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hand it could not agree to surrender Nagy and his comrades to the Soviet military authorities or to the Kadar government for fear of serious discredit in the eyes of its own people as well as the outside world. Thus, on November 5, Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic replied to Khrushchev with a proposal to send Nagy and the rest to Yugoslavia.32 On November 7, however, Khrushchev categorically rejected this offer in the name of the Soviet leadership and added a blunt threat: Citing the Brioni agreement, he warned that the proposal to send Nagy to Yugoslavia could be seen by Moscow as an example of Belgrade's secret solidarity with Nagy's policies and could cause "irrevocable damage" to Soviet-Yugoslav relations.33

The Kremlin rejected Kadar's hesitant proposal, which was made to Andropov on November 8, regarding the possibility—in order to avoid heightening the tensions in relations with Yugoslavia-to allow Nagy and his group to go to Yugoslavia under the condition that a written document was received from Nagy stating his resignation from the post of prime minister of the overthrown government and written promises from him and the others not to harm Kadar's government. In response to the communication received from Andropov, Moscow instructed him to tell Kadar on behalf of the CC CPSU that it was not advisable under any circumstances to let Nagy and the others go to Yugoslavia, and that the Yugoslavs would be forced to agree to the demands for his surrender. As for Kadar's apprehension about aggravating relations with Belgrade, the CC CPSU Presidium confirmed the position set out in Khrushchev's communication of November 7 to Tito, Kardelj, and Rankovic.34

Insofar as this position did not leave the Yugoslav leadership any possibility of slipping between the Scylla of confrontation with the USSR in case Nagy was not surrendered and the Charybdis of its public exposure as an accomplice to Soviet intervention in case he was handed over, on November 8, in a new message to Khrushchev on behalf of the CC LCY, Tito tried to explain to the Kremlin that Yugoslavia was simply not in a condition to permit the surrender of Nagy and the others to the Soviet or Hungarian authorities for fear of being discredited. At the same time, Tito tried in various ways to justify why the Yugoslavs had not achieved Nagy's resignation, after he with his entourage had shown up in the Yugoslav mission. In the message Yugoslavia's support for the Kadar government was forcefully emphasized, and it was proposed that a joint compromise resolution be found, including through an amnesty for Nagy and the others hiding in the Yugoslav mission in Budapest.35 In the hopes that it would help soften Moscow's position and obtain the assent of the Kadar government, Belgrade gave a directive to Soldatic on November 9 to try to obtain from Nagy at least a formal announcement of his resignation from the post of primeminister of the fallen government.36 However, Nagy refused 37

Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership replied to Tito's

appeal of November 8 with a proposal on November 10 that Nagy and Losonczy (who had entered his government) be sent to Romania. The rest, on condition of a statement of loyalty to the Kadar government, could receive their freedom and remain in Hungary.38 The departure to Romania was, in essence, tantamount to Nagy's surrender, but formally it was the compromise asked for by Tito. The Yugoslav government found it impossible to accept such a proposal, which Soldatic had already expressed to Kadar on November 11, noting that Nagy's departure to Romania could, in Belgrade's opinion, damage Yugoslav prestige and that Romania is not a suitable country for such a purpose. 39 It was clear that the Romanian scenario, involving a country of the "socialist camp" under Soviet control, was virtually tantamount to handing Nagy over to the Soviet military or to Kadar's government. In addition, such a scenario had no chance of Nagy's acceptance.40 Belgrade, for its part, proposed two scenarios: either a declaration by Kadar's government guaranteeing Nagy and the rest freedom if they leave the Yugoslav diplomatic mission, or their unhindered departure to Yugoslavia.41

Like Belgrade, Moscow and its subordinate Kadar sought to find a solution to this situation, though each in their own interest. In contrast to Yugoslavia, which was in a hurry to resolve this question in order to rid itself of the source of difficulty with the USSR, the Soviets at first showed a tendency to outwait the Yugoslav leadership. But the continued formal existence of the Nagy government, which still had not resigned, seriously aggravated an already difficult domestic and international political situation for the Kadar government. This provoked great concern at the meetings of Kadar's temporary Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (CC HSWP) on November 11 and 16, at which the situation of the "two governments" was seen as one of the most important tasks.42 Diplomatic maneuvers ensued, when Kadar first assured Soldatic on November 16 that Nagy and his group could leave the Yugoslav mission without fear of being followed, and, if they wanted, leave Hungary. On the instructions of the Soviet side, he demanded on the following day in the form of a preliminary condition, a statement from Nagy and Losonczy that they no longer considered themselves members of the government, and, together with the others, would agree to support Kadar's government. The Yugoslavs for their part began to work towards the Kadar government's granting them a written promise that Nagy and the others could freely live at home without repression against them.43

The arguments surrounding these positions, which continued until November 21, shifted entirely to the sphere of negotiations between Belgrade and the Kadar government;44 the Soviet side, able to manipulate Kadar from behind the scenes, outwardly removed itself from the discussion regarding the Nagy question. Immediately, polemics arose between Hungarians and Yugoslavs (previously avoided by both sides) regarding general

principles of the Hungarian crisis and the evaluation of Soviet and Yugoslav policy in Hungary. The ground was laid by the publication in the 16 November issue of Borba of Tito's speech to party activists in Pula on 11 November. In his speech, the Yugoslav leader had justified the Soviet military intervention undertaken on 4 November as the lesser evil in the face of the threat of “counterrevolution" and expressed support for Kadar's government, but at the same time characterized the crisis as a consequence of the Soviet support given until the last moment for the RakosiGero regime, including the first Soviet military intervention on October 24, which naturally provoked outrage in Hungary. Tito connected a similar orientation of Soviet policy in relation not only to Hungary, but also to other Eastern European countries of the "socialist camp" with the fact that among a portion of the Soviet leadership, the Stalinist legacy, which he characterized as a product of the system that had formed in the USSR, was still strong. Tito's speech itself and its publication in particular constituted a clear attempt to distance himself from Soviet policy in Hungary in light of disappointment with Moscow's actions both in Yugoslavia and the outside world, while at the same time defending Yugoslavia's agreement to intervention on 4 November and the support for the Kadar government. The Yugoslav action elicited a sharp reaction from the Soviet leadership, which, however, was expressed primarily in private, in Micunovic's meetings with Khrushchev and other members of the CC CPSU Presidium. Moreover, the Soviets emphasized that they did not want to see difficulties arise with Yugoslavia and charged Belgrade with breaking mutual agreements. The public response to Tito's speech, made in the form of material published in Pravda on November 19 and 23, rejected Yugoslavia's evaluations, although, in Micunovic's opinion, in relatively measured terms, as was the Moscow leadership's general position toward relations with Yugoslavia during these days.4

45

This was also said in connection with Nagy's detention by Soviet troops and his group after they had left the Yugoslav mission on November 22. The proposal for his arrest had been sent back on November 17 to the CC CPSU Presidium by Malenkov, Suslov, and the secretary of the CC CPSU, Averkii Aristov, who were present in Hungary. And Kadar, who was negotiating with Yugoslavia and on November 21 made a written statement guaranteeing safety for Nagy and the others, had been aware of this plan, endorsed by the Soviet leadership, from the beginning.46 When Nagy and the others, upon leaving the Belgrade mission were detained and forcibly sent to Romania, the Yugoslav leadership limited itself to a protest to the Kadar government, while to the Soviets on November 24 it expressed only "surprise" regarding this incident.47

In its private contacts with Moscow, however, Belgrade showed increasing unhappiness with Soviet encouragement of the anti-Yugoslav campaign carried out in East European countries and by certain Western

Communist parties, especially the French, as well as the Soviet manner of acting without regard to Yugoslav interests or prestige, as in the case of Nagy's arrest. The expression of such disaffection was a long letter from Tito to Khrushchev dated 3 December 1956 which, among other things, repeated and intensified criticism of Soviet policy in Hungary and argued the wrongful nature of Soviet accusations against Yugoslavia with regard to the Brioni agreement and the Nagy question.48

In essence, each of the sides occupied a simultaneously defensive and offensive position, trying to stick the other side with public and non-public demarches and to halt criticism made in its direction. The Yugoslav leadership used its public demarches for personal justification and for raising its prestige inside Yugoslavia and in the international arena (in this respect Kardelj's speech in the Skupshchina played the same role as Tito's speech in Pula).49 For the Soviet leadership the campaign of criticism against Belgrade functioned as one of the means for reinforcing its control over Eastern European countries of the "Socialist camp" and over the world Communist movement.50 Such friction continued towards further escalation of mutual accusations and counter-accusations for the rest of 1956 and into the first months of 1957, both in public statements and in a continued exchange of secret letters between Moscow and Belgrade. In particular, the response to the Yugoslav letter of 3 December 1956 became the Soviet letter from 10 January 1957, after which there followed the Yugoslav answer on 1 February 1957.51 But despite the sharpness of the polemic in this correspondence, both sides came to the same basic conclusion: they negatively evaluated the revolutionary attempt to liquidate the Communist monopoly over the government in Hungary and considered the military suppression of the revolution to be lawful.

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under reactionary pressure [nazhim reaktsiia]. They also intend to come to an agreement with Imre Nagy so that he will make a statement supporting the government headed by Kadar in Sol'nok.

In Kardelj's words, such an announcement would facilitate the discussion of the Hungarian issue in the Security Council and the recognition of Kadar's government as the legal government. Kardelj, on Tito's instructions, requested the advice of the CPSU and the Soviet government as to whether to continue further talks with Imre Nagy. Tito also asked the Soviet government to convey to Kadar's government the request that they not repress those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the recent events in Hungary.

Tito, in Kardelj's words, also asked the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy from possible attacks on it, especially if reactionaries find out that Nagy, who is located in the embassy, is supporting Kadar's government.

From the diary

of D.T. SHEPILOV

4/XI-56 N. FIRIUBIN

Secret

7 November 1956

On a Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Micunovic

At 14:10, I received the ambassador of Yugoslavia to the USSR, Micunovic. I told him that I had received his report on the conversation between Minister for Foreign Affairs Koca Popovic and the Soviet ambassador Firiubin in which Koca Popovic stated that a Soviet tank located alongside the building of the Yugoslav mission in Budapest opened fire on November 6 at 12:45 (Budapest time). The direction of the shot has not been established, but all of the windows in the Yugoslav mission were blown out and the window frames were damaged, and the event led to panic amongst the people located inside the mission. I told Micunovic that I had just spoken with the commander of the Soviet military unit in Budapest and had instructed him to conduct a careful inquiry into the veracity of this fact. That will be done and the results of the inquiry will be conveyed to the ambassador. However, as a preliminary matter the commander of the Soviet military unit in Budapest categorically states that that sort of incident could not have taken place, since everything is completely calm in the region where the Yugoslav mission is located and since the tanks located near the mission were unlikely to have needed to open fire. However, I once again confirmed that the results of the inquiry as to the veracity or fictitiousness of the episode of which Koca Popovic had informed our ambassador would be conveyed to him as well.

In this regard I told Micunovic that on November 5 of this year, the Yugoslav ambassador in Hungary, Soldatic, made a request to the USSR ambassador in Hungary, com. Andropov, for the removal of the Soviet military unit which was located in the proximity of the mission building since at present the presence of this military unit near the Yugoslav mission was not necessary.

I told Micunovic that the Soviet military commander in Budapest for his part considers it possible to comply with the Yugoslav mission's request and to remove the Soviet military unit located near the mission.

I also told Micunovic that we cannot but be astonished by Koca Popovic's statement that "public opinion in Yugoslavia is quite strongly indignant." If we are talking about feelings, then our population, as well as every Hungarian patriot, is indignant to a far greater degree because of the fact that bankrupt degenerates and accomplices of counter-revolution such as Nagy and company, with whose knowledge worker-revolutionaries and communists were hanged on the streets of Budapest, took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy after their defeat.

Micunovic said that he had just acquainted himself with com. Khrushchev's letter of November 6 to coms. Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic. He cannot speak officially about the letter as a whole, but personally considers that its contents and conclusions contradict the understanding reached between com. Tito and coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov during their recent visit to Brioni.

Micunovic also stated that he does not differ with me in the judgment that Imre Nagy and his government cleared the way for counter-revolution. But there is an entire group of people with Nagy among whom there are honest communists. During the conversations at Brioni, it was stipulated that Imre Nagy and the others could improve the position of the new revolutionary workerpeasant government if in one way or another they announced their intention to assist this government or, at the least, not to speak out against it. The presence of Imre Nagy and others presently in the Yugoslav embassy does not contradict the understanding which took place between coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov and com. Tito and other Yugoslav figures during coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov's visit to Brioni.

I answered that insofar as I was informed of the contents of the conversation which took place at Brioni between coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov, on the one hand, and the leaders of Yugoslavia on the other, the Yugoslav government's provision of asylum to Nagy and his entourage in the Yugoslav embassy starkly contradicts the said conversation and understanding. Coms. Khrushchev and Malenkov informed the leadership of the party and the USSR government that com. Tito and the other Yugoslav leaders fully agreed with their Soviet comrades' conclusions that Imre Nagy and his confederates are not only political bankrupts, but are people who cleared the way for counter-revolution and who themselves became the accomplices of reactionaries and

imperialist forces. I know, for example, that during the conversation, com. Tito stated: "What sort of revolutionary is Nagy? What sort of communist is he if leading workers, communists and public figures were hanged and shot with his knowledge?"

In light of these facts, we are truly astonished and perplexed by the fact that the leaders of the Yugoslav government have sheltered the anti-people group headed by Nagy in the walls of the Budapest mission.

Micunovic once again repeated that he did not dissent from our assessment of Nagy. However, it is not necessary to create additional difficulties for the new Hungarian government and provoke the excitement and dissatisfaction of the Hungarian and Yugoslav population, as well as additional unpleasantness in the UN and in worldwide public opinion through certain actions relating to Nagy and his group, by which he meant that at present they are not taking part in any political activity and are keeping quiet. I informed Micunovic that he would be received at 18:00 for a conversation with com. Khrushchev.

Attested: [signature] [...]

D. SHEPILOV.

Letter of the CC UCY to the CC CPSU with an exposition of the views of the leadership of the UCY on the events in Hungary

To the first secretary of the CC CPSU,

Dear comrades!

comrade KHRUSHCHEV

should not remain in such a government any longer and
that they should rely on the laboring masses and resist
reaction in the most decisive manner. There is no need to
remind you that from the very beginning, and also
throughout our entire conversation, we expressed our
doubts as to the consequences of open help from the
Soviet Army. But bearing in mind that, in accord with
your evaluation that such help had become unavoidable,
we considered that nonetheless it would be necessary to do
everything possible in order to minimize harm to the task
of socialism. You recall that we first stated our opinion.
that in such a position it would be best of all to create a
government there in which people who had not compro-
mised themselves during the regime of Rakosi would take
part, and at the head of which would be comrade Kadar as
a prominent communist who enjoys influence among the
Hungarian laboring masses. We considered that it would.
be good if this government made a public appeal, and
subsequently this was done. We agree with this appeal and
for this reason in our public statements we gave full
support to the government and the program which it
announced. We believed that you agreed with this, that
only such a government could once again restore contact
with the laboring masses and gradually eliminate at least
the serious [tiazhelye] consequences of the events in
Hungary. You yourselves could see here [u nas] that in all
of our arguments we were guided only by deep concern
that the victories of socialism be preserved in Hungary and
that the restoration of the old order, which would have had

8 November 1956, Brioni far-reaching consequences for all countries located in this
part of Europe, including Yugoslavia, be prevented. In
particular, in connection with all of this we put forward
our thoughts on trying to keep communists, and perhaps
Nagy himself, out of this government, in which different
anti-socialist elements were located and which for this
very reason was not in a condition to halt the [forces of]
reaction on their path to power. Comrades Khrushchev
and Malenkov did not reject these thoughts. On the
contrary, they agreed with them, with some exceptions as
to Nagy. We considered that in this government and
around it there were honest communists who could be very
useful in creating the new government of Janos Kadar and
in liquidating the activity of anti-socialist forces. On the
basis of this conversation at Brioni, we took some mea-
sures in Budapest on the afternoon of Saturday, 3 Novem-
ber of this year.

We received your letter in which you stated the point of view of the Presidium of the CC CPSU on the issue of Imre Nagy and others who took refuge in our embassy in Budapest. We understand some of your arguments which are put forward in the aforementioned letter, and [we] consider them logical, but all the same we must sincerely say that in your letter we were deeply moved by the lack of understanding of our position and, especially, the lack of understanding of our readiness to resolve this issue in the spirit of reciprocal friendly relations, and not to the injury of the international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sovereign country. You agreed with us that Yugoslavia plays and in the future should play a very useful role in the world thanks to the reputation which it has acquired.

We will explain in detail to you here, which circumstances led to the current state of affairs, so that our position on this issue becomes clearer to you.

It is true that, during our conversations at Brioni, we agreed on the assessment that the weakness of Imre Nagy's government and the series of concessions made by that government to reactionary forces led to the risk of the destruction of the existing socialist achievements in Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists

On November 2, Zoltan Szanto spoke with our representative in Budapest. In the course of this conversation, Szanto expressed the desire that he and some communists, if it were possible, could leave the building of the government and the CC and could find sanctuary in our embassy, since their lives were being threatened by reactionary bands of rioters. In the spirit of this conversation, our representative answered Szanto that we were ready to give them shelter if they made their escape immediately. We expected that they would answer on Sunday, the fourth of the month. However, on the morning

of the same day, the Soviet Army began its actions, and our conversations were ended. Instead of that, early in the morning of the same day, on the basis of previous conversations, Nagy and 15 other leaders of the government and the party together with their families arrived at our embassy. When we received the first report about this event from Budapest, we did not know whether the announcement which had been read, which you cite in your letter, was in fact Nagy's announcement or whether it was published without his knowledge. And so, Nagy and his group arrived on the basis of the conversations which had taken place earlier, before we from Belgrade could react to his announcement, for the authenticity of which we had no proof. As soon as we received word that Nagy and the others had taken refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, comrade Kardelj invited the counselor to the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, comrade Griaznov, and told him this fact. Despite the absence of such information, all the same, we then considered that an appropriate announcement by Nagy, if essentially in favor of the Kadar government, could still assist an easing of the situation in Hungary, as we proposed to you. Having not received an urgently requested reply from you in this regard throughout November 4, we refrained from further actions in that direction.

If attention is paid to all of this, then it becomes obvious that only as a result of the speed of events, matters were not clarified and problems were created, which it is now necessary to resolve. We believe that the question of whether our embassy in Budapest behaved correctly or not is now irrelevant, but that it is important that we jointly resolve the problem in the spirit of friendly relations, which we have already restored between our countries and our parties, since [the problem] in the final analysis appeared as a result of our conversation in Brioni, although, because of events which occurred during the night from Saturday to Sunday, things have developed in a different way than we proposed. After this, essentially, only their personal issue in regard to their request for asylum will remain to be decided.

We do not dispute some of your arguments as to the fact that granting asylum in Yugoslavia to members of the former Hungarian government, whose chairman has not resigned, could be negative, and do not think that we do not realize that all of this has also brought us some unpleasantness and complications. As we see from your letter, you have not accepted our proposal that Nagy and the rest of the group be transported, with your permission, to Yugoslavia, and that puts us, understandably, in a very difficult position. Specifically on that point, we would like you to treat the search for a joint way out of all of this with great understanding, since neither by the stipulations in our constitution on the granting of the right of asylum, nor by international custom, nor by other considerations which we cited earlier, can we break the word we have given and simply hand over these people. Here we must especially emphasize that such an action by us would provoke far

reaching consequences in our country.

In your letter you say that this could have negative consequences for our relations as well, but we consider that this should not hinder the development of friendly relations between our parties and countries, [relations] which of late have already brought significant results. We consider that this issue can be resolved in such a way that it not harm either our country, or the Soviet Union, or the development of socialism in Hungary. We consider that the very friendship which exists between our two countries demands that the government of the Soviet Union regard the international prestige of Yugoslavia with great understanding, as it regards the prestige of the Soviet Union itself. If we did not behave in this way, the masses of our people could not understand either the politics of the Soviet Union or the politics of their own Yugoslav government. If we regard matters in this way, then we must believe that with the aid of the good will of both countries it is necessary to find a resolution which would not have a harmful influence on our friendly relations.

Bearing in mind such a state of affairs, it is difficult. for us to believe that you, despite this, will not try to find another solution, all the more since we consider that, aside from transportation to Yugoslavia, there are also other possibilities for resolving this problem in keeping with international law, like, for instance, amnesty or something similar. We hope that you in the spirit of everything we have set out will once again examine your position.

In conclusion we would like once again to return to one argument from your letter. Despite the fact that some malevolent persons can interpret our relationship to Nagy and to the rest of the group in Budapest, we want to emphasize that we have absolutely no connection with this group, nor with the events in Hungary. Moreover, we reject the hint about our imaginary connection with the Petöfi club. Yugoslavia exists just as it is, with all its revolutionary past, with all its experience and understanding of socialist construction. If separate people in Hungary spoke about her [i.e. Yugoslavia], that does not give anyone the right to impute responsibility to Yugoslavia for internal events which have entirely different sources and other culprits. Precisely because we saw all of the dangers hidden in the stormy [events] in Hungary, we were extremely restrained and did all we could to act in a calm manner. This is evidenced by the arrival in Yugoslavia of the delegation of the Hungarian Workers' Party headed by Gerö. On the same principle we agreed with you in your assessment of the course of events in Hungary and publicly gave our support to the revolutionary workerpeasant government headed by comrade Kadar from the very first day. Accordingly, if someone now tries to accuse Yugoslavia of the events in Hungary, for which it bears not the slightest responsibility, we consider in such a case that it is in our common interest, and in the interest of socialism to repudiate such rumors.

With a comradely greeting

On behalf of the Central Committee

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