into the power of the British; and the Boer army in Natal fell back upon its own frontier.

It is evident that the success which attended the advance of Lord Roberts was to some extent due to the previously existing conditions, in which the forces of both sides were fully occupied throughout the theatre of war; while it is also clear that the greater rapidity of the movements in the Free State was partly dependent on the difference between the comparatively level plateau of the Free State and the rugged hills through which the Upper Tugela and its tributaries make their way. Though the future historian will probably be able to assign their due share of influence to those local and special difficulties, of which at present the exact effect is obscure, he will hardly modify the first impression that, in explaining the contrast between the two epochs of the war, a place must be given to 'the neglect of the principles of strategy in the one and to their application in the other.'* A good commentary upon the whole campaign is conveyed by a well-known passage of the great Swiss strategist in which he declares that the object of his work is to prove that there exists a fundamental principle of all the operations of war, and that it consists, first, in bringing the main body of the forces of an army successively to the decisive points of a theatre of war; secondly, in engaging this main body against the fractions of the enemy's army; thirdly, on the day of battle, in directing the main body of the forces upon the decisive point of the battle-field; and, lastly, in putting these forces into action, whether on the theatre of war or on the field of battle, with such energy and such unity of direction that they may put forth a simultaneous effort. Jomini regarded it as essential that a general should, so far as possible, endeavour to place his principal force upon the communications of the enemy without compromising his own; and Lord Roberts, by choosing for his point of concentration the camp on the Modder River, was able, in his subsequent advance towards Bloemfontein, first to threaten and then to occupy the main line of communications of all the Boer troops in the southern portion of the Free State, while his own line of communications was protected partly by the garrisons which defended its vulnerable points, and still more effectively by the position of his own army and the direction of its movement.

But the analysis of Jomini, valuable as it is as a clue to the formal strategy of the late operations, is yet in one respect inadequate. The campaign of a good general will always stand

* Jomini: Troisième Appendice au Précis de l'Art de la Guerre,'

the test of strategical analysis and illustrate the principles of what used to be called correctly but vaguely the art' of war. But the strategical principles which analysis reveals are the smallest part of generalship. A knowledge of strategical theory helps us to appreciate the work of a Cromwell or a Napoleon and to recognise his greatness; it does not account for him. A great commander is before all things a great man, in whom concentration of purpose is carried to the point at which his whole action appears simple, so that what half the world calls genius is called by the other half the embodiment of common sense. The science of strategy is no more than the logic of the general's mind; and good generalship is related to strategical theory exactly as good thinking to logical science. Logic never made a great mind, nor æsthetic analysis a great artist. Moreover, in the conduct of war, as in all matters of practical skill, it is in the execution, and not merely in the design, that the master-hand reveals itself.

Much has been said and written on the various defects in the preparations made during the earlier portion of the war; upon the insufficiency or imperfection of the supply of guns, the faults of the rifle with which the troops were armed, and the delay in providing the requisite animals and waggons for land transport. These subjects seem now likely to pass, too soon perhaps, into oblivion; but something will have been gained from the experience of the past six months if the nation should be induced by it to take to heart once more the great lesson of all military history, that in war the first requisite is a leader; and that, in regard both to the preparations made during peace and to the conduct of operations, the most responsible, the most important, and the most decisive act of a Government is the selection of its Commander-in-chief.

ART. XIV.-FOREIGN OPINION.

MODER

ODERN journalism has, in these latter days, fulfilled the poet's prayer—

'O wad some power the giftie gi'e us

To see ourselves as others see us!'

and has proved, only too conclusively, that our neighbours on the Continent see us, at present, in an extremely disagreeable light. In no previous epoch of our history, it may probably be said, has there occurred so general an outburst of animosity against this country. The fact is patent: the causes are not equally clear. The average Englishman is apt to attribute the prevalent feeling to mere envy and malice; to detestation of free trade, parliamentary government, the Protestant succession, and other national palladia; to colonial disappointment and commercial jealousy. Such reasons may account for much, but they hardly suffice to explain the hostility of the cultivated and intelligent. It is at least interesting, and may be important, to ascertain the reasons which influence persons whose opinions we are bound to respect, even when those reasons are not convincing. We need hardly remind our readers that we do not hold ourselves responsible for the statements made or the views expressed in the following articles, but the names of the authors are a sufficient guarantee that the thoughtful element in their respective countries is duly represented.

GERMANY."

Amid the angry war of words to which the hostile condition of public opinion in England and Germany has unfortunately given rise, we recall, like a half-forgotten legend of the distant past, that tremendous moment when Wellington, on the heights of St. Jean, in the late afternoon of June 18th, 1815, expressed aloud his wish that night or the Prussians would come. The hopes of victory were sinking with the setting sun, when, at first dull in the far distance, then nearer and nearer, louder and louder, in the rear and on the flank of the enemy, the thunder of the Prussian guns burst on Wellington's ear, and "Thank God!' he exclaimed, 'old Blücher is there.' †

The great fight was over: the victory that decided the fate

It has been thought advisable to translate this article from the German original. The translation has been revised by Herr Rodenberg.

Pierson: Preussische Geschichte,' pp. 152, 154.

of the world was won. The English call it the battle of Waterloo, and the Waterloo column on the Waterloo-platz in Hanover preserves the memory of the name. We Germans call

it the battle of La Belle Alliance.'

In the centre, and on the highest point of the French position, lies a farm called La Belle Alliance. As a memorial of the league which exists to-day between the Prussian and the English nations, of the union of the two armies, and of their mutual confidence, the Field-Marshal has proposed that the battle shall be known by that name.'

Thus ran Gneisenau's order to the army; and the triumphal column on the Belle-Alliance-platz in Berlin maintains the memory of it to this day. But, by whatever name we know the battle, the 18th of June, 1815, is a day of glory for Germany and England alike; and both nations link together in undying recollection the names of Marshal Vorwärts and the Iron Duke.

The memory of these events was still green in the thirties and forties of the nineteenth century, and the German youth of that day grew up in the glamour of them. They formed the glorious climax of the history-lessons in the schools; and the story of the 18th of June, enthusiastically narrated by the teacher, was drunk in by his pupils with equal enthusiasm. True, a jarring note was even then struck when we were told that the English claimed the greater share of credit for the victory, and that Wellington himself, twenty-one years after it had been won, had in a speech in Parliament uttered words insulting to the Prussian army." The present writer was at that time a schoolboy in Hanover, and can speak of these things from his own recollection. He even remembers seeing King Ernest Augustus-the monarch who overthrew the Constitution, and forced the seven Göttingen professors to resigna 'Stockengländer,' as Treitschke calls him, full of that arrogant contempt for the German nation which prevailed among the more ignorant section of his compatriots, and which led him to remark that no humiliation was too great for a German to put up with.†

But utterances like these of the two English dukes were forgotten in the general admiration which was felt in Germany for England, and which, if possible, grew still warmer when the lad passed from school to university. The British constitution was the ideal of our historical professors; its praises resounded in the lectures of Schlosser, of Gervinus, of Häusser,

* Häusser: 'Deutsche Geschichte' (ed. 1869), iv, p. 668, note. Treitschke: Historische und politische Aufsätze' (ed. 1865), p. 383,

and, above all, of Dahlmann, one of the famous seven of Göttingen, who designated the English people as, politically speaking, the most advanced in the world, and was wont to describe the State possessed of English institutions as, simply, 'the good State.'" To England our eyes were turned when, in the dreary days of the Reaction and amid the internal divisions of our distracted country, we strove to infuse hope into our bosoms, and to summon up courage for new efforts, by gazing on the spectacle of a great and free nation. It was on the free soil of England that our political exiles, condemned for their conscientious opinions to life-long prison or even to death, found a hospitable refuge until the dawn of a better day restored them to their homes. In later years, when, grown to man's estate, a German travelled to England and to London, he was astounded by the material greatness of the country and its huge metropolis, while an imperishable impression was made upon him by the monuments of a glorious past and the accumulated signs of present opulence. He gazed upon these wonders with no envious eyes; but a feeling of bitterness came over him when the superiority of England was unsparingly pressed home, and when it became only too clear that Englishmen took no pains to know the higher sides of German social life, but derived their idea of Germans from the specimens of the race who frequented the wretched purlieus of Leicester Square or North London.

We tried to comfort ourselves with the reflection that, in the days before the Crimean War, the average Englishman nourished a deep-seated prejudice against all foreigners' without exception; but it did not escape our notice that the great London journals, while retailing by the column all that happened in Paris, hardly ever deigned to take notice of German affairs, and, if they spoke of them at all, only displayed their ignorance. To be sure, Germany was not, in those days, particularly interesting; it was, as Metternich said of Italy, rather a geographical expression than a political entity. Buthere we touch the beginning of that hostility towards England which has ever since been on the increase-no sooner did we take the first step towards realising our political aspirations than we encountered the jealous opposition of Great Britain.

The accomplishment of our political unity, the longing for which has never wholly slumbered in the German heart, began with the Danish War of 1848, when, against law and against treaties, Denmark attempted to tear asunder two German pro

* Treitschke Historische und politische Aufsätze' (ed. 1865), p. 393.