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of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia

(I.B. Tito)

[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 486, ll. 61-67. Copy. TsKhSD. f. 89. per 45. dok. No. 38. Obtained by the National Security Archive and CWIHP. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie (CWIHP).]

Leonid Gibianskii is a senior researcher at the Institute for Slavonic Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and has published widely on Soviet-Yugoslav relations.

1 Practically nothing was changed in this sense by the publication of a collection of documents on Yugoslavia's policies towards Hungary in connection with the Hungarian revolution in 1959: Politika Jugoslavije prema Madarskoj i slucaj Imre Nada (Belgrade, 1959). It was compiled and published in connection with the trial that took place in 1958 in Hungary of the group of participants in the prominent revolutionary events of 1956 headed by Imre Nagy. The publication had a propaganda aim: to disprove the accusations made in the course of the trial of Yugoslavia's participation in statements against the pro-Soviet communist regime in Hungary. Although the collection, which consisted largely of newspaper publications, also included fragments of individual archival documents, as a result of the careful selection that had been exercised in its compilation, it lacked materials which would have exposed the behind-thescenes dimension of Soviet-Yugoslav contacts in connection with the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

2 Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970, 1971). I used the corrected Russian original of the recollections, which was published in the Moscow journal Voprosy istorii in 1990-1995 under the title of "Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev."

3 Veljko Micunovic, Mockovske godine 1956-1958 (Zagreb, 1977); in this article the second edition (Belgrade, 1984) is cited. For an English-language edition, see Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary (London, 1980).

4 Leonid Gibianskij, Magyarorsag, 1956: Hruscsov es Tito titkos levelezese. - Koztarsasag, 1992, 25 szm, pp. 74, 76-77, 80-81; 26 szam, pp. 74, 76-77, 80-81; 27 szam, pp. 29-32; Leonid Gibianskij, "Le trattative segrete sovietico-jugoslave e la repressione della rivoluzione ungherese del 1956," Storia Contemporanea (Roma), 1994, no. 1, pp. 57-82. I touched on this problem briefly in: Leonid Ja. Gibianski, Witali, Ju. Afiani, Aleksandr S. Stykalin, “Zur sowjetischen Außenpolitik im Herbst 1956," in Inge Kircheisen, ed., Tauwetter ohne Frühling: Das Jahr 1956 im Spiegel blockinterner Wandlungen und internationaler Krisen (Berlin, 1995), pp. 42-44.

5 of the most essential publications of documents, see: “Hungary, April-October 1956: Information of Iu. V. Andropov, A.I. Mikoian, and M.A. Suslov from Budapest," Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), 1993, No. 4, pp. 103-142; "Hungary, OctoberNovember 1956: From the archives of the CC CPSU," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1993, No. 5, pp. 132-160; “Hungary, November 1956 - August 1957: From the archive of the CC

CPSU," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1993, No. 6, pp. 130-144; A "Jelcindosszie": Szovjet dokumentumok 1956 - rol. (Budapest, 1993); Hianyzo lapok 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KB leveltarabol (Budapest, 1993); Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956: Az allami- es partkapcsolatok rendezese, az oktoberi felkeles, a Nagy Imre-csoport sorsa. Dokumentumok (Budapest, 1995); "How the `Hungarian issues' were resolved: Working notes of the meetings of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, JulyNovember 1956," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 2, pp. 73-104 and No. 3, pp. 87-121. For an English translation, commentary, and annotation of the CC CPSU Presidium meetings on the 1956 Hungarian (and Polish) crises, see Mark Kramer, “Special Feature: New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises" and Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., “The `Malin Notes' on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956," in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 358-384, 385-410.

6 In Moscow I researched documents in the former archive of the CC CPSU, now the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (henceforward TsKhSD); in Belgrade, I worked in the former archive of the CC of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, which now is a fond in the collection of the Archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije [henceforward - AJ], f. 507), and in the archive of the former united secretariat on Yugoslav foreign affairs (Arhiva Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove, Politicka arhiva [henceforward ASSIP-PA]). I also used xerox copies of some archival materials kindly provided by my colleagues from the Institute of Slavic Studies and Balkanists of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vyacheslav Sereda and Aleksandr Stykalin, the latter of which I also thank for his help in translating documents from Hungarian.

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For the transcript of this meeting of the CC CPSU Presidium, see "How the `Hungarian issues' were solved," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 2, pp. 82-83. For the discussion at the meetings of the CC CPSU Presidium on 28-31 October on the issue of whether to resort to a repeat operation by Soviet troops or to refrain from this, see ibid., pp. 88-95, 97-102; No. 3, pp. 87, 90. The working notes of the said meetings confirm the circumstance mentioned in Khrushchev's memoirs, that the discussion of this issue in the CC CPSU Presidium was conducted in close connection with the negotiations between the Soviet leadership and the delegation of the CC of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which was in Moscow from 23-31 October to examine the events in Poland and Hungary (see: “Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev," Voprosy istorii, 1992, No. 11-12, pp. 83-84). In keeping with the data published in recent years in China, on 30 October 1956, the Chinese Politburo telegraphed a message to the delegation in Moscow to transmit Beijing's opinion to the Soviet leadership, that the Soviet troops should not be withdrawn from Hungary and should support communist power in that country. On 31 October, the Chinese delegation informed Khrushchev about this; see Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," paper presented to the International Conference "Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," Budapest, 26-29 September 1996, organized by the National Security Archive, the Institute for the History of the

1956 Hungarian Revolution, and the Cold War International History Project.

9 "Hungary, October-November 1956,” p. 146.

10 "Memoirs of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev," Voprosy istorii, 1994, No. 5 (hereafter - Khrushchev's Memoirs), pp 75-76; "How the `Hungarian issues' were resolved,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 3, p. 92.

11 On 31 October in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade, a telegram confirmed by the CC CPSU was sent from Moscow, in which Khrushchev proposed a secret meeting with Tito at any location in Yugoslavia or the USSR "in connection with the situation which had arisen in Hungary." On the same day, Moscow was informed in a telephonogram from the embassy that Tito agreed to a meeting and would prefer to conduct it in his residence on the island of Brioni, where he was then residing. See "Hungary, October-November 1956,” p. 146; "How the 'Hungarian issues' were resolved," Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 3, p. 91. 12 Khrushchev's Memoirs, p. 77.

13 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 157, 164.

14 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-91 (st. sign. 1-1/63), p. 4.

15 Khrushchev's Memoirs, p. 77; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 158-159.

16 AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-78, 1. 2; 119-95, 1. 7-8, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84, p. 18.

17 Khrushchev's Memoirs, p. 77; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, p. 159.

18 TsKhSD, f. 89, per, 45, dok. 84, s. 18; AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-95, 1. 61; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 159-160. 19 Khrushchev's Memoirs, pp. 77, 78; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 159-161; AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-78, 1. 3. 20 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 160-161.

21 AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, 1. 1; 119/1-78, 1. 2-3; 119/I92 (st. sign. 1-1/64), 1. 3; TsKhSD, f. 89, per, 45, dok. 83, p. 4. 22 Gibianskij, Magarorsag, 1956... - Koztarsasag, 1992, 25 szam, p. 81.

23 See footnotes 53 and 54.

24 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, III/67.

25

AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, 1. 3; 119/1-95, 1, 14, 64-65; TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84, p. 21; “Hungary, OctoberNovember, 1956,” p. 149.

26 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, p. 159.

27 Ibid., p. 160. See Cable from Firiubin to Soviet Foreign

Ministry, 4 November 1956, printed below.

28 “Hungary, October-November 1956," p. 119. Printed below.

29 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 160-161.

30 "Hungary, October-November 1956,” pp. 149-150.

31 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-76.

32 About this telegram, see AJ, f. 507, CD SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, 1. 1;

Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 171-174.

33 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, II. 1-4.

34 "Hungary, October-November 1956,” pp. 151-153.

35 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-78, 11. 1-7. Printed below.

36 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, p. 190.

37 Ibid., p. 191.

38 On the Soviet reply, see. ibid., pp. 194, 210; TsKhSD, f. 89,

op. 2, d. 3, ll. 4-5; Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, p. 178; AJ, f.

507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-80 (st. sign. 1-I/57), l. 3.

39 TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, 11. 4-5; published in Hungarian in Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 210-211. 40 Nagy demonstrated a decisive rejection of compromise with the Kadar government and the Soviet side, and in relation to sending him to Romania, gave a categorical refusal to the Romanian representative, Walter Roman, who visited him ten days later. Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 195, 285286.

41 Ibid., pp. 192-193, 210; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, 11. 4-5. 42 Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 196-203, 230-232. 43 Ibid., pp. 233-240; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, 11. 3-4. 44 On these negotiations, see Magyar-jugoszlav kapcsolatok 1956, pp. 241-257, 259-275.

45 Micunovic, Mosckovske godine, pp. 184-191, 195-199, 200

201.

46 TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, 1. 4; ibid., d. 3, 1. 11. 47 Ibid., d. 5, 11. 19-26.

48 AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-83; TsKhSD, f. 89, op. 2, d. 4, 11. 24-33. See CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.

49 The available documents so far do not permit an explanation of the extent to which differences inside the Yugoslav leadership might have played a role here.

50 Obviously, the struggle within the CC CPSU Presidium is also expressed here. Its more conservative members, above all Molotov and Kaganovich, in the course of the suppression of the Hungarian revolution, spoke against any even purely declarative criticism of the Rakosi regime by Kadar, and in reply to the objections of Khrushchev and a series of other officials in the Soviet leadership, scared them with the danger of the Kadar government's slide on "the Yugoslav path." See "How the 'Hungarian issues' were resolved,” Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, No. 3, pp. 111-112, 114-117.

51 The Soviet letter of 10 January 1957, signed by Khrushchev, is in TsKhSD, f. 39, per. 45, dok. 83; AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/92. The Yugoslav response of 1 February 1957, signed by Tito, is in AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-95, 1. 1-35, 58-76, and TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 84. See CWIHP Electronic Bulletin.

In Memoriam:

Deng Xiaoping and the Cold War

In the final analysis, three main courts will pass judgement on the actions of our Parties. First of all, the masses, secondly, the communist parties, which in the course of their practical existence must figure out what is going on, and in the third instance, time and history, which makes the final conclusions.

General Secretary Deng Xiaoping in conversation with Soviet Ambassador S.V. Chervonenko (12 September 1960)1

By David Wolff

eng may have had something more philosophical in mind, but, his ultimate arbiter, history, is the daily output of the historians. This section of the Bulletin aims to provide enough archival material for historians of Chinese, Russian, and Communist history to begin a debate on the role of Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) in Sino-Soviet relations during the years 1956-1963, a period that witnessed both the final years of cooperation between the two communist powers and the emergence of tensions that finally split the alliance. Although the late paramount leader of the People's Republic of China is best remembered for the tremendous, though uneven, reforms that he introduced and oversaw during the last twenty years of his life, his earlier achievements should not be neglected.

Within weeks of the conversation from which the epigraph is drawn, Deng arrived in Moscow for ideological jousting at the highest levels with Mikhail Suslov, the Kremlin's "gray cardinal." And Deng always gave as good as he got. Of course, by 1963, when again Deng and Suslov headed the delegations, the level of vituperation had risen sharply. When Deng returned from this last encounter, the whole CCP Politburo, headed by Mao, Zhou, and, Lin Biao turned out at the airport to applaud him, Peng Zhen, and Kang Sheng.2 Vlad Zubok, in an insightful and provocative introductory essay, speculates that the services Deng rendered Mao in his battle with the Soviet "older brother" may have saved his life when the Cultural Revolution swept others away. Chen Jian's "Rejoinder" only strengthens this impression, while providing a fuller Chinese politics context. Both the 1960 and 1963 talks, together with seven memoranda of conversations between Deng and Soviet representatives, are excerpted in this Bulletin. Additional materials can be found at the CWIHP website: cwihp.si.edu.

The fall of 1960 was a special time in other respects, for the USSR had just withdrawn its experts from the PRC, occasioning bewilderment, hardship and ill-will.3 Although the Soviet Union was well enough informed about affairs in China to sense the variety of reactions, newly released materials are only now making clear the depth of division. Only a few weeks after the withdrawal, the CCP

leadership had moved to seaside Beidaihe to escape the Beijing summer heat. Therefore, Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, joined them there and met with Mao on August 10. In referring to the Soviet Union, Mao was livid.

Khrushchev can cooperate with America, England and France. He can cooperate with India and Indonesia. He can even cooperate with Yugoslavia, but only with China is it impossible on the grounds that we have divergent opinions. Does that mean that his views are identical with America, England, France and India to allow whole-hearted cooperation? [He] withdraws the experts from China and doesn't transfer technology, while sending experts to India and giving technology. So what if China doesn't have experts? Will people die, I don't believe it.

Ho's reaction was: "That's a pretty strong statement."4

In sharp contrast to this explosion, four days earlier on August 4, Chen Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, had met with Ambassador Chervonenko and insisted that "speaking as one Communist to another," a full break between the 5 parties was not a possibility. But what does this divergence of messages reveal? It is possible that in light of the disastrous famine that accompanied the "Great Leap Forward" and would claim upward of 15 million Chinese lives in 1959-61, Mao had ordered his subordinates to show restraint and moderation in the hope of continuing aid from the Soviets. After all, where else would it come from? On the other hand, it is also possible that the Chinese leadership, influenced by the same perception of China's dire straits, collectively opted for a moderate policy, despite Mao's rancor and radicalism. If this is indeed the case, we will find Deng among the moderates, placating the Soviets right up into 1962, if not further. But only additional documentation, especially from the Chinese side, can answer these critical questions.

The search for a current of moderation in a period usually identified with deepening estrangement in SinoSoviet relations is exactly the kind of refinement that document-based studies of the Cold War can offer. An October 1997 gathering on "Sino-Soviet Relations and the

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Document-based studies can also help us to draw a detailed and more human portrait of a giant of the twentieth century. What is certain is that the history of the Cold War will not be complete without an archive-based biography of Deng Xiaoping. CWIHP, together with all scholars of the Cold War and China, looks forward to the speedy release and publication of Deng-related materials by the appropriate PRC “units" with actual archival access, especially the Central Archives with their holdings of CCP documents. CWIHP is continuing its collection of materials from which to piece together the lifework of Deng Xiaoping and hopes that readers with such documents will forward copies to the Project.

1 TsKhSD (Tsentral'noe khranilishche sovremennoi

dokumentatsii) [Central Repository for Contemporary Documentation], f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, 1. 255.

Kang Sheng's diatribe against the Soviet treatment of Stalin is
probably the most powerful piece of oratory in this Bulletin.
On the withdrawal of the Soviet experts, see Chen Jian, “A
Crucial Step toward the Sino-Soviet Schism" in CWIHP Bulletin,
8-9 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 246ff.

4 See Yang Kuisong "Toward the Breakdown, 1960-3,” p.5
(Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference "Sino-Soviet
Relations and the Cold War" (Beijing, 1997)).

5

See Odd Arne Westad, "Who Killed the Alliance?" pp. 7-8. (Presented at the CWIHP-sponsored conference "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War" (Beijing, 1997).

More on this can be found in CWIHP Bulletin 6-7 and 8-9, where the Russian version of a message from Mao to Stalin (2 October 1950) suggests great tensions in the earliest phases of the Korean War, a supposed highpoint of socialist internationalism. The previously accepted Chinese version, claiming identity of views on the sending of "volunteers” to Korea, now appears to have been a draft telegram never sent. Only declassification of the document and examination of its archival context can clarify this contradiction further.

Sino-Soviet Relations and the Cold War

An International Symposium Sponsored by

The Cold War International History Project, The Wilson Center; Institute of Contemporary China, CASS; Center for Oriental History Research, Chinese Association of Historians; Fairbank Center, Harvard University 22-25 October 1997, Beijing

Wednesday, October 22, 1997

Brief Introduction of Conference Organization

SHEN ZHIHUA (Director, Center for Oriental History Research)

DAVID WOLFF (Director, The Cold War International History Project)

Reflections on Sino-Soviet Relations

Speakers: LI LIAN, ANATOLII HAZONOV, WARREN COHEN, YAN MINGFU, WU LENGXI, HUANG HUA, ZHU RUIZHEN

The Making of the Sino-Soviet Alliance

Dieter Heinzig (Federal Institute of East European and International Studies, Germany)
The Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty Negotiations: A Reappraisal in Light of New Sources
SHEN ZHIHUA (Center for Oriental History Research)

The Signing of the Sino-Soviet Alliance Treaty of 1950 and Soviet Strategic Aims in the Far East
XUE XIANTIAN (Modern History Institute, CASS)

Soviet Strategy toward Xinjiang during the Postwar Period

LEONID NEZHINskii (Russian History Institute, Russian Academy of Science)
The Changing Theoretical Foundation of Soviet Foreign Policy during the Cold War
Discussants: LIU GUOXIN (Institute of Contemporary China);
VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC)

Thursday, October 23, 1997

Sino-Soviet Economic Relations

WILLIAM KIRBY (Harvard University)

China, the Soviet Union, and East Europe: Trade Relations

ZHANG SHUGUANG (University of Maryland)

Western Economic Embargo against China and Sino-Soviet Relations

LEONID SHIROKORAD (St. Petersburg State University)

The Cold War and Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations in the Late 1940s and Early 1950s
Discussants: LEV DELYUSIN (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science);
ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History)

International Conflict and Sino-Soviet Relations

KATHRYN WEATHERSBY (Independent Scholar, Washington, DC)
Sino-Soviet Relations and the Korean War

LI DANHUI (Institute of Contemporary China)

Sino-Soviet Relations and China's 'Assist Vietnam and Resist America'
HOPE HARRISON (Lafayette College)

China and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1962

CHEN DONGLIN (Institute of Contemporary China)

China's Responses to the Soviet Union's Military Interventions in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia:
A Comparative Study

Discussants: CHEN JIAN (Southern Illinois University)

BORIS KULIK (Far Eastern Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Science)

Friday, October 24, 1997

Changing Relations Between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s

MIKHAIL PROZUMENSCHIKOV (Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents, Moscow)
The Year 1960 as Viewed by Soviet and Chinese Leaders

NIU JUN (American Studies Institute, CASS)

Changing Chinese Policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cultural Revolution
ANATOLII HAZONOV (Oriental Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Science)
Soviet Policy toward China during the Khrushchev Period

LEV DELYUSIN (Institute of World Politics and Economy, Russian Academy of Science)
Reflections on the Beginning of the Sino-Soviet Conflict

Discussants: LI JINGJIE (Institute of East European and Central Asian Studies, CASS)
ODD ARNE WESTAD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute)

Chinese and Soviet Leaders and Sino-Soviet Relations
ZHANG BAIJIA (CCP Central Institute of Party History)
Mao Zedong and Sino-Soviet Relations

VLADISLAV ZUBOK (National Security Archive, Washington, DC)

Deng Xiaoping and the Sino-Soviet Split
WILLIAM TAUBMAN (Amherst College)
Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations

Discussants: HOPE HARRISON (Lafayette College); YANG KUISONG (Institute of Modern History, CASS)

Saturday, October 25, 1997

Sino-Soviet Split and the Cold War

LI JIE (CCP Central Institute of Documents)

The Origins, Process and Consequences of the Sino-Soviet Polemic Debate
ODD ARNE WESTAD (The Norwegian Nobel Institute)

Who Killed the Alliance? An Account of Politics, Hunger, and Refugees

YANG KUISONG (Modern History Institute, CASS)

The Path toward the Split: How the CCP Leadership Dealt with the Crisis in Sino-Soviet Relations, 1961-63 BORIS KULIK (Far Eastern Institute, Russian Academy of Science)

The Sino-Soviet Split in the Environment of the Cold War

Discussants: LI HAIWEN (CCP Central Institute of Documents); DAVID WOLFF (Cold War International History Project)

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