Inside the Cold War a cold warrior's reflectionsDIANE Publishing |
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第 1 到 5 筆結果,共 8 筆
第 2 頁
... Polaris , then Poseidon , and finally Trident sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Their alert posture called for remaining submerged at sea for periods of 60 days or more, constantly ready to launch missiles. Although attention was ...
... Polaris , then Poseidon , and finally Trident sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Their alert posture called for remaining submerged at sea for periods of 60 days or more, constantly ready to launch missiles. Although attention was ...
第 14 頁
... Polaris program made better progress than predicted , however , and the planned Regulas II nuclear boats were converted to nuclear - powered attack submarines . A modified Skipjack - class nuclear attack boat , equipped with 16 Polaris ...
... Polaris program made better progress than predicted , however , and the planned Regulas II nuclear boats were converted to nuclear - powered attack submarines . A modified Skipjack - class nuclear attack boat , equipped with 16 Polaris ...
第 15 頁
... Polaris A1 missiles were successfully test-fired on 20 July 1960. The new strategic capability was promptly declared operationally ready and the George Washington deployed on the first fleet ballistic missile (FBM) patrol, slipping out ...
... Polaris A1 missiles were successfully test-fired on 20 July 1960. The new strategic capability was promptly declared operationally ready and the George Washington deployed on the first fleet ballistic missile (FBM) patrol, slipping out ...
第 27 頁
... Polaris submarine and SLBM programs, which were followed by the largest submarine building program in US history—all powered by nuclear energy. Rickover was promoted to vice admiral in 1958 and became only the third Naval officer in ...
... Polaris submarine and SLBM programs, which were followed by the largest submarine building program in US history—all powered by nuclear energy. Rickover was promoted to vice admiral in 1958 and became only the third Naval officer in ...
第 73 頁
... Polaris . With DOD approval, the FBM program to develop the Polaris got under way in 1956. The program costs would be astronomical—$120 million for each submarine, with an estimated $10 billion to build and maintain the estimated 41 ...
... Polaris . With DOD approval, the FBM program to develop the Polaris got under way in 1956. The program costs would be astronomical—$120 million for each submarine, with an estimated $10 billion to build and maintain the estimated 41 ...
常見字詞
aboard Admiral Rickover Air Force airborne airplane altitude Army assigned Atlas atomic ballistic missile base became boats Boeing bomb bay Bomb Wing bomber crew capability Cold War Cold Warriors communist conscripts copilot crew force cruise Defense deterrence Dosaaf duty electronic engine equipped evaluations feet fighter flew flight flying fuel ground alert ICBM initial KC-97 Stratotanker Komsomol Korean landing later launch LeMay long-range Looking Glass Lt Gen maintained Maj Gen miles Minuteman missiles missile gap mission Moscow navigation Navy nuclear submarine nuclear weapons operations pilot planning Polaris political professional proficiency propulsion radar reconnaissance aircraft Retired Russian SAC’s served SLBM Soviet military Soviet Union SSBN staff story Strategic Air Command strategic bomber strategic nuclear takeoff target Titan Titan II troops United University Press USAF war-fighting warhead weapon system World War II York young Zampolit
熱門章節
第 66 頁 - I believe the country needs this information and I'm going to approve it. But I'll tell you one thing. Someday one of these machines is going to get caught and we're going to have a storm.
第 4 頁 - Hoover and admired his aggressiveness, gave him a pointed gesture of support at a correspondents' dinner. The storm spent itself, leaving the Director only slightly dampened. With the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war, the FBI renewed its passionate crusade against com-munism.
第 9 頁 - Churchill made acknowledgment sometime ago when he declared, "the United States Strategic Air Command is a deterrent of the highest order and maintains ceaseless readiness. We owe much to their devotion to the cause of freedom in a troubled world. The primary deterrents to aggression remain the nuclear weapon and the ability of the highly organized and trained US Strategic Air Command to use it.
第 104 頁 - I slipped a message, under the carpet, in the Pentagon that we ought to turn SAC loose with incendiaries on some North Korean towns. The answer came back, under the carpet again, that there would be too many civilian casualties; we couldn't do anything like that. So we went over there and fought the war and eventually burned down every town in North Korea anyway, some way or another, and some in South Korea, too. We even burned down Pusan — an accident, but we burned it down anyway. Over a period...
第 163 頁 - Richard N. Current, T. Harry Williams, and Frank Freidel, American History: A Survey (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1964), p.
第 174 頁 - Detente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT," American Political Science Review, vol.
第 79 頁 - Strategic Air Command have developed a system known as airborne alert where we maintain airplanes in the air 24 hours a day, loaded with bombs, on station, ready to go to the target ... I feel strongly that we must get on with this airborne alert . . . We must impress Mr. Khrushchev that we have it, and that he cannot strike this country with impunity.
第 46 頁 - This probably stems from the fact that although it was often admired, respected, cursed, or even feared, it was almost never loved. In fact, I think it would be fair to say that it tended to separate the "men" from the "boys!" It was relatively difficult to land, terribly unforgiving of mistakes or inattention, subject to control reversal at high speeds, and suffered from horrible roll-due-to-yaw characteristics. Cross-wind landings and takeoffs were sporty, and in-flight discrepancies were the rule...
第 162 頁 - Eisenhower, Khruschev and the U-2 Affair. New York: Harper & Row, 1986.
第 38 頁 - ... reason. The pilots all reported that the B-36 was an excellent flying airplane and as time went on they expected that its maintenance problems would become far easier of solution than originally expected.