By the time Kosygin finished his presentation, the other members of the CPSU Politburo were largely in agreement that, at least for the time being, attempts to rely on "healthy forces" were bound to be fruitless. Without a suitable alternative, Soviet leaders would have to deal as best they could with the existing authorities in Prague.

No sooner had this consensus emerged, however, than Brezhnev received an urgent phone call from Shelest, who wanted to convey the results of his discussions with Bil'ak. Shelest offered a detailed account of the trends described by the Slovak leader: the growing strength of “rightist" and "anti-socialist” forces, the persecution of "honest Communists," the use of sabotage by "rightists" to prevent Warsaw Pact military exercises in Czechoslovakia, the emergence of a "second center" of latent "counterrevolutionaries" in the upper levels of the KSC, and the possible "loss of Czechoslovakia" as a member of the socialist camp.21 Shelest left no doubt that the only hope of salvaging the situation was by relying on Bil'ak and the other "healthy forces," who had assured Shelest that they were "ready to move openly against the creeping counterrevolution, even to the point of waging an armed confrontation" against the KSC's "second center."

When Brezhnev reported back to his colleagues on the alarming picture conveyed by Shelest, the mood within the Soviet Politburo changed. The notion of relying solely on Dubcek and his aides no longer seemed particularly viable. Brezhnev summed up the new consensus when he argued that Bil'ak was "more perceptive" than Dubcek in his assessment of events, and that "we must maintain close contact with the healthy forces."22 The impact of Kosygin's visit was thus largely dissipated.

Although Soviet leaders continued to have serious doubts over the next few months about the ability of the "healthy forces" to rectify the situation in Czechoslovakia, Shelest's initial meeting with Bil'ak marked a turning point in the crisis. Had Shelest not provided such a dire report and spoken so strongly about the need to work with the "healthy forces," the Soviet Politburo might well have been inclined to wait longer before resorting to military force. But once the prospect of relying on "healthy forces" seemed feasible, the Soviet authorities had an incentive to act before the Slovak Party Congress on 26 August and the KSC's Extraordinary 14th Congress in September, when these "healthy forces" were likely to be removed from the scene. Hence, a tentative deadline for resolving the crisis, either peacefully or through military force, was set by Shelest's meeting with Bil'ak.

18 April: ... From information provided by Yu. Il'nyts'kyi and V. Nikitchenko (KGB) I learned that V. Bil’ak and A. Koscelansky23 from Slovakia expressed a desire to meet with me in Uzhhorod.24 It would be good to receive information about the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia from first-hand sources. But I can't do this independently, without permission from Moscow.

30 April: On the eve of the May Day holiday, I called L. Brezhnev and wished him well for the forthcoming holiday. I laid out my thoughts about a possible meeting I might have with Bil'ak and Koscelansky at their request. Brezhev reacted quite agitatedly and warily to what I said, and his mood even seemed to change. He only managed to say: "It would be better if Bil'ak and Koscelansky came to Kyiv for a meeting with you."

19-20 May: I carefully pored through the briefing materials coming in from various sources in the Czech lands and Slovakia about my forthcoming meeting with A. Koscelansky and V. Bil'ak.

21 May: The secretary of the UkrCP's Transcarpathian oblast committee, Yu. Il'nyts'kyi, called me and reported that my meeting with V. Bil'ak and A. Koscelansky might take place on 24-25 May. They're requesting that we put them up for the night on our territory on 23 May, and that this be done very covertly and inconspicuously.25 They're afraid that they will be persecuted for having contacts with us. We cleared up all matters pertaining to the organization of the meeting and the “covert” lodging for Bil’ak and Koscelansky. We decided that we'll put them up for the night and hold the first meeting and negotiations in the same place (at a dacha in the mountains, not far from Uzhhorod)....

24-25 May: In Uzhhorod I twice met and had prolonged discussions with V. Bil'ak and A. Koscelansky. The first meeting occurred outside the city in a cottage in the Carpathians, where we spent almost the whole night having a discussion. The second was in Uzhhorod, at the headquarters of the party's Transcarpathian oblast committee. I tried to memorize both discussions as accurately as possible, and in addition I made notes from recording equipment, knowing that I would have to write a detailed and precise memorandum to the CPSU CC because this information is of great importance to us-it is first-hand, objective, and truthful. I spoke very little because I mainly wanted to listen and to clarify numerous points.

Here is the basic outline of the discussion.

Bil'ak and Koscelansky informed me in detail about the situation in the party and the country in the leadup to the May plenum of the KSC CC. They informed me about the complexities of the struggle against rightists. A. Dubcek is at loose ends, and he is unable (and isn't particularly willing) to expose the role of rightist elements in the country and the rightist forces in the party. There is no unity of action in the KSC CC Presidium. "We, the Slovaks, will fight to the end in the struggle for a Marxist-Leninist line in the party; we will not retreat a single step. It's obvious that we, the Slovaks, together with you will again have to liberate the Czechs." Continuing his remarks, V. Bil’ak said: "To cool off the hotheads, it's urgently necessary that you conduct maneuvers of your troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia. Once

Russian soldiers turn up, all of these political rats will go hide in their burrows. The appearance of your I. Yakubovskii (commander of the Warsaw Pact forces) alone will do a lot to cool down the situation. In the struggle against the rightist elements, the nation, including all Communists, must behave more boldly."

Among the party activists and state security agents there have been many instances of suicide induced by threats from rightists. For their part, the rightist elements have been making open threats: "Soon the time will come when we will hang all Communists, stringing them up by their feet.” Without any let-up, the extremist elements are demanding and achieving the retirement of Communists, particularly the leaders of regional committees and municipal committees who support Leninist positions. This is happening often. Murders of secretaries of party organizations in enterprises and collective farms and other such incidents are occurring even in Slovakia. Former kulaks are infiltrating the agricultural cooperatives and are threatening the leaders of the farms and the secretaries of party organizations. They're demanding the return of their land and property.26 Sabotage is being carried out at the railroad junctions to hinder the transport of Soviet troops who are coming to take part in the exercises planned by the Warsaw Pact. They're disconnecting the water fountains so that the locomotives will fill up with water and are diverting them from the switching points.

We're all afraid of the upcoming KSC CC plenum; we're not fully certain that we will win because of the divisions within the Presidium. We also don't have an organizational plan for our actions. A. Dubcek is not capable of doing anything even if it would “stabilize" our acrimonious situation. If we don't gain control of the situation within a month, Dubcek will perish, and so will we along with him. I've been discussing matters a good deal with A. Dubcek, and I say to him: "Sasha (and I myself lament), why don't you return to Bratislava, this isn't what you were after, Sasha." If today Slovakia were to deviate from the line of the KSC CC, this would lead to the collapse of the Czechoslovak republic. We will do everything possible to preserve Czechoslovakia as a socialist country. In Slovakia threats have been made against Communist activists. If something extraordinary should happen, we request that you grant refuge in Uzhhorod to our wives and children. The directives of the minister of internal affairs are not being carried out in Slovakia because we know that he is taking part in another "center," headed by Kriegel and Spacek.27

The loss of Czechoslovakia would be equivalent to sacrificing the gains of the Great Patriotic War.28 This cannot be permitted. Czechoslovakia occupies a very important place on the map of Europe; the dark forces simply want to blackmail the entire socialist camp. You are our friends, and you won't allow this to happen. We are ready to move openly against the creeping counterrevolution, even to the point of waging an armed confrontation. We're certain that you will help us in our trying hour. Perhaps if this should happen, even that "apostle" A. Dubcek would sober up and begin acting decisively.

Bil’ak again began characterizing A. Dubcek. He said: "Dubcek is now the most popular man in the country. The rightist elements revere him as their standard-bearer. They're shrewdly and slyly using him in pursuit of their nefarious aims. I regard Dubcek himself to be honorable, but very ambitious; he's clearly not a politician of such scale. He has come to believe, based on their assurances and suggestions, that Czechoslovakia can provide an example of a new development of socialist society a new, socialist democracy—and that Czechoslovakia will become the ‘hub of the world.' But I'm worried that this little hub could come undone and cause a bad stomach ache.”29

I asked V. Bil'ak a leading question: "On whom can you rely in your struggle against the rightist forces? Who and where are your healthy forces?" Bil'ak then characterized several leaders of the KSC and the government.

D. Kolder:30 Bil'ak said about him that he is an honest, fine, and committed Communist, who himself is a worker; but he has little tact in his dealings with comrades, and recently has been consuming too much hard liquor. He believes 100 percent in A. Dubcek, and Dubcek believes in him. It's true that they [i.e., the rightists] view him with hostility and regard him as a dangerous man, and that at the first opportunity they will try to remove him from the political arena through Dubcek's own hands.

J. Lenart:31 He's an honorable man, an engineer by training, who is versed in both technology and economics. He's rather frightened by the events under way in the country and the party, but he's not sufficiently resolute in his actions. One can count on him in the right circumstances, but he wavers in his positions. He is preparing to speak at the CC plenum and to expose Dubcek's mistakes, but Sasha (Dubcek) is recommending to him not to do this. Lenart is now perplexed and has become withdrawn. He has consulted with me several times. I support him in every way.

J. Janik:32 He's a principled Communist; he firmly supports Leninist positions and believes that without the Soviet Union there can be no socialist Czechoslovakia. Against him, too, the rightists are waging vicious attacks and are trying, through all possible means, to find or create some pretext for compromising him.

C. Cisar: He has known Moscow for many years and has been to the Soviet Union numerous times. Outwardly he's well disposed toward you. But now his position toward you has changed 180 degrees; he has even begun displaying a certain degree of contempt for Russians. I don't myself understand what happened, but it's obvious that it was spawned under the influence of the rightists. Cisar has great influence in Czechoslovakia and especially in the Czech lands. For the sake of achieving his aims, he's capable of engaging in all manner of political fraud and deception.

A. Indra:33 He's the most honest and truthful of all the KSC CC secretaries. He's 46 years old and is a railroad engineer who acquired practical leadership experience from work at a factory. He knows economics reasonably well. He's a cultured and thoughtful man with a good moral character, but unfortunately he doesn't have adequate

schooling in political leadership. Dubcek could rely on him in his work, but for some reason he ignores him, seeing in him a rival.

V. Bil'ak: I'll speak personally about him.34 I also knew him previously. I'd met briefly with him on occasion, and had heard a lot about him from the comrades in Transcarpathia. He is a fine and vigorous Communist, who is himself a Ukrainian, a native of our Transcarpathia. His mother, sisters, and brothers live in a mountain village in Transcarpathian oblast. Bil'ak often visits them. He has good professional contacts with the party and council officials of Transcarpathian oblast, particularly with the first secretary of the oblast committee, Yu. Il'nyts'kyi. Their families are friendly with one another. V. Bil'ak is a politically literate, cultured, and well-read individual, with a fine knowledge of the history of his country, especially the period of the Austro-Hungarian empire. My impression of Bil'ak is of a principled man who supports correct positions, and of a cunning, far-sighted politician.

V. Bil'ak spoke further about some aspects of A. Dubcek's activity: "At his (Dubcek's) suggestion, to please the rightist forces, the department in the KSC CC for security and defense matters was disbanded. As a result, the CC was essentially deprived of the instrument needed to supervise the activity of the administrative organs, the army, and the state security forces."35 He gave a detailed description of the activity of the right-opportunist Czech center in the KSC, and cited the following names: J. Smrkovsky, O. Sik, F. Kriegel, C. Cisar, V. Slavik, V. Prchlik, M. Vaculik, and B. Simon.36 The forces of this center define the tactics and strategy of the anti-party struggle within the KSC. This, in essence, is an alternative Central Committee of the KSC. In the territories and regions, groups and cells have been well conceived and organized for a struggle against Communists who support correct positions.

Bil'ak and I arranged to maintain contact. He requested that all due assistance be given to the healthy forces in the party and the government. I assured V. Bil'ak that all matters of a confidential nature would be reported personally by me to L. Brezhnev. The political and economic situation in the party and the country will be reported by me in an official memorandum to the CPSU CC Politburo. Bil'ak and I agreed that we would definitely meet after the May plenum of the KSC CC. He will let me know about this through appropriate channels.

EXCERPT No. 3

Shelest's Account of His Secret Meeting on Lake Balaton with Vasil Bil❜ak, 20-21 July 1968.

This next excerpt from Shelest's diary recounts his secret meeting with the Slovak Communist Party leader, Vasil Bil'ak, on the shore of Lake Balaton in Hungary. The meeting took place late in the evening of 20-21 July, exactly a month before the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Nothing was known about this meeting-not

even the fact that it was held until Shelest released his diary in the mid-1990s. Other information that had previously been available, particularly about Shelest's contacts with hardline, antireformist members of the KSC Presidium led by Bil'ak, lends strong credence to the diary account. The excerpts below are therefore of immense historical significance, filling in a crucial and hitherto unknown part of the 1968 crisis. All existing accounts of the crucial period between mid-July and early August 1968 will need major revision.

As noted above, in early May 1968 Brezhnev and the other members of the CPSU Politburo designated Shelest to act as a liaison with the anti-reformist members of the KSC Presidium. It is now clear from Shelest's diary that this role took on enormous importance in the latter half of July, shortly after the Warsaw Meeting (14-15 July) and the publication of the Warsaw Letter on the 18th.37 In his diary Shelest describes how he suddenly received a phone call from Brezhnev on the afternoon of 20 July. Brezhnev instructed the Ukrainian party leader to be ready to fly within a few hours to Hungary, where he would first meet with the General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP), Janos Kadar, and then set off for a highly confidential discussion with Bil'ak. Shelest duly complied with Brezhnev's wishes, flying first to Budapest and then traveling to Kadar's dacha on Lake Balaton. (Balaton is the largest inland lake in central Europe, and Kadar's main dacha was on the northwestern shore.) Shelest encountered some difficulty in finding Bil❜ak along the shoreline, but with the help of a few assistants who had come along from Kyiv, he finally hooked up with the Slovak party leader.

Shelest's detailed notes of his conversation with Bil'ak were derived from a tape recording that was made of the entire session without Bil'ak's knowledge. The full recording has not yet been released (though presumably it is stored in some archive in Moscow, perhaps in Shelest's personal file in the Russian Presidential Archive), but the diary account is a worthy substitute. The relevant portions from the diary are translated here in full because of their great historical value.

Five key points about the Shelest-Bil' ak meeting are worth highlighting:

First, it shows, once again, what an overriding priority the Czechoslovak problem was for the Soviet leadership in 1968. Shelest had many pressing duties to attend to in Kyiv, but he was willing to fly off immediately to Hungary when Brezhnev called him on the afternoon of 20 July. Because Shelest believed that a resolution of the Czechoslovak crisis would be essential for the future stability of Ukraine (and thus for the stability of the USSR as a whole), he was willing to subordinate his immediate concerns at home to the management of the foreign crisis.

Second, the meeting casts a whole new light on Janos Kadar's role after the Warsaw meeting. It is clear, both from newly released documents and from Kadar's own recollections published in 1989, that the Hungarian

leader's position on Czechoslovakia became much less conciliatory after Dubcek declined to attend the Warsaw Meeting. Shelest's account underscores just how farreaching Kadar's change of heart was. Not only did Kadar express strong criticism of Dubcek at the Warsaw Meeting, but he followed this up by abetting the formation of an anti-Dubcek group of hardliners who could "request" Soviet military assistance. No doubt, Kadar was still hoping that military intervention could somehow be averted, but he was actively taking part in the secret political and military preparations for an invasion. Just two days after the Shelest-Bil'ak meeting, Soviet troops in Hungary were ordered by Moscow to make final arrangements for large-scale military "exercises" north of the border, a process that was completed by the beginning of August. Hungarian leaders, despite their earlier reservations about military action and their efforts to find a compromise, were now finally willing to concede that a military solution might be unavoidable.

Third, it is striking how diffident Bil'ak was during the meeting with Shelest and how unconvincing his assurances were. Shelest himself noted at several points that Bil'ak seemed to be promising far more than he could deliver, at least at the time. Later on, when Bil`ak finally transmitted the "letter of invitation" to Shelest, it was signed by fewer than a dozen officials, hardly an encouraging sign that an alternative regime could be swiftly established. Yet by mid-August, in the leadup to the invasion, Soviet leaders deluded themselves into believing that the "healthy forces" had "consolidated themselves and now constitute a majority." Shelest's own view may have been less sanguine-not least because in the meeting on 20-21 July, Bil'ak had been "inhibited and guarded" and had "failed to clear up certain matters and to discuss certain things fully"-but Shelest was willing to overlook or at least downplay these concerns in the Politburo's subsequent deliberations.

Fourth, Shelest's account reveals that the “letter of invitation" was more important than often thought. Interestingly, the reason that Soviet leaders wanted the letter well in advance was not so that they could foster an appearance of legality around the invasion. They planned to do that instead with a letter to be published in Moscow Pravda the day after Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia, when hardline KSC officials presumably would no longer be hesitant to associate themselves openly with a call for "fraternal assistance." Shelest promised Bil`ak that the initial letter would be kept secret and that the signatories would not be disclosed-a promise that was steadfastly upheld. (The letter was tightly sealed away for 24 years.) It is clear, therefore, that the reason Brezhnev was so intent on securing a letter from Bil'ak was to ensure that the anti-reformist group would consolidate its ranks and act cohesively in the leadup to the invasion and at the moment when Soviet troops entered Czechoslovakia. The "letter of invitation" was thus intended to establish a "credible commitment" by the hardliners to

form an alternative regime.38 As Shelest put it during his

secret conversation with Bil'ak:

Wouldn't it be worthwhile if your [hardline] group now wrote a letter to us requesting help? For you, won't this provide a guarantee that you will be bolder and more cohesive in your struggle against the nefarious activities of the rightists, and won't it strengthen your actions?

The hope in Moscow was that if the "healthy forces” took the decisive step of affixing their signatures to a document, they would no longer have any leeway to "opt out" of their projected role in welcoming an invasion.

Fifth, the fact that Shelest was chosen by Brezhnev to play such a sensitive role in late July and early August militates against the notion that there was a power struggle between the two men in 1968. A senior Czechoslovak official in 1968, Zdenek Mlynar, claimed in his first-hand account of the 1968 crisis (published in the West in the late 1970s) that someone on the Soviet Politburo-whom he presumed to be Aleksandr Shelepin-was seeking to exploit the crisis to replace Brezhnev.39 Subsequently, a few Western observers speculated that Shelest might have been the one who was trying to dislodge Brezhnev in 1968. Neither the CPSU Politburo transcripts nor Shelest's diary provides any substantiation for this argument (or for Mlynar's claims about Shelepin40). On the contrary, both the transcripts and the diary suggest that, at least in 1968, Brezhnev still looked warmly upon Shelest and was willing to entrust the Ukrainian leader with a vital political function in the preparations for military action. Although Shelest clearly ran afoul of Brezhnev later on and was ousted from the Politburo in 1973, the falling-out between the two seems to have followed, rather than accompanied, the 1968 crisis. It is certainly conceivable that the events of 1968 helped embolden Shelest in the early 1970s and contributed to Brezhnev's perception of a threat from the Ukrainian leader, but there is no evidence that Brezhnev was already seeking to fend off such a challenge in 1968. Had he perceived an urgent threat from Shelest during the Czechoslovak crisis, he never would have selected him for the crucial role of liaison with the “healthy forces.”

Sometime after noon, L. Brezhnev telephoned me from Moscow and said that today, 20 July, I must urgently fly to Budapest, where I would have a meeting and discussion with J. Kadar: "He will tell you everything and what you need to do." And Brezhnev added: "You are to have a meeting on Lake Balaton with Bil'ak. He's vacationing there with a group of Czechoslovak comrades. You must act cautiously and discreetly there so that you don't attract the attention of the rest of the Czechoslovak group. During the meeting with Vasil, act independently and try to gauge what V. Bil’ak's situation and mood are like." A special military transport

plane of the Air Force had left from Moscow at 1:00 p.m. to fly to Kyiv, and I would fly on that plane to Budapest, landing at a military airbase of our Southern Group of Forces. Guards from the KGB, a technician with hidden recording equipment, and my assistant, A. Pakharenko, will fly with me.

From Borispol airport, we left for Budapest at 5:00 p.m. At the military airbase I was met by representatives of the military administration and a representative of the Hungarian Party's CC. One of Kadar's automobiles was driven up to avoid attracting attention with an embassy car, and no one from our embassy met me. Nonetheless, after the meeting with Kadar, I stopped by our embassy and met and talked with Ambassador F. Titov and all the embassy staff. They told me a good deal about the reaction in Hungary to the Czechoslovak events. Hungary itself had many problems of its own, and J. Kadar had to do a lot of finagling.

The meeting with J. Kadar was held in the CC building in his office, in the constant presence of his attractive and charming Nadja. J. Kadar's mood was good, and he was expecting me. At L. Brezhnev's instruction, I conveyed greetings to Kadar from Brezhnev, Podhornyi, Kosygin, and the other members of the Politburo. Kadar thanked me for the greetings and best wishes. Then he and I discussed all matters pertaining to my trip to Lake Balaton to meet with V. Bil'ak. Kadar assigned a trusted aide, the head of the MSZMP CC's International Relations Department, to accompany me.41 "You'll stay at my dacha,” Kadar said. "This will be a good cover. You are my guest. As far as the meeting with Bil'ak is concerned, you yourself must take care of it. He knows that you must fly to Budapest and that you must be on Lake Balaton, but he doesn't know when and where the meeting must take place. You'll need to arrange all of that once you arrive at Lake Balaton."

At L. Brezhnev's instruction, I informed J. Kadar about the recent CPSU CC plenum and about the consideration being given to the plenum documents around the country and in the republics, territories, and provinces.42 At the CPSU CC Plenum our delegation's actions at the Warsaw Meeting were endorsed. Kadar, in turn, told me that their CC Presidium had just endorsed the actions of their delegation at the Warsaw Meeting. He has information that overall the Party and the people support measures aimed at regulating the situation in the KSC and the country. Continuing the conversation, Kadar said: "It's too bad that the Czechoslovak comrades so far don't understand or don't want to understand the full seriousness and, above all, the danger for the KSC and their whole country."

Kadar told me that this morning, 20 July, he had spoken for around two hours in the CC with some Czechoslovak comrades, including Svestka, the editor of Rude pravo. “The conversation took place by chance under the following circumstances: Our editor of the Party newspaper long ago knew Svestka very well; they even became good friends with one another. For some days with our permission he visited Prague and had detailed conversations there at various levels. Our editor invited Svestka to visit us in Budapest, where he could meet with journalists and have a bit of a

vacation on Balaton.4 43 Svestka mentioned that the situation was quite complicated in the KSC and the country, as well as in the CC itself and in the mass media, where the rightist elements have seized all the key positions and are successfully carrying out their activities."

After a long but extremely important conversation with J. Kadar, which was very useful in clarifying all points, I left for Balaton. We arrived there when it was already dusk, around 7:00 p.m. local time. We stayed at Kadar's personal dacha. It was a modest, two-story house that was quite comfortable and cozy, and was located on the very shore of the lake. The weather we encountered on Balaton was not very hospitable; it was cold and a strong wind was blowing, causing yellowish-gray waves to rise up on the lake amidst a great roar. I went out onto the shore for a walk in the hope of meeting V. Bil'ak, since the Hungarian comrades had told me that, at the moment, he was out for a walk. Although I also knew which dacha Bil'ak was staying in with his family, I decided not to go there lest I attract the attention of the Czechs.

Time passed, it was already 9:00 p.m., but I hadn't yet succeeded in making contact with Bil'ak. I decided to send my comrades who arrived with me, A. Pakharenko and K. Glushko, to the club to see Bil'ak. They reported to me that Bil'ak was there, and that they, the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians, were having some sort of heated and lively conversation. I had to solicit the help of the Hungarian comrade who had been assigned to me by J. Kadar. He went to the club and discreetly informed Bil’ak that I had arrived and was waiting to meet him at Kadar's dacha. But Bil'ak requested that we arrange to meet on the shore of the lake at 10:00 p.m.

I went out along the shore: It was dark and there was noise from the waves and the wind. It was hard even at a close distance to notice anyone, much less hear his voice distinctly. The designated time passed, and Bil'ak was still not there, when suddenly, close beside me, a man came up. I was about to call out to him "Vasil,” but I restrained myself. It turned out that this was a man who had been sent out on a "reconnaissance mission." Within a certain time Vasil himself showed up; I called out to him, and he responded. That is how we met. We initially decided to hold the meeting on the shoreline by Kadar's dacha, but the wind and the noise of the waves on Balaton interfered too much with our talk, and besides that, it was impossible to record our conversation.

We went inside the dacha, and our conversation lasted from 11:00 p.m. until 5:00 in the morning. This is what I heard and recorded, and how I kept track of our discussion and the entire conversation:

In his side of the conversation, V. Bil’ak dwelt mainly on the general situation and the state of affairs in the KSC and in the country as a whole. He said that in the KSC CC and in the country, and especially among rightist elements, the publication of the letter from the five Warsaw Pact countries had caused shock, terror, and even panic. Kriegel had ordered an overseas passport for himself, and Dubcek had said that the letter was like a knife stabbing him in the heart.