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here, too, there is a potential for friction in response to adjustments in relative power and influence. Should Japan lose confidence in the credibility of the United States security guarantee or should the United States lose patience with what we perceive to be Japan's failure to take more responsibility for its own defense, basic changes in the relationship could occur.

Similarly, should we on our side change our position with respect to maintaining and expanding a liberal international trading system, our relationship also could be radically altered.

None of this seems likely at this point. Security, economic, and political ties are strong, but clearly careful handling is necessary on both sides of the Pacific.

A high degree of emotionalism envelops the discussion of trade, and to a lesser extent, defense issues. Therefore, to assure future relations and preserve these relations will require the exercise of considerable initiative and understanding on our parts, on both our parts.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. [Mr. Holdridge's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

I provide the following statement in my capacity as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The statement is for use by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, in its March 1, 1982 hearing on United States-Japan relations.

EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONS

Changes in United States-Japan relations in recent years have not been as dramatic or distinct as when we moved from one earlier post-war stage in our relationship to another. It was easy to draw a demarcation line, for example, between the Occupation and post-Peace Treaty era, when Japan regained the attributes of sovereignty; or between the early years after the Korean War, still marked by heavy dependence upon the United States and an unequal Security Treaty, and the 1960's, marked by the breaking-in period of the new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the dramatic resurgence of the Japanese economy. What we have seen over the past decade is a broadening and deepening of our relations, characterized by a growing spirit of equal partnership. Changes may not be clearly discernible in the short term but are nonetheless marked when we look back at the situation, say, five or six years ago.

Perhaps Japan's most significant shift of the past decade has been from the status of a regional power to identification as a leading member of the advanced industrialized democracies. Japan has collaborated with us and West European nations in the OECD, at the annual Summit meetings, and at major issue-oriented international gatherings. Both our countries are aware of the tremendous influence we assert jointly as the free world's two largest industrial powers-and we are aware of and sustained by the hypothetical prospect we both wish to avoid: an Asia in which we were working at cross purposes.

As we have moved toward what was termed at one recent bilateral summit meeting a "productive partnership," the legacy of the patron-client relationship that characterized much of the post-war period has largely faded away. We are now approaching an equilibrium in our dealings with one another. As Japan's economic strength has grown and its political horizons have broadened, we find our mutual interests transcending the traditional focus of Asia to embrace other regions, including the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Africa, Latin America and most recently, the Polish situation. As spelled out in greater detail below, an extraordinary degree of consensus pervades our diplomatic effort around the globe.

UNITED STATES-JAPAN RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AND ITS

SUBCOMMITTEES ON

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE

AND ON

ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 1, 3, 9, 17, 24; APRIL 27; JUNE 2, 15; AUGUST 4, 1982

98-175 O

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON: 1982

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington

GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DAN MICA, Florida

MICHAEL D. BARNES, Maryland
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
GEO. W. CROCKETT, JR., Michigan
BOB SHAMANSKY, Ohio
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
DENNIS E. ECKART, Ohio
TOM LANTOS, California
DAVID R. BOWEN, Mississippi

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
LARRY WINN, JR., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JOEL PRITCHARD, Washington
MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa

ARLEN ERDAHL, Minnesota
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN LEBOUTILLIER, New York
HENRY J. HYDE, New York

JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., Chief of Staff
LINDA G. SILVER, Staff Assistant
ANNE I. MARKWARD, Staff Assistant

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY AND TRADE

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York, Chairman

DENNIS E. ECKART, Ohio DON BONKER, Washington HOWARD WOLFE, Michigan BOB SHAMANSKY, Ohio

ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
ARLEN ERDAHL, Minnesota
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
MILLICENT FENWICK, New Jersey

R. ROGER MAJAK, Subcommittee Staff Director
TABOR E. DUNCAN, JR., Minority Staff Consultant
CAROL PAGE Rovner, Subcommittee Staff Associate
JOHN MAXWELL HAMILTON, Subcommittee Staff Associate

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