fact that an American spy, Polish General Staff Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, had delivered the full plans for martial law, except for the date. Moreover, on November 7 Kuklinski was spirited out of the country, and the Polish and Soviet governments became aware that the United States knew all about those plans. (Kuklinski had also provided CIA with the most explicit and full information on the planned Soviet intervention in December 1980.) Yet neither the Soviet nor Polish leaders were warned, and public American warnings that the Polish crisis must be solved by the Poles themselves, intended to discourage possible direct Soviet intervention, could by December 1981 be seen almost as an invitation for Polish resolution of the crisis by martial law. Kuklinski himself had intended that the United States at least warn Solidarity, and some Solidarity representatives at the conference were still asking why the United States had not done so. The answer appears to have been a desire not to trigger bloodshed, although there were no U.S. documents or authorities to confirm that assumption or clarify the U.S. inaction. Kuklinski himself, living incognito in the United States, although recently pardoned by the present Polish government (rescinding fully a death penalty earlier imposed by a trial in absentia) and invited to the conference, feared to attend. Three of his hundreds of messages to CIA, the only three declassified by CIA for Kuklinski's use in successfully appealing his earlier conviction, were however made available.

Shakhnazarov several times posed the question of the extent of a U.S. role in inspiring and supporting Solidarity. There was no clear answer, but the consensus seemed to be that Solidarity arose and acted on its own initiative, that Western sources including private American entities such as the AFL-CIO and later the quasi-governmental National Endowment for Democracy provided valuable support in communications and printing supplies. Brzezinski and Pipes affirmed that direct covert U.S. government assistance was given only after martial law was imposed. (Even then, one Solidarity leader remarked, a requested computer was denied because its dispatch would have contravened the U.S. embargo imposed as a sanction!)

In a broader sense, however, a much more important U.S. role was ascribed by two rather disparate groups at the table. Marshal Kulikov and General Gribkov blamed the United States government for having carried out a master plan for breaking up the Warsaw Pact (and the Soviet Union), Gribkov even referring back to Churchill's proposed wartime second front in the Balkans to head off a Soviet presence in central Europe! Kulikov brandished a paperback Russian translation of Peter Schweizer's book Victory, ascribing victory in the Cold War to Reagan's early militancy including covert operations in Poland. This charge was, to many unexpectedly, supported by Richard Pipes and General William Odom, Brzezinski's NSC military aide in 1980 and the chief of U.S. Army Intelligence in 1981-82. (Brzezinski was no longer present at this session of the conference, but had earlier ascribed a

major role to the Carter administration's policy of seeking the "delegitimization" of the Soviet Union and bloc.)

Some other American participants disagreed with this view that the United States had played the main role in bringing about the fundamental changes in the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and none of the Poles even addressed the question. Much as such changes may have been consistent with U.S. aims and desires, and were welcomed, they were not caused by U.S. policies or actions. Rather, these historical (and historic) changes in the 1980s occurred because of objective internal necessities, and subjective actions by Soviet and Eastern European leaders and peoples.

The ultimate transformation of Eastern Europe climaxing in 1989 deserves, however, to be the subject of another conference-and such a conference is planned.

1 Co-ed.: Previous "flashpoints" conferences included a conference on the "Prague Spring," held in Prague in 1994 (cosponsored by the National Security Archive, CWIHP and the Institute for Contemporary History of the Czech Academy of Sciences); the conference "Hungary and the World, 1956,” held in Budapest in September 1996 (co-sponsored by the National Security Archive, CWIHP, and the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, Budapest) and the conference "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," held in Potsdam (Germany) in November 1996 (co-sponsored by the National Security Archive and Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam). For further information see CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996/97), 355-357; and Malcolm Byrne, "Cold War 'Flashpoints,"" CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 14. A final conference on "The End of the Cold War" is being planned.

Raymond Garthoff is a retired senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is the author of many books on the Cold War.

"You, Mr. Vance, are a new person."

Talks Between A.A.Gromyko and C[yrus] Vance 28-30 March 1977

[ Ed. Note: In Bulletin 5, pp. 144-154, 160, CWIHP published a selection of declassified documents generated by the multi-year Carter-Brezhnev Project on US-Soviet Relations and the Collapse of Détente. Supported by a multinational consortium of research institutions and organizations, the Carter-Brezhnev Project was spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Institute of International Studies at Brown University. The documents in Bulletin 5 brought the reader up to US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's departure for Moscow, but the fateful visit itself was not covered. At both ends of his stay, Vance met with CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev. Sandwiched in between were four meetings with veteran Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. The main topic of discussion was US President Jimmy Carter's "comprehensive" proposals for the SALT-2 Treaty, views that the Soviets saw as contravening the Vladivostok accords reached with US President Gerald Ford in 1974. The Soviet rejection of Carter's initiative was certainly the newsmaking centerpiece of the Vance visit. Other, more positive, discussions covered a wide range of topics, including the Vienna talks on arms limitations in Central Europe, the Middle East, non-proliferation, Cyprus, and others. Below is a brief sampler.]

28 March (17:30-20:00)

A.A. GROMYKO. [Opening the attack on the SALT-2 issue] How should we evaluate the current situation in this light? You, Mr. Vance, are a new person. But try to see the situation with our eyes. What conclusion should the Soviet side come to for itself on the basis of the experience which we have had so far with the new American administration, the conclusion that the next government of the USA which will replace the current one, will just as easily throw everything that we are able to agree upon now into the trash? If such is the case, one must ask where is the minimum of stability that should exist in the relations between our two countries?

29 March (11:00-13:00) GROMYKO. The situation in the Middle East has been a subject of discussion between our countries, including on the highest level, for many years. We discussed this issue with President Johnson, with President Nixon, and with President Ford. We discussed it, although not in such a deep or detailed way, with the new Administration. However, there is [still] no solution to the problem, and the situation in the Middle East is extremely dangerous and fraught with the possibility of a new explosion. We are deeply convinced that you are mistaken if you believe that it is possible to buy peace in the Middle East by giving 200-300 million, even a billion dollars to some country.

C. VANCE. We don't believe that (My tak ne

schitaem).

GROMYKO. Good. That is encouraging. Consequently, it is necessary to seek political solutions. Does the USA consider that Israel is ready to recognize the right of the Palestinians to an independent nation-state? You understand that these issues are interconnected.

VANCE. I cannot speak for Israel, but I agree that this is the stumbling block (kamen' pretknoveniia). GROMYKO. I can say the same regarding the Palestinians. If Israel will recognize the rights of the Palestinians, they will recognize Israel's rights. The issue here is who will speak first, but we do not consider that an insoluble issue. This is why diplomacy exists.

29 March (16:30-19:45)

VANCE. I agree that cessation of the state of war is the most important issue. But normalization of relations can facilitate the preservation of peace.

GROMYKO. That does not contradict what I said. May we consider that we have here with you a common understanding?

VANCE. We have an understanding.
GROMYKO. Can't we say that our positions

coincide?

VANCE. We put a somewhat greater accent than you on normalization of relations as a means of maintaining peace.

GROMYKO. We stress the significance of achieving peace, not belittling the significance of normal relations between states. For example, in a state of normal relations with Israel, we would with satisfaction eat Israeli oranges. I have heard that they have good oranges.

30 March (11:00-14:00)

VANCE. I want now to touch on the issue of the radiation which the employees at our embassy in Moscow are subject to. I know that in the recent past its level has decreased, but it is still being observed, which, of course, provokes concern among our people. The full cessation of this radiation would be valued highly and positively by us.

GROMYKO. I must say quite frankly that I am pretty fed up with this issue. I cannot add anything to the response which has been given by us to the American side. Despite the fact that in the recent past some industrial enterprises have been moved out of Moscow, they are, unfortunately, still inside the city limits, including its central part.

Of course, I will keep in mind what you have said, but I must frankly state that in the USA you have lovers (liubiteli) of various contrived "issues." Without this, they simply get bored (Bez etogo im prosto skuchno zhit')....

Present at the negotiations were: for the Soviet sideComs. L.V. Smirnov, A.F. Dobrynin, G.M. Kornienko; for the American side-M[alcolm] Toon, P[aul] Warnke, A[rthur] Hartman, W. Highland.

[Source: TsKhSD f. 89, op. 76, d. 1, ll. 1-80. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

Petro Shelest served for many years in the upper levels of the Soviet hierarchy. From 1961 to 1975 he was a member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), and from 1964 to 1973 he was a full member of the CPSU Presidium/Politburo. He also served as First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UkrCP) from 1963 to 1972 and as Soviet first deputy prime minister in 1972 and 1973. Following the removal of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964, Shelest was a close ally of the new CPSU First Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. Later on, however, the two men had a fallingout, which culminated in Shelest's ouster from the leadership in April 1973. Shelest remained in a low-level economic post in Moscow until 1978, when he was forced to retire. He lived as a private pensioner in Moscow until his death in early 1996.

The publish

During his years in power, Shelest kept a meticulous, handwritten diary, which eventually came to thousands of pages. The diary is an invaluable source for those studying key events in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. An abridged edition was put out in Russian in 1995 by the German publisher "edition q" and the "Kvintessentsiya" publishing house in Moscow, but unfortunately the publishers omitted many crucial passages, including detailed remarks about the role of Ukrainian nationalism in Shelest's removal. ers also allowed Shelest to insert occasional post-hoc clarifications and reminiscences alongside his original diary entries. Through most of the book it is easy to distinguish between the original entries and Shelest's later comments, but in a few cases the two are not easily separated. It would have been much better if the publisher had typeset the diary in its original, unabridged form without supplementary material, and if Shelest's memoirs had then appeared separately. To prevent any confusion, researchers are well advised to consult the original diary, which is now stored along with the rest of Shelest's personal and official papers at the former Central Party Archive in Moscow.4

The diary, written mostly in Russian but interspersed with Ukrainian, covers both domestic and foreign developments. Of particular interest are the lengthy sections dealing with the Soviet-Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. Western scholars long ago surmised that Shelest played a key role during the 1968 crisis, and that he was a strong proponent of military intervention. Those judgments have been amply confirmed by the diary as well as by the newly released transcripts of CPSU Politburo meetings from 1968 and a vast quantity of other declassified materials in the Ukrainian and Russian archives (a selection of which

will be published along with my commentary in the next CWIHP Bulletin). During interviews in 1989 and the early 1990s, Shelest insisted that he had not favored military action in 1968, but his diary, the CPSU Politburo transcripts, and countless other items in the Ukrainian and Russian archives all belie this claim.3 The diary also sheds fascinating light on aspects of the 1968 crisis that had not previously been known from the many thousands of documents that have been declassified since 1990 in Moscow, Kyiv, Prague, and other former Warsaw Pact capitals. No serious study of the 1968 crisis will be able to neglect this remarkable source.

The four excerpts below will be introduced separately. The first excerpt highlights the concerns that Shelest had in 1968 about the political spillover from Czechoslovakia into Ukraine. The second, third, and fourth excerpts deal with the function that Shelest carried out on behalf of the CPSU Politburo as an intermediary with the pro-Soviet hardliners in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunisticka strana Ceskoslovenska, or KSC). That function, as shown below, was a vital factor in the emerging consensus in Moscow on the need to use military force.

EXCERPT No. 1

Shelest's Concerns About the Spill-Over Into Ukraine

Throughout the 1968 crisis Shelest and other Soviet leaders feared that events in Czechoslovakia were emboldening Ukrainian intellectuals and nationalist elements. Newly declassified materials, including Shelest's diary, the CPSU Politburo transcripts, and a plethora of other documents from the Ukrainian and Russian archives (a selection of which will be published in the next CWIHP Bulletin), bear out Grey Hodnett's and Peter Potichnyj's earlier conclusion that "there was an important linkage between the situation in the Ukraine and the developments in Czechoslovkia."4 The new sources also confirm that Soviet leaders themselves, especially Shelest, were fully aware of this linkage. On numerous occasions, Shelest informed Brezhnev that Ukrainian intellectuals and students were being affected by "the stepped-up activity of anti-socialist, opportunist, and anarchist elements" in Czechoslovakia.5 He warned that the media in Czechoslovakia were "adopting rightist, antisocialist positions" to "weaken the role of the [Communist] Party," causing "disarray" among residents of western

Ukraine. Heeding Shelest's complaints, Brezhnev raised the matter with the KSC leadership during a meeting in Moscow in early May 1968:

Comrades, you know about the CPSU's principled position based on full respect for the independence of all fraternal Parties and countries. But not every question is a purely internal matter. . . . After all, your newspapers are read also by Soviet citizens, your radio is listened to in our country as well, which means that all such propaganda affects us, too.6

Shelest, for his part, complained in much stronger terms to the Czechoslovak authorities. During bilateral negotiations with the KSC Presidium at Cierna nad Tisou in late July, he explained why the "alarming developments" in Czechoslovakia were a matter of "common concern" to the Soviet Union:

Soviet Ukraine is an integral and inseparable part of the USSR. We have a population of 46 million, including many nationalities, of whom nearly 2.5 million are Communists. We and you, our Czech friends, are direct neighbors, and, as is customary with neighbors, we know a lot about each other that is not known or even noticed by those further away. . . . We see and hear your radio and television broadcasts, and read your newspapers. Hence, for us in Ukraine it is all the more insulting what is going on in Czechoslovakia, a state supposedly friendly to us.7

Shelest accused the KSC leaders of approving "the publication of counterrevolutionary tracts which are then sent through special channels into Ukraine."8 In the weeks after the Cierna negotiations, Shelest continued to warn that the "counterrevolutionary and revanchist" influences in Czechoslovakia would increasingly filter into Ukraine unless "decisive measures" were taken.

This first set of excerpts from Shelest's diary provides further evidence of the Ukrainian leader's belief that events in Czechoslovakia were "causing unsavory phenomena here in Ukraine as well." The situation, he wrote, was especially bad in Ukraine's "western provinces, where the inhabitants receive information directly from their neighbors across the border" and "watch both Czechoslovak and Western radio and television." Shelest also noted that vigorous steps had to be taken to curb the "distribution of political and nationalist leaflets" and to prevent the circulation within Ukraine of newspapers published by the Ukrainian community in Czechoslovakia. He repeatedly warned his colleages on the CPSU Politburo about these matters, as is evident not only from the Politburo transcripts but from the documents in the next issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.

Because of Shelest's standing as a full member of the CPSU Politburo, his close ties with Brezhnev, his role as the leader of a key Soviet republic bordering on Czecho

slovakia, and his participation in high-level bilateral and multilateral talks with KSC officials, his views about a growing spill-over from the Prague Spring were bound to have a major effect on Soviet decision-making.

26 March: .. I had a lengthy conversation with the first secretary of the UkrCP Kyiv municipal committee, A. P. Bovin. He reported to me that political and nationalist leaflets were being widely disseminated at T. G. Shevchenko State University in Kyiv and at the agricultural academy. In these two institutions of higher education, roughly 600 leaflets had been discovered. Measures are being devised to prevent the distribution of such leaflets.

An unhealthy situation has arisen in the Kyiv branch of the Union of Writers with respect to organizational, creative, and political matters. We also considered this matter and proposed measures to improve the [party's] work among

11 April: .... I arranged a conversation in my office with the UkrCP CC Secretary responsible for ideological matters, Ovcharenko, and the head of the UkrCP CC department for academia and higher educational institutions, Tsvetkov. 10 We reviewed matters connected with the work of the republic's scholarly establishments and higher educational institutions. We concluded that we needed to conduct further study of the state of instruction and how to improve the lectures in economics and humanities departments and faculties in the republic's universities and colleges. We must give special attention to the state of affairs in T. G. Shevchenko State University in Kyiv. Here, as before, there is great confusion and political disorientation [induced by the events in Czechoslovakia]. All sorts of leaflets and pamphlets are being distributed. All of this is being done not by students or instructors, but by outsiders, since there is free access to the university. A decision was reached to restrict free attendance at the university's building.

21 May: Today I had a phone conversation with L. Brezhnev; we considered all aspects of my forthcoming meeting and negotiations with A. Koscelansky11 and V. Bil’ak about the state of affairs in the KSC and in the country as a whole, as well as about the political situation.12 Unsavory phenomena are beginning to show up in Ukraine as wellwe've found pamphlets intended for the leadership of the country. Brezhnev requested that I give him a detailed report

after my meeting with the Czechoslovak comrades.

14 June: I informed Brezhnev about my impressions of popular sentiments in the western oblasts, which I was visiting yesterday evening.13 In those oblasts the population has a much more vivid sense of the alarming events in Czechoslovakia, and is receiving information through direct contacts with inhabitants of regions along the border. For this reason, they can more urgently and objectively assess all the events in Czechoslovakia.

24 July: The chairmen of the party's Volyns'ka and Chernihiv oblast committees gave reports at the UkrCP CC Secretariat: "The situation in these oblasts regarding social science instruction and training of university and high school students is deplorable, especially in rural areas. The situation with radio, television, and telephones is very bad. Extremely urgent measures must be adopted to set matters straight. We have received no answer to the letters and requests we have sent about these matters to the CPSU CC and to the Council of Ministers and Gosplan in the hope of getting suitable technical equipment for the republic. In these oblasts the [official] radio and television practically don't work at all. At the same time, the residents are listening to Western radio stations and watching Western television.”14 1 instructed the oblast party chairmen to write, for the third time, a letter to the center requesting help.

21 August: Some young person called the switchboard of the UkrCP CC, identified himself as a student of Kyiv University, and said: “Let Cde. Shelest know that we don't attach any truth to the items published in Pravda about Czechoslovakia. We, the youth of the country, will do the same thing here that young people in Czechoslovakia were doing. We regret that our troops have invaded Czechoslovakia. "15

29-30 August: I spoke with the oblast committee secretaries about current economic, administrative, and political matters. Overall, according to the information available to the secretaries, the population's reaction to the communique from our negotiations with the Czechs in Moscow was positive. 16 However, in two parts of Kyiv and in numerous other cities in the republic, leaflets and graffiti turned up in public places denouncing the CPSU and Brezhnev, calling for freedom of speech, expressing support for the Czechoslovak events, and condemning our military intervention in Czechoslovakia's affairs and our political pressure on the new elements in Czechoslovakia.17 Measures have been taken to track down and bring to account the authors of the leaflets and graffiti.

There have been instances, especially in Crimea, Odessa, and Voroshylovhrad, when some members of the party as well as non-party members have expressed their disagreement with our actions in Czechoslovakia. All of this must make us very wary.

EXCERPT No. 2

Shelest's First Meeting with Vasil Bil’ak

On 6 May 1968 the CPSU Politburo, at Brezhnev's behest, authorized Shelest to begin serving as a clandestine liaison with the "healthy forces" (i.e., pro-Soviet hardliners) in Czechoslovakia headed by the Slovak Communist Party leader, Vasil Bil'ak. 18 This action, coming two days after Brezhnev and his colleagues had denounced the Prague Spring during bilateral negotiations in Moscow with senior KSC officials, reflected Brezhnev's growing belief that the existing leadership in Czechoslovakia might be unwilling to fulfill Soviet demands. Although Brezhnev maintained close contacts with the KSC First Secretary, Alexander Dubcek, until mid-August (just a few days before the invasion), the establishment of backchannel contacts with Bil'ak facilitated Soviet planning for an invasion and the installation of a new regime.

This excerpt from Shelest's diary describes his first meeting with Bil'ak. The initiative for the discussion had come from Bil'ak in mid-April, but Shelest had not wanted to set up a meeting without Brezhnev's approval. When Shelest spoke about the matter with Brezhnev in late April, the Soviet leader was wary of establishing a back-channel liaison with Bil'ak; but after the 4 May negotiations, Brezhnev's view of the situation changed, and he decided to have the Politburo authorize Shelest's secret contacts with Bil'ak. With help from the secretary of the UkrCP's Transcarpathian oblast committee, Yu. Il'nyts'kyi, Shelest arranged to meet with Bil'ak and Jan Koscelansky in Uzhhorod on 24-25 May.

Shelest's detailed account of his discussions with Bil'ak was based both on notes and on a tape-recording of the sessions. The account in his diary is identical to a classified report he provided to the other members of the CPSU Politburo on 27 and 29 May. 19 Hence, there is no doubt about its authenticity.

Shelest's account of the meeting proved to have a farreaching impact on Soviet decision-making. During the first part of the CPSU Politburo's session on 27 May, Soviet prime minister Aleksei Kosygin offered impressions from his recent visit to Czechoslovakia, which had ended the same day that Shelest was meeting with Bil'ak. Kosygin had gone to Czechoslovakia ostensibly for a vacation at the spas in Karlovy Vary, but the real purpose of his trip was to assess the state of the KSC leadership. Kosygin's report on 27 May largely discredited the notion that the Soviet Union would be able to work with "healthy forces" in the KSC to establish an alternative regime:

An analysis of all my conversations, meetings, and materials indicates that at present, in the given situation, there are no more authoritative people in the party and the country than Dubcek, Cernik, Smrkovsky, and Svoboda. For this reason, obviously, we must shape our policy accordingly.20