Manchuria was no more threatened with attack then, except from Russia, than is any other part of China now.

Nor is the danger so chimerical as some may suppose. Twice within comparatively recent history have foreign invaders approaching from the North planted themselves on the throne of China. The Yuen dynasty, which bore sway during part of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, was formed by the Tartar chieftain Jinghiz Khan, and consolidated under his successor Kublai Khan-the great Emperor of Marco Polo's time. The present Manchu dynasty holds the throne by no other title than that of conquest. In each case the ruling class were as alien to the mass of their subjects, in race, language, and tradition, as the Romanoffs would be. These facts are well known in Russia, and in their eyes history may well repeat itself.

It

But whether of set purpose or not, it may be assumed that so long as China remains the soft yielding mass which it is at present, so long will there be encroachment more or less rapid on the part of the vigorous and zealous servants of the Czar. is not likely that Russia, having at so much cost established railway connexion with Eastern Siberia, will be content with that comparatively barren region, when the fertile plains of China are lying at her feet, and through misgovernment almost inviting occupation. We do no violence to probabilities in supposing that the Russian advance will continue, as it has done in Central Asia, until she meets a barrier sufficiently formidable to make her pause. Natural barriers there are none. The range of hills to the north of Peking, along which the Great Wall of China runs, is easily surmountable and, once across these, there is no barrier or break of any sort until the confines of Burmah and Tongking are reached.

We have been at some pains to set out the position clearly, because on our appreciation of that position must depend the measures which we can or ought to take. It will be seen that

we are confronted with two dangers: first, the danger of internal revolt and anarchy consequent on the weakness of the central Government, and second, the danger that Russia will use this weakness to obtain domination. Each of these constitutes a serious menace to our trade and commerce, and still more to the new railway and mining interests we have recently acquired. The remedy against both is the same. It is the conservation of the existing constitution of China, but strengthened and renovated by such reforms as will give the Government a new lease of life. In preserving China we are protecting our own truest interests; in allowing the Empire to

be broken up we are imperilling those interests and converting China from an area of peaceful commerce into a battlefield of the nations of Europe.

As to the policy which this country ought to adopt, we agree generally with the views of Lord Charles Beresford as expressed in the last chapter of his book-views, we think, which have not yet received the attention they deserve:

'I feel most strongly,' he says, 'that the pride and profession of Great Britain, to be the champion and chivalrous protector of weak nations, have been humbled and exposed by her acquiescing and taking part in the disintegrating policy of claims and counter-claims with which the Chinese Empire is being bullied whilst she is down. I hold that to break up a dismasted craft, the timbers of which are stout and strong, is the policy of the wrecker for his own gain. The real seaman tows her into dock and refits her for another cruise.

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In my opinion there is only one remedy, which is to maintain the integrity of the Chinese Empire and give security to the trade of all nations by a thorough reorganisation of the army and police of the entire country. . . . Why should not Great Britain, which has the largest vested interest in the country, lead the way, and invite the co-operation of all interested parties in the organisation of China's military and police in the same spirit as Sir Robert Hart has organised her Customs?'*

But we think this does not go far enough. While inviting the co-operation of other Powers, Great Britain should not wait till a concert of this sort can be arranged, but should proceed to make it clear to China that we mean to prevent her from going to pieces, and this, not in her interest, but in our own. The idea has been hovering over our Foreign Office that there is no need to hurry, that China is still a going concern, and that something will turn up which will obviate the need of our interfering at all. We think this is a fatal mistake. Little by little our interests are being undermined and frittered away. We give way here and give way there because the thing is not worth fighting about, and we shall wake up some day to find that our political influence in China has gone, that it has been supplanted by that of a rival Power, and that it can only be recovered at the cost of war. It goes without saying that without political influence-that is to say, a conviction on the part of the Chinese that we can and will enforce our demandswe may abandon all hope of accomplishing anything at Peking. Force, with the power and the will to use it, is the only argument the Chinese understand. It was by that we gained our commercial supremacy, and by that only can it be maintained.

* The Break-up of China,' p. 439.

Our first care must therefore be to recover lost ground and rehabilitate ourselves in the eyes of the Chinese. Instead of acquiescing in claims and demands that tend to disruption, we ought to oppose them, from whatever quarter they come. The Chinese have on various occasions appealed to us for help; it should be given them. The United States and Japan may be willing to join us in any such guarantee, but even if they decline we should still not hesitate. The position, we think, may be put in a nutshell. The only Powers from whom we may expect opposition are Russia and France. Either these Powers have designs on China, or they have not. If they have not, they will not display hostility to our policy of conservation, but will rather join in it. If they have designs, the sooner they are frustrated the better, and we shall never be in so good a position to frustrate them as we are now. We take it for granted that this country will fight rather than see itself squeezed out while China is partitioned between these two Powers or reduced to the condition of a dependency. If either or both should venture now on such a war of partition they must fight with the sea as a base, and on that we are supreme. A few years hence, if we let things drift till the Siberian Railway is finished, we shall be in a very different position.

What we urge, therefore, is that the short time of grace be utilised in strengthening our position and that of China. Having recovered our normal position in Peking, it should be used in developing the latent resources of the country. We must take in hand the reorganisation of her army and finances. On this point our greatest difficulty will be to secure the hearty co-operation of China herself; but that must be got over

as best it may. We cannot stop to argue the point, because we

are taking action, not in China's interest, but in our own. She will learn in time to acknowledge her indebtedness, as Japan did. But meantime the work must be set going. We have said that, so far as one can foresee the future in the light of the past, Russia will in due course continue her expansion southward till she reaches a barrier strong enough to make her pause. That barrier can only and ought only to be China herself. Our task is to teach China how to build up an army that will present such a barrier. Of men sufficient for the purpose there is no lack. If we take the Chinese in hand, as we have done other native races, we may expect equally good results. If money is wanting, as at first it may be, we need not hesitate to guarantee a loan.

We in England have been so accustomed of late to hear the merits of sea-power extolled that there is probably a comfort

able assurance in many minds that so long as we retain command of the sea we cannot be ousted anywhere. But sea power has its limits, and continental warfare is one of them. The great battles of Asia will in the future, as in the past, be fought out by land forces, with this difference, that in the future sea power will be of little avail. When Russia has connected her eastern and western dominions by railway, and has massed a hundred thousand men on the Chinese frontier, not all the navies in the world will prevent her marching from north to south of China if she is so minded. We must meet her in that case, if we meet her at all, by land forces, the bulk of which must consist of Chinese soldiers fighting in the defence of their own country.

Lord Salisbury, speaking at the Guildhall in 1895, in regard to the situation in China, said:

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'Depend upon it, whatever may happen in that region, be it in the way of war or in the way of commerce, we are equal to any competition which may be proposed to us. We may look on with absolute equanimity at the action of any persons, if such there be, who think that they can exclude us from any part of that fertile and commercial region.'

That was perhaps true in 1895, and it may be true to-day, but will it be true five years hence, when the Siberian Railway is finished? There are some, we know, who look on the Siberian Railway as a fraud, and who argue that, considering its length and the fact that it will probably be a single line, it can never be of much use for military purposes. But the Nile Railway is only a single line, and by means of it we carried an army to Khartoum. Moreover, the Russians can take their time-they need have no fear for their communications, for the Siberian Railway is one we cannot cut or interrupt. We agree that we could probably carry troops to the Far East by sea more quickly than Russia could by land, and if we were as supreme on land as we are at sea, we might, as Lord Salisbury says, view the proceeding with perfect equanimity. But are we? Supposing, for the sake of argument, that Russia were proposing to launch one hundred thousand men on a defenceless China, how would Great Britain meet that competition? Russia has only got to take her time, sending forward one thousand men a week, or whatever it may be; and how are we to stop her? By landing an equal number of British and Indian troops in China? We doubt it. To begin with, where are we to find our hundred thousand men, with Russia simultaneously threatening India and perhaps Teheran? If the Chinese cannot be taught to fight their own

battles, with possibly a stiffening of British and Indian troops, we cannot do it for them.

Many will probably say: The Japanese and other nations will never permit the Russians to conquer China; why should we be anxious? That may or may not be; we cannot tell what others may do or can do; we can only speak for ourselves. But it would be a hazardous policy in any case to allow the security of our trade and commerce to depend on the actions of any other Power. The rôle we have hitherto played has been that of general protectors of commerce in China, and we have not yet fallen so low as to live on sufferance or under foreign protection. The interests of Japan, no doubt, coincide largely with our own, but ours are greater. Allies the Japanese may be, but we must lead.

If Russia has no such designs as we have sketched above, we may of course congratulate ourselves. In that case, our efforts to assert our influence in China will have done no harm; they will have tended to secure the public peace and the free development of commerce. We shall be by so much in a better position to require from the Chinese Government the strict fulfilment of old treaty obligations and a free scope for the working out of the new railway and mining concessions. Our policy of patience has left in abeyance several private claims; we refer particularly to the Kow-shing case and the Bank of China case, both of which have been pending for years. It is preposterous that we cannot get these settled. While repelling all claims which make for disintegration, we should encourage and support all that tend to commercial development. If we are to protect China, it is not in order to allow her to go to sleep again, but to keep her on the march of progress until she can continue her journey alone.

It is impossible within our limits to go into any details showing how such a policy is to be worked out, but it must be generally on the lines familiar to us in Egypt, and with the fleet as a motive or driving power. As a beginning, we would suggest the placing of British officers as Advisers at the capitals of the several vice-royalties in the Yangtze Valley, Nanking, Wuchang, and Chengtu. Obstructive officials must be weeded out; those among them who cannot work with us must be invited to betake themselves elsewhere. The inception of the Wei-hai-Wei regiment contains the germ of great things. When regiment No. 1 is ready, it might be chartered with its officers to the Chinese Government for service up the Yangtze, and regiment No. 2 started. One such battalion would do the work of half-a-dozen of the present native regiments in putting