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treaty right now, both are possible (Trieste and Albania) at the same time" (at this he chuckled).

Tsito]: “Three times we put off Enver Hoxha's visit to B[el]g[ra]de, since we were planning on a meeting with you. Generally speaking, we are ready to sign an agreement with Albania assuring (its-trans.) “sovereignty."

bourgseois) parties, the monarchy and the Bulg[arian]
position on signing a peace treaty.”

S[talin): "Correct, but they must be offered help.”
7) Hungary

Tsito): “We have no territ[orial] demands. Since the int(ernal) political) situation has been corrected there, we have dropped our territ(orial] demands in accordance with


your advice."37




[***Here text has been inserted from below, marked by

******. ]S(talin): “Do you know Enver? What kind of person is he?** [

**** Further text is crossed out: “They were trying to visit us, but they do not want to send Enver by himself - they want Kochi Dzodzej to accompany him." This phrase is printed in a slightly altered form further below.] Is he a communist? Are there any internal problems of their own - what is your information on this?"

Tsito): “I did not see Enver Hoxha (sic—trans.], he is a young man, but in the course of the war he became popular...

****** We will work out an agreement and foster circumstances for greater closeness."

S[talin] agreed. ******

Tsito): “...and in general, the government consists of young people. As far as we know, there aren't any kind of special problems."34

S[talin): “They were trying to come here, but they do not want to send Enver alone, but Kochi Dzodzej wants to come with him as some kind of restraint. What do you know of this?”

T[ito): “We are not aware (of this) nor of the presence of some kind of disagreements."

S[talin): “We are constantly putting off their visit. What do you think, should we receive them? We think that there is no need.”

T[ito): “Yes, we can take care of everything with them.”

S[talin): “Right now it would be inconvenient for us and for them. Better if we help them through you.

,,35 S[talin): after this, expressed the opinion that something is amiss in the Alb[anian] Politburo.

Marko: “Comrades in the Politburo do not see Env[er] Hoxha as a sufficiently solid party member, and thus they always insist on him being accompanied by Kochi Dzodzej as the most senior party member in the Politburo. At the April plenum they discussed the question of the party line, especially with regard to Yugoslavia and the S[oviet] Union, and ascertained certain mistakes, and excluded Seifulla Maleshov 36 from the Politburo as a bearer of these mistakes. Since then, the leadership has been more consistent."

Tsito): “We can resolve this question with them.”
S[talin): "Good."
6) Bulgaria

S[talin): “Are you currently in favor of a federation with Bulgaria?"

T[ito]: “No. Now is not the time. For they have not yet definitively resolved many things: the army, the

S[talin): “Right. If you have good relations with your norsthern) neighbor, then Greece will also look at you differently... And does Greece raise any demands with regard to Yugoslavia?"

T[ito): "There were provocations against us, but not in recent times.”

S[talin): "The Eng[lish) maintain an army there in order to prop up the reactionary forces, and yes, possibly for other reasons as well."

Tsito]: (laughs): “We have demands against them: Aegean Macedonia) and Salonikki."

M[olotov): “Yes, Salonikki is an old Slavic city. You need access to the Aegean sea.”

S[talin): “Damn it* [*Russian words used in document.) Many comrades have gone to Bulg(aria), but things are not moving, not developing as they should. The communists have influence, but they do not hold corresponding positions in the state apparatus. We should have told them to remove Stainov. 38 Currently we have there the Sec[retary) of the Min[istry) of Forseign] Affairs."** [**Russian word used in document.)

T[ito): "I later explained to Rakosi that we demanded Petchui9 because of strat[egic] reasons and in order to help the Hung[arian] communists, since the reactionary forces were beginning to raise their heads." S[talin): “And did they really believe you?..?

-40 S[talin): "And what further plans have you for tonight?"

T[ito): "We don't have sa plan)."

S[talin) (laughing): "Leadership, but without a state* [*Russian word used in document.) plan!” (laughing).

Vlado: “We accommodated ourselves to meet with you."

S[talin): “Then we can have a snack."** [**Russian word used in text and alongside in brackets an explanation in Serbo-Croatian is given: “to eat something".]

M[olotov): "If you are inviting us, then with great pleasure."

At the villa**


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not the same, she cannot gather and lead; at this difficult time she is in no condition to govern. In Rumania there are good young comrades.

In Germany F. is a good leader, Pieck - "the father”**** (****Russian word used in document.), is gathering people and resolving various questions...

45 Germans are nothing without orders. The International - there's nothing to say.

46 Referenda - "but it's nonsense


[ ***** Russian words used in quotes in the document.)

Warlike people are trying to draw in the Greeks. 48

“Do you want another war, to have your backs beaten again, to have Slavs lose another ten million? - If you do not want this, then the Slavs must unite in a single front with the Sov[iet] Union.”

The idea of revenge in Italy.

Realism and idealism of Benes:49 realist, when shown strength, but would be an idealist if he felt he was in possession of strength (this is an answer to Tito's remark: Benes is an English person, though a realist).

“Firlinger30 will go with the communists.”

Relations between Czechia and Poland: Entertaining as a pre-election maneuver; fact is, they did not undertake any dip[lomatic] steps.51

Yugoslavia is a democracy* [*further crossed out: “new”) of a special type (non-Soviet type), different from all others.

“We are Serbs, Molotov and I ... we are two Serbs..."** (**Phrase composed of Russian words.]

"Slovenian*** (***Russian word used in text.) mercenary intelligentsia.":52

USSR Soviet of Ministers, member of the Politburo, secretary (essentially general secretary) of the Central Committee (CC) of the All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik) (TSK VKP(b)); Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) - chairman of the Council of Ministers of Yugoslavia, general secretary of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY); V.M.Molotov (Skriabin: 1890-1986) - vicechairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR Minister of Foreign of Affairs, member of TSK VKP(b) Politburo; A.I. Lavrent’ev (1904-1984); Aleksandr Rankovich (1909-1983) - Politburo member, secretary of CC CPY, in charge of organizational and cadre affairs; Kocha Popovic (b.1908); Blagoe Neshkovich (b. 1907), also CC secretary of the C[ommunist] P[arty) of Serbia; Boris Kidrich (1912-1953), at the 7 May 1946 meeting of the CC CPY Politburo was appointed to the post of Chairman of the Economic Council and Minister of Industry and Trade (AJ-CK SKJ.III 19) in place of Hebrang (see introduction), the official appointment took place in June after returning from Moscow; Vladimir Popovic (1914-1972).

Only the more important Yugoslav activists who had arrived in Moscow were present at the meeting with Stalin. In addition to those noted above, the delegation accompanying Tito in his visit to USSR included the assistant Chief of the General Staff Rade Khamovich, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Zdenko Ulepich, directors of the departments of the Navy and of Military Industry in the Ministry of People's Defense of Yugoslavia, Srechko Manola and Miyalko Todorovich, commander of the People's Defense Corps of Yugoslavia (state security force) Jovo Vukotich, member of the Union Planning Commission Zvonko Morich, author Radovan Zogovic, in charge of cultural policy affairs and CC CPY agitsation)-prop[aganda). See Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 2, 11. 169-170; Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita (Josip Broz Tito Archives, Belgrade), F. Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije (hereafter AJBT-KMJ), 1-1/7, L.1.) 3

The majority of the Trieste population was Italian, while the adjoining region (oblast'] was settled primarily by Slovenians and Croatians. Yugoslavia, with the USSR's support, claimed this entire territory, which had been included as a part of Italy following World War I. The Yugoslav proposal was to grant Trieste the status of a separate federal unit, within the parameters of the Federated Yugoslav state, while granting the port of Trieste the jurisdiction of a free port. The Western powers came out against transferring Trieste and its adjoining regions to Yugoslavia. Western diplomats were discussing possible compromises by granting Trieste and its adjoining regions the special status of a “free city.” Later, by the end of June 1946, such a proposal was made by France. 4

Under the Versailles treaty of 1919, Danzig (Gdansk) and an adjoining region, up until that time under claim by Poland from Germany, were given a special status under the protection of the League of Nations. Danzig had the status of a demilitarized free city with its own laws and government organs, while control of its foreign relations and its water and rail transport lines was held by Poland, to whose customs system it also belonged. Memel (Klaipeda) and its adjoining region, until 1919 having also belonged to Germany but now claimed by the new Lithuanian state, was at first put under the control of the Entente, and then transferred to Lithuanian authority under the conditions of the special convention of 1924. It stipulated significant autonomy for Memel in its internal affairs, laws and executive organs, but which nevertheless had to operate under the parameters of the Lithuanian constitution. 5

The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the USSR, USA,

Eucalyptus. 53

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“Tito must take care of himself, that nothing would happen to him ... for I will not live long ... laws of physiology..., but you will remain for Europe...


954 Churchill told him about Tito..., that he is “a good man." - St[alin): “I don't know him, but if you say so, that means he must be good. I will try to meet him."

Let Djido come, so I could rest under his care... “I will cure my migraine under his care."56

“Bevin - an English Noske":57

Vlado inquired about Marko, and after Marko, about Vlado...

“Berija - Marko - who will subvert whom?':58

(Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita. Fond Kabinet Marsala Jugoslavije. I-177. L. 6-11. Original. Manuscript. Document obtained and translated into Russian by L. Gibianskii; translated into English by Daniel Rozas.)


According to the register of persons received by Stalin, the meeting lasted from 23:00 hours, 27 May 1946, to 00:30 hours, 28 May 1946. Note by Yu.G. Murin, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), Fc (f.) 45, Opis' (op.) 1, Delo (d.) 416, List (1.) 95 ob. 2 1. V. Stalin (Djugashvili; 1879 (1878)-1953 - chairman of the

Great Britain, France and China was created by the decision of the Potsdam conference in preparation for a peace treaty with Germany and its former European allies. At the CFM meeting in Paris during 25 April - 16 May 1946, where, among other things, the peace treaty with Italy was being drafted for later examination by the Paris peace conference, a central point of discussion became the establishment of a new Italian-Yugoslav border, in connection with the problem of Trieste and its adjoining territory. The Soviet delegation under Molotov's leadership actively supported Yugoslav territorial claims. 6

During the meeting with Lavrent’ev on 18 April 1946, Tito announced his intention to visit Moscow to discuss economic cooperation, and also noted that such cooperation must also include the sphere of military industry.” (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 31.) Yugoslavia, having received from the USSR during 1944-46 large-scale shipments of weapons, ammunition, military equipment, and military machinery (including equipment for 32 infantry divisions, several aviation divisions, tank and artillery brigades), had made similar requests previously. Since the summer of 1945, Yugoslavia had been sending requests to the Soviet government for captured factories, workshops, and materials for the production of ammunition, mainly from Soviet occupation zones in Germany and Austria. The Soviet side tried to fulfill these incoming requests in part. (Ibid., d. 10, 11. 18-19; ibid., f. 144, op. 5, p. 5, d. 2, 11. 44, 46, 4950; ibid., op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, 1. 43.) However, Tito, who had proposed even in January 1946 to send a military delegation to Moscow for the purpose of agreeing on a general plan for the training and equipping of a 350-400,000 men-strong Yugoslav army, tried to get the USSR to render broader assistance in the construction of the Yugoslav military industry, possibly through mixed Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises. (Ibid., f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 11, 19-20.) On April 9, during an expanded meeting of the CC CPY Politburo, the members of the military delegation which was to go to USSR for negotiations were mentioned: K. Popovic, Z. Ulepic, S. Manola, M. Todorovic (Arhiv Jugoslavije (Archives of Yugoslavia, Belgrade), F. SKJ, CK SKJ (hereafter AJ-CK SKJ] I11/16), that is, the same people who later accompanied Tito to Moscow. 7

Stalin was referring to the situation as of mid-April 1946 (see introduction). However, following this, the trade delegation led by the Minister of Foreign Trade Petrovic, which visited Moscow during the first half of May, was assigned the task, in addition to preparing an agreement for mutual shipments of goods, of also holding negotiations to draft agreements on economic cooperation, including the establishment of joint enterprises. Thus, these questions were discussed by the delegation during its negotiations with the Soviet partners prior to Tito's arrival. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, 1. 5; ibid., d. 15, 11. 38, 90.) On the question of joint enterprises, there were disagreements, which had emerged already during late April, when separate negotiations commenced in Belgrade on the first of these, an aviation enterprise: the Yugoslav delegates considered the Soviet version of the agreement on this enterprise unacceptable to Yugoslavia. The examination of this question was transferred over to the Moscow talks on the general problems of organizing future enterprises. Both sides expressed mutual dissatisfaction with each other's position with regard to the negotiations on the aviation enterprise. (See ibid., d. 10, 11. 6-7; d. 15, 11. 89-90; Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove SFRJ (Archives of the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs of the SFRY (Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia), Belgrade), Politicka arhiva (hereafter ASSIP-PA), 1948 god. F-I, Pov. 1535; V. Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita (New

Materials for Josip Broz Tito's Biography), T. 3 (Belgrade, 1984), pp. 244-245.)

I.V. Sadchikov (b. 1906), USSR ambassador to Yugoslavia from March 1945 to February 1946. He was replaced by Lavrent'ev.

On the following day Tito proposed that in order to make comments the Yugoslav delegation should take the draft of the agreement put together by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 119.) As a result, on 8 June 1946, concurrently with the inter-government agreement on mutual shipment of goods for 1946 (Historical-Foreign Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties of the Russian Federation, f. Treaty-Legal Department, op. 11876, d. 55, II. 14-16), Mikoian and Petrovic signed an agreement on economic cooperation. This agreement provided for the creation of eight Soviet-Yugoslav joint-stock enterprises in Yugoslavia: extraction and refinement of crude oil, extraction of bauxite and production of aluminum, extraction and production of lead, exploration and extraction of coal, ferrous metal production, civilian aviation, the Danube shipping company, and the Soviet-Yugoslav bank. It also provided for further examination of the proposed lumber and paper-cellulose enterprise. The agreement contained the overall equal-term scheme for enterprise organization, while the actual establishment of each of these was to be formulated by separate concrete agreements. (See ibid., 11. 17-19.) In addition to the establishment of enterprises, the agreement provided for Soviet technical assistance to Yugoslavia in areas of electrical, food, textile, chemical, and metal forging industries, as well as the production of building materials and in agriculture (ibid., 1. 17). Like other documents signed during this visit, the agreement on economic cooperation was not published. The joint communique issued in connection with the visit stated only that “decisions were made concerning close economic cooperation between both friendly countries." Pravda, 12 June 1946.

But the carrying out of the agreement met with difficulties. By February 1947, an agreement had been reached only with regard to the establishment of two enterprises: civilian aviation and the Danube shipping company. As for the others, the main stumbling block was tied to the production of Yugoslav mineral resources: Yugoslavia insisted that the value of mineral deposits be counted as part of their share of the investment, while the Soviet side maintained that the overall value of mineral deposits could not be counted as investment. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16, 11. 75, 109-110.) This was discussed by the CC CPY Politburo in late September 1946, where frustration with the Soviet position was voiced, with some members, as Lavrent'ev later found out, going so far as to compare this to the “capitalist countries'” mining of Yugoslav mineral resources before the war. (See AJ-CK SJK. III/21; AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 16. II. 75-76.) And when in early 1947 the Yugoslav government sought decisive action from Molotov and even Stalin himself for the swift establishment of the planned enterprises on the basis of Yugoslav proposals, Stalin, during a 19 April 1947 meeting with Kardelj, announced that there must be no further establishment of enterprises and proposed instead to assist Yugoslav industrialization through Soviet shipments of complex machinery and materials, access to blueprints and technical documentation, and the dispatch of specialists on terms of credit. (See ASSIP-PA, 1947 god, F-IV, Str. Pov. 125, 1234, 1238; AJBT-KMJ, 1-3-6/639, 11. 2-3; ibid., 1-3-6/646, 11. 9-11.) Yugoslavia agreed, and the corresponding agreement was signed in Moscow on 25 July 1947.

10 The outcome of the visit was announced in a joint communique: “The government of USSR agreed to equip the Yugoslav Army with weapons, ammunition, etc. on conditions of long-term credit, as well as to assist in the reestablishment of the Yugoslavian military industry." (Pravda, 12 June 1946.) However, no concrete agreement had been signed at this point. It was to be worked out in special negotiations. Even during Tito's visit, the Yugoslav General Staff forwarded requests, on the basis of which the Soviet General Staff determined the type and quantity of materiel to be shipped to Yugoslavia, and a portion of the shipments began to arrive even before the forthcoming agreement. (See AVP RF, f. 144, op. 6, p. 8, d. 3, 11. 132-134; ibid., op. 7, p. 12, d. 1, 1. 23.; ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 968; ibid., 1947 god., F-IV, Str. Pov. 1881.) 11 Enver Hoxha (1908-1985) - first secretary of the CC CPA [Com. Party of Albania), chairman of the Council of Ministers of Albania. Kochi Dzodzej - organizational secretary of CC CPA, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Internal Affairs, the number-two man in the Albanian government at the time. In 1948 he lost in the power struggle against Hoxha, was stripped of all posts, arrested, and executed in 1949. 12 In February 1946 the CC CPA Plenum resolved to call the First CPA Congress on 25 May 1946. However, the Congress was not called until November 1948. 13 The memorandum “On Yugoslav-Albanian Relations,” put together by the director of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Balkan sector, A.A. Lavrishchev, in preparation for Tito's visit to Moscow, labelled the completion of the YugoslavAlbanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance “useful and important,” and contained only the recommendation to avoid mentioning Italy in the treaty, adopting instead the wording from the Yugoslav-Polish treaty signed in March 1946, which could be used against Italy if it tried to “renew aggression.” (The Yugoslav-Polish Treaty provided for mutual military and other assistance using all available means, if one of the countries “is drawn, as a result of invasion, into military operations against either Germany, a country which had been allied with Germany during the last war, or any other country which had directly or by any other means allied with Germany or its allies in such an aggression.”) As for the “discussion of incorporating Albania into the Yugoslav Federation,” the memorandum recommended to put this off, “in order not to exacerbate the international positions of Yugoslavia and Albania.” It further specified that it be put off until peace treaties were signed with Italy and Austria, and Albania was included into the UN. “By the same reasoning” it advised to refrain from signing a secret military agreement between Yugoslavia and Albania, and to “simplify the border situation without signing a special agreement, so as not to attract British and American attention to this matter.” (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 10, 1. 3.)

In his meeting with Tito, Stalin stayed close to this strategy. However, it is unclear whether his arguments to put off federation for the time being were an actual expression of the Soviet policy or simply a tactical ploy, intended to shield the real Soviet efforts to prevent Albania's unification with Yugoslavia altogether, which later became one of the reasons for the 1948 conflict. As a result of the 1946 Moscow talks, the question of direct Albanian unification with Yugoslavia was for the time being removed from the agenda. In addition, the Soviet side, having given Tito the "okay" for the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Close Economic Cooperation with Albania, informed the Albanian government that it had come out in favor of these agreements and of further “Albanian orientation toward

closer relations with Yugoslavia.” This had an influence on the Albanian position and in particular on Hoxha, who arrived in Belgrade in late June 1946, where he consulted with Lavrent'ev before signing the corresponding Yugoslav-Albanian documents in early July. (Ibid., d. 15, 11. 167-168; ibid., d. 16, 1. 1.) 14

Already since late 1944, the leadership of the communist parties of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, having come to power, began talks on uniting both countries into a federation. The talks were sanctioned, if not even initiated, by Stalin himself, who at the time was in favor of expediting the creation of such a body. Apparently, he had intended this as a means to significantly strengthen the people's democracy" in Bulgaria: first, with the help of the more stable communist regime in Yugoslavia, and second, reckoning that by uniting with Yugoslavia—a member of the anti-Hitler coalition-Bulgaria would successfully shed its status as a vanquished nation and consequently escape U.S. and British prerogatives stemming from their participation in the establishment of allied control. In early 1945, however, the Western allies, exercising these prerogatives, vetoed the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. And when Stalin in turn decided to have Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for now sign only a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the veto was extended to this as well. The matter had to be put off to follow the signing of a peace treaty with Bulgaria. See L. Ya. Gibianskii, “U nachala konflikta: balkanskii uzel" ["The Beginning of Conflict: the Balkan Knot"], Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir 2 (1990), pp. 172-173.

In early 1946, although the peace treaty was still far off, the Bulgarian side began to pose the question to the Soviet and Yugoslav governments of resuming the Bulgarian-Yugoslav talks on federating, broken off a year ago. This was done mainly in January 1946, during the Moscow visit of the Bulgarian primeminister and the ministers of foreign and internal affairs. In his reply Molotov pointed out the importance of holding off on federation and the Treaty of Alliance until a more opportune moment. (ASSIP-PA, 1945/1946 god., F-1, Str. Pov. 433, 434.) Nevertheless, in April the Bulgarian envoy in Belgrade posed the same question to Tito and Lavrent'ev. Tito, like Molotov, told the Bulgarian envoy that such steps, if taken prior to signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria, would cause harm. Nevertheless, in relating this to Lavrent'ev, the Yugoslav leader stated in a significantly decided tone that he cannot currently support the idea of establishing a federation with Bulgaria,” as the latter continued to remain a formal monarchy, and in particular because the communist party influence in Bulgaria was “incomparably weaker” than in Yugoslavia. However, certain that Bulgaria would once again raise this question, Tito asked the Soviet ambassador to ascertain Moscow's position on signing the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship. (See AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 11. 39-41, 47-48.) And in the discussion with Lavrent’ev a week before his visit to the USSR, speaking on the agenda for the Moscow talks, he pointed out the importance of examining Yugoslav relations not only with Albania, but with Bulgaria as well. (Ibid., 1. 100.)

The Yugoslav position coincided with the Soviets’, as reflected in the MFA USSR report by Lavrishchev, “On Relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.” The report was completed on 27 May 1946, the day of Tito's arrival in Moscow and his reception by Stalin. Its accompanying suggestions for talks with the Yugoslav leader stated that although the establishment of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation would correspond to the interests of both countries," it would be a mistake to undertake its creation, as well as to conclude the Treaty of Friendship and

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Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, prior to with Tito had not been fulfilled by the ruling regime. Afterwards signing a peace treaty with Bulgaria and resolving “difficult lived in Zagreb under surveillance by state security organs. internal-political questions" within both countries. (Ibid., d. 10, 25 Milan Grol (1876-1952) - during the war, member of the 11. 13-17.)

monarchy's government in exile, in March 1945 took the post of 15

It is unclear why, contrary to the previous Soviet position vice-premier in Tito's united government. Resigned in August expressed in Lavrishchev's report and in Molotov's statements 1945, accusing the ruling regime of being in the hands of the during the meeting, Stalin suddenly announced that the Bulgar- CPY and thus in violation of the Tito-Subasic agreement, and ian-Yugoslav treaty could be concluded prior to signing the peace became one of the leaders of the legal opposition formed in fall treaty with Bulgaria. However, at the meeting with Stalin a few 1945. Following the first elections to the skupscina (parliament) days later, which, along with Tito and accompanying Yugoslav in November 1945, when the opposition was defeated and was officials, also included the Bulgarian leaders Georgii Dimitrov, practically destroyed, Grol retired from politics and devoted Vasil Kolarov and Traicho Kostov, it was decided that the

himself to the theater. Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty would be signed after concluding the 26 Following the 1945 elections, the opposition parties were in peace treaty with Bulgaria. In addition, it was provided that the effect liquidated, while the parties comprising the People's Front, matter would involve the closest cooperation between Yugoslavia run entirely by the CPY, began to take on an increasingly and Bulgaria. See N. Ganchovskii, Dnite na Dimitrov kakvito gi fictitious and deceptive character.

27 vidyakh i zapisyakh (Sofia: 1975), vol. 1, p. 220.)

Regions that do not export foodstuffs, particularly bread, and 16

The reference is to the regime that appeared in Poland in July are even unable to support themselves. 1944 with the arrival of Soviet forces, and which was established 28 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency. by the Soviet Union and Polish communists relying on its 29 Eduard Kardelj (1910-1979) - member of the Politburo, military presence. On 21 April 1945, when the treaty between Secretary of CC CPY, vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, USSR and this regime was concluded, the Western allies

chairman of the Oversight Commission of Yugoslavia; Milovan continued to recognize the Polish government in exile.

Djilas (b. 1911) - member of the Politburo, Secretary of CC CPY, 17 Matyas Rakosi (1892-1971) - General Secretary of the

minister without portfolio. Hungarian Communist Party, deputy prime-minister.

30 Reference made to Molotov's support at the CFM meeting in 18 The question of Yugoslav territorial claims on Hungary was Paris, 25 April - 16 May 1946 (see note #5).

31 raised by the Yugoslav representatives to the Soviet government Known deposits of non-ferrous metals. already towards the end of the war. In particular, Hebrang. 32 The gulf on Yugoslavia's Adriatic coast. assigned by Tito to visit Moscow in January 1945 (see introduc- 33 Such a formulation was not contained in the Yugoslavtion), put forth to Stalin claims to the region of the city of Pecs Czechoslovak, but in the 1946 Yugoslav-Polish agreement on and the “Bais triangle.” Stalin at the time replied that such a friendship and mutual assistance (note 13). The agreement of question could be put before the allied powers only in the event friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation in peacetime, that the Yugoslav population in these regions started to “clamor" signed by Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on 9 May 1946 made for unification with Yugoslavia. The question of possibly posing no mention of former German wartime allies. It stated that the Yugoslav territorial demands to Hungary and relocating Hungar- signing parties would render each other military and other ians from Yugoslavia was discussed in April-May 1946 by assistance using all available means, if one of them is brought Yugoslav and Soviet representatives of various ranks. In late into conflict with Germany, the latter having repeated its April 1946, Tito also discussed the matter with Rakosi, who had aggressive policies, or with any other country which had aligned come to Belgrade. The Yugoslav leader expressed readiness not itself with Germany for the purpose of aggressive action." to put the territorial demands on Hungary before the Council of 34 Tito was obviously being sly, as evidenced by the following Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference, but with the reply from Rankovic, who referred to both the CC CPA Plenum condition that the Yugoslav minorities in Hungary be granted which had expelled Maleshov from the government (see ethnic rights and Yugoslav economic interests ensured in

introduction), and the clear criticism by a number of Albanian border regions. Rakosi agreed. (See AVP RF, f. 06, op. 7, p.53, d. Politburo members toward first Party secretary and head of 872, 1. 16; ibid., f. 0144, op. 30, p. 118, d. 12, 1. 6; ibid., d. 13, 11. government Hoxha. 19, 22-23; ibid., d. 15, 11. 39, 64-65.)


The Soviet Union's assistance to Albania, in particular 19 Reference is to the Council of Foreign Ministers (see note military assistance using Yugoslavia as a go-between, was #5).

undertaken immediately following the war. When in summer 20 Pseudonym of Aleksandr Rankovic.

1945, during the first Moscow visit by the Albanian government 21 Koca Popovic.

delegation, the question of arming and equipping the Albanian 22 Vladimir Popovic.

army was being discussed, the USSR government enacted a 23

According to Dedijer's account given in his book, Stalin said resolution to send shipments of arms and other military materiel this when Tito began to introduce to him members of the

to Albania “via the government of Yugoslavia," that is, within the Yugoslav delegation, and Molotov nodded his head in agreement context of shipments to Yugoslavia. (See “New documents on the with Stalin's words. See Vladimir Dedijer, Josip Broz Tito: Great Fatherland War,” Kommunist (The Communist) 7 (1975), p. Prilozi za biografiju (Josip Broz Tito: Materials for a Biography) | 52.) On the eve of Tito's visit to Moscow in May 1946, Kardelj (Belgrade, 1953), p. 448.

expressed to Lavrent'ev the opinion that USSR trade operations 24 Ivan Subasic (1892-1955) - June 1944-March 1945 prime- in Albania must be carried out by mixed Soviet-Yugoslav minister of the Yugoslav monarchy's government in exile, signed enterprises, once these were established. See AVP RF, f. 0144, an agreement with the National Liberation Committee of

op. 30, p. 118, d. 15, 1. 108. Yugoslavia with Tito at its head and took the post of foreign 36 Seifulla Maleshov (b. 1900) - member of the CC CPA minister within the national coalition government formed by Tito Politburo in charge of economic policy; expelled from the in March 1945. Resigned in fall 1945, stating that his agreement Politburo by the CC CPA Plenum in February 1946.

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