Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 297. 78 Sokolovskii, Semenov and Iudin to Molotov and Bulganin, 24 June 1953, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 12a, p. 5, d. 301, 11. 1-51. See Ostermann, “New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953;" Faina Nowik, “Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik, 1953-1955,” Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik in der Ära Adenauer, ed. Gerhard Wettig, (Bonn 1997), 57. In his memoirs, Semenov points out that the report also described the role Karl Schirdewan, the head of the important Central Committee department “Leitende Organe and Massenorganisationen der Partei” and later an outspoken critic of Ulbricht, had played. Semenov seemed to have favored Schirdewan's promotion to the Politburo at this time (Schirdewan was eventually promoted to the top party organ in at the 15th plenum). 79
Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 297. 80
Semenov was probably in Moscow for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum 2-7 July 1953. 81 Printed below. 82
See Ulbricht's final speech at the 15th Plenum, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (12 June 1957), 364-370.
MASTNY WINS 1997 GEORGE Louis BEER PRIZE
Considering that lately a number of important events have taken place concerning Germany (the Bundestag's ratification of the Bonn and Paris “agreements,”I the
»1 intensification of militarization and fascism in Western Germany, Adenauer's trip to France, England, and the United States), and also stemming from the necessity for the USSR to retain the initiative on the German question, we should plan our further measures concerning Germany. These measures should promote the increase of Soviet Union's authority among the German people and contribute to further development of the movement of German democratic forces for the unification of Germany, against the Bonn and Paris "agreements," against the militarization and fascization of Western Germany.
For these purposes it is necessary:
1. To advance a proposal for the formation of a [unified) German Provisional Government, by the parliaments of both the German Democratic Republic and Western Germany, while preserving the existing governments of the GDR and Western Germany, with the aim of reunifying Germany on a democratic and peaceful basis.
The chief task of the all-German Provisional Government should be the preparation and carrying out of free allGerman elections without foreign interference. The Provisional Government will work out a draft of the allGerman electoral law on the basis of the electoral laws of the GDR and Western Germany and also bearing in mind the electoral law of the Weimar Republic. The Provisional Government will organize, if it deems necessary, an inspection of available conditions for carrying out democratic all-German elections, and it will also take the necessary measures to create the requisite conditions for carrying out such elections.
The Provisional Government will represent Germany in quadripartite negotiations on the question of concluding a peace treaty with Germany, which should begin without further delay.
Furthermore, the Provisional Government should be entrusted with discussing and resolving questions touching upon common interests of Germany, namely: representation of Germany in international organizations, questions of German citizenship, trade between the GDR and West Germany, postal and telegraph communications, railway and water communications [transportation links), scientific and technical collaboration, and other issues of an allGerman character.
CWIHP is pleased to note that Dr. Vojtech Mastny has been awarded the George Louis Beer Prize of the American Historical Association for his book The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press, 1996). The prize is given for the best book on European international history in the 20th century. A close collaborator of CWIHP and the National Security Archive for many years, Dr. Mastny is currently in Europe as a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities in Essen, Germany, as well as the Manfred Woerner Fellow of NATO. In the fall of 1998, he plans to return to Washington to resume work on his next book about the origins of détente in the 1960s.
After carrying out all-German democratic elections, the National Assembly of Germany, elected by the people, will ratify the German Constitution and will form the permanent Government of a united and independent Germany. With this in mind, the united democratic Germany will be allowed to field its own national armed forces, necessary for the defense of the country.
The proposal on the formation of an all-German Provisional Government will represent a new concrete step by the Soviet Government towards the national reunification of Germany, which will evoke a broad positive response among the German people. This proposal will help expose the position of the (other) three great powers [i.e., USA, Great Britain and France) on the German issue, directed at preventing German unification on a democratic and peaceful basis. The three great powers will have difficulty objecting to the formation of an all-German Provisional Government, since the existing governments of Western Germany and the GDR will be retained, and the Provisional Government, as its main task, will be responsible for preparing and carrying out all-German elections.
If the United States, England and France object to the proposal on the formation of an all-German Provisional Government by the parliaments of both the GDR and Western Germany, we, on our part, should offer to conduct a referendum amongst the entire population of Germany on this issue.
2. In order to create conditions that provide for the realization of truly equal and democratic elections without foreign interference on the whole territory of Germany, (we should) advance a proposal on the simultaneous withdrawal of all armed forces of the occupying powers, immediately after forming the all-German Provisional Government. At the same time, all foreign military bases located on German territory should be liquidated and the armed forces of any foreign power or a group of great powers, should be prohibited on German soil. Also prohibited should be the use, in any form, of human and material resources, of the German territory or any of its
purposes of war by one or another of the great powers or a coalition of great powers.
The proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of all occupation troops out of Germany in order to provide freedom for the all-German democratic elections will thoroughly undermine the slogan advanced in first order by the three great powers to carry out free all-German elections under international control. The great powers are very likely to decline the proposal to withdraw troops, but this would place them in a difficult situation in front of the German people. Accepting this offer would mean the withdrawal of American troops back across the ocean and the effective derailment of the aggressive plans of the North Atlantic [NATO] bloc in Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Government proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of occupation troops out of Germany, following the formation of an All-German Provisional Government, would find warm approval among the people of Germany,
including Western Germany and amongst certain parts of the German bourgeoisie.
3. For the purpose of further strengthening the German Democratic Republic, raising its own all-German and international prestige, as well as for the purpose of strengthening the USSR's influence on the German people and equally emphasizing the peaceful and friendly character of mutual relations between Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, it is advisable to carry out the following measures:
a.) To remove the control exercised by Soviet occupation authorities over the activities of GDR government organs and accordingly liquidate the Soviet Control Commission in Germany, with its central and local agencies.
b.) Instead of the currently existing Soviet diplomatic mission in Berlin, establish an Embassy of the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic, entrusting it with functions of an all-German nature, stemming from the quadripartite agreements on Germany as a whole. In large cities of the GDR (we should) establish 7-8 Soviet consulates, to serve the needs of Soviet citizens and troops and to carry out other consular functions.
c.) To declare amnesty and return to their homeland the (German) prisoners of war, held in the USSR, [including those] convicted for crimes against the Soviet people, except those who have committed particularly grave crimes.
Removing control over the activity of governmental bodies of the GDR would promote the normalization of our relations with the GDR as a people's democracy, and strengthen the position of the Soviet government on the all-German question, described above in articles 1 and 2. The German population would see that the Soviet Union, not only in its diplomatic speeches but also in practice, adheres in its relations with Germany to a policy that takes into account the fundamental national interests of the German people.
4. For the purpose of rendering assistance to the German Democratic Republic for further development of its peaceful economy, building the basis of socialism, and raising the well-being of the working people, it is advisable to carry out the following measures:
a.) To reduce by half the remaining sum of reparation payments from the GDR;
b.) To transfer to the government of the GDR, on favorable terms and for the appropriate recompensation, all enterprises of GUSIMZ,3 located on GDR territory.
c.) To enter into negotiations with the GDR government on establishing a joint Soviet - German joint-stock company "Wismut," on the basis of [the] already existing enterprise of "Wismut,"4
d.) To establish an official exchange rate for the German mark of the GDR in terms of the Soviet ruble.
5. To invite in the near future a government delegation from the GDR for an official visit to Moscow. To discuss with this delegation the aforementioned questions,
including the proposal for the formation of an all-German population from the GDR to West Germany is growing, as Provisional Government, and look into questions of an is confirmed by the data furnished (in the box] below: economic character, presented in article 4, as well as Detailed data on social and age composition are contained questions of broadening scientific-technical collaboration
in Appendix No.1.10 and exchange of specialists between the USSR and GDR, Of this number, 320 persons exited across maritime of the education of German students in higher educational and zonal borders during the (first) four months of 1953; establishments, etc.
the rest left through Berlin.
The increase in the number of persons moving from (Source: AVP RF f. 6, op. 12, p.16, d. 259, 11.45-46. Provided by the GDR to West Germany can be explained by an Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive). Translated by intensification of the class struggle in the city and the Daniel Rozas (Johns Hopkins University)]
countryside, and also by the fact that in the practical work of implementing major economic and political measures,
administration often is substituted for political mass work, Memorandum, V. Chuikov, 5 P. Iudin, 6 L. Il'ichev7 and certain ministries [and] local party and state organs to G. M. Malenkov,8
commit gross errors and excesses in regard to different 18 May 1953
strata of the population.
After the second conference of the SED [in 1952), the Soviet Control Commission in Germany
government of the GDR and the SED CC took a number of
Secret important decisions aimed at limiting capitalist elements in 18 May 1953
industry and trade, as well as the kulak class in the copy No. pg. 00195 countryside.
All of this led to the fact that a portion of the peasIn the Presidium of the Central Committee of the antry, chiefly large (peasants), began to give up their land. Communist Party of the Soviet Union
On 1 April 1953, 442,8 thousand ha., or 7.3% of the entire
arable agricultural area of all peasant farms, including to comrade G.M. MALENKOV
393,0 thousand ha. from farms having over 20 ha. land, or In keeping with instructions from the CPSU C[entral] 26% of the agricultural area of these sorts of farms, were C[ommittee), the Soviet Control Commission in Germany abandoned and vacant. presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the It should be noted that the measures to limit capitalist population from the German Democratic Republic to West elements in the city and the countryside in many cases are Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures. 9 implemented without sufficient political and economic
In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the preparation, as a result of which some party and governSoviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a mental measures have found insufficient support among a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of significant portion of the populace. the German Democratic Republic. Despite the general economic improvements and
II political strengthening of the GDR, the departure of the
With the general rise in the standard of living of the
By social composition, those who have left the GDR fall into the following categories:
4 mos. in 1953