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selves into admitting that some kind of war allegedly would lead to the end of capitalism and the end of civilization, it means that we do not have our head on our shoulders, but on the totally opposite part of the body (laughter). Therefore, no science, no political considerations can justify (such a statement of Malenkov]. It merely proves how harmful is carelessness in the questions of theory and the lack of principles in politics.

[Source: TsKHSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 127. Translated by Vladislav Zubok.)

industries' production of consumer goods at the expense of
"heavy” industries, producing armaments.

I.F. Tevosian was a minister of “black” metallurgy and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. He made his career as one of Stalin's favored “captains” of “industrialization.” Khrushchev in this episode poses as a defender of the interests of heavy industry against Malenkov. 6

This discussion of yet another “political error" by Malenkov reveals, incidentally, the negligence of the "collective leadership" to peruse carefully routine speeches delivered by all members of the top Soviet leadership who, by the Constitution, had to run for elections for the Supreme Soviet-nominally the highest power of the land. Malenkov said that “a new world war...with modern weapons means the end of world civilization.” On the background of Malenkov's remarkable initiative, see David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 337-339; Zubok and Pleshakov, pp. 166-167. 7

The sentence is unclear in the Russian original, but Khrushchev talks here about Beriia's attempt to make Ignat’ev, minister of the MVD or Internal Security a scape goat for the Kremlin doctors' affair in 1952. In his proposal to the Council of Ministers on 3 April 1953 to free the arrested doctors and close the affair, Beriia specifically blamed Ignat’ev and the leadership of the "old" MVD. Later, when he was arrested, this gesture came to be regarded as a clever ruse to earn popularity in the country and to restore Beriia's personal control over the secret police machinery. For the text of Beriia's proposal and the comments, see G.Kostyrchenko, V plenu u Krasnogo Faraona,

pp. 358-60.


Khrushchev is probably referring to the discussion of Beriia's role in the debate on the future of Soviet policy in Germany at the July 1953 Plenum (see the publication in Izvestiia TsK KPSS, no. 1-2, (1991)). In the following paragraph Khrushchev criticizes Malenkov's position on the “construction of socialism in the GDR” during the meeting of the Soviet leadership on 28 May 1953, when Lavrentii Beriia and Viacheslav Molotov presented two rival proposals. Beriia suggested renouncing the goal of constructing socialism altogether and, according to some sources, even contemplated a neutral, democratic, bourgeois Germany. The rest of the leadership, however, opposed this proposal and agreed with Molotov who only suggested rejecting the course of “forced” construction of socialism that had been earlier sanctioned by Joseph Stalin for the GDR communist leadership. The debate resulted in the behind-the-scenes negotiations that led to the “New Course” proposals of the Soviet leadership. The following excerpts from Khrushchev's speech at the plenum highlight Malenkov's role in the debate. Khrushchev, clearly for the purpose of undermining Malenkov's authority, “reveals” that he had been supportive of Beriia's proposal. On historians' debate about the significance of this episode see: Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War. From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 160-162; James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany in 1953,EuropeAsia Studies, vol. 45, no. 4 (1993), pp. 671-691. On Berija contemplating a “neutral reunified” Germany, see Pavel Sudoplatov et al., Special Tasks. pp. 363-364. 2

Khrushchev makes an important distinction between the two bodies that ruled the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Malenkov as a chairman of the Council of Ministers presided over the meeting of May 28, while Khrushchev was there only by invitation as a Secretary of the CC. Voroshilov who did not get any important government job in the post-Stalin setup was not apparently invited to the meeting, although he was a member of the CC Presidium (Politburo). Khrushchev's statement generally corroborates the view that immediately after Stalin's death Berija and Malenkov sought to continue Stalin's tradition in putting the state government above the party “collective” decision-making body. 3

“They” meaning Beriia and Malenkov. On the details of these behind-the-scenes negotiations and threats, see “Memuary Nikiti Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” Voprosy Istorii, no. 2-3 (1992), pp. 93-94; Feliks Chuev, Sto sorok besed s Molotovym, (Moscow: Terra, 1990), pp. 332-335. 4

In this speech Malenkov proposed substantial measures to improve living standards of Soviet people, particularly the collectivized peasantry, by reducing taxes, increasing the size of private plots of land for peasants' households. He also proposed, for the first time since 1928, to increase investments into “light”


Both Khrushchev and Kaganovich confirm that it was Stalin who hand-picked Ignat’ev after he removed and arrested his much stronger predecessors, Beriia and Abakumov. See Gennadi Kostyrchenko, V plenu u krasnogo faraona; Politicheskiie presledovaniia evreev v SSSR v poslednee stalinskoe desiatiletie. Dokumental'noe issledovanie. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia, 1994), pp. 289-357 or the English-language version Out of the Red Shadows: Anti-Semitism in Stalin's Russia (Prometheus Books, 1995). 9

In April-May 1953 Churchill, before he was incapacitated by a stroke, advocated an early summit of Western powers with Stalin's successors without a definite agenda. 10

This paragraph contains Khrushchev's reference to the “Taiwan crisis” unleashed by the PRC's leadership in September 1954 with bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, two offshore islands occupied by the Nationalist troops. The crisis ended on 23 April 1955. American newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst came to Moscow and talked to Khrushchev in 1955.

This admission is the first “hard” evidence that Malenkov, along with Beriia, was the principal architect of the Soviet “peace initiative” of the Spring of 1953. Although Malenkov adhered here to the infamous party tradition of “self-criticism,” in this case he must have told the truth—he denied other “sins,” but there was simply no reason for him to frame himself on such a serious issue. For more extensive comment on the significance of Malenkov's statement here, see Vladislav Zubok, “'Unacceptably Rude and Blatant on the German Question': The Succession Struggle after Stalin's Death, Berija and the debate on the GDR in Moscow in April-May 1953,” presented at a conference “Das Krisenjahr 1953 und der Kalte Krieg in Europa,” Potsdam, 10-12 November 1996.




N.A. Bulganin Address to the Plenum of the CC CPSU Khrushchev. Tito told us that when the military 9 July 1955

advisers left Yugoslavia, some of them wept.

Bulganin. Here, then, comrades, is the reason. There Bulganin. [Ed. note: Bulganin begins his speech by was no mention of internationalism at all. There was pride laying out the 31 May 1954 Presidium resolution on the and ambition. This is how the rupture began. Com. turn towards friendly relations with Yugoslavia. He then Molotov was there then; he should know. summarizes the positive reactions of key socialist leaders At the same time (as the withdrawal of advisers) there consulted, including Ulbricht, Mao Zedong and others.) came a communication from Albania that Tito had decided As for military potential, we lost the strongest country in to move a division into Albania, without having asked Europe. Not one state in Europe has an army like

Stalin about it. That poured even more oil on the fire. Yugoslavia's, which today has 42 divisions. The Yugoslav And, finally, the third reason is the one about which com. army has modern equipment, including artillery, tanks, air Molotov spoke, although entirely incorrectly. He correctly power, even jets supplied for free by the Americans. depicted the fact, but gave the issue his own evaluation.

By its geographical position, Yugoslavia occupies a That is in relation to Trieste. On Trieste, I will say that very important and very vulnerable place for the Soviet com. Molotov's position was incorrect both then and Union. If you look at a map, you will see that Yugoslavia recently. (Ed. note: For more on Yugoslav-Albanian has driven a wedge deep into the east. And now imagine relations and the Trieste issue, see the Yugoslavia section future military events. Let's assume that we had to rush of this Bulletin.) our military forces toward the west. In such a case, we

Khrushchev. Both the beginning and the end were would have 40-50 divisions of the Yugoslav army on our incorrect. left flank.

Bulganin. The beginning was incorrect and the end Khrushchev. Plus American ones.

was especially incorrect. Tito wanted to get Trieste. Bulganin. We would be so pinned down that we

Khrushchev. And at that time we wanted Yugoslavia would have to send a covering force of at least 70-80

to get Trieste. divisions there.

Bulganin. But what's wrong here? God grant that he Mikoian. And not on plains, but in the mountains. get two Triestes (Dai bog, chtoby dva Triesta poluchil], but Bulganin. And if we must fight in the south...

we objected to it then. Khrushchev. With the Turks, for instance. Such a

In 1954 there was also a scandal regarding Trieste. In possibility is not ruled out, either.

October 1954, under pressure from the Americans and the Bulganin. Yes, such a possibility is not ruled out... English, Yugoslavia and Italy agreed on a division of the Then on our right flank we would have the Yugoslav army Trieste zone. The agreement did not wholly satisfy the with a contingent of 50, and perhaps more, divisions. Yugoslavs, but all the same Tito decided to agree to what Yugoslavia controls the Adriatic Sea, which is

they proposed. It would seem that we should have then, at connected with the Mediterranean Sea, one of the very the beginning and in 1954, supported the Yugoslavs and important, decisive lines of communication of the Anglo- said that we were “for” (it). But our MID [Ministry of American military forces, since the Americans and English Foreign Affairs) decided to protest and to submit the issue receive vital strategic raw materials and other sorts of to the UN; it was said that they were violating the interests supplies through the Suez canal and across the Mediterra- of the Soviet Union as an allied power and were underminnean. Controlling the Adriatic, Yugoslavia threatens the ing our prestige, because they didn't ask us. Mediterranean.

In the Presidium it was decided that the MID's point It must be remembered how significant this state is. of view was incorrect. And, finally, comrades, there are the people and the

Khrushchev. That was the period when no one was cadres. The Yugoslavs are superb fighters, superb people, any longer recognizing our allied rights in relation to who like us.

Trieste. Khrushchev. It would be well if com. Molotov

Bulganin. We did not support MID's proposals, but looked at these cadres, and saw what sort of people they proposed that we write that the Soviet Union agreed to are, what sort of life path they have traveled...

support the Yugoslavs, for which our Yugoslav comrades [Ed. note: Khrushchev and Bulganin then begin to thanked us when we were there. sing the praises of Yugoslav comrades in counterpoint,

That is how the rupture began. There were no facts to remembering shared service in the Spanish Civil War, the effect that the Yugoslavs were creeping away from a earlier meetings in the USSR, etc.. Discussion then turned Marxist-Leninist position, from internationalism, and were to the origins of the split and the withdrawal of Soviet taking a nationalist path. There was nothing of the sort. military advisers from Yugoslavia.]

Simply ambition, pride, and only afterwards the letters Bulganin. The (Soviet) military and civilian advisers which you know about were written to the Yugoslavs. who were told to leave were perplexed. What was going Com. Molotov wrote at Stalin's dictation. We all helped on? They believed that there would be a military confron- however we could. tation, even war, and some wept.

Khrushchev. And the main material for this de


scended from the ceiling (bralsia s potolka), that is, was thought up.

Bulganin. Yes, the material was a fabrication. It was then that they made fabrications about Marxism-Leninism and nationalism. Let's speak plainly. After all, it was so. I understand that com. Molotov will say that Bulganin is simplifying. I am not simplifying; I am saying how it was. That is how the disagreements with Yugoslavia began, as a result of which we lost the friendship of this country.

Com. Molotov spoke here about 1945, about Trieste. The disagreements started, he said, not in 1948, but back in 1945.

From 1945 to 1948, we lived like great friends with Tito; both during the war and afterward, we had very good relations. Tito visited Moscow. You introduced him to me, com. Molotov; incidentally, together we drove with him to [visit] Stalin. We lived like friends. What sort of conflict did we have with Tito in 1945? There was no conflict. Everything happened in 1948.

I already talked about Albania, and now I will talk about the Balkan federation. Comrade Molotov spoke about how the idea arose, but he forgets that there were witnesses: myself, Mikoian, Malenkov and other members of the Presidium, Kaganovich, Voroshilov; Khrushchev at that time was not there; he was in the Ukraine.

Khrushchev. Yes, I was not there; at that time I was in the Ukraine.

Bulganin. Now com. Molotov is ascribing the Balkan federation to Tito. [Ed. Note: For more on this, see the article by Gibianskii in this Bulletin.) But the issue was first raised by Stalin in a conversation with Dimitrov

a what if, he said, you united the Balkans, created a federation[?]

Khrushchev. There, in Yugoslavia, they almost built an office building for the federation's institutions, but did not finish it.

Bulganin. You would be supported, said Stalin to Dimitrov; try talking with Tito. Dimitrov went home, visited Tito, spoke with him, and then it [i.e. the federation) got underway (poshlo).

Khrushchev. And now he is being accused of straying from Leninism for that.

Bulganin. I state that with all responsibility. Let the other members of the Presidium confirm where the idea came from. Now com. Molotov is foisting the idea on com. Tito.

Malenkov. That's right.

Khrushchev. How is that! They directed such actions by com. Tito against Leninism.

Bulganin. That is how the matter stood. Now I want to speak about Yalta.1 We were not there. Coms. Stalin and Molotov were there. Was Voroshilov there or not?

Voroshilov. I was not.

Bulganin. How did they divide Yugoslavia between England and the Soviet Union and how did Tito find out about it? This is a major embarrassment. Com. Khrushchev spoke about this in his report, [and] I will not

dwell on it. A tactical conversation (takticheskii razgovor] with Churchill took place, but it came into the open.2

Khruschchev. Tito should have been informed in time.

Bulganin. Yes, Tito should have been informed. Churchill divulged the fact in his memoirs, which were recently published.

Khrushchev. The Yugoslav leaders found out from Churchill and not from us what we should have told them

Bulganin. I want to return somewhat to the beginning, when a letter of 31 May 1954 on the Yugoslav issue was written by the CC Presidium. At first we ordered the MID to write the letter. To write a draft and present it to us. Unfortunately, I do not have the text of the letter; com. Suslov has it. If only you knew what sort of letter it was! Com. Zorin wrote it on the order of com. Molotov. I do not know whether he reported on it to Molotov or not. Com. Molotov was then in Geneva. Zorin came to the Presidium and said that he had acquainted com. Molotov (with it) and that he had agreed. In the letter it talked about the necessity of doing a survey on our relations with fascist Yugoslavia. In the letter it was called fascist Yugoslavia, and its leaders, fascists...

On the issue of disarmament, com. Molotov took an incorrect position on the decrease of military forces by a third.

Khrushchev. And even committed a distortion of a CC decision.

Bulganin. Afterwards, the CC Presidium adopted a decision to the effect that our position had to be changed on the issue of cutting armaments. I will speak in greater detail of this. The Soviet proposal on the issue of disarmament, which was being looked into and discussed in different committees of the United Nations, stipulated a reduction in arms and armed forces of the five great powers by one third. The Westerners insisted on a reduction of armed forces to a definite level, because one third, let us say, of five million is one thing, and one third of one million is another. If we cut one third and France cuts one third, that would be different things. From this point of view our position was out of date (ustarela).

Khrushchev. That position is unwise.

Bulganin. But for several years we have been chewing [zhuem) the same thing over: one third, one third. Com. Gromyko sat on the subcommittee in London for a month and kept reporting that the most ideal thing was cutting by a third. Stupidity!

Khrushchev. Besides himself, he didn't convince anyone there.

Bulganin. In March 1955, the CC Presidium recognized the position of the MID on that issue to be incorrect (nepravil'noi) and adopted a resolution to reject that thesis. We said that we should agree with the Westerners as to levels. A directive went to London in fulfillment of our decision. And all of a sudden we read Malik's telegram from London, that he is continuing his line on one third. What was going on? It turns out that in the telegram

which went to London as an instruction from com. Molotov, the following clarification was made: if necessary, if you are asked, what the term “agreed levels” means, you must say that we have in mind a reduction of arms and armed forces by one third. Com. Molotov then excused himself, saying that he had made an oversight, that it was a mistake, but I consider it necessary to speak about this.

between our party and the leadership of the CPY, there was the fact that the Yugoslav leaders distanced themselves from the principled international positions for which they had stood in the previous period.

In a discussion of this issue in the CC Presidium, some doubt was expressed in relation to the awkwardness and incorrectness of the given explanation. However, the following arguments followed in defense of the given explanation of the reasons for the rupture: that if we did not say that the main reason was Beriia's and Abakumov's intrigues, then the responsibility for the rupture would fall on Stalin, and that was impermissable.

These arguments should not be accepted.
Khrushchev. On Stalin and Molotov.
Molotov. That's new.
Khrushchev. Why is it new?
Molotov. We signed the letter on behalf of the

(Source: TsKhSD f.2, op. 1, d. 173, II. 76 ff. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.

1 Ed. Note: In February 1945, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met in the Palace of Livadia at Yalta in the Crimea to discuss and agree on the postwar order. 2

Ed. Note: In October 1944, Churchill and Stalin met in the Kremlin and divided up spheres of influence in Europe, allegedly on the back of an envelope. For details, see Albert Resis, “The Churchill-Stalin Secret ‘Percentages’ Agreement on the Balkans, Moscow, October 1944,” American Historical Review 83 (197778) pp. 368-87.

party CC.

Khrushchev. Without asking the CC.
Molotov. That is not true.
Khrushchev. That is exactly true stochno).
Molotov. Now you can say whatever comes into

your head.


Evening, 9 July 1955

Bulganin. (Chairman) Com. Molotov has the floor.

Molotov. (Ed. note: Molotov presents the development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations since World War Two for about twenty minutes.] Comrades, the issue of Yugoslavia has great political significance. Obviously, the complex nature of the Yugoslav issue is clear to us all...

If one were to judge by this statement, it would appear that the main reason for the rupture in relations between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) in 1948 was some “materials” which were fabricated by the enemies of the people Beriia and Abakumov, and the rest is not worthy of attention.

From what I have said and from a real acquaintance with the materials, one can, however, establish that this statement, which tries to explain the reason for the rupture in relations with the CPY in large part by the hostile intrigues of Beriia and Abakumov, does not fit with the factual situation. Beriia and Abakumov's intrigues, without a doubt, played a certain role here, but this was not of chief importance.

The groundlessness of that explanation, it seems to me, is visible from the following:

First, it was incorrect to place the blame for the rupture in relations between the CPSU and the CPY only on our party, while keeping silent about the responsibility of the CPY. This falsely exonerates (obeliaet] the leadership of the CPY, for which there are no grounds.

Secondly—and this is the important point-it should not be ignored that as the basis of the disagreement

Khrushchev. Without even asking the members of the Politburo. I am a member of the Politburo, but no one asked my opinion.

Molotov. Com. Khrushchev is speaking imprecisely (netochno).

Khrushchev. I want once again to repeat: I was not asked, although I (was a member of the Politburo.

Molotov. You must not forget that the basic and real reason for the rupture was the move of the leadership of the CPY from a position of communism to a position of nationalism, and not just someone's intrigues which, of course, also played their role.

Did such a departure by the Yugoslav leaders from communism occur or not? We must give an answer to that question...

Does this mean that there are no grounds for rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia? No, it does not.

If a rapprochement and an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and this or that country which does not belong to the socialist camp (for instance, India or Finland) is possible, then, consequently, an improvement in relations and a rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia is also possible, if Yugoslavia shows, along with the USSR, an aspiration to this. In the present conditions such a rapprochement is possible chiefly along intergovernmental (Ed. note: i.e., non-party] lines.

In our relations with Yugoslavia, we cannot forget the fact that Yugoslavia left the people's democratic countries with which it was together from 1945-1947. But, on the other hand, we must reckon with and appreciate the fact that Yugoslavia, although it drew closer to the imperialist camp, is trying in some capacity to preserve its sovereignty and national independence, although in recent years untied its hands to speak out against the USSR at any time on all and sundry issues of international relations. The government of Yugoslavia has not yet once said that it has revised these views, or even that its foreign policy is closer to the position of the USSR and the people's democratic countries than to the position of the powers in the imperialist camp...

[TsKHSD, f.2, op. 1, d. 173, 11. 1-11. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.)

its ties with countries like the USA, England and others, and together with this, its dependence on these countries, have have become stronger and stronger. It [Yugoslavia] is between two camps, tilting towards the capitalist countries. In view of this, it is completely clear that it is our task to weaken Yugoslavia's ties with the capitalist countries which are pulling it into the imperialist camp, be they commercial, economic, or military-political ties, which are putting Yugoslavia in a position of dependence on imperialism. For this, it is necessary to increase and strengthen Yugoslavia's ties with the USSR and the people's democratic countries, showing all possible vigilance in relation to the remaining ties that Yugoslavia has with the capitalist countries. Such a policy will strengthen our socialist camp and at the same time will weaken the camp of the imperialist countries. Such a policy is correct, let's say, in relation to India (or Finland), and is all the more correct in relation to Yugoslavia, where the revolutionary traditions of partisan struggle against fascist occupiers are alive and sympathies for the USSR are great in the people, and where such post-war revolutionary victories as the nationalization of large industry and others, which were accomplished when Yugoslavia marched in the same ranks as the people's democratic states which had arisen at that time, have been preserved. However, it should not be forgotten that in recent years (1949-1955), Yugoslavia has made a series of steps backward both in the city (the weakening of state planning authority in relation to nationalized industry), as well as especially in the countryside, where in recent years a line of renouncing the collectivization of agriculture has been followed.

We must make sure that Yugoslavia does not enter the North Atlantic bloc, or any of its international affiliates, and that Yugoslavia leaves the Balkan union, [since) two of the three participants (Turkey and Greece) are members of the North-Atlantic bloc. It is also in our interest to help Yugoslavia reduce its economic dependence on the USA and other capitalist countries. We must expand and strengthen cooperation with Yugoslavia, above all in the international arena, in the struggle to strengthen peace in Europe and in the whole world. The same can be said in relation to possible international cooperation in the economic sphere, insofar as joint steps with Yugoslavia and other countries in the interest of normalizing international trade and against discrimination and other aggressive actions by capitalist countries headed by the USA, are possible and desirable.

However, appropriate caution and a critical approach should be shown toward Yugoslavia's political steps, bearing in mind that in recent years Yugoslavia's position on a series of issues (for instance, on the German issue) has been closer to the position of the Western powers than to the position of the USSR and the people's democratic countries. It should not be forgotten that in accusing the Soviet Union of imperialist tendencies and of the so-called policy of “hegemony,” the Yugoslav government has

Continued from page 33 bered, “The commission report was given by Pospelov (he was and remains pro-Stalinist). The facts were so terrifying that when he spoke, especially in very serious places (tiazhelyi), tears appeared in his eyes and his voice trembled. We were all stunned, although we knew much, but all that the commission reported we, of course, did not know. And now it all was verified and confirmed by documents."5

After the report Khrushchev stated his position: “Stalin was incompetent (nesostoiatel'nost') as a leader (vozhd'). What kind of leader [is this], if he destroys everyone? We must show the courage to speak the truth. Opinion: tell the Congress; to consider: how to tell the Congress. Whom to tell[?] If we do not tell, then we are dishonest (nechestnost') towards the Congress. Maybe have Pospelov prepare a report and tell—the causes of the cult of personality, the concentration of power in one (set of] hands, in dishonorable (nechestnykh) hands.":6

[Ed. Note : Behind the scenes of the ongoing Congress, the Presidium edited Khrushchev's speech. The passage below was excised.]

“Every member of the Politburo can tell of disrespectful (bestseremonnyi) treatment by Stalin of Politburo members. I present, for example, this case. Once, not long before his death, Stalin summoned several members of the CC Presidium. We went to his dacha and began to discuss several questions. It happened that on the table across from me there was a big stack of papers, which hid me from Stalin.

Stalin testily shouted: “Why are you sitting there?! Are you afraid that I will shoot you? Do not be afraid, I will not shoot, sit a bit closer.' There are your relations with members of the Politburo."7


(Source : V.P. Naumov, "K istorii sekretnogo doklada N.S. Khrushcheva na 20th s'ezde KPSS,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia 4 (1996) pp. 147-168, reprinted in Forum fur osteuropaische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte 1(1997), pp. 137177. Special thanks to Donal O'Sullivan for permission to reprint. Translated by Andrew Grauer.)

1 Mikojan's diary can be found in the Presidential Archive (APRF, f.39, op.3, d. 120). 2 Malin Notes are located in the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD, f.3, op.8, d.389). 3

The draft of Khrushchev's speech can be found in TsKhSD, f.1, op.2, d. 16. 4 TsKhSD f. 3, op. 8, d. 389, 11. 52-54. 5

APRF f. 39, op. 3, d. 120, 11. 115-116. 6

TsKhSD f. 3, op. 8, d. 389, 1. 62. 7

TsKhSD f. 1, op. 2, d. 16, 11. 76-77.

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