Inside the Cold War a cold warrior's reflections

DIANE Publishing


讀者評論 - 撰寫評論




第 66 頁 - I believe the country needs this information and I'm going to approve it. But I'll tell you one thing. Someday one of these machines is going to get caught and we're going to have a storm.
第 4 頁 - Hoover and admired his aggressiveness, gave him a pointed gesture of support at a correspondents' dinner. The storm spent itself, leaving the Director only slightly dampened. With the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war, the FBI renewed its passionate crusade against com-munism.
第 9 頁 - Churchill made acknowledgment sometime ago when he declared, "the United States Strategic Air Command is a deterrent of the highest order and maintains ceaseless readiness. We owe much to their devotion to the cause of freedom in a troubled world. The primary deterrents to aggression remain the nuclear weapon and the ability of the highly organized and trained US Strategic Air Command to use it.
第 104 頁 - I slipped a message, under the carpet, in the Pentagon that we ought to turn SAC loose with incendiaries on some North Korean towns. The answer came back, under the carpet again, that there would be too many civilian casualties; we couldn't do anything like that. So we went over there and fought the war and eventually burned down every town in North Korea anyway, some way or another, and some in South Korea, too. We even burned down Pusan — an accident, but we burned it down anyway. Over a period...
第 163 頁 - Richard N. Current, T. Harry Williams, and Frank Freidel, American History: A Survey (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1964), p.
第 174 頁 - Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT," American Political Science Review, vol.
第 79 頁 - Strategic Air Command have developed a system known as airborne alert where we maintain airplanes in the air 24 hours a day, loaded with bombs, on station, ready to go to the target ... I feel strongly that we must get on with this airborne alert . . . We must impress Mr. Khrushchev that we have it, and that he cannot strike this country with impunity.
第 46 頁 - This probably stems from the fact that although it was often admired, respected, cursed, or even feared, it was almost never loved. In fact, I think it would be fair to say that it tended to separate the "men" from the "boys!" It was relatively difficult to land, terribly unforgiving of mistakes or inattention, subject to control reversal at high speeds, and suffered from horrible roll-due-to-yaw characteristics. Cross-wind landings and takeoffs were sporty, and in-flight discrepancies were the rule...
第 162 頁 - Eisenhower, Khruschev and the U-2 Affair. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.
第 38 頁 - ... reason. The pilots all reported that the B-36 was an excellent flying airplane and as time went on they expected that its maintenance problems would become far easier of solution than originally expected.