網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

AGRICULTURE AND PASTORAL PURSUITS.

The Japan Year Book for 1917 estimates that more than 75 per cent of the entire population is occupied in agricultural pursuits. It is estimated that one person cultivates half an acre and that there are five productive persons per family, making the average farm in Japan 2 acres; even in the northern parts of the main islands, where the largest farms occur, the average is not more than 71⁄2 acres per family.

Rice is a crop of first importance, with barley and wheat next. During the last seven years the average crop of rice has approximated 265,000,000 bushels, barley 50,000,000 bushels, and wheat 25,000,000 bushels.

Pastoral pursuits in Japan are inconsiderable.

MINERAL PRODUCTION.

COAL.

Coal is one of Japan's most valuable and dependable resources. Trade Commissioner J. Morgan Clements, in his report on the mineral resources of Japan, gives the available reserves of all classes of coal in Japan as about 8,000,000,000 metric tons, of which a very large percentage is bituminous. The largest deposits are on the island of Kyushu and those next in importance on the island of Hokkaido. The production for 1915 was about 22,700,000 short tons and for 1916 about 25,350,000 short tons. On account of the shortage of labor, this production does not seem (from preliminary information) to have been maintained in 1917 and probably will not be equalled in 1918. More than 75 per cent of the present production is from the Kyushu fields. A considerable part of this is from mines with modern equipment, but there are still a number of mines worked by primitive Japanese methods. Future railway construction will be little affected by the coal traffic except, probably, for the building of some additional mileage on the North Island.

IRON.

The question of an adequate supply of iron and steel is Japan's greatest industrial problem for future solution. Mr. Clements gives the probable consumption of iron and steel for 1917 as 1,350,000 tons, and it is estimated that this will probably be increased to as much as 2,000,000 tons in 1920. During 1917 it is hardly likely that the total production of iron under Japanese control, including that from Chosen, Manchuria, and China, exceeded 750,000 tons, leaving 600,000 tons to come from other sources principally America. Japan is undoubtedly making a very careful study of future supplies not only of iron, but of coal as well, from Chosen, Manchuria, and China. The figures given by Mr. Clements show only about 18,000,000 tons of known iron deposits (estimated) and only about 45,000,000 tons of other possible deposits.

COPPER AND OTHER MINERALS.

In recent years Japan's copper production and its value have both increased very largely. Mr. Clements gives the production in 1915 as nearly 166,000,000 pounds, valued at $26,700,000 gold. In 1916

the production was increased to more than 221,000,000 pounds, and the value increased to more than $54,700,000 gold.

It is not probable, however, that the production of copper or any of the other minerals will in the future have any substantial effect on the building of additional railways or the traffic for the present lines.

GENERAL MANUFACTURING.

As is doubtless known by anyone interested in reading this report, manufacturing of many kinds has made rapid progress in Japan in recent years, particularly since the beginning of the war. As the result of his investigation, the writer was impressed in both Australia and Japan by the fundamental differences between those countries and the United States with respect to the manufacturing of railway equipment. The principal elements of divergence are the private ownership of the railways in the United States and the enterprise of railway-equipment factories that depend solely on private initiative and capital.

The situation in Japan is interesting and instructive and is very well covered by Dr. Toshiharu Watarai, formerly assistant councilor in the Imperial Board of Railways of Japan, in his Columbia University study entitled "Nationalization of Railways in Japan," where in the preface he makes the following statement:

* * *

Although most economic problems can in general not be considered apart from other discussions, the problem of railway nationalization is a particularly difficult one in that it ought to be discussed with equal care from the point of view of state policy and national defense, as well as from that of economics. What, then, are the economic conditions in Japan? In my opinion, there are two great intellectual and physical obstacles in Japan which have hitherto hindered the development of its economic life. They are the lack of the individualistic idea (or independent spirit) of the people and the lack of capital. The Japanese people, who were for a long time under the idealistic-stoic influence of Buddhism and Confucianism, as well as subjected to the despotic pressure of the feudal system, have a very weak independent emotion, so that the economic life of the nation has naturally been depressed to a low level. Under such conditions the state-socialistic idea spreads rapidly among the people. This is shown by the fact that most of the great industries in Japan have been started or aided by the Government. The reader of this dissertation will realize that the nationalization of the railways in Japan was effected under such political and economic circumstances. Our effort must, therefore, be to remedy these defects. We can see that conditions in Japan-especially in the two points mentioned—contrast strongly with those in the United States.

These remarks no doubt apply to the Japanese manufacturing situation in general as well as to the railways in particular.

MANUFACTURING OF RAILWAY EQUIPMENT.

While the Imperial Government Railways of Japan have a number of extensive workshops reasonably well equipped with modern machinery, the general function of these workshops is to handle repairs to all classes of equipment and materials rather than to carry out extensive manufacturing, although a relatively small number of cars, particularly good wagons, are manufactured in several of them. Most of the manufacturing of rolling stock, however, is carried out by concerns under fostering contracts from the railways. The Imperial Steel Works at the port of Wakamatsu (near Moji), on the Island of Kyushu, nominally supplies the iron and steel required by

106229°-19-10

the Japanese railways, but at times, particularly since the beginning of the war, it has been found convenient to buy a good deal of the iron and steel elsewhere, especially in the United States. Without question, the above-mentioned steel works can not be considered a really private enterprise, and, while possibly not directly a Government plant, it has been as fully protected in its development as though actually under Government control and management. The Kisha Seizo Kaisha, with works at Osaka and Tokyo, is the largest manufacturer of locomotives and cars, and the Kawasaki Dock Yards at Kobe are the next largest manufacturers of railway equipment; this latter company's production consists largely of locomotives, though both companies produce, at times, a considerable amount of structural materials. At the time the writer was in Japan these two concerns had orders totaling 152 locomotives for the Government railways. In addition, they had contracts for a number of locomotives for the private and light railways. There are also a number of smaller concerns manufacturing cars-particularly goods wagons and tramway cars-for the Government railways and the private railways, light railways, and tramways. All these concerns have been or are being developed by fostering contracts from the railways, as indicated above by Mr. Watarai.

II. COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL CONDITIONS.

DOMESTIC COMMERCE.

While the amount per capita of domestic commerce is small, yet for the amount of railways it is very considerable and consists of a great variety of articles, many of which are agricultural products. Shipments constitute, for the most part, what would be termed in the United States "classified business." The only portion that is handled on a commodity basis is the coal traffic, which amounts to more than 50 per cent of all the tonnage handled. The average haul in 1916-17 was 99.3 miles, representing a gradual increase from 84 miles in 1913-14.

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS.

As

As probably everybody knows who will be interested in this report, both the exports and the imports of Japan have grown rapidly in the last few years, particularly since the beginning of the war. a result, the amount of business offered has been entirely beyond the capacity of the railways to handle satisfactorily. This has been especially true of the freight traffic, which in many instances has been badly congested, particularly at the principal ports and in the industrial districts of Osaka-Kobe, Yokohama-Tokyo, and Moji. The Japanese control of Pacific shipping has already very largely increased reshipping in Japanese ports, particularly Kobe.

TARIFFS.

The present Japanese tariffs went into effect July 17, 1911, and are fully set forth in the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce Tariff Series No. 28, revised in June, 1912. The duties imposed are protective wherever there are Japanese manufacturers to protect, and this no doubt will be the future policy of the Japanese Government.

TRADING CENTERS.

Yokohama and Kobe are large trading centers and are important points for export and import business, but Tokyo is most important from the standpoint of railway markets for the reason that this is the headquarters of the Imperial Government Railways of Japan. Osaka is also an important trading center, being the center of the largest industrial and tramway district in Japan.

INDUSTRIAL CENTERS.

The largest all-round industrial center is the Osaka district, including Kobe, Kyoto, and the districts surrounding Osaka Bay. Next in importance is the Tokyo-Yokohama district, including the districts surrounding Tokyo Bay, but the Moji-Shimonoseki district is also very important and has the distinct advantage of close prox

imity to the fuel supply on the island of Kyushu. The advantages of fuel supply may also lead to considerable industrial development on the North Island, particularly at Muroran, near which there is now a steel plant (though it can hardly be considered successful thus far).

INDUSTRIAL LABOR.

One of the supposed advantages of Japan is the large supply of cheap and industrious labor, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this report. The writer, however, is inclined to believe that this asset has been somewhat overrated. In the first place, there is not the great supply of available labor that is supposed to exist. As a matter of fact, there was a shortage of labor in all the heavy industries when the writer was in Japan in 1917; at least, this was the case at the coal mines, at the shipping ports, and on the railways (particularly in the workshops). As long as the present large percentage of people are occupied in agricultural pursuits, the present labor supply is not going to be materially augmented.

In the heavier industries the Japanese labor is not particularly capable nor are the present methods of working efficient; but both of these conditions can and probably will be improved. One feature that impressed the investigator was the number of women employed in the heavy industries, particularly coal mining and construction work. The percentage of women in railway work is not nearly so great as in some other classes of work. In 1917 the percentage of women in railway employ was only 3.35 per cent of the whole, more than one-half of them being employed in flagging grade crossings. Careful observation led to the conclusion that the Japanese are better developed in the line of novelty industries than in heavier manufacture and that this is particularly true of electrical work, in which connection they also show a decided technical adaptability.

In regard to the wages paid in the heavy industries, it was found difficult to obtain data that would enable definite conclusions to be arrived at. However, in such works as the Kisha Seizo Kaisha and the Kawasaki Dock Yards, it was ascertained that, from 1905 to the beginning of the war, such wages as $0.20 to $0.30 gold per day were paid for various forms of common labor; more or less skilled labor around these shops was paid from $0.35 to possibly $0.45, and good mechanics seldom received more than $0.50 per day. These figures are only approximate, and the wages seem to vary unaccountably in different situations. Wages since the beginning of the war have been very generally advanced in all classes of heavy industrial work, and now in the above works various forms of common labor vary from $0.25 to $0.50 (and probably higher for some of the better grades of labor). Skilled-mechanic labor now varies all the way from $0.50 to $2 per day, although it may be considered exceptional for wages to exceed $1.50 per day. At such points as Nagasaki Harbor, the supply of labor has been entirely inadequate; wages have been generally doubled and in some cases trebled or even more largely increased. Persons who were paid $0.15 to $0.20 per day before the war have been earning $0.35 to $0.50, and in some instances considerably more, for such work as coaling ships on passage through Nagasaki. Here a large number of women are employed and the labor demand and supply are both variable.

« 上一頁繼續 »