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Molotov was satisfied with that (answer) and did not mention it again. 32 Dimitrov raised the issue about the conclusion of a treaty on mutual assistance between the USSR and Bulgaria. He stressed that it would be of great significance for Bulgaria. Stalin agreed with this, but added that among the Quisling countries33 [the USSR) would first conclude treaties with neighbors: with Romania—this treaty is almost ready, with Hungary and Finland.

Then Stalin underlines that we (i.e. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) must build up our economy, culture, army, and that a federation is an abstraction. Suddenly Stalin asked about our friend Pijade,"

"34 Kardelj told him that he is working on our legislation.

Kardelj asked [the Soviets) about their opinion what answer should be given to the Italian government who asked the Yugoslav government to support Italian claims to govern their former colonies. Stalin said that these demands must be supported and asked Molotov how (the Soviet side) responded. Molotov says that they still have to respond and that he believes they should wait. Stalin told them that there is no point in waiting and the answer should be sent immediately. He said that former Italian colonies should be put under Italian governance (trusteeship, and remarked that kings, when they could not agree over the booty, used to give (disputed] land to a weakest feudal so they could snatch it from him later at some opportune moment, and that feudal lords invited a foreigner to rule them so they could easily overthrow him when they become fed up with him.

On this note the conversation ended.

I would remind (napominaiu] that the criticism of Dimitrov by Stalin, although rough in form, was expressed in friendly tones. This report was composed on the basis of notes taken at the meeting and from memory.

the interview a plan was set forth which goes too far without any attempt to consult with whomever it may concern. A question was put forth of creating a federation or a confederation, a customs union that would include both Poland and Greece. Com. Georgii Dimitrov speaks of all these things without being granted authority by anyone concerned. This is misguided in principle and is tactically harmful. This eases the burden of the creators of the Western bloc.” And further: “We must take the position in such a way that all would know—both enemies and friends—that this is our point of view. We consider this absolutely wrong and unacceptable in the future.” This is contained in slightly abbreviated form in the Soviet record as well. 5

According to Bulgarian and Soviet records this was spoken by Molotov, not Stalin. Kolarov's account puts it in the following manner: "When we spoke with the Polish comrades, they said: We thought that this was Moscow's opinion. Everyone thinks that if Dimitrov or Tito speaks of a number of countries, it originates from the USSR. In essence, the Polish comrades said that they are against Georgii Dimitrov's idea and consider it misguided." 6

According to the Bulgarian and Soviet records, this was also spoken by Molotov, while Stalin supplemented this with separate remarks. 7

Before these statements by Stalin, the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov's account, show the following remarks by Molotov: “[Czechoslovak President Eduard] Benes' newspaper immediately hastened to write that ‘Dimitrov puts out communist plans, and now the Czech communists must answer. On the other hand, this position of Georgii Dimitrov contradicts the declaration of the nine communist parties.” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record. 8

According to Bulgarian and Soviet records, this statement by Molotov sounded more categorical. Kolarov's account records the following words: “In the future, com. Georgii Dimitrov must rid himself and us of the risks of such statements.” 9

[Translator's Note: This intervention is presented dramatically in Djilas's book. “**'Yes, but you didn't consult with us!" Stalin shouted. “We learn about your doings in the newspapers! You chatter like women from the housetops whatever occurs to you, and then the newspapermen grab hold of it.” (p. 175)—V.Z.] 10

The Bulgarian and Soviet records note somewhat stronger self-criticism by Dimitrov. Kolarov recorded his words: “This was harmful and fundamentally misguided. This was selfindulgence. Such statements will not be repeated in the future.” 11

According to Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov's, Stalin said: “We wanted to say another word. The Poles and Czechs are laughing at your federation. Ask them do they want it?” The same is corroborated by the Soviet record.

According to the Bulgarian records, in particular Kolarov's account, Stalin said to Dimitrov: “You are a politician and must think not only of your own intentions, but also of the consequences of your statements.” Later, returning once more to this question, the Soviet leader said to Dimitrov: “You are an old politician. What possible mistakes could one speak of? You may have another goal in mind, but you yourself will not admit it. You must not give interviews so often.” According to the Soviet record, Stalin, noting that Dimitrov has apparently another goal that must be revealed, added that these are not little children sitting here, and Dimitrov is not a “pre-schooler.” [Translator's Note: This part of the conversation is dramatized in Djilas' book in the following dialogue: "Stalin, decidedly and firmly: “There are serious differences,

(Source: Arhiv Josipa Broza Tita, Fond Kabinet Marshala Jugoslavije 1-3-b-651, 11.33-40. Translated by Vladislav Zubok (National Security Archive)]

1 [Translator's Note: In Conversations with Stalin (1962) Milovan Djilas recounted this meeting in great detail. He mentioned that he had submitted a written report of that meeting to the Yugoslav Central Committee, but that he could not get access to it when he wrote the book. As the comparison of the document with the book reveals, Djilas' memory retained with remarkable precision some pivotal moments of the conversation.—V.Z.) 2

Baranov, Leonid Semenovich-assistant director of the CC VKP(b) (Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Department of Foreign Policy. 3 The statement concerns the Yugoslav intention of deploying a division, which never took place. 4

In the Bulgarian records, particularly Kolarov's account, this is presented in the following manner: “It seems to us that com. Georgii Dimitrov has taken a fancy to

and inter ws, thus giving opportunity to be prompted with questions which ought not be discussed in the first place. This is misguided and undesirable. During the course of

press conferen




Why hide it? It was Lenin's practice always to recognize errors and to remove them as quickly as possible.' Dimitrov, placatingly, almost submissively: 'True, we erred. But through errors we are learning our way in foreign politics.' Stalin, harshly and tauntingly: ‘Learning! You have been in politics fifty years—and now you are correcting errors! Your trouble is not errors, but a stand different from ours.'" Then Djilas writes that Dimitrov's ears “were red, and big red blotches cropped up on his face covering his spots of eczema. His sparse hair straggled and hung in lifeless strands over his wrinkled neck. I felt sorry for him... The Lion of the Leipzig Trials...looked dejected and dispirited." (pp. 176-177)—V.Z.) 13 The entire conversation recorded by Djilas about the draft of a Bulgarian-Romanian treaty sent to the Soviet government, which in turn expressed no objections over the article on the customs union, is absent from the Soviet and Bulgarian records. Kolarov's account contains only the following phrase: “Kolarov points out that the treaty with Romania had been harmonized with Moscow." 14 [Translator's note: “nobody” here means the United States and Great Britain, not the Communist Party of China. This phrase reveals Stalin's emphasis on realpolitik as a method to prevent “imperialists'" consolidation and intervention into Balkan affairs.—V.Z.] 15 The Bulgarian records contain the following words expressed by Stalin over this matter: “You see the kind of war that is raging in China. We don't have a single one of our soldiers there." 16

According to Bulgarian records, the question of signing a protocol on mutual consultation arose in connection with Dimitrov's statement on 10 February concerning Moscow: “We also receive little information from here.” Stalin responded: "You have the right to demand from us to keep you informed. Let us then put together a protocol on obligatory consultation between us on all important international questions.” This is similarly recorded in the Soviet record. 17 [Translator's note: According to Djilas, “he was red and, what was a sign of agitation with him, he drew his head down between his shoulders and made pauses in his sentences where they did not belong." (p. 179)-V.Z.) 18 [Translator's note: The exchange on the failure to inform the USSR on sending Yugoslav troops to Albania was more serious and emotional, according to Djilas' book: “”Stalin shouted, “This could lead to serious international complications...” Kardelj explained that all that had not yet been final and added that he did not remember a single foreign problem but that the Yugoslav Government did not consult with the Soviets...“It's not so!" Stalin cried. “You don't consult at all. That is not your mistake, but your policy-yes, your policy!" Cut off, Kardelj fell silent and did not press his view." (pp. 179-180)—V.Z.] 19 [Translator's Note: In Djilas's book Stalin says: “No, they have no prospect of success at all. What do you think, that Great Britain and the United States—the United States, the mo powerful state in the world —will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea! Nonsense. And we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible.” (p. 182) —V.Z.] 20 As noted in the Bulgarian records, in particular in Kolarov's account, Stalin cautioned the Yugoslav side against careless involvement in Albania, where the USA and England might strike back, claiming to be defenders of Albanian independence. With this in mind, Stalin put this question to Kardelj: “If the Greek partisans are defeated, will you go to war?” Kardelj replied in the negative. To which Stalin said: “I am arguing on the basis of

an analysis of the current forces of the partisans and their enemies. Recently I have started to doubt the prospects of a partisan victory. If you are not convinced that the partisans will win, the partisan movement ought to be wrapped up. The Americans and the English are very interested in the Mediterranean sea. They want to have a base in Greece and will spare no means to preserve a government that listens to them. This is an important international question. If the partisan movement is wrapped up, then they will have no reason to attack you. It's not so easy to start a war now. If you are convinced that the partisans have a chance of victory, then that's a different matter. But I somewhat doubt it."

The Bulgarian records note the following remark by Kostov: “We believe that a defeat of the partisan movement in Greece would create a very difficult situation for other Balkan countries.” To this Stalin replied: “Of course the partisans must be supported. But if the prospects for the partisan movement are falling, it is better to postpone the fight until better times. That which is lacking in relative forces cannot be supplemented with moans and exclamations. What is needed is a thoughtful reckoning of forces. If this shows that at the present time the matter is moving nowhere, one must not be afraid to admit it. There have been other instances when partisan movements were terminated given an unfavorable situation. If it's impossible today, it will be possible tomorrow. You are afraid to state the question clearly. You are under the impression of a “moral obligation.” If you cannot lift the weight which you have hoisted upon yourselves, you must admit it. You must not be afraid of some kind of a “categorical imperative" of moral obligation. We do not have such categorical imperatives. The entire question rests in the balance of forces. We go into battle not when the enemy wants us to, but when it's in our interests." Further discussion of the Greek question, following these observations by Stalin, is recorded in the Bulgarian records: “Kardelj: Over the next several months the chances of the partisans will become clear. Stalin: In that case, fine, you can wait. Perhaps you are right. I also doubted the abilities of the Chinese and advised them to come to a temporary agreement with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang KaiShek]. They formally agreed with us, but in practice continued on their own course—that is, mobilizing the forces of the Chinese people. After this, they openly raised the question: we will continue to fight; the people support us. We said: fine, what do you need? It turned out that the conditions were very favorable to them. They turned out to be right, we turned out to be wrong. Maybe we will turn out to be wrong here as well. But we want you to act with certainty. Kolarov: Will America allow a partisan victory? Stalin: They won't be asked. If there are enough forces for victory, and if there are persons capable of employing the force of the people, then the fight must be continued. But one must not think that if things are not successful in Greece, then everything is lost."

The Soviet record overall corroborates this course of discussion, but sets it down in significantly condensed form, without a number of details. In particular, it does not record Kostov’s remark found in Bulgarian records on the difficult consequences the defeat of the Greek partisans would bring to other Balkan countries (in the Djilas report this remark is attributed to Dimitrov), and Kardelj’s negative reply to Stalin's question whether Yugoslavia would go to war in the event of a Greek partisan defeat. In addition, the Soviet record corroborates Kardelj's optimistic assessment, noted by Djilas, of the prospects



of a partisan victory in Greece, though at the same time noting his qualification that this is possible only in the absence of direct US assistance to the Greek government, apparently meaning intervention by the American military. 21 The reference is to the creation of a Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, declared by the decision of the leadership of the Communist Party of Greece in late December 1947. This government would be headed by the commander of the partisan forces, member of the Communist Party Politburo, Markos Vafiadis, known at the time as “general Markos.” The Bulgarian records note that at the 10 February 1948 meeting Stalin said on this subject: “The bordering countries must be the last to recognize the Markos government. Let others, who are further away, recognize it first." This statement by Stalin—that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania must refrain from recognizing the Greek revolutionary government, and allow other people's democracies,” not bordering Greece and not accused of interfering in its internal affairs, to recognize it—is absent from the Soviet record. However, it does contain a statement by Kardelj (not present in the Bulgarian records) declaring that it would be better for Albania or Bulgaria to recognize Markos, and not Yugoslavia, for the latter is a member of the UN. 22

[Translator's Note: This “seaman" must be Fedor Raskolnikov, a famous Bolshevik and agitator of the Baltic fleet, later a Soviet emissary to ignite the Muslim revolution in Asia. He defected in 1937 from Bulgaria, where he was ambassador and wrote a letter to Stalin denouncing his regime and the purges of Bolsheviks in the USSR.–V.Z.) 23 On 13 December 1947, Lavrent'ev, on orders from Moscow, informed Tito of the Albanian government's request for a shipment of 5 thousand tons of oats from the USSR, and inquired whether Yugoslavia had any objections to this. Two days later, Tito replied to the ambassador that the shipments from the USSR are not needed: Albania will receive the oats from Yugoslavia. However, the oats promised by Yugoslav never arrived in Albania. Even after the meeting in Moscow, during the second half of February 1948, Lavrent'ev, in his discussion with Kardelj, attempted to find out why this occurred. Kardelj explained this through a misunderstanding and lack of cooperation between the corresponding government bodies in Yugoslavia. AVP RF, f. 0144, op. 32, p. 128, d. 8, 11. 3, 8, 96, 102-103, 114-115. 24 The Bulgarian records note this statement by Stalin in the following manner: “The Yugoslavs, apparently, are afraid that we will take Albania away from them. You must take Albania, but wisely.” The Soviet record notes this statement by Stalin in more detail. It notes his words that “the Yugoslavs, apparently, are afraid that we will take Albania from them, and that's why they want to deploy their forces there sooner. They believe that we are tearing away from them their union both with Bulgaria and with Albania, and want to present us with a fait accompli.” 25 The Bulgarian records present this thought by Stalin in the following manner: “Only three federations are possible and naturally inherent: 1) Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; 2) Romania and Hungary and 3) Poland and Czechoslovakia. These are the possible and realistic federations. A confederation among ourselves is something far-fetched.” Somewhat further along in the Bulgarian records are the following words by Stalin: “You must not delay with uniting three countries—Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.” The Soviet record does not include the idea of three federations, and only mentions that Stalin remarked on the natural rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and Poland and Czechoslovakia, while calling the idea of a single federation of all countries “nonsense.”

According to the Soviet record, Stalin used the term “federation" only in connection with the Bulgarian-Yugoslav union, though also noting that first Bulgaria and Yugoslavia could be united, and then Albania could also be included. Neither the Soviet nor Bulgarian records contain any mention of a conversation, found in the Djilas report, regarding the name of the united YugoslavBulgarian country. 26 Kardelj's reply on possible enemy interference in the shipment of oats is not mentioned either in the Soviet or Bulgarian records. The Soviet record mentions only Kardelj's words that the question of oats is unclear to him. 27

Ed. Note: For the Bulgarian version of this Greek-Chinese comparison, see footnote above. 28 The Bulgarian and Soviet records do not contain such a dialogue between Stalin and Kardelj. According to the Bulgarian records, such a dialogue took place between Stalin and Dimitrov. 29

According to the Bulgarian records, this was stated not by Kardelj and Djilas, but by Stalin himself. 30

[Translator's Note: This is a reference to Nico Spiru, a member of the Albanian leadership with links to Belgrade, who committed suicide in November 1947.–V.Z.] 31

[Translator's Note: Early in 1948 the US Department of State published the documents on the Nazi-Soviet talks and agreements in 1939-41, seized in Germany at the end of the Second World War.—V.Z.) 32

According to the Soviet record, Dimitrov said nothing of the kind, and, indeed, said that the Bulgarian government would take measures to cover more carefully their forces and weapons. 33

[Translator's Note: In other words, the countries that collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second World War.–V.Z.) 34

[Translator's Note: A member of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. On Stalin's remarks about Pijade to Djilas, see Conversations with Stalin, p. 154.–V.Z.]



Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early 1946: New Evidence from the Hungarian Archives

by Csaba Békés


t has been long debated by scholars when the idea of being a reaction to the intensification of frictions between forming a new Communist world organization after the allies, originally was a part of a wider Soviet scheme

the Second World War was raised. In the absence of aimed at fostering Communist takeover in East Central relevant sources the still prevailing classical interpretation Europe by peaceful means, while preserving Sovietsuggests that this idea was a Soviet reaction to the

Western cooperation as well. Marshall Plan introduced in the Summer of 1947 and after The document published below, is an excerpt from the the Soviet Union's refusal of the plan, the formation of the peech of Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Eastern Bloc and its ‘executive committee', the

Hungarian Communist Party at the 17 May 1946 meeting COMINFORM, was a logical next step in breaking off

of the Central Committee of the HCP.3 As part of a long relations with the West. Surprisingly enough, no evidence survey on current international issues, he informed the CC of any kind has emerged from Russian archives from the members about the Soviet conception on the setting up of time of their partial opening in 1991 pertaining to this a new Communist-world organization. He gave a detailed important topic. However, documents discovered by analysis to his audience of how this new body would be Russian scholar Leonid Gibianskii in the Tito archives in different from the KOMINTERN using exactly the same Belgrade show that the idea of setting up such an organiza- arguments presented at the time of the setting up of the tion was already discussed during the talks between Stalin KOMINFORM in September 1947. Between 28 March and the Yugoslav leader in Moscow in May-June 1946.1 and 2 April 1946, Rákosi had been on a secret mission in

Documents from Hungarian archives not only confirm Moscow, where he was trying to achieve better terms for that a Soviet plan to re-establish a Communist-world Hungary at the forthcoming peace conference. On 1 April

4 organization was in the making already as early as March 1946, he met with Stalin and Molotov, and it is likely that 1946, but they also show that the implementation of the at this point he received the information he presented later plan was postponed in order to avoid its potential negative to the Central Committee.5 effects during the forthcoming elections in France,

Besides stressing the general importance of the Czechoslovakia and Romania as well as in the course of document as the earliest known evidence of Soviet plans the ongoing European peace settlement. This proves that for the establishment of the later KOMINFORM, it is also the idea of setting up the later COMINFORM, rather than worth noting that during recent talks between the Hungar


Speech by Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party at the Meeting of

the Central Committee, 17 May 1946 [...) Finally I would like to raise another question, which, like socialism, we have not spoken much about so far. This refers to the creation of a new International. The comrades know that the third International had to be dissolved, because progress proved that it damaged rather than benefited the growth of the communist parties. [...] When we arranged the third International, I remember the trouble we went to to show that we wanted a centralized, strong International with executive powers, similar to how Marx imagined the International in 1864, and not just the sorting office and so on that the second International became before the First World War. And this was the catastrophe of the third International. Because instead of every country looking separately for the conditions for revolution, and not trying the impossible task of centralizing and directing the whole movement, it directed it from the center. The result was that the parties gave up independent politics, continually looked in the direction of the center, and waited for its instructions. This view led the comrades to announce the discontinuation of the third International. And afterwards, now that the International has been discontinued, the parties are ing forth one after the other to say how the existence of the International limited their progress, e.g. most recently we heard from our Yugoslav comrades how much such a central institution held them back, which, unaware of local conditions, sometimes demanded quite the opposite of what they needed. So such an International can no longer be established. On the contrary, the International should be such that it does not hinder the progress of individual parties, that it provides a means for individual parties to execute the tasks leading to the liberation of the proletariat, bearing local circumstances in mind. I should immediately say that as far as this is concerned, the new International cannot be compared to the previous ones. This will not be an organizing body; its task will be to compose, to help in making objections, to communicate the good or bad experiences of one country's communist party to that of another country, that they should learn from their neighbors' experiences and losses. This will undoubtedly be very useful, as not just us, but communist parties the world over are beginning to feel that without the exchange of experiences and objections they cannot produce adequate plans on international questions. It is such an International that we now intend to establish, and this International will help rather than hinder the international communist movement. On the same note, the view will change that was widely spread at the third International, for

example, that we have to wait for the conditions for revolution to appear in at least a bunch of countries, and only then can we instigate the revolution. I remember that when the situation was revolutionary in Germany in 1923, in all the neighboring countries we prepared for such revolutionary action, so that there could be a revolutionary situation in more than one country at the same time. I remember that in the Czech Republic, France and other countries where the situation was not nearly as developed as in Germany, we prepared assistance programs, similar uprisings, etc. History has shown that that was wrong. Now we are going to follow another route. Here I should immediately say that not many people are aware of this interpretation of the dissolution of the International, because they did not talk about it very much in this period and therefore completely incorrect views are spread amongst some of the parties. For example when we were with the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and we tried to reconcile the Hungarian Communist Party's line on the question of the Hungarians in Slovakia with that of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the comrades announced the theory that the International had to be dissolved, because the international aspirations (meaning “national aspirations” — Cs. B.) of the individual Communist Parties are so much at odds with each other, that they could not be fitted into the agenda of an International. Because of this they calmly recommended to us that we should attack the Czech Communist Party, while they attack the Hungarian Communist Party. We rejected this theory. We were convinced that this was wrong, and that Stalinist reasoning would say something totally different. There is not even a trace to show that the national aspirations of the particular communist parties do not fit into the International; it points to completely different reasons. Now that communist parties have everywhere become stronger and come to the fore, there should be pressure for the institution of the Communist International or some other international communist body. At the moment this is being disturbed by the whole list of parties preparing for elections. The comrades know that they are preparing for elections in France, Czechoslovakia and Romania, and that our comrades there are otherwise occupied. They are also occupied with the question of peace. But as soon as the elections die down and peace is agreed, at that moment this will come to the fore and then we will establish some kind of international body. One part of this conception is that in these changed circumstances, whenever a country achieves the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat or for socialism, this will be carried out, with no regard for whether the respective country is in a capitalist environment or not. This is also a new perspective, which simply means that in a country where as a result of the work of the communist party these conditions are present, it has to be realized. This is fresh encouragement for all Communist Parties, because now it will principally be dependent on their work whether or not the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat are created in their own country. (Source: Archives of the Institute for Political History (AIPH), Budapest, 274. f. 2/34. Translated by David Evans.)

ian and the Yugoslav Communist leaders the latter com- quoted by: Robert C. Tucker: “The Cold War in Stalin's Time," plained about how the KOMINTERN, unaware of local

Diplomatic History, Vol. 21:2 (Spring 1997), 275. See also Leonid conditions, sometimes demanded quite the opposite of

Gibianskii, “The Soviet Bloc and the Initial Stage of the Cold War,"

in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. what they needed. Paradoxically, although Tito and the

2 I first presented this finding at the international conference: Yugoslav leaders now themselves became proponents of

Internal Factors Facilitating Communist Takeover in East Central the new Communist organization, their eventual rupture Europe 1944-1948, Opocno, Czech Republic, 9-11 September 1993, with the rest of the Soviet bloc was caused by exactly the see: Csaba Békés, “Mad'arská politická krize na jare 1946," same Soviet attitude. Rákosi's speech also provides an

Suodobé Dejiny (Praha), 1994. No. 4-5. pp. 509-513.

Archives of the Institute for Political History, (AIPH) Budapest, important contribution to the "blueprint debate” on

274. f. 2./34. whether Stalin had a plan to sovietize these countries. The 4

For the story of this Hungarian Communist initiative see: Csaba conception, outlined by Rákosi, obviously repeating what Békés, “Dokumentumok a magyar kormánydelegáció 1946. áprilisi he had heard in Moscow, shows a cautious, but deter

moszkvai tárgyalásairól. (Documents on the negotiations of the mined, policy: in those countries where the Communist Hungarian Government Delegation in Moscow in April, 1946)" party itself would be able to create favorable internal

Régió (1992), 3, 161-194; for an English version see: “The Commu

nist Parties and the National Issue in Central and Eastern Europe conditions for a smooth and peaceful takeover, they would

(1945-1947). An Important Factor Facilitating Communist Takeover be allowed to do so. However, at this stage, in the spring

in the Region," 6. Martie 1945: Incepturile communizarii Romaniei. of 1946 Stalin, eager to maintain cooperation with the Editure Enciclopedia, (Bucharest, 1995), 245-253. Western Allies, did not plan to permit any kind of forceful 5 No minutes of that meeting have been found to date on either side. takeover, relying on direct Soviet support, or implying

After returning from Moscow Rákosi reported on his visit at the 3 civil war.

April Politburo meeting but according to the then prevailing practice no minutes were taken. However, on 18 April, he gave a speech at the meeting of party secretaries of factories and plants in Budapest,

where he briefly summarized the Soviet ideas on setting up a new Dr. Csaba Bekes is a research fellow at the Institute for the History of Communist World organization (AIPH 274. f. 8/14). the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budapest. A former CWIHP fellow, Dr. Bekes has written widely on the international dimensions

The Institute for the of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. He is co-editor (with Malcolm

History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution
Byrne and Christian Ostermann) of a forthcoming National Security
Archive document reader on the 1956 crisis.

Dohány u. 74

H-1074 Budapest/HUNGARY 1 L. Gibianskii: “Kak voznik Kominfom: Po novym arkhivnym

Fax: 011-36-1-322-3084 materialam,” Novaia i noveishaia istorija (1993), No. 4. 135-136,

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