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a) Regarding missile forces.

The missile forces that form the backbone for the defense of the Soviet Union and the island of Cuba, must be prepared, upon signal from Moscow (po signalu iz Moskvy), to deal a nuclear missile strike to the most important targets [ob'ekty] in the United States of America (list of targets included in attachment #1) [Ed. Note: This attachment has yet to be located.]....

d) Regarding the Naval Fleet

The Naval Fleet Group must not allow ships and transport vessels of the enemy to approach the island of Cuba and carry out naval landings on the coast. They must be prepared to blockade from the sea the US naval base in Guantanamo and provide cover for their transport ships along lines of communication in close proximity to the island.

Nuclear missile-equipped submarines should be prepared to launch, upon signal from Moscow, a nuclear missile strike on the most important coastal targets in the USA (list of targets provided in attachment #1).

The main forces of the fleet should be based in the region around Havana and in ports to the west of Havana. One divisional brigade of high-speed cruisers should be located around Banes.

6. The operational uses of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba should be formulated by 01 November 1962. [Ed. Note: 1 November is written in a different hand from the rest of the document.] Attachments:

1. List of targets for missile forces and nuclear missile submarines for working out flight paths-attached separately.

2. List of the battle composition of the Soviet Military Group in Cuba on 3 pages, r[ecord] r/t #154

3. List of launching mechanisms, missiles and nuclear warheads possessed by the Military Group, on 2 pages, r[ecord] r/t #164.

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Zhou Enlai Explains China's Decision to Explode the Second Atomic Bomb

Introduction and Translation by Qiang Zhai

On 16 October 1964, China successfully detonated its first atomic bomb, an underground explosion at the Lop Nur test facility. Seven months later on 14 May 1965, Beijing succeeded in testing its second atomic bomb, this one an aerial drop. On May 21, Zhou Enlai made a speech at a war-planning meeting of the Central Military Commission, explaining the party's decision for the explosion of the second bomb. Zhou's remarks are notable for two things: first they highlight Mao Zedong's role in setting the general time frame for the test; second, they demonstrate that Chinese leaders fully considered the pros and cons of the possible effects of the explosion on international opinion, especially in the Third World, and believed that they could persuade world opinion to support China's action.

Zhou's speech was published in Dangde wenxian (Party Documents), No. 3, 1994. Translation excerpts follow.

Zhou Enlai's Speech at the War-Planning Meeting of the Central Military Commission, 21 May 1965

The current international situation-particularly the national, democratic, and revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—is a developing one. Take a look at Asia, Africa, and Latin America. There are incidents everywhere and all of them are the direct results. of American imperialism. The United States has created all these problems, causing many of its allies and friends to break away. [Ed. Note: Within the past month, the United States had sent Marines to suppress what it called a communist revolt in the Dominican Republic, arousing heavy international criticism.] The atomic test we have just conducted is the best proof. We decided this year to explode the second atomic bomb. Because the bomb would be air dropped, we decided to carry out the test between April and May. The test could not be done too early. It had to be done between April and May. We chose May. Are we going to encounter more opposition this time than we did last year? Just the opposite. It was a test for us when we set the time during the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. The Chairman [Mao Zedong] made the decision to press ahead with the explosion in anticipation of condemnation. Of course, the specific date of explosion was left for the Special Committee2 to decide. The front command made decisions on specifics, and in the rear I discussed [broader issues] with Luo Ruiqing.3 Politically, this was the moment when the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference met in Ghana.

There is a historical lesson, that is, at the time of the

First Non-Aligned Meeting in Yugoslavia in [autumn] 1961, Khrushchev wanted to test a big atomic bomb in order to show off, to intimidate and frighten people, but he triggered opposition from all over the world. Delegations were sent to the United States and the Soviet Union to appeal for a suspension of the test. Last year, before we exploded our bomb, India asked China not to conduct the nuclear test. But India obtained only two votes and its proposal did not pass. We went ahead with our explosion. Last year, we selected the time of explosion after the Second Non-Aligned Meeting. This time we chose to test before the Second Afro-Asian Conference. We did consider the issue of possible reactions when the AfroAsian Solidarity Meeting was in session. Maybe the situation has changed this time. At the Afro-Asian Solidarity Meeting, we met a lot of people, who in public expressed regret and advised us to stop testing. But in private they congratulated us. This shows that nationalism has two sides. On the one hand, because nationalist countries oppose imperialism, they support us. Our possession of the nuclear bomb has not only encouraged them but also strengthened their power. On the other hand, pressured by imperialism, induced by the Soviet Union, and influenced by the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty [signed by the United States and Soviet Union in the summer of 1963], they expressed regret. Wherever we went, we came across such mixed feelings. But this time we did not expect that so many people would hail our test. This year, only the United States showed little reaction because it wanted to downplay our role. Although it did not respond in public, it was actually worried at heart. This time, the people of the world, including the Japanese people, hailed and congratulated us, and expressed happiness.

I have also conducted a survey: when we were carrying out the nuclear test, two entertainment groups from Japan were in China. Because Japan has been attacked by two atomic bombs and has suffered, it opposes nuclear tests. The members of the two groups were middle-of-the-roaders. Some were to the left of the middle and others to the right of the middle. I had two conversations with them. I said: "When we possess atomic bombs, it means that the Japanese also possess them. We all oppose nuclear bombs. You have been hit by two atomic bombs and you have made contributions to the whole world, because everybody in the world now opposes nuclear war. Without the sacrifice caused by those two atomic bombs, how could international attention be focused? Without the harm done by poisonous gas, how could people come to oppose gas warfare? There is always a price to pay." Chairman Mao has also said that when a heavy price had been paid, people would not dare to use such weapons again. At the moment, there is the atomic bomb [in China's possession]. In the future, there will be the hydrogen bomb as well as long-distance missiles. The United States may employ tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam. It may use such weapons against China later. As

Chinese we must be confident that no matter how many people will die in a nuclear war in the future, we will win world peace eventually. Just as Chairman Mao has pointed out, we will win peace, and win the victory of antiimperialist war. If the United States attacks us, it will mean the coming of the time to eliminate nuclear war once and for all. That is because, when the United States drops a nuclear bomb on us and causes damage to part of China, it will alienate the people of the world, including the American people. If the Soviet Union refuses to intervene in such a situation, then it is taking the first step in the direction of sitting on the top of a mountain to watch tigers fight. In that case, the American people need to consider the consequences and so do the Japanese people. When the atomic bomb is shot over their heads toward us, the Japanese will suffer more damages than we will. Japan has a population of one hundred million concentrated on several large islands. It has many industries. At present, Japan is doing the opposite of what we are doing: instead of building an underground railway, it is constructing a railway above ground from Tokyo to Osaka. We can not do that. If we do that, we do not know how much damage we will incur when nuclear war comes. Therefore, we must be prepared to pay a price to win international sympathy and support. As to those visitors from the Japanese entertainment world, most of them are afraid of war. After my talks with them, they felt that they had confidence when they stood beside China. One of them revealed his true feeling. He said that "I was unhappy when I first learned about your test. After hearing your talk, I have come to believe that we should hail your test. We should stand together." This shows that people's minds can be changed. From this perspective, our current prestige in the world has risen.

At present, the Soviet Union is also deliberately underestimating us. In reality, it is afraid of us. At the moment, the United States is afraid of us and so is Britain. France also feels that it is lagging behind. It realizes that it has not developed the manufacturing technique that we have now. Although France has been engaged in its nuclear program for many years, it has only tested a few devices and it can not air drop the atomic bomb. Its uranium-235 factory will not be put into production until 1969. For this reason, the United States has decided to fight a large war and the Soviet Union will participate. But it will take many steps to reach that point. It is not a simple matter. We should be prepared for that eventuality. The more we are prepared, the more the enemy wants to

retreat.

Qiang ZHAI teaches history at Auburn University at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994).

1 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), is by far the best source available in English on the history of China's nuclear weapons program, but its treatment of the explosion of China's second atomic bomb is quite brief (see p. 208).

Since the publication of Lewis and Xue's book, a number of fresh Chinese sources have emerged, adding new detail to the knowledge of the role of such leading figures as Mao, Zhou Enlai, Nie Rongzhen, and Song Renqiong in the development of China's nuclear weapons. The most notable among them are: Wei Wei, chief comp., Nie Rongzhen zhuan (Biography of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1994) and Song Renqiong, Song Renqiong huiyilu (Memoirs of Song Renqiong) (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1994). Based on party and military archives, Wei's book is the official biography of Marshal Nie Rongzhen and part of the Contemporary China series. Song Renqiong served as head of the ministry in charge of nuclear industry between 1956-1960. Among other revelations in his memoirs, Song described the rise and fall of Sino-Soviet nuclear cooperation between 1956-1959. He discussed in detail his participation in Nie Rongzhen's 1957 trip to Moscow, where the two countries signed the New Defense Technical Accord, in which the Soviet Union agreed to provide China with the prototype atomic bomb, missiles, and related data.

This refers to the Fifteen-Member Special Committee, headed by Zhou Enlai, which was created in November 1962 to take charge of China's nuclear program.

3 Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army.

The Conference on Poland, 1980-1982: Internal Crisis,

International Dimensions

Raymond L. Garthoff

[Co-editor's Note: The following essay by Raymond Garthoff is a first report on the conference "Poland 1980/ 81: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions,” held in Jachranka/Warsaw on 7-10 November 1997, opening what promises to be a controversial debate on the results of the meeting. Co-organized by the National Security Archive, the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and CWIHP, the conference produced a great amount of new documentation and testimony by participants from all sides of the conflict. The conference was covered in New York Times articles (by Jane Perlez and Tina Rosenberg), the Los Angeles Times (by Malcolm Byrne and Pawel Machcewicz), and the international press. Future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin and CWIHP Working Papers, as well as a comprehensive National Security Archive Document Reader will feature further new evidence and analyses. The conference was made possible by financial support from the Open Society Institute (New York), John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Chicago), the Smith Richardson Foundation (Westport, CT), the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Washington, D.C.), the Committee for Scientific Research (Warsaw), as well as the Batory Foundation (Warsaw). CWIHP is pleased to note the efforts of major contributors to the success of both conferences: Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive), Jim Hershberg (George Washington University), Andrzej Paczkowski, Pawel Machcewicz, Dariusz Stola and Ryszard Zelichowski (all at the Institute of Political Studies/PAS). For further information on the conference, contact Malcolm Byrne at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. (Fax: 202-994-7005; Tel: 202-994-7000; email: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu) or Andrzej Paczkowski at the Institute of Political Studies in Warsaw (Fax: 48-22252146, email: POLITIC@ISPPAN.WAW.PL).]

The fourth in the series of international conferences on Eastern European "flashpoints" in the Cold War, dealing with the crisis in Poland in 1980-82, was held in Jachranka, Poland, on 8-10 November 1997. The conference was co-sponsored by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. As in the earlier conferences in this series, new documentary sources were made available, mostly before the conference began, and the conference included both participants in the crisis and the scholars studying it. Most of the new archival materials in this instance were Polish, but some very useful new documents were found in other Eastern European and Moscow archives. A number of

newly declassified U.S. documents were also made available. Partly owing to the fact that this was historically the most recent of the crises examined, a large number of important participants in the events were present, especially among the Polish leaders and Solidarity protagonists (not, however, including Lech Walesa, who had been expected). General Wojciech Jaruzelski, who as party First Secretary and Prime Minister promulgated martial law in December 1981, his colleague and predecessor Stanislaw Kania, who held back from martial law in 198081, and their colleague and in 1982 Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, were among the Polish leaders. Zbigniew Bujak, Karol Modzelewski, Wieslaw Chrzanowski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and others represented Solidarity.

American policy advisors present included Zbigniew Brzezinski, a key figure in 1980 as President Carter's National Security Advisor and Richard Pipes, as the senior Soviet and East European affairs NSC staff officer in President Reagan's administration in 1981. (Secretary Alexander Haig was unable to attend, and no U.S. representatives from the Departments of State and Defense or CIA were present.) From Moscow, Marshal Viktor Kulikov and General of the Army Anatolii Gribkov, in 1980-82 respectively the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact, were joined by Georgii Shakhnazarov and Valerii Musatov, well-placed senior Central Committee experts on relations with Eastern Europe in 1980-82, with Shakhnazarov having served as secretary of a key Politburo subcommittee on Poland chaired by Mikhail Suslov. These, and others (for example Jan Nowak-Jezioranski, the influential long-time head of Radio Free Europe's Polish Service), held forth in very interesting exchanges.

Marshal Kulikov, resplendent in the beribboned regalia of a Marshal of the Soviet Union, and with a bevy of aides, was the only participant to come in uniform. General Jaruzelski wore the dark glasses that are his hallmark (not an affectation, but needed ever since his eyes were weakened during his family's early wartime exile in Siberia). Initially nervous, and high strung, he clearly was still reliving the experience of 1980-82 more than any of the others (and was constantly attended by bodyguards). Kania, often short-changed as a weak leader in 1980-82, was unexpectedly impressive, and an articulate spokesman. Some of the Solidarity leaders, in particular Bujak who was the only one to escape internment in 1981 and remain underground, are still young men even fifteen years later, in contrast to the fading generation of the leaders of that time.

The conference began by examining the internal Polish situation, and as was to be expected that part of the program could have been titled "Poles apart." One of the key questions directly and indirectly addressed, but never fully answered, was whether there had been sufficient common ground for a compromise between the government and the opposition that could have averted martial

law, had there been better reciprocal understanding of the minimum requirements of the sides. With a realistic evaluation of the perceptions of the two sides at that time, I believe there was not. In the concluding session, there was however a striking comment by Rakowski, who had negotiated with Solidarity leaders on behalf of the regime in 1981, that at that time he had never received signs of Solidarity thinking on a possible compromise modus vivendi that had just been expressed at the conference by former Solidarity leader Modzelewski. On the other hand, another Solidarity spokesman, Wieslaw Chrzanowski, admitted that some in Solidarity had sought to provoke repression so as activate popular participation in a showdown. As was acknowledged, one problem was that Solidarity was a diffuse movement with differing views. An important related question was whether Soviet hegemonic influence permitted any alternative to martial law, other than Soviet military intervention. Some, perhaps most, participants regarded martial law as a serious setback, as in some respects it undoubtedly was. Yet Jaruzelski had a point in reminding the conference that martial law not only brought a virtually bloodless end to the immediate crisis, it was also not the end of the road. Only eight years later, the same Polish leaders and the same leaders of Solidarity agreed on a peaceful evolutionary transfer of power with revolutionary consequences. One of the Solidarity leaders suggested there had been eight years wasted, but it was far from clear that the events of 1989 could have taken place in 1981—not only in terms of the internal political dynamics in Poland, but also in terms of critical differences in Moscow between Brezhnev's encrusted policies and those born of Gorbachev's new thinking, and in East-West relations. Much of the discussion, not least by Jaruzelski himself, was directed to the question of whether General Jaruzelski was a traitor to Poland doing Moscow's bidding in imposing martial law and suppressing Solidarity, or a hero in taking the only action that could have saved Poland from the burden (and possible internal explosion) following Soviet military intervention and occupation. Such extreme characterizations are hardly appropriate for historical analysis but the matter is not in Poland merely a matter of historical curiosity. (In fact, having been in effect tried on a treason charge by a special commission of the Polish parliament and found not guilty last year, Jaruzelski faces a possible retrial on reformulated charges by the recently elected parliament, in which the Socialists have lost the majority they held when the first commission reached its verdict.)

The conference could not of course reconcile divergent Polish views on such questions (and possibly not even differing views among non-Polish historians), but much of the conference deliberation turned and returned to such questions as whether the Soviet leaders planned (or even might have decided) to intervene, justifying Jaruzelski's position, or whether Moscow had decided not to intervene and Jaruzelski could have avoided martial law.

Marshal Kulikov adamantly contended that the Soviet Union at no time had plans to intervene militarily. When confronted with evidence to the contrary, he retreated into distinctions between full and final plans for a specific action, and mere outline plans. The distinction may be valid, but he did not explain evidence of concrete plans for use of East German and Czech forces (or the published account of one Russian general at the time commanding a division earmarked for intervention). He seemed to protest too much, and finally General Jaruzelski in exasperation noted that only since the question of entry of Poland into NATO had been posed in 1993 did Russian officials argue that Moscow had never intended to intervene in Poland in 1980-82 (thus presumably seeking to deny Polish justification of a requirement for security against a possible Russian threat). Again, though the conference could not establish the full picture, the preponderance of evidence supports a conclusion that the Soviet leaders were planning (and certainly had fully prepared for) an intervention on 8 December 1980, but decided not to do so only on December 5 after a long discussion with Kania and Jaruzelski in which the latter argued that they could deal with the situation. The Soviet leaders may also have been influenced by a Hot Line message from President Carter on June 3 warning that the U.S.-Soviet "relationship" would be "most adversely affected if force was used" (while also reasserting that it was "the firm intention of the United States not to exploit the events in Poland, nor to threaten legitimate Soviet security interests in that region"). Brzezinski, in particular, argued that this warning was a crucial element, along with the pleas of the Polish leaders. No doubt it did play some part, but there is no available evidence as to whether it was a contributory re-enforcing element or a decisive factor in the thinking of the Soviet leaders.

Whether there was a specific plan to intervene in December 1981, before Jaruzelski made his decision to impose martial law, is less clear. Notes of a Politburo meeting on 10 December 1981 (two days before Jaruzelski's decision) show a Politburo consensus at that time not to intervene with Soviet troops. Whether that was known to Jaruzelski is not certain, but in any event it would be surprising if he had not believed that the Soviet leaders might intervene at some point, and he evidently decided for that reason (and perhaps also others) to act. He vividly recalled personally seeing Brezhnev embrace and reassure Alexander Dubcek at Bratislava in the summer of 1968, not long before the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Whether the Soviet leaders ever went beyond preparing for contingent intervention, they clearly did use the capability for intervention to place pressure on the Polish leaders to suppress Solidarity. Kulikov and Gribkov acknowledged that the partially mobilized forces in military "exercises" ending in late 1980 were ordered by Moscow to be kept going for another three months or so, through the next crisis in March 1981, for political reasons.

In sum, it is clear that there was a strong preference, if not determination, by the Politburo not to resort to direct Soviet military intervention. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests at least a short-lived reluctant decision to act in early December 1980, soon set aside. There were probably also contingent preparations for possible intervention in March and November-December 1981, although these military preparations in 1980 and 1981 were also calculated to exert pressure on the Polish leaders. In an extreme situation, such as an outbreak of civil war in Poland or threat of US-NATO intervention, most observers believe Soviet military forces would almost certainly have been sent in. But as in so many cases, this must remain a judgment rather than a certainty, and will probably remain so even after the archives are fully opened.

There were also disputed questions as to whether General Jaruzelski had agreed in late 1980 to open Polish borders to Soviet troops, a contention Jaruzelski vehemently denied. East German documents showed that Polish officers had assisted in route reconnaissance in Poland for German officers who would have led an intervention contingent. Similarly, there was an issue as to whether Polish leaders had encouraged the Soviet Union to keep their military exercises going in early 1981 in order to justify resort to martial law. There were indications to that effect, yet it is clear that Kania and Jaruzelski held back from imposing martial law on those occasions despite Soviet pressure to do so. In short, uncertainties on a number of matters remain.

This conference, as the earlier ones in the series, brought out that the other communist regimes of the Warsaw Pact were also parties to these crises and more generally to Soviet bloc politics. Although the Soviet Union was the hegemonic power in the bloc and made the final decisions, its leaders also were influenced by considerations as to the impact of developments, in this case in Poland, on the other Eastern European bloc countries, and to some extent by the views of their leaders. As in 1968, the leaders of East Germany and Bulgaria, and in 1980-81 of Czechoslovakia as well, urged Soviet intervention in Poland before the virus of Solidarity would spread to their countries. They were quite prepared to participate. In this case their views were not adopted, but this does not mean that the Soviet leaders in Moscow did not weigh considerations of the impact of events in Poland on the other bloc countries seriously. Indeed, in a very different way, the evident brittle weakness of these Communist regimes later played a role in a more enlightened Moscow leadership's conclusion that the whole edifice of the bloc and internally of its members required restructuring.

These questions of Soviet, Warsaw Pact, and U.S., decisions and influences on the situation in Poland, interacting with the decisions of the Polish leaders, were the second major focus of the conference deliberations.

In November-December 1981, unlike December 1980, the United States did not issue a clear warning, despite the

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