ePub 版

of commitment to mutual consultation between the USSR


Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the and Bulgaria and the USSR and Yugoslavia on foreign

President of the Russian Federation; APRF), fond (f.) 45, opis’ policy questions. The Djilas report states that this proposal (op.) 1, delo (d.) 397, listy (11.) 107-110.

8 was advanced by Stalin and Molotov within the context of

“Poslednii vizit I. Broza Tito k I. V. Stalinu” ([J. Broz Tito's

final visit to J.V. Stalin), Istoricheskii arkhiv 2 (1993), pp. 16-35. accusations directed at Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for not

9 AJBT KMJ, 1-3-b/651, pp. 33-40. Minutes of the CPY informing Moscow of their projected foreign policy

Politburo meeting on 19 February 1948 are in Arhiv Jugoslavije activities. At the same time, the Bulgarian and Soviet

[Archives of Yugoslavia: henceforth AJ], fond 507, CK SKJ, III/ records portray the matter in an entirely different light: 31 a (copy). Stalin proposed to sign such a protocol in response to 10 AJBT, KMJ, 1-3-b/651, pp. 45-46. Dimitrov's complaint that Moscow gave out little informa- 11 Kostov's stenographic record, or more specifically its tion regarding its position on important foreign policy

deciphered version in Bulgarian, was also included in Georgii questions. Here, as in the case with the Greek partisan

Dimitrov's journal, stored in the same archive: Tsentralen

d'rzhaven arkhiv (documents from the former Central Party movement, we do not have at our disposal documents to

Archives (TSPA), henceforth TsDA-TSPA), f. 146, op. 2, arkhivna determine whether Stalin was actually planning to raise

edinitsa (a.e.) 19, 11. 103-128. The rights to the journal now kept this question, or whether he was simply availing himself of

in the archive, including Kostov’s stenographic record, are held the opportunity provided by Dimitrov's statement.

by Georgii Dimitrov's adopted son Boiko Dimitrov, to whom I The records printed below of Stalin's meetings with

am deeply grateful for giving me a copy of the text of this record. Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaders constitute an 12 TsDA-TsPA, f. 147, op. 2, a.e. 62, 11. 5-35 (manuscript). important source for historical study and point out direc- Kolarov also noted in Russian some statements by Stalin and tions for further archival research.

Molotov (ibid., 11. 1-4).
13 The archive has a typewritten copy.

Minutes of conversation of Zorin and Gerashchenko,

department heads in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute of

Affairs of USSR, with Kardelj and the chief Yugoslav military Slavonic and Balkan Studies of the Russian Academy of

envoy in Moscow, Velimir Terzic, 23 November 1944. Arkhiv Sciences, and most recently the coeditor (with Norman vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of Foreign Naimark) of The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Policy of the Russian Federation, henceforth, AVP RF), f. 0144, Eastern Europe, 1944-1949 (Westview Press: Boulder, op. 28, papka (p.) 114, d. 4, 11. 220-221.

15 1997).

Copy of Kardelj's letter to Tito, dated 28 May 1945, AJ, f.

Edvard Kardelj, kutija (box) “Sabrana dela”, t. IX (X), No. 9, p. | Editor's Note: The May 27/28 meeting only lasted 90 minutes

82; the USSR Embassy memorandum to the Yugoslav governbefore breaking up for an early morning snack. Stalin was a

ment (May 1945) in AJBT, KMJ, 1-3-b/616. night owl and many of his summits (including the 1948 meeting

16 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent’ev and Hebrang on included here) should be “double-dated,” although for conve

17 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 26; nience, the earlier day is often used to identify meetings. On the

memorandum “Economic Relations Between the USSR and abolition of nocturnal summons under Khrushchev, see John

Yugoslavia,” 22 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. Gaddis, We Now Know (Oxford, 1997) p.

10, 11. 6-7.

206. 2 Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Prilozi za biografiju (Josip

17 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Hebrang on Broz Tito: Materials for Biography] (Belgrade, 1953), pp. 447

16 April and between Lavrent'ev and Hebrang on 17 April 1946, 453, 497-504. For a slightly different version, in English

AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 11. 20-21; Hebrang's letter

1. 1. translation, see Tito Speaks (London, 1953) and Tito (New York,

to Kardelj, dated 17 April 1946, AJBT, KMJ, 1-3-b/62

18 Hebrang's letter to Kardelj, dated 17 April 1946, AJBT, KMJ, 1953). 3 Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962),

1-3-b/623, pp. 1-3.

19 The letter still remains in Tito's archive: see previous pp. 114-120 (in Yugoslavia this could only be published almost

footnote. three decades later: Milovan Djilas, Razgovori sa Staljinom (Belgrade, 1990), pp. 111-118); Edvard Kardelj, Borba za

Copies of minutes of these Politburo meetings, AJ, f. 507, priznanje i nezavisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957: Secanja

CKSKJ, III/17; III/18. The decision was secret, and it was [The Struggle for Recognition and Independence of New

published only when the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict broke out in Yugoslavia 1944-1957: Memoirs) (Belgrade-Ljubljana, 1980),

1948; see Borba (Belgrade), 30 June 1948.

21 Minutes of conversation between Tito and Lavrent'ev, 18 pp. 112-117. Thirty years later Dedijer himself admitted this selectiveness,

April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 31.

f. d explaining that this was entirely due to the fact that he was

23 Memorandum “On the creation of an industrial infrastructure writing the book from the perspective of the Yugoslav government. Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza

for the production of ammunition in Yugoslavia,” 27 May 1946, Tita [New Materials for Josip Broz Tito's Biography), vol.3

AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 11. 19-20.

24 (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 283-284, 291-293.

Copy of minutes of this Politburo meeting, AJ, f. 507, 5 While dictating his memoirs, Kardelj asked to verify, corrobo


25 Minutes of conversation between Tito and Lavrent'ev, 18 rate and expand many of his recollections on the basis of archival documents. See Edvard Kardelj, Borba, p. 14

April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 31. 6 Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavihe

26 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 29 (henceforth AJBT, KMJ), 1-1/7, pp. 6-11.

April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 62.


22 Ibid.

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27 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 7 May 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 76. 28 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Kardelj, 23 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 45; also see footnote 28. 29 Memorandum, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 11, 1-3. 30 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 20 May 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 100. 31

I considered this problem in my “Balkanskii uzel” (The Balkan Knot], in 0.A. Rzheshevskii, ed., Vtoraia mirovaia voina: Aktual'nye problemy (The Second World War: Contemporary Problems] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 96-101. 32 Minutes of conversation between Lavrent'ev and Tito, 22 April 1946, AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30. p. 118. d. 15. 11.

39-41. Copy of “Agreement on Economic Cooperation Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia,” 8 June 1946, Arkhiv Ministerstva vneshnikh economicheskikh sviazei Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation)], fond: Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, 11. 17-19. 34

Negotiations for a concrete agreement were being carried out by a special Yugoslav military-trade delegation which arrived in Moscow in fall 1946. The type and the amount of materials designated for shipment to Yugoslavia were determined by the Soviet side on the basis of a Yugoslav procurement application, the first of which was handed over at the time of Tito's visit. See, e.g., the correspondence between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow during November 1946-March 1947; AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, 11. 121, 125, 132-143; ibid., op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, 1. 23. 35 Minutes of conversations between Lavrent’ev and Enver Hoxha (the latter had arrived in Belgrade by then), 24 June 1946, and between Lavrent’ev and Hysni Kapo, Albanian Minister in

Yugoslavia, 1 July 1946: AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 11. 167-168; and ibid., d. 16, 1. 1. 36 See L. Ya. Gibianskii, “Problemy mezhdunarodnopoliticheskogo strukturirovaniia Vostochnoi Evropy v period formirovaniia sovetskogo bloka v 1940-e gody” [Problems of East European International-Political Structuring during the Period of the Formation of the Soviet Bloc during the 1940s), in M.M. Narinskii et al., eds., Kholodnaia voina: novye podkhody, novye dokumenty (The Cold War: New Approaches, New Documents] (Moscow, 1995), pp. 103, 105, 106-107. 37

These notes, untitled and undated, can be found in AJBT, KMJ, 1-1/7, pp. 51-52.

I have examined this episode elsewhere in more depth on the basis of Russian, Yugoslav, and Bulgarian archival materials. See, e.g., “The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Formation of the Socialist Camp Model," in Odd Arne Westad et al., eds., The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945-1989 (London & New York, 1994), pp. 30-39; “The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform,” in Giuliano Procacci et al., eds., The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/ 1949 (Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli: Annali, Anno Trentesimo) (Milano, 1994), pp. 469-472, 474. 39

Detailed analysis of this meeting can be found in: L.Ya. Gibianskii, "K istorii sovetsko-iugoslavskogo konflikta 19481953 gg.: sekretnaia sovetsko-yugoslavo-bolgarskaia vstrecha v Moskve 10 fevralia 1948 goda” [On the History of the SovietYugoslav Conflict of 1948-1953: The Secret Soviet-YugoslavBulgarian Meeting in Moscow on 10 February 1948), Sovetskoe slavianovedenie (since 1992 Slavianovedenie) 3 and 4 (1991) and 1 and 3 (1992). For a shorter analysis see my “The 1948 SovietYugoslav Conflict...," pp. 40-42. 40 For more details see L. Ya. Gibianskii, “K istorii...." Sovetskoe slavianovedenie no. 1 (1992), pp. 55 ff.

For further documentation on:

• the Soviet-Yugoslav split

• the 1956 Hungarian Crisis

• Stalin as a Statesman

visit the CWIHP Electronic Bulletin at:


I. Soviet and Yugoslav Records of the Tito-Stalin Conversation of 27-28 May 1946

A. The Soviet Record:

Record of Conversation of Generalissimus I.V. Stalin with Marshal Tito

27 May 1946 at 23:00 hours

Secret Present: from the USSR side – [USSR Foreign Minister] V.M. Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrent'ev;

from the Yugoslav side — Minister of Internal Affairs, A. Rankovich; Head of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General K. Popovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Serbia, Neshkovich; Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Slovenia, Kidrich; Yugoslav Ambassador to USSR, V. Popovich.2

At the start of the meeting com. Stalin asked Tito whether, in the instance of Trieste being granted the status of a free city, this would involve just the city itself or the city suburbs, 3 and which status would be better - along the lines of Memel (Klaipeda, Lithuania) or those of Danzig (Gdansk, Poland).4 Tito replied that the suburbs of the city are inhabited by Slovenians. Only the city itself would be acceptable. Though he would like to continue to argue for including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Further, Tito, in the name of the Yugoslav government, expressed gratitude to com. Molotov for the support that the Soviet delegation showed in the discussion of the question of the ItalianYugoslav border at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Paris, 5

Com. Molotov gave a report on the differences in status between Memel and Danzig, pointing out that the status along the lines of Memel is more acceptable.

Com. Stalin asked Tito about the industrial and agricultural situation in Yugoslavia.

Tito replied that all land had been sown the intermediate crop was awaited, and that industry was working well.

After which, com. Stalin invited Tito to present the group of questions which the Yugoslav delegation wished to discuss this evening.

Tito put forth the following questions: economic cooperation between USSR and Yugoslavia, military cooperation, and Yugoslav-Albanian relations.

6 Regarding the question of economic cooperation, Tito said that Yugoslavia did not want to turn to the United States for credit. If America were to agree to provide loans, then this would be tied to demands for political concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia does not have the means for further industrial development. The Yugoslav government would like to receive assistance from the Soviet Union, in particular, through the establish

ment of mixed Soviet-Yugoslav associations. Yugoslavia has a fair amount of mineral and ore deposits, but it is in no position to organize production, since it does not possess the necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia has oil deposits, but no drilling machines.

Com. Stalin said: “We will help.”

Regarding com. Stalin's questions, whether Yugoslavia was producing aluminum, copper and lead, Tito answered in the affirmative, noting that Yugoslavia had many bauxite and ore deposits for the production of these metals.

Com. Stalin noted that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had informed Yugoslavia of its readiness to participate in talks regarding the establishment of mixed associations, but no final answer had been received from Yugoslavia. As a result, the impression was created that Yugoslavia was not interested in forming such associations.7

Tito objected, stating that on the contrary, he had spoken several times with ambassador Sadchikov8 about the Yugoslav government's desire to create mixed SovietYugoslav associations.

Regarding com. Stalin's note whether it will not be necessary to allow other powers into the Yugoslav economy following the formation of mixed SovietYugoslav associations, Tito answered that the Yugoslav government had no intention of allowing the capital of other powers into its economy.

Subsequently, com. Stalin summarized, saying that in this way the Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation was being conceptualized on the basis of forming mixed associations.

Tito affirmed this, stating that he was intent on presenting the following day his proposals, in written form, on this subject. 9

With respect to the question of military cooperation, Tito said that the Yugoslav government would like to receive shipments from the Soviet Union to supply the military needs of Yugoslavia, not in the form of mutual trade receipts, but in the form of loans. Yugoslavia has a small military industry which could produce grenade launchers and mines. In a number of places there were cadres. But there were no corresponding arms, since the Germans carried them away. The Yugoslav government would like to receive some machinery from Germany as reparations for the reconstruction of certain military factories. But Yugoslavia cannot by itself provide for all of its military needs, and in this regard, the Yugoslav government is hoping for assistance from the Soviet Union.

Com. Stalin said that Yugoslavia ought to have certain military factories, for example, aviation [factories), for Yugoslavia may produce aluminum given the presence of rich bauxite deposits. In addition, it was necessary to have artillery munitions factories.

Tito noted that (artillery) gun barrels may be cast in the Soviet Union and then further assembly may be done in Yugoslavia.


Touching upon the question of Yugoslavia's water borders, com. Stalin said that, for the purpose of safeguarding them, it was important to have a good naval fleet. You need to have torpedo boats, patrol boats, and armored boats. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this regard, we will nevertheless, in the words of com. Stalin, help

10 you. Regarding Albania, com. Stalin pointed out that the internal political situation in Albania was unclear. There were reports that something was happening there between the Communist Party Politburo and Enver Hoxha. There had been a report that Kochi Dzodzejll wants to come to Moscow in order to discuss certain questions prior to the party congress. 12 Enver Hoxha has also expressed desire to come to Moscow together with Dzodzej.

Com. Stalin asked Tito whether he knows anything about the situation in the Communist Party of Albania.

Tito, appearing unacquainted with these questions, replied that Hoxha's visit to Belgrade was being proposed for the near future. That is why he, Tito, believes that the reply to the Albanians should note that Dzodzej's and Hoxha's proposed visit to Moscow will be examined following Hoxha's visit to Belgrade.

Com. Molotov noted that we were trying to hold back the Albanians' efforts to come to Moscow, but the Albanians were determined in this.

Com. Stalin noted that the Albanians' visit to Moscow might bring an unfavorable reaction from England and America, and this would further exacerbate the foreign policy situation of Albania.

Further, com. Stalin asked Tito whether Enver Hoxha agreed with including Albania in the Federation of Yugoslavia.

Tito replied in the affirmative.

Com. Stalin said that, at the present time it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to resolve two such questions as the inclusion of Albania into Yugoslavia and the question of Trieste.

Tito agreed with this.

As a result, continued com. Stalin, it would be wise to first examine the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Tito said that, above all, this treaty must provide for the defense of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania.

Com. Stalin said that it is important to find a formula for this treaty and to bring Albania and Yugoslavia closer

Com. Stalin noted that one need not fear this. During the initial stages things could be limited to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, though indeed, more needs to be done.

Tito agreed with this.

Com. Molotov noted that at the present time difficulties may arise from the fact that a peace treaty had not yet been signed with Bulgaria. Bulgaria was perceived as a former enemy.

14 Com. Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance. 15 For example, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland before Poland was even recognized by other countries. 16

Further, com. Stalin summarized the meeting, saying that what the Yugoslav government is looking for in economic questions and in military matters can be arranged. A commission must be established to examine these questions.

Tito informed com. Stalin of Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary, notifying of Rakosi's visit to Belgrade.

17 Tito declared that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the question of Yugoslavia's territorial demands against Hungary (demands on the Ban’skii triangle ["Baiskii triangle,” the region along the HungarianYugoslav border centered on the city of Baia.])18 in the Council of Ministers. 19 Tito expressed his satisfaction with Yugoslavia's signing of an agreement with Hungary on reparation payments.

Com. Stalin noted that if Hungary wanted peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia had to support these endeavors, bearing in mind that Yugoslavia's primary difficulties were in its relations with Greece and Italy.

Recorded by Lavrent'ev.

(Source: Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), f. 45, op. 1, d. 397, II. 107-110. Published in Istoricheskii arkhiv, No. 2, 1993. Translated by Daniel Rozas.)

B. The Yugoslav Record

Yugoslav Record of Conversation of I.V. Stalin
and the Yugoslav Government Delegation

Headed by J. Broz Tito, 27-28 May 1946
In the Kremlin

27.V.46*, 23:00 hours.

together. 13

[*Recorded by B. Neshkovich.)

Com. Stalin touched on the question of including
Bulgaria in the Federation.

Tito said that nothing would come of the Federation.
Com. Stalin retorted: “This must be done.”

Tito declared that nothing would come of the federation, because the matter involved two different regimes. In addition, Bulgaria is strongly influenced by other parties, while in Yugoslavia the entire government, [though] with the presence of other parties, is essentially in the hands of the Communist Party.

[Translator's note: the brackets used in the text are from the Russian translation of the Serbo-Croatian document. Any brackets and notes by the English translator will hereafter be denoted by "trans."]

[Present:) Stalin, Molotov, Lavrent'ev, Tito, Marko,

20 Kocha,21 Vlado, 22 Kidrich, Neshkovich.

Stalin: “Beautiful people, strong people.”


[Stalin:) “A hardy nation."
Molotov: agreed.23
Stalin: Asks how was our trip.
Tito (says) it went well...

Stalin (chuckling, ironically): “How is my 'friend' [Russian word used in text] Shubashich?". Tito (similarly) [says), he is in Zagreb, in the coop.

24 And also Grol. 25

Stalin (similarly): “And how is my friend' [Russian word used in text] Grol?”

Tito (similarly): "He's in Belgrade"...

(Tito:) "We always had measures to suppress them. The parties exist only formally, though in fact they don't exist. In reality, only the Communist party exists."26

Stalin chuckled pleasantly at this.
Stalin: "What kind of crop will you have?"

Tito: “An especially good one. The land has been well sown. In the passive regions27 it will be good. The assistance of UNRRA 28 will not be needed. There will be lots of fruit.”

Stalin: “Have you sown everything?"
Tito: “Everything has been sown.”

Stalin: “What is your plan? What would you like to raise [for discussion]?"

Tito: puts forth economic and military questions.

Stalin during the whole time: "We'll help!" * (Stalin] “How are Kardelj and Djilas?”:29 * Here a line was moved from below where it is denoted by

T[ito): “Well. We couldn't all come, and so only half of the government is here."

S[talin): "The English and Americans don't want to give you Trieste!" (chuckling).

T[ito): thanked for the support, (said) that the people send their greetings to Stalin and Molotov, (speaks of the great political significance (of Soviet support).

Molotov: “But you still do not have Trieste...”.

Tsito]: nevertheless, [Soviet support) is of great pol[itical) importance... 30

* During the time that Tito [...]*.


ite.” T[ito] explained where the deposits were, as well as the locations Bora, Trepcha and Rasha31 - and that we have good coal, but not coke for house ovens.

3) Molotov said that one of the Italian economic arguments for receiving Rasha is the fact that without it Italy would only be able to meet 20% of its demand. 4) The

army. S[talin): “This is right, that in the event of war, because of the difficulty of supply, that there ought to be] as much military industry in the country as is possible. It would be good to develop the aviation industry, given the rich bauxite deposits, and, as for artillery, the forging ought to be done within the country." S[talin): "For coastal defense, you need to build

“I formations of fast, light, and mobile ships, for Italy will be left with a sufficiently strong Navy (about two squadrons)."

Tsito): “... In Boka Kotorska32 ships of 30,000 tons can be stationed.”

S[talin): “These days they build ships of 60,000 tons. Currently we are having great difficulties in naval fleet construction, but we must assist you. I agree to assist you with equipment for munitions and light firearms factories. We will also assist you with cadres, who will help to organize officer improvement schools, which would in 1-2 years be turned into an Academy (on the level of the Frunze (Academy]).

Shipments for the Y[ugoslav] A[rmy) will be made outside the framework of trade agreements - that is, free and on credit.

It is very important that you have a naval fleet. We will assist you in the construction of shipyards and bases and corresponding nav[al] cadres.

We will assist you with the extraction of oil. Together with munitions factories, it is important to reestablish arsenals, with which we will also assist you. It is necessary to examine the possibility of constructing aviation-engine factories."

5) Albania*.

[Further, two lines are crossed out:"S[talin): "What do you think of [doing) with Albania?"

T[ito): “Sign...”.]T[ito) (with regard to the naval fleet): “We must know whether our border will be along Albania or the coast.”

S[talin): “What exactly are you proposing?"

T[ito): “To sign one good treaty to help Albania - a treaty to defend independence, this will help both in the given situation and with regard to the naval threat."

S[talin): “This is a new formulation, but it ought to be examined and worked out. You worked out a good treaty with Czechia and found a new formulation: not only against Germany and its allies during the war, but also against its future allies.33 But one needs to think about it more and find an appropriate formulation.

Right now is not the time for a federation (not with Bulgaria either). Most important now is the question of Trieste, and this must be decided first. But if you want a


23:00 h. [** Recorded by K. Popovich.)

...1) S(talin): “On our part we made a proposal to your comrades, responsible for eco[nomic) questions, whether you would agree to the establishment of joint enterprises. We will hold nothing against you if you decline. Poland, for ex[ample), declined on the grounds that the Americans may, in their turn, raise questions of establishing joint enterprises."

T[ito): “No, such is not my opinion nor the opinion of other leaders - (on the contrary, we think) it is necessary."

2) S[talin): "...I agree to the establishment of these enterprises as you see fit...”. (M[olotov): “In those fields that are more beneficial both for you and for us...")

S[talin): expressed interest in where our oil and bauxite deposits are located. “You have very good baux

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