now practically certain, in the light of subsequent facts, that such a Convention was entered into, and that it embodied an understanding between the two Governments. According to this Convention, besides railway and mining privileges in Manchuria, since confirmed, Russia was to have a lease of Kiaochow Bay; only-not to excite the jealousy of other Powers-Russia was not to take immediate possession unless there was danger of war. China was also with all haste to refortify Port Arthur with Russian assistance, and in event of hostilities Russia was to have the use of it. Russian officers were also to be engaged for the re-organising of the land forces of Manchuria. Having paved the way thus far, Russia was evidently prepared to wait the completion of the Siberian Railway before making a further move. But that she looked upon Manchuria as already practically her own was shown in the efforts she made to get English engineers ousted from the Chinese Northern Railway, and to prevent the extension of that line outside of Shan-hai-kwan with the aid of English capital.

So matters stood till Russia's hand was forced by the seizure of Kiaochow Bay by the Germans towards the end of 1897. The events of the five months following this move-i.e. from November 1897 till April 1898, the period covered by the Blue-book No. 1 of 1898-are pregnant with consequences. The period will in all probability be pointed to hereafter as one of the turning points in history. It began by Russia tentatively and almost apologetically sending two or three of her ships to Port Arthur as a winter anchorage'; it ended in the general recognition that the place had become a Russian fortress-the Sebastopol of the Far East-from which she will never be ousted except at the cost of war. It began with the territory of China still intact and her independence still unimpaired; it ended with the first dismemberment of the Empire, and with its independence, in the language of Russia herself, reduced to a mere name.

We have space only to refer briefly to the various steps of this strange story. On 17th November, 1897, Sir Claude Macdonald telegraphed that German ships had occupied Kiaochow Bay, and on 17th December, just a month later, that five Russian men-of-war were going to winter at Port Arthur. A few days later the Yamen confirmed the news and said it was with their permission. At the same time Count Mouravieff informed our Ambassador at St. Petersburg that it was a mere matter of temporary convenience and meant nothing at all. Similarly

* China, No. 1 (1898),' Nos. 28, 37.

the Japanese Government were informed that the port had been lent only temporarily as a winter anchorage. The Japanese Government replied that they credited the assurance and made a note of it.'* A fortnight later we find M. de Staal, the Russian Ambassador, complaining to Lord Salisbury that British men-of-war were also at Port Arthur, and that their presence there had produced a bad impression in Russia.' The complaint was repeated a few days after, and we were told that the Russian Government hoped we would avoid any friction in their sphere of influence.'† The mere fact that such complaints were made ought to have put our Government on their guard that something sinister was intended. Why should Russia have objected to our men-of-war visiting any port of China, which by treaty they had a perfect right to do? and why should Russia have claimed this neighbourhood as her sphere of influence'?

The reply of Lord Salisbury was extremely disappointing. In a half apologetic way, and while declaring we were within our treaty rights, he said that our ships had been sent by the Admiral on the station, and not in pursuance of orders from home, and in the ordinary course of things would soon move to another anchorage.‡ Reading between the lines, it seems pretty clear that something in the nature of instructions was sent to the Admiral in China to withdraw his ships. They had been sent to Port Arthur for the express purpose of watching events and keeping our Minister informed of what was going

on.

The

No objection was offered by the Chinese. On the contrary, the Chinese authorities had formally consented to allow them to remain. It is not to be supposed that they would have been withdrawn, without some intimation from home, just at the critical moment when their presence was most desired. net result was that the ships were removed. They have not gone back since. If ever the secret history of this short period comes to be written, we shall perhaps know why these ships were withdrawn. To an ordinary outsider it looks uncommonly like a backdown before a Russian demand. On Lord Salisbury's own showing we were where we had a perfect right to be. We were asked to clear out. We did so, and Russia has been in possession ever since.

Retribution came quickly. The public, especially the Continental public, was not slow to put on the transaction the one explanation which the facts suggested. The Russian Govern

* China, No. 1 (1898),' No. 29.

Ibid., Nos. 48 and 66.

+ Ibid., Nos. 63 and 66.

ment was doubtless jubilant at the unexpected success of their diplomacy, and their newspapers hailed it as a triumph. Sir Claude MacDonald telegraphed a few days later from Peking :

'It is stated in a Reuter's telegram published here that it is officially announced at St. Petersburg that British men-of-war have received orders to quit Port Arthur immediately in consequence of representation made by Russia. Above is having a most injurious effect here.'

It was in vain for Lord Salisbury to protest that the news was a pure invention. The only way to stop such a report and check the injurious consequences was to send the ships back again. If this had been done, Port Arthur would still have been Chinese territory; and the open door, for at least a good number of years to come, would have been secured. What was not less important, the injurious effect which Sir Claude speaks of would have been neutralised. Nothing, in fact, has done our prestige and influence in China so much injury as this episode. It is said in plain language, all over the country, that we are afraid of Russia. Residents in Shanghai are told so to their faces, and, though the high officials at Peking may be more polite, we may depend on it they think the same.

The rest of the story is soon told. It could have been no surprise to learn soon after that Russia had demanded a lease of Port Arthur and the adjacent anchorage of Ta-lien-wan; the only reason given being that it was 'to assist China in protecting Manchuria against the aggression of other Powers.' In conveying this information Sir Claude adds: Yamen are aware they must yield to Russian demands unless they receive help.'* No help was, however, forthcoming. It was suggested that it might perhaps do some good if England were to give an assurance that she, at all events, had no aggressive designs on Manchuria. As help of this sort costs nothing it was given, only to be contemptuously ignored by Russia, who felt, much to her delight, no doubt, that her long-looked-for goal had at last been reached, and that an ice-free port and a fortress ready-made were in her hands. Why she should have gone out of her way, when she found success so easy, to declare that both Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan should be open to foreign trade,† is a mystery as puzzling as the puzzling as the many other mysteries with which this Blue-book abounds. Her object can hardly have been to prove again to all the world how easy it is for her to repudiate her most formal assurances, and with what simple good-nature England accepts such repudiation.

* China, No. 1 (1898),' No. 100.

† Ibid., Nos. 101, 110, 120, 137.

We have dwelt thus far on this episode because we think that on it hinged the whole question of the future of China. Russia began by objecting to the occupation of Port Arthur by the Japanese on the ground-a very proper one, we think that such occupation would reduce the independence of China to a shadow. She ended by taking it for herself; and will anyone say that the independence of China is now any less fictitious than it would have been with the Japanese in possession? It has given Russia a predominating influence at Peking, and in proportion as her influence has grown, so has that of England waned. China is not a free agent, but must view every proposition in the light it may assume in the eyes of Russia.

This was precisely the impression which Lord Charles Beresford carried away. He tells us :

I hardly ever made a suggestion to any prominent Chinese official which I thought might tend to the security of British trade and commerce that I was not met with the question, " But what would Russia say to that?" or words to that effect. The idea is gaining ground all over China that Great Britain is afraid of Russia.'

The Viceroy of Nanking informed him that a short time ago the name of Britain was more respected than that of any other nation, but now the name of Russia was most feared. On the question of China asking Great Britain for assistance, his Excellency said Russia would not allow China to do anything

of the sort.*

Such is the immediate result of what at first sight appears a retirement little less pusillanimous than that of Mr. Gladstone in 1881. Allowances must no doubt be made for the position in which the Government found itself in the spring of 1898. There were serious difficulties with France about Nigeria, and there was a prospect of still more troublesome questions on the Upper Nile. The reconquest of the Sudan was not yet half completed. The storm-cloud which has lately burst over South Africa was already gathering. In these circumstances it was natural that the Government should shrink from adding a Chinese imbroglio to those already existing or in immediate prospect. But our complaint is that by their previous neglect of a great opportunity they had allowed things to come to such a pass as to leave them no alternative but defiance or retreat. Granted that the situation had been prejudiced against us by the fact that Lord Rosebery stood aloof at the close of the Japanese war, allowed the three other Great Powers to step in, ostensibly as friends of China, and thus deliberately weakened

* ‘The Break-up of China,' pp. 21, 117.

our position at Peking-granted, that is, that we imitated the policy of France in Egypt in 1882, with similar results—it was surely all the more incumbent on Lord Rosebery's successors to waste no time in recovering all the influence that could be recovered at the Chinese Court, and in making it clear that we should not allow any other Power to present the pistol at the heart of China' which had been knocked from the hand of Japan in the moment of victory. Unfortunately, this attitude was not adopted, and Russia was left free to follow up her advantage. Nevertheless, even after the Cassini Convention, had we indicated diplomatically but decidedly that we should regard the occupation of Port Arthur by any other Power but China as an unfriendly act, that occupation could hardly have taken place, and the railway would not have been carried in that direction. Later still, had our ships remained at Port Arthur, the lease of the port might not have been obtained, or, if obtained, would hardly have been published and acted upon. To seize Port Arthur in such circumstances would have been to risk war with Great Britain, and Russia was in no position to risk war. She would have bided her time, no doubt, but we should have staved off-at least for some years-what must be regarded as a serious blow, if not a disaster; and we should have re-instated ourselves in the good graces of China, by helping her to resist demands otherwise irresistible. However, the chance is past, and recrimination is useless; but, since the Government seems only too ready to slip back again into the policy, or impolicy, of drift, it may be of some avail to take to heart the results of our temporary weakness two years ago.

Since this date, many events have occurred which prove the desire of Russia to thwart the purposes of this country, such as her compelling China to refuse the loan which England had agreed to give; * her opposition to the Northern Railway loan; and again, after the two countries had agreed to a formal recognition of their respective spheres of influence, her demand for a strategic railway to Peking. But more important than individual unfriendly acts is the general aim which they display. All the actions of Russia point in one direction, viz., to constitute herself the protector of China and dictator in Chinese affairs. Her pretext for the occupation of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan was to protect Manchuria against the aggression of other Powers.'† The same pretext would justify the occupation of Peking, or for that matter Shanghai or Canton.