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These proposed railways consist of two trunk lines—one between Canton and Hankow and the other between Hankow and Chengtu, the capital of the Province of Szechwan.
The Canton-Hankow line and branches total about 685 miles, of which 269 miles on the Hankow end is now practically completed, On the south end 140 miles is completed and is now being operated by a private company, but on the completion of the rest of this trunk line it will be taken over by the Ministry of Communications. This leaves about 250 miles to be finished. This is considered by far the most important railway in China to be completed. It will connect the thickly populated part of South China with Peking and Hankow and the other parts of Central and North China. No doubt, as soon as conditions warrant, steps will be taken to secure further loans for the completion of the work. The writer was informed that location surveys have been practically completed for the remaining parts of the line, and this should enable more accurate estimates to be made on the cost than has been the rule with many of the other lines.
The Hankow-Szechwan line totals about 800 miles. No part of this line has been completed and very little effective construction work has yet been done, for the reason that the portion near Ichang partly completed by the provincial authorities before the taking over of this line by the Ministry of Communications has been abandoned to enable a line of better grade to be secured by the change of route.
Appendix 8 shows a copy of the final Hukuang Loan Agreement and several subsequent notes under date of March 1, 1913, March 3, 1913, and September 12, 1913. This agreement may be of particular interest in the event of negotiations for further funds, in view of the fact that the available British and American funds have been utilized for the building of 269 miles of the Canton-Hankow line now practically completed and in view of the controversy that arose regarding the awarding of some of the business in this connection.
This proposed line is to connect with the Tientsin-Pukow line at Wui, a short distance north of Pukow, using the latter line's Pukow terminals, and is to extend west about 350 miles through the Provinces of Anhwei and Honan, connecting with the Peking-Hankow line at Sinyangchow, about 135 miles north of Hankow.
The preliminary agreement for this line was signed in 1899, but the final agreement was not actually executed by the Ministry of Communications until November, 1913. This agreement was signed by the Chinese Central Railway (Ltd.) as a purely British undertaking, providing for the appointment of British engineers and the use of British materials and equipment, but it is claimed that a co siderable percentage of the stock of the company has passed into the hands of French and Belgians, who will thus be entitled to their share of the profits of this enterprise. The terms of this agreement are the same as the Tientsin-Pukow conditions referred to later as being more favorable from the Chinese standpoint than the railway loan agreements made previous to that time. The Tientsin-Pukow agreement is shown in Appendix 6.
The duration of the loan is 40 years and amortization was to have commenced with the eleventh year from the date of the loan, Januery 13, 1908, but on account of the delay occasioned by the war this will hardly apply. Very little progress has been made in connection with the actual construction of this line, but it is believed to be one of the projects that will be taken in hand as soon as funds can be secured after the war.
This line is to connect Shasi on the Yangtze River in the Province of Hupeh, about 200 miles above Hankow, with Shingyifu in the Province of Kweichow, a distance of about 655 miles. A branch is to connect Changtehfu on this line with Changsha, about 105 miles distant, where it would connect with the Canton-Hankow Railway. This loan agreement was substituted, with little modification, for the Canton-Chingkung agreement made by the Chinese National Railway Corporation, of which Dr. Sun Yat Sen was director general and Mr. George Bronson Rea technical secretary. This loan agreement is with Pauling & Co. (Ltd.) (British), who are to carry out the construction on a basis of cost plus a percentage for their services and profit. The Government, after the dissolution of the Chinese National Railway Corporation, refused to recognize the validity of any agreement entered into by Dr. Sun, but realizing the advantage of this form of agreement, it proceeded to negotiate another contract with the same firm for the construction of what is considered the more important line from Shasi to Shingyifu. This last agreement was signed by the Ministry of Communications in July, 1914. The loan is to run 40 years. There are many points in this arrangement that are considered to be of relatively great advantage to the Chinese Government as compared with any previous form of railway loan agreement. It is probable that the Ministry of Communications will contend, so far as practicable, for these general terms in all future agreements. A copy of this agreement is shown in Appendix No. 7.
The Siems-Carey Co. is an American corporation that has entered the field in China in recent years and that has a preliminary agreement for financing and constructing several hundred miles of railways for the Ministry of Communications. There are a number of lines for which surveys and field studies of the routes are being made, and from these data estimates and conclusions are being arrived at regarding the cost and advisability of building the several lines under consideration. Under the circumstances, their construction is certainly very desirable, but a most serious difficulty has been encountered in the objections raised by persons who assert that the rights of their concessions are being invaded.
Railway agreements in China can be divided into two distinct classes---first, railway concessions, which are really not agreements in a strict sense, and second, the class that can fairly be called railway loan agreements. It is well to understand that a railway loan in China is not the usual commercial transaction that it is in most other parts of the world, particularly in the United States or Canada,
but is in fact a political issue between two or more nations, of which China is one of the principals.
As stated previously, it was thought that it would not be necessary to cover the subject of railway agreements in preparing this monogiaph on railway markets in China, but a brief study led to the conclusion that this would be a necessary or at least a very desirable feature of the report, to support some of the conclusions and suggestions made later. The railway agreements of China have been discussed and written about to a considerable extent, but this appears to have been done in most cases from either the political or the financial viewpoint, as is very natural, since they were framed so largely from those standpoints. The writer's study, however, was made from the viewpoint of the engineer confronted with the construction, maintenance, and operation of these lines and the purchase of materials, equipment, and supplies to the best advantage. In this connection one of the features especially considered was the development of traffic between the several railways and the grouping and consolidating of the management of the various lines in the most economical arrangement. This should be permissible, since the central Government is in most cases actually responsible, as the last source, for the interest on the loans; but in reality the restrictions of the loan agreements prevent the consolidation of the railways to the best advantage of the whole.
To illustrate the various features of both classes of arrangements and the progressive development of the situation from the forcing on China by Russia of the Chinese Eastern Railway concession to the conclusion of the Pauling Loan agreement, granting to China reasonable conditions for the financing and construction of the railways and the right to operate them as Chinese properties after construction, the writer has, in general, shown only such agreements as appear to be typical and to mark actual steps in the development of this situation. However, copies have been added of the Hukuang Loan agreement and notes of interpretation, for the reason that the Hukuang and the Siems-Carey agreements are the only ones in which American interests are involved at present. There is also a copy of the Ssupingkai-Chengchiatun Railway agreement, as representing the latest type of Sino-Japanese agreement in connection with the lines being built in Manchuria with Japanese loans, which will, for the present, at least, be operated as part of the South Manchuria Railway system.
No effort has been made to show all the numerous agreementsnot even all of those relating directly to the most important linesbut to any one interested in this situation it is suggested that the most complete information available can be found in the publication that was expected to appear some time in 1918 under the title “Compilation of treaties and agreements with and concerning China concluded during the period from 1894 to 1917, inclusive, under the editorship of Mr. J. V. A. MacMurray, first secretary of the American legation in Peking. This will be published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY AGREEMENT.
Appendix 2 contains translations of documents relating to the first concession (and one of the most important) forced from China during the “Battle for Concessions." The first document (see p. 274) is the agreement for the construction and operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway from Pogranichnaya (Suifenho, Chinese name) on the eastern border to Manchuria (Manchouli) on the western border of Manchuria, now forming part of the Trans-Siberian route. The original of this agreement is in Chinese and French. The translation in the Appendix is from the French text and is the same as will appear in Mr. MacMurray's compilation. The text shown by Mr. Kent in his "Railway Enterprise in China" is a translation from the Chinese, taken from Rockhill's “Treaties and conventions entered into by China between 1894 and 1904.” While these translations differ in some details the substance is practically the same, but it is probable that the French text is the one that guided the Russians in their handling of this situation. The second document in Appendix 2 (see p. 276) is a translation of the supplemental agreement for the construction and operation of the South Manchurian Branch (then so-called) from Harbin to Port Arthur. This is the tianslation from the Chinese text as shown by Rockhill's “Treaties." The name of the Russo-Chinese Bank has since been changed to the Russo-Asiatic Bank.
The concluding section of Appendix 2 (see p. 278) shows the “Statutes of the Chineze Eastern Railway Co.," which are given in order to show the scope of the powers granted to the railway company to develop and operate the resources of this territory in addition to the construction and operation of a railway. This text is taken from Kent's “Railway Enterprise in China.” The writer was unable to identify the text from which this translation was made, but in view of the accuracy of all of Mr. Kent's data, no doubt is entertained with respect to its correctness.
Reference to the taking over of the southern part of the South Manchurian Branch (or what is now the South Manchuria Railway Co.'s line) from Russia by Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese War and the extending of this concession to a total of 99 years will be made later in connection with the South Manchuria Railway Co.
PEKING-HANKOW RAILWAY AGREEMENT.
In this case it may be considered that the arrangement was first a concession and at a later date was changed to a loan agreement. The first section of Appendix 3 (see p. 285) is the translation from the French text, as shown by Rockhill's “Treaties.” The second section has to do with a supplementary loan. This is a translation from the French text as printed in Mr. C. C. Wang's “Railway Loan Agreements.'
The history of these negotiations is long and complicated but the outstanding points are as follows: The project was first undertaken by Grand Councilor Chang and Mr. Sheng, both previously men. tioned, who endeavored to raise two-thirds of the necessary capital among the Chinese.
When this failed and when negotiations were in progress with the Carey-Washburn group of American interests, the Belgians appeared and their terms seemed so attractive that Director General Sheng proceeded to close on what, at that time, he regarded as the best terms. When the details came to be settled, however, many of the apparently good terms had to be modified. It is probable that this is one of the loans in which there will be
considerable difficulty in finally overcoming all the restrictions, though a good deal of progress has already been made to that end.
PEKING-NEWCHWANG RAILWAY AGREEMENT.
This was the first real loan agreement of any magnitude negotiated. It is of the class in which the Chinese gave all the actual management into the hands of foreigners. The first section of Appendix 4 (see p. 294) is a copy of the preliminary agreement of June 7, 1898, and the second section is the final agreement of October 10, 1898—both taken from Kent's "Railway Enterprise in China." This agreement was very vigorously objected to by Russia as encroaching on its "sphere of influence” in Southern Manchuria and constituting what the Russians called "foreign control of the line."
It was on this occasion that England and Russia reached the agreement that the latter should confine its activities to Manchuria and territory north of the Great Wall and England to the Yangtze Valley, as outlined in the notes between Count Muravieff and Sir Charles Scott. Without question this agreement and the success of the Peking-Mukden Railway gave the British an opportunity, which they utilized to considerable advantage, to introduce British railway methods and equipment on this and other Chinese railways. The Peking-Mukden Railway loan has been shown to have the best margin of safety of any loan so far.
CANTON-KOWLOON RAILWAY AGREEMENT.
The next step in the change of conditions for railway loans was marked by the agreement for the Chinese portion of the CantonKowloon Railway, which was signed March 7, 1907. Appendix 5 (see p. 299) shows a copy of this agreement, as given in Rockhill's “Treaties." In the discussion of railway loan agreements in China in recent years the terms of this agreement have been referred to as typical of the conditions claimed by British interests to constitute the best arrangement for the construction of railways in China with money raised on foreign loans. This agreement provides that the administration and control of the funds shall be under a Chinese managing director appointed by the viceroy and that there shall be associated with the managing director a British chief engineer and a British chief accountant nominated by the British & Chinese Corporation and approved by the viceroy. Å great deal has been said about the effects of this arrangement, but it has worked out to what might be called a dual control, with the British chief engineer and British chief accountant in technical control of the administration.
TIENTSIN-PUKOW RAILWAY AGREEMENT.
The next advance in the development of the loan conditions was the signing of the Tientsin-Pukow agreement January 13, 1908. The conditions have since become known as the "Tientsin-Pukow Terms” and mark a distinct type of loan agreement. Appendix 6 (see p. 306) is the text as shown by Rockhill's “Treaties.” The terms of this loan were more to China's liking than the conditions of any loan made up to that time. It put in the hands of the Chinese director general control of funds derived from the loan. The British