The conversation took place in warm, friendly circumstances.

The counselor to the Embassy, I.I. Safronov, and the First Secretary of the Embassy, B.V. Kapralov, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC

Signature

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF f. 0100 op.53, p.8, d. 454, ll. 165-9; translated by Ben Aldrich-Moodie.]

The Short Version of the Negotiations Between CPSU and CCP Delegations (September 1960)

CPSU Delegation: Suslov (leader), Kozlov, Kuusinen, Pospelov, Ponomarev, Andropov, Il'ichev, Konstantinov, Grishin, Chervonenko

CCP Delegation: Deng (leader), Peng Zhen, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, Yang Shangkun, Hu Qiaomu, Liao Chengzhi, Wu Xiuquan, Liu Xiao

The first talk took place on 17 September 1960 from 1300 to 1500....

In conclusion, Deng Xiaoping asked, as he said, the essential question: What does the CC CPSU and the Soviet government want to do with Soviet-Chinese friendship?... Only after the clarification of this essential question made up of many facts, can one ascertain which assumptions are necessary for us to solve our disagreements...

[Second Session 19 September 1960]

First of all com. [Frol] Kozlov explained that we have always assumed that truly fraternal relations corresponding to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism must be established between our parties, states and people...

Secondly, Comrade Kozlov noted that as causes of the serious disagreements that supposedly have long existed between the two CCs, the Chinese comrades' letter mentions events that are related to Soviet-Polish relations as well as the events in Hungary in the fall of 1956. These questions were resolved long ago between the CC CPSU and the CCs of the Polish party and Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. We have [reached] unanimity with these parties in our evaluations of the events of fall 1956.

We do not hide that at that time the Chinese comrades really did give us advice, but this advice was completely different from that now cited in the Chinese comrades' letter. Comrade Kozlov rebuts the Chinese comrades'

claim and then asks: why do you now wish to return to the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary. We think that this is not done for the sake of clarifying the evaluation of these events. One sees, however, that such a questioning can only stoke nationalistic moods in Poland and Hungary in order to undermine the tight fraternal and heartfelt relations of the USSR and the CPSU with Poland and Hungary.

[Third Session: 20 September 1960]

The next accusation by Deng: We are also very puzzled by the following fact. Following his meeting with Comrade Khrushchev and several other leading figures in the USSR, Comrade Ho Chi Minh made a stop-over in Beijing on his way home and reported the following news: During the conversation with him and other Vietnamese, Comrade Khrushchev stated that enormous efforts were being spent in China to restore the gravesite of Genghiskhan and that this smelled of "yellow peril." The creation of Genghis-khan's empire involved three countriesMongolia, our autonomous territory, and Soviet Buriatiia. Whereas it is usually stated in your country that it was primarily the Europeans who had to suffer from the attack by Genghis-khan, it was actually the Chinese who suffered the most from the attack.

Ponomarev: One should strike his grave, not celebrate him.

Pospelov: Why do they celebrate him as a progressive figure? Many nations had to suffer under his attack.

Peng Zhen: How could we interfere in the internal affairs of the Mongolians who want to restore the gravesite of their ancestors [?] You, for example, like Peter I. You intended to erect a monument in Port Arthur to three Russian generals-Kuropatkin, Alekseev, and Makarov, who had led an aggression against China.

Pospelov: This was never the case with Kuropatkin and Alekseev, only with Makarov; because Kuropatkin and Alekseev had betrayed the interests of Russia.

Peng Zhen: And now concerning the question of the Korean War.

Then the entire conversation with Khrushchev on June 22 was repeated and the attempt was made to whitewash Mao Zedong of any guilt. Mao Zedong reportedly stated at the beginning of the Korean War: "If the enemy transgresses the 38th parallel, China-since it is not up to the Soviet Union to send troops for the protection of North Korea is prepared to protect the common interests of the socialist countries, to send its own volunteers."

Following further discussion of the topic Deng declared: in explaining all of these facts we would like to ask the Soviet comrades to rethink whether all that they have done with respect to their enemies and with respect to their friends was appropriate. We have no doubt that overall you are taking a stand against imperialism.

Ponomarev: We, however, had the impression that all our deeds were also directed to support American imperi

alism.

Deng: But why then did Comrade Khrushchev speak with such esteem about Eisenhower?

Suslov: One cannot mix up matters of principle with the diplomacy of the struggle.

Deng: Comrade Suslov, do not jump to conclusions too easily. You are not used to listening to others. Under such conditions it is difficult for us to finish our discussion. There is no state of equality. We would like to ask you, however, on whom you can count when difficulties will arise? On Eisenhower, on Nehru or the likes, or on a fraternal socialist country, on China?

Kozlov: There is no such question for us.

Deng: It would be perfect if such questions did not exist. But in reality such facts exist, and they cause

concern.

Kozlov: Then you yourself want a decline in our relations. You yourself are pushing this line. We state that there is no such question, but you maintain that it exists nevertheless. We declare in the name of our country, in the name of our people that we will defend you in case of an attack with all means [available to us]; but you doubt this. Deng: I ask you that your actions meet your recent statements.

Suslov: This statement is offensive to us.

Deng: I declare in the name of our party, in the name of the entire Chinese people, and fully aware of the responsibility, that regardless of all the[se] circumstances and the attacks on the Chinese people, the People's Republic of China and our party will take the side of the socialist countries in all difficulties.

Suslov: Did we not act this way when there was a difficult situation in the GDR in 1955 [1953?], did we not take full responsibility when we dealt a blow to the counterrevolution in Hungary?

Deng: But during the Chinese-Indian border conflict you did not act that way.

Suslov: But you were not threatened by a dangerous aggressor.

Deng: You unilaterally withdrew your experts from China, you transferred the ideological differences to the sphere of international-state relations, and I do not agree that India did not threaten China. You declared that you took a neutral position in the question of the Sino-Indian conflict. It is news to us that a fraternal socialist country can take a neutral position in the conflict with bourgeois India with regard to another socialist country.

In his further remarks, Deng spoke about the disagreements which had occurred in the relations between China and the USSR, among other things about the negotiations of the supreme command of the Far Eastern military district on joint air defense on 4 February 1955 and those on air defense between the military districts of the USSR and China on 27 September 1955. Peng Zhen thoroughly explained once again the question of the construction of a long-wave radio station. Deng stated in conclusion: As is well known, an extremely unequal treaty existed according

to which China did not have the right to permit representatives of third countries to enter two provinces of the PRC. These two provinces are our territories. Is it your business whether we permit the entry of persons from third countries or not [?] These questions were discussed with Comrade Mikoian during his trip to the PRC, and it was resolved. We appreciate that you resolved these questions. Suslov: And why do you now raise these longresolved questions once again? What is your point?

Deng: Unfortunately, the proposals with regard to the construction of a joint fleet, a long-wave radio station, and negotiations on a basis of equality [sic?] came from Comrade Khrushchev. Comrade Mao Zedong back then had asked Comrade Khrushchev: What should we do when you raise these issues, should we act according to your proposals or according to our thoughts. If we act as you wish, we would have to cede our entire coast to you, as was the case with Port Arthur [Lushunkou] and Dalnii [Dalian]. Comrade Khrushchev responded: You cannot act like that. Where would you go? Comrade Mao Zedong then stated: We will go into the mountains as partisans. Suslov: We think this is a joke.

Deng: This was not a joke. This was a very serious conversation. It must be stated that following this conversation, you stopped delivering to us technical documentation and equipment for the construction of a nuclear submarine fleet, while the CC CPSU communicated to the CC CCP on 20 June 1959 that the USSR would terminate the deliveries of technical documentation and necessary materials for the production of atomic weapons... With regard to the Chinese-Soviet border incidents, Deng stated: on this question, we will communicate our response through diplomatic channels, and therefore we will not take a position at this point....

Deng:...I take advantage of the opportunity to ask you to transmit our greetings to your Party and to com. Khrushchev. At the same time, please transmit the following wish: since last September com. Khrushchev has personally attacked our country and Party many times causing us alarm. As the leader of the Soviet party and the Soviet state, com. Khrushchev exercises powerful influence over world affairs. Therefore, we ask you with all our hearts and sincerity to deliver this message [to Khrushchev], asking him to pay attention to it. With great satisfaction, we ascertain that both sides consider this meeting useful and are of the opinion that this is a contribution towards gradually overcoming our differences...

[Source: SAPMO (former Socialist Unity Party [SED] Archive) JIV 2/202-280, Bd.3; provided by Tim Trampedach (Freie Universitat-Berlin); translated by Christian Ostermann.]

In connection with 27 September instructions from the Center, I made a request to meet with Mao Zedong. On September 30, the Secretariat of the CC CCP informed us that Mao Zedong had instructed Deng Xiaoping to receive the Soviet ambassador. On the same day I met with Deng Xiaoping.

At the beginning of the conversation, Deng Xiaoping by way of explaining why Mao Zedong did not receive us, said that the "other comrades of the CC are very busy receiving kings" (at that time, the king and queen of Nepal and the Belgian queen were located in Beijing).

I gave information in an oral form on the Albanian issue (it is our opinion that they were already informed of the matter). Having heard our message, Deng Xiaoping said: "Bad news. Have you reached the culmination point of mutual relations between your two countries and two parties?"

I answered Deng Xiaoping that as he knows from our formerly delivered letter, the Soviet government has more than once made efforts directed at normalizing SovietAlbanian relations, but the Albanian leaders are taking steps in the opposite direction. Their last step is damaging the security of the member-countries of the Warsaw pact and the basic security of the entire socialist camp.

Deng Xiaoping stated that everyone must not take extreme measures in order to leave room for a settlement.

I again emphasized that after the Moscow conference, the Soviet side undertook multiple steps in order to eliminate misunderstanding in the relations between the Soviet Union and Albania. For instance, a readiness by N.S. Khrushchev to meet with the Albanian leaders was expressed, although the latter, as the Chinese comrades well know, stubbornly refused such a meeting. I added that such a position by the Albanians is incomprehensible

to us.

We, Deng Xiaoping responded, are acquainted with the correspondence over this period between the Soviet Union and Albania. Between the CCP and the CPSU there were also great disputes. It is well that both you and we did not take the matter to extremes. We have always stood and stand for this. We said and still say to the Albanian comrades that relations between you should improve and

not worsen.

Then Deng Xiaoping thanked [me] for the message and expressed the hope that this bad news would be the

culmination point after which an improvement would

ensue.

I said that for our part, we would like to share this opinion, but that the situation was not of the Soviet Union's making (za Sovetskim Soiuzum). As for the Albanians' most recent act, it affects the interests of all of the Warsaw pact countries, of the whole socialist camp. For that reason, efforts were needed which would lead to unity on the part of all of the countries of the socialist commonwealth.

In reply, Deng Xiaoping said that he was not in the mood to immerse himself in the essence of the SovietAlbanian differences. We have, he emphasized, a single desire that the relations between your countries improve. In reply to my words that the CPSU had no other desire than to improve relations between the USSR and Albania, Deng Xiaoping again moved the conversation to SovietChinese relations. Having mentioned that relations had been very strained between the CCP and the CPSU and the PRC and the USSR, Deng Xiaoping stated the opinion that since the Moscow conference, these relations have been developing fairly well (neplokho). Having noted that in Korea, F.R. Kozlov invited him to lunch, and he [invited] F.R. Kozlov, Deng Xiaoping said: "We spoke about the importance of solidarity. I said to Kozlov that, of course, on this or that concrete issue we might not have identical opinions, but on the whole after the Moscow conference, our relations have been developing fairly well. Kozlov agreed with this." On a series of important international problems, Deng Xiaoping continued, we expressed and continue to express support for your actions. Between the USSR and the PRC, very good cooperation has been established in the international arena; for instance, at the Geneva conference on Laos. Of course, on certain questions we have not entirely identical opinions. It is true that in Korea we did not speak about the Albanian issue with Kozlov, he added.

Further, Deng Xiaoping stated that "there are 12 countries in the socialist camp, but the issue of relations between the USSR and Albania stands out most of all. Is there really no possibility of finding some way to resolve this issue? For our part, we hope and wish that such a path be found." Deng Xiaoping reminded [us] that Zhou Enlai and he (Deng Xiaoping) had earlier already stated their opinion on Albanian affairs. It is true, he noted, turning to us, that you were not content, especially with my (Deng Xiaoping's) statement.

On that note the conversation about the Albanian issue ended....

At the end of the conversation, I inquired as to whether the CC CCP had received the CC CPSU's congratulatory telegram on the PRC's national holiday. Having received a negative reply, I informed Deng Xiaoping on this issue. Deng Xiaoping expressed thanks to the CC CPSU for the congratulations. Afterwards, he noted that a solemn celebration dedicated to the PRC's

12th anniversary was held in Moscow, and asked that thanks be conveyed to the CC CPSU for the attention paid to the Chinese people's holiday.

The candidate of the secretariat of the CC CCP, Yang Shangkun, translators for the CC CCP apparatus, Yan Mingfu and Zhu Ruizhen, as well as the counselor to the embassy, F.V. Mochul'skii, were present during the conversation.

Ambassador of the USSR in the PRC

signature

(S. CHERVONENKO)

[Source: AVPRF f. 0100, op. 53, p. 8, d. 454, ll. 175-8; translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

9 April 1962

On April 5, in keeping with instructions from the Center, I turned to the CC CCP with a request to meet with Mao Zedong, or with a person to be named by him, in order to inform the Chinese side of the negotiations of com. A.A. Gromyko with [US Secretary of State] D[ean] Rusk on the German issue. After a silence lasting for four days, they replied to us that Deng Xiaoping had been instructed by the CC CCP to meet with the ambassador. I visited Deng Xiaoping in the CC CCP building. In connection with Deng Xiaoping's question about my trip to Moscow, I told him in detail about the work of the March Plenum of the CC CPSU. Deng Xiaoping then handed me a letter from the CC CCP of 7 April 1962, which is an answer to the CC CPSU letter of 22 February 1962.

Since these letters by the CC CCP are long, Deng Xiaoping stated that he would not read it. The basic content of the letter of the CC CCP to the CC CPSU, he continued, is that, no matter what, the CPSU and the CCP must close ranks and, in a spirit of unity, resolve their problems....

(S. CHERVONENKO)

Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC

Transcripts of the Conversations (Excerpts) With the General Secretary of the CC CCP

DENG XIAOPING

1 March 1962

[Source: AVP RF. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

Stenogram: Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, Moscow, 5-20 July 1963.

At the beginning of the meeting, Deng Xiaoping and CC CCP Secretariat candidate member Yang Shangkun were cautiously reserved, noticeably nervous, and evidently ready to receive a document of a different character.

[Deng said] "...we draw your attention to the fact that your letter talks about the necessity of improving relations with Albania. In the end, the larger party should take the initiative on such issues. Issues of prestige do not exist for a large party and a large country. In the past we had disagreements with other parties and we have experience in resolving them, as we told com. Khrushchev. As we told you earlier, we have experience in relations with Korea. The CPSU has much experience in relations with Poland. For this reason, given a desire to improve relations, of course, a resolution will be found."...

The meeting, which continued for about an hour and a half, took place in an even, calm tone. After the Chinese comrades had acquainted themselves with the contents of the CC CPSU's letter, their reserve (skovannost') disappeared; they acted more freely and cordially. In parting with us, Deng Xiaoping said: "Your letter calls for solidarity-and that is good."

8 July

Deng Xiaoping. By law, obviously, Com. [Comrade] Grishin should not object to our working?

Grishin. Today is a work day. I don't know what Liu Ningyi thinks.

Kang Sheng. Liu Ningyi is silent, which means that he agrees.

Deng Xiaoping. Well as for today, perhaps I should speak?

Suslov. Please, [go ahead]...

Speech by the CCP delegation head Com. Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping. First of all, I want to announce that our delegation at the request of the CC of our party came to this meeting in Moscow of representatives of the CCP and USSR with the sincere intention of removing discord and strengthening unity...

...It can be said with all candor that a whole series of disagreements of a fundamental character which exist today in the international communist movement, started at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

In the past we never spoke about this openly, because we were taking into account the situation you were in. We only mentioned that the disagreements which have arisen in the past few years in the international Communist movement were provoked by the violation of the Declaration of 1957 by comrades from several fraternal parties... We have always considered and still consider that the 20th Congress of the CPSU put forward positions on the issues of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition which went against Marxism-Leninism. Especially serious are two issues: the issue of the so called "peaceful transition" and the issue of the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin under the pretext of the so called "struggle with the cult of personality"...

Here I want just briefly to say the following: a criticism of some errors by Stalin is necessary; taking off the lid, so to speak, and ending superstition is a good thing. However this criticism must be correct both from the point of view of principles and from the point of view of methods.

Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the facts demonstrate that the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin is a serious step undertaken by the leading comrades from the CPSU with the aim of laying out the path to the revision of Marxism-Leninism on a whole series of issues... After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, as a consequence of the so-called struggle against the cult of personality and the full, groundless denunciation of Stalin, the wave of an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign was provoked around the whole world...

The most prominent events which took place in this period were the events in Poland and Hungary.

We have always considered and still consider that in resolving the issues connected with the events in Poland, the CPSU took a position of great-power chauvinism, trying to exert pressure on Polish comrades and to subordinate them to itself by means of coercion and even tried to resort to military force. We consider that such a method is not only evidence of great-power chauvinism in relation to fraternal countries and to fraternal parties, but also evidence of adventurism.

Following this, the counterrevolutionary mutiny in Hungary took place. The Hungarian events by their character differ from the events in Poland. In resolving the issues associated with the events in Poland, which were issues of an internal order [vnutrennego poriadka], between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, the comrades in the CPSU resorted to coercive methods, even trying to resort to military force.

And what position did the CPSU take in regard to the counterrevolutionary revolt in Hungary? The leadership of the CPSU at one time tried to leave socialist Hungary to the mercy of fate. You know that at that time we spoke out against your position on the matter. Such a position was practically tantamount to capitulation. The course and details of these two events are well known to you and to us. I do not want to dwell on them greatly... After the

20th Congress of the CPSU, beginning in 1956, at meetings of an internal sort [vnutrennego poryadka], the leading comrades of our party criticized your errors in a moderate form more than once. In his statement comrade Suslov said that we kept quiet for 7 years. There are no grounds for [saying] that.

In fact, both on the issue of Stalin and on the issue of the form of transition, that is peaceful transition, the leaders of the CCP presented their views more than once to the leaders of the CPSU. And these views are well known to you.

Back in April 1956, Com. Mao Zedong stated our opinion on the issue of Stalin in a discussion with Com. Mikoian and also after that, in a discussion with Ambassador Com. Iudin.

Com. Mao Zedong emphasized that it is incorrect to think that "Stalin's errors and contributions are divided into equal halves;" "whatever happened, all the same Stalin's contributions are greater than his errors. One must evaluate it as follows, that his contributions make up 70 percent, and his mistakes30 percent. It is necessary to make a concrete analysis and to give an all-around [vsestoronnaya] assessment."... In October 1956, Com. Zhou Enlai also stated our views about Stalin in a discussion with Com. Ponamarev, who was then a member of the CPSU delegation present at the eighth Congress of our [CCP] party. In discussion with Com. Ponomarev, Com. Zhou Enlai criticized the mistakes by comrades from the CPSU: first, "no preliminary consultation was carried out with fraternal parties"; secondly, "an all-around historical analysis was completely lacking" in relation to Stalin; thirdly, the leading comrades from the CPSU “lacked selfcriticism". These are the three points which Com. Zhou Enlai talked about.

On 23 October 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again talked with Com. Iudin about the issue of Stalin. Com. Mao Zedong then said that it was necessary to criticize Stalin, but that in relation to critical methods we hold to another opinion, and also have a different opinion about some other issues. Com. Mao Zedong also said that you had completely renounced such a sword as Stalin, and had thrown away the sword. As a result, enemies had seized it in order to kill us. That is the same as if, having picked up a stone, one were to throw it on one's own feet [podniav kamen' brosit' ego sebe na nogi].

On 30 November 1956, Com. Mao Zedong again received Com. Iudin and in a conversation with him said that the basic course and line in the period of Stalin's leadership was correct and that one must not treat one's comrade like an enemy.

On 18 January 1957 in Moscow, at the fifth discussion with the government delegation of the Soviet Union, Com. Zhou Enlai touched on the events in Hungary, noting that the counter-revolutionary revolt in Hungary was connected, on the one hand, with some mistakes committed by Stalin when resolving issues of mutual relations between fraternal parties and fraternal countries, and, on the other