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Listen! When Stalin died, 109 people were killed. 109 people died because everyone moved like a mob and smothered them. This is just such a psychosis (psikhos). Some people, when they were in the hall near the casket, started crying-What are we going to do now? Comrades, common people is one thing, but how many party members and Komsomol members thought when Stalin died, what will happen after him? Is it proper? Is it appropriate to imagine a hero, and make everything dependent on him? Comrades, do we then need the party? What is it? It means not believing in human judgment, not believing in the force of democracy, not believing in collective leadership. Comrades, then let's choose a king. The monarchists say their system is better, because all your elections depend on your voters, and they adapt [to each other], but our monarch, he was given the power to rule and manage by God. Then we must agree with even such an absurdity. And now, we're trying to break this myth of power and infallibility. Some say, what would you have done during the war, if you didn't have Stalin? Defeated the Germans. Defeated them—and defeated them sooner, with less blood [lost]. I'm sure of it. And maybe we could have avoided the war. Maybe, if our policy was a little smarter, maybe, we could have avoided the war. Nobody knows. That is how I and my friends in our collective see these things.

Listen, such absurdity. When Lenin died, no busts. Stalin died, there wasn't a single town or city where a monument to him was not placed. We, when he died, we couldn't imagine what to name after him, to immortalize him the day he died, because whatever we did would have been significantly worse than what he had done during his lifetime. Can this be correct? Can this be correct upbringing? There was no modesty, although he talked a lot about modesty. There were many, many shortcomings, which, unfortunately, we could not......We ourselves suffered from it. I vacationed with him one year. I lived next [door]. I told my friends and they understood it. They said that if you're still alive after this vacation, say "Thank God." Why? Because I had to dine with him every day. It means I had to be drunk every day. I beg your pardon. Am I saying it too frankly, yes? (Voices from the audience [in Russian]: You're saying the truth. Say it. Say it.) You just can't do this. We had foreigners arriving and coming over sometimes. We were ashamed when we came for dinner, because there was a battery of mortars (batareia minometov) [Ed. note: hard liquor] on the table. There's a limit to everything...... It was like this, comrades. It was. But, if one doesn't drink and eat with him, you're his enemy. You're his enemy. This kind of absurdity, why did it happen? If he was not protected by the cult of personality, he would have been kicked out, and told: Listen, dear, drinking so heavily isn't allowed. You have to work. We're responsible for the work done. He [Stalin] himself once told us in the heat of conversation: "Go on talking. Once, Lenin called me [to him] and tells me: Why, my dear (baten'ka), are you drinking so heavily? You're buying champagne by the case, getting people drunk. And

he wanted to put me on trial." He [Stalin] told us this......We couldn't tell him that it would have been for the best if Lenin had done it, because if you said it, you wouldn't be going home anymore. You're not children, comrades. You should understand. I have a lot of Polish friends. And [Stalin] made me a Pole. Stalin asked me: "What's your last name?" I said: "Khrushchev." "Your last name ends like a Polish one with [one line black out in text] ski." I said: "Who knows. I lived for a long time as Khrushchev, and now its-ski." Comrades, I was standing near Yezhov, and Stalin said: "Yezhov said it." Yezhov replied: "I didn't." "How is it you didn't say it? When you were drunk, you said it to Malenkov." Malenkov passes by. Stalin says: "Did Yezhov tell you that Khrushchev's Polish?" He says: "No." You see, they'll say, why is Khrushchev denying. First of all, I'm at Russian, I'm not denying. Second, what kind of crime is it if I had been Polish? What kind of crime? Look, comrades, when Stalin died, Beria took his post. And he was then the most influential man among us. Beria and Malenkov. He took the post of internal affairs minister, comrades. Beria. But, what kind of counter-revolution did we have in 1953? None. We have a good, friendly, lively society in the Soviet Union. What did he need it for? So that he could stand above the party. What does it mean to stand above the party? It means to raise his own cult of personality. What Stalin was, Beria would have become (Byl Stalin, stal by Beriia). He'd have destroyed the party. The party would be like a formality, because he'd be in command. So, then, we rebelled and arrested Beria for raising his hand against the party. We told him this. We didn't arrest him like Stalin arrested Kosior. Instead, we arrested him during the meeting. All members of the Presidium were present. We told him: "We accuse you of such and such actions. You encroach on the rights of the party as shown by. We said it to him." This, he says, I did because of this and that. We then said, arrest him. When the prosecutor interrogated him, Beria said: "On what grounds do you arrest me?" He replied: "You're asking me on what grounds? The entire Presidium and Council of Ministers were there when you were arrested. Not only them, but the entire government apparatus!" [Ed. note: For Beria letters from prison to Malenkov, see the Berlin 1953 section of this Bulletin and the CWIHP website: cwihp.si.edu.]

With these words, allow me to finish my presentation. (Applause.)

Chairman [Comrade Zawadzki in Polish] In accordance with our mutual agreement, those among the comrades with a question, please ask them, and those among the comrades who want to express themselves also feel free to express yourself.

Comrade Kazimierz Witaszewski [in Polish]

I want to deal with the following problem. Comrade Khrushchev spoke of Comrade Stalin as the strongest, the best type of Marxist-Leninist. On the other hand, we read

Comrade Khrushchev's speech. And what Comrade Khrushchev said here, it's all about what Stalin did on his own, in spite of the collective, without coming to an understanding with anyone. I can't understand, how to explain this, that a Marxist, the party leader, who, on the one hand talks about what kind of person a party member ought to be a communist, modest, ought to listen to the voice of the masses—and, on the other hand, this same party leader does not recognize the collective, the Central Committee, the Politburo, works on his own, shoots people, old Bolsheviks, without cause. Here, for me, a question emerges, how is it possible to reconcile one with. the other, that Stalin was a good Marxist?

[Several questions follow. Then Khrushchev answers, not always to the questions, but at some length.]

Comrade Khrushchev [in Russian]

Where would you place Stalin? Would you say he's not a Marxist? Stalin, who occupied such a prominent position in the party, and possessed indisputable, colossal influence, and revolutionary abilities, led the party by what path? In the direction of building a socialist society. This is a fact. Could Stalin have led in a different direction? He could have. Could he have brought it to some other result? I think that he couldn't, because the party would have resisted. But, Stalin himself was a convinced Marxist, and he was convinced that society in particular must become a communist society, and he served this society with all his body and soul. Of this, I have no doubt. The question of the means and of the course taken, this is a completely different question. It's difficult to combine, but it's a fact. And these facts have already taken place. How you want to combine it, and think it through, this depends, so to speak, on your individual abilities. But, it's a fact. We can't say that by using such and several methods to kill people, he killed so-and-so many in order to destroy the socialist regime, so that he could put the Soviet Union onto the capitalist rails. This would be stupid (glupost'). This would be a lie. This would be stupid. Who would believe it? No, that's wrong. Here's the whole tragedy for Stalin was a revolutionary. And therefore, to affirm the new, we should fight with the old. And in this struggle, comrades, we never denied harsh methods and extreme actions. We didn't deny it in the past, and we don't deny it now. Therefore, on this, Stalin was a Marxist, and he served, and used all the methods available. He used them so that in this struggle to affirm [the new], he destroyed his own people. His own people were destroyed (svoikh unichtozhal). Of course it's possible. This was in every party. There were always cases where someone was under the suspicion of being an agent provocateur. Sometimes investigations and courts were used, but it later turned out that they had been honest people. Were there cases like these? Of course there were. And it was the same in the Polish party. It was everywhere. If there's an underground, if there's a struggle,

then it's always possible. And the fact that the enemy sends its agents is known to everybody, comrades. Its all a question of intelligence, methods, and abilities. Stalin had such views, he understood it well, and tried to protect himself. And in protecting the revolution, he got to the point where, as they say, the artillery fired on its own army.

Well, my dear friend, I can't say anything else. I would be dishonorable, if after his death, everything was blamed on him. That wouldn't be very smart. We would then not have been Marxists, or we would not have understood it and explained it correctly. Stalin in particularly was a Marxist. A Marxist. We think so. The question of his mistakes on the questions of theory, and in other instances, is not being discussed right now, comrades. This was a man who devoted his body and soul to the working class. There isn't a single doubt about it. But......always, so to speak, humans are fallible. Something unpleasant is omitted, something pleasant is exaggerated. So this kind of lesson is not accepted as a valid source of history. I don't want to insult our elders, I myself am not young, but I know that sometimes......[about events] forty to fifty years ago, everyone tells his own [version]

...Stalin valued every revolutionary. It had to be seen. We saw it. We're now talking about the negative [side of] history. But, Stalin, comrades, if I could talk about the good times, [Stalin's] attention and caring. This was a revolutionary. He lived life, but he had a persecution mania (maniia presledovaniia) about somebody pursuing him......And, because of it, he would never stop......He, even his own relatives......He shot them. Because, he thought that the brother of his first wife-a Georgian woman, she died a long time ago. (From the audience: Alilueva. No, Alilueva's the last wife.) Svanidze. Svanidze. Her brother. This was a friend of Stalin's. This was already an old man. He was a Menshevik, then he joined the party, and we often saw him with Stalin. And, evidently, Beria suggested that this Svanidze was an agent, that he was an enemy, and that he had a directive to kill Stalin. Stalin, of course, said listen, he sleeps over at my place, he dines with me, he's often been with me. So, why is he not doing what he's supposed to? He could have poisoned me a long time ago. But, Beria tells him: "No. You know there are different agents. Some get the assignment immediately. Some agents are kept near you, behave normally, then the time comes, he gets the signal, and then he'll do it!" Stalin believed him. Svanidze was arrested. He was interrogated by all methods [i.e., torture]. He was sentenced to execution by shooting. Stalin lived with Svanidze for so many years; something human [remained]; so he still had doubts. Then, he orders Beria: When Svanidze is about to be shot, tell him that if he admits his guilt-Stalin was already sure that Svanidze was an enemy—and asks for forgiveness, we will forgive him. We will forgive him. Before Svanidze was shot, we are told, he was told Stalin's words, and he said: "Exactly

what am I guilty of? Why should I ask for forgiveness. I'm not a criminal. I'm a member of the party. I'm an honest person. I didn't commit any crimes before Stalin, and before the party and country. I won't ask." And he was shot. That's what was happening. So, why did Stalin destroy [Svanidze]? He destroyed him simply so (prosto tak)......He believed he was an enemy. We have to rack our brains to explain things that are not so easy. You have to complicate this question a little bit. Only then will you understand correctly, and correctly give an explanation. This is a complicated question.

The beginning of the war and Stalin. Comrades, here, it was said that maybe we could have used it to our advantage, when he turned out to be......This was impossible, comrades. The war began......the enemy attacks, and if we, at that time, had announced that we dismissed Stalin from the leadership. Comrades, a better present to Hitler could not be imagined......(Voice from the audience: Correct, [he] had to direct the collective.) Exactly, had to direct. Comrades, all this is being explained simply, right here at this meeting, and after Stalin's death, and you have to have [in mind] the concrete conditions. The war was going on, and the name of Stalin played a big part, and suddenly we're announcing we dismissed Stalin. Comrades, that is defeat. This would mean the death of the country.

...Stalin must be criticized, and we already see how we are criticizing him. But, comrades......even if you smear a person more and more, he won't get darker than he deserves. We can smear his reputation. But, after us, there are going to be people, you know, like restorers, who in cathedrals or somewhere start restoring things that were already painted and repainted, each artist in his own way. But, a good restorer takes it, cleans everything, washes everything off, and says: "This is, in reality, the work of such and such. And everything else was merely appended." So it is in this matter, too, comrades. Stalin, comrades, is such a figure that many historians will break their teeth trying to learn this history, and there will still be something left to learn. Stalin is Stalin. He's a very complex figure. He had a lot of good and a lot, a great lot, of bad. Now, we're trying to deal with the bad so that we can strengthen the party's correct path of action. But, Stalin will, in any case, from us, and after us, and from our grandchildren and children, receive what he deserved. He played his part and played in such a way that God left it to others, who worked with him, to know. I'm saying it directly, because it's a question of the struggle......Stalin had his own methods. He said that in order for the working class to succeed, in order to take power, many thousands and millions of workers had to die. Maybe it was a mistake. At such a moment of revolutionary struggle, it's possible that there are mistaken victims. But, he says, history will forgive me. Is it possible? Perhaps. The whole question concerns the scale of these mistakes. A question of methods. Because his doses were incorrect, because an incorrect method of leadership was used. And

we want to avoid this. Comrades, we ourselves aren't guaranteeing that mistakes won't be made. We also can't allow; we also arrested people, and will probably make arrests in the future. I think that you'll also have to do this. But, if you now become liberals, and look at everybody and pat everybody on the back, then these enemies will bite your hands off (ruki pootkusaiut). We have such enemies and you have them. You probably have more enemies, because you're younger than we are, and we destroyed more, and you're closer to them. So, I think that even in the future mistakes are possible. I can't say, right now, that we promise that not even a single hair will fall from the head of any person. No. Comrades, this is very complicated. Comrades, the enemy is really insidious, the enemy really is, has been all the while, and we'll fight with these enemies wherever we recognize them and, maybe, where we don't recognize them. I, for example, know that when I worked in Ukraine, we destroyed not one, but many of our enemies using the hands of our enemies. We knew......these ones......we forged some documents. We would place them surreptitiously everywhere.......they arrested them, tortured them, and hung them. But, you'll say that this is cruel. But, comrades, we're fighting with the enemy. Is this method with enemies allowed? I think it's allowable. Will we give it up, now? I, for example, won't refuse to use it, if it's used to destroy the enemy......If we're going to be cowardly, it means we are cowards. So there, dear comrades. (...)

(Applause. Stormy applause.)

[blocks in formation]

Evening, 24 June 1957

Suslov chairing. Com. Molotov has the floor. Molotov. Comrades, I have already spoken about the fact that I wish further to touch on international issues. It seems to me that in this regard com. Khrushchev's efforts are not entirely successful. We all understand and consider it necessary to conduct, support, and stimulate those measures which assist the lessening of international tensions. This is the basis for our work on strengthening peace, on delaying and averting a new war. And we must by all means possible be careful that this policy gives the results that we want to derive from it.

In connection with this, I consider that when com. Khrushchev, in a conversation with the editor of the American newspaper, The New York Times, Turner Catledge, published on 14 May spoke about the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, he committed an error, an incorrect [step]; he spoke as follows: “Speaking more concretely about international tension, the matter, obviously, reduces in the final analysis to the relations between two countries— between the Soviet Union and the United States of America."

Voices. Correct.

Molotov. And further, he says: "We consider that if the Soviet Union is able to come to an agreement [dogovorit 'sia] with the United States, then it will not be hard to come to an agreement with England, France, and other countries.”

Voices. Correct.

Molotov. I consider this incorrect both in essence and in tactics. It does not accord with the Leninist policy in international affairs which has been approved by the 20th party congress. (Agitation in the hall)...

Molotov....we can fight against imperialism and win out over imperialism only by making use of contradictions in the imperialist camp. If we imagine that we can come to an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and therein see the expressed essence of our policy, then we forget the basic Leninist position on making use of "cracks”, contradictions in the imperialist camp. We must not unite the imperialist and capitalist states around America, [must] not push for that and [must] not depict the situation in such a way that the Soviet Union must only agree with the United States of America, and all the remaining countries will supposedly play an insignificant role. No, comrades, now that we have become a great power, a powerful force, and have huge support in our socialist camp in the East and the West-in these conditions we must be particularly careful to deepen any split, any disagreements and contradictions in the imperialist camp, in order to weaken the international position of the United States of America-the most powerful of the imperialist powers. But imperially strong America cannot dictate everything to the other imperialist states. For that reason we support all sorts of contacts with non-socialist

countries and consider it to be very important. We support contact with little Denmark, Norway, Burma, Egypt, and so on. Moreover, we bear in mind that the use of contradictions in the camp of the capitalist states has a very great significance. And only in that way, squeezing not only America, but also other states which diverge from or waiver within the capitalist camp, only in that way can we weaken America itself, which is struggling against us. For that reason the issue of the use of the stated contradictions, that we not forget about these contradictions-that is our most important issue in the whole of our foreign policy

[Ed. Note: After numerous interruptions] Molotov. Let me finish. From a different angle, there is another shortcoming here. How can one reduce the matter to the relations between the USSR and the United States of America, forgetting about the socialist camp? Com. Khrushchev's formulation ignores all of the remaining socialist countries besides the USSR. One must not, however, ignore the People's Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, or the other socialist countries... Kirilenko. Answer this question: who are such dogmatists, how are we to understand them?

Molotov. Maybe you are not up [plokho razbiraetes'] on this matter, com. Kirilenko, but how are the others relevant here [pri chem tut drugie]? I am talking about something that requires the attention of the comrades present at this plenum. For this reason I am saying important things, although maybe you do not agree with this. There is a measure of truth here, in any case. We have never formulated the issue of the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and America as did com. Khrushchev. Once in 1924, Trotskii tried to throw out the slogan that now America had made a beggar of Europe. That was an anti-Marxist thing. Perhaps com. Khrushchev forgot this and has forgotten the lessons which the party had on that count in the past? But it doesn't hurt us to give a reminder about that. (Noise in the hall.)

I, comrades, want to say something further about the second mistake of com. Khrushchev in the statement to the editor of the newspaper The New York Times. Com. Khrushchev speaks in this way-I am citing from Pravda:

"If, for instance-N.S. Khrushchev adds as a joke— our minister Gromyko and your secretary Dulles met, in a hundred years they wouldn't agree on anything, and, perhaps, only our grandsons would wait long enough to get any results from these negotiations." Voice. Read on.

Molotov. Read on yourself.

Voice. It is being said as a joke there.

Molotov. One does not play with the authority of the MID of the USSR in front of the bourgeois governments. It is incorrect in its essence, and it is tactically harmful to the Soviet state. And however much you say, these things must not be condoned, because they bring harm to our state, and let us tell com. Khrushchev that right to his face [priamo v glaza]...

Khrushchev. Imagine: the President in the presence of the other Finnish leaders invites guests to a steam bath, but the visitors spit and leave. That offends, insults them. When we returned to Moscow and they started to upbraid me for visiting the Finnish steam bath and Bulganin began to join in as well, I said: Molotov wants to depict me as an unprincipled person because I went to the bath. How can you not be ashamed of yourself? You here won't go with anyone. If you got your way, you would lead the country to the end of its tether [do ruchki], would argue with everyone, would lead [the country] to conflict. Look at your telegram from San Francisco; what did you write in it? You wrote that war could start right now. How could the foreign minister behave so?

Molotov. Don't make things up [Ne vydumyvaete], com. Khrushchev.

Voice. Com. Molotov, there is nothing left for you to do but drag out the dirty laundry [ubornuiu vytashchit']; you've stooped so low.

Mikhailov. Com. Khrushchev, both in former trips, and when he was in Finland, worked for the people, for the party, and you, com. Molotov, should be ashamed to spit on this work; it is not worthy of you.

Molotov. I disagree with com. Mikhailov. (Noise in the hall). The First Secretary could have behaved in a more dignified manner in Finland.

Voice. Tell us, how was it undignified?

Rudenko. And you consider it dignified to visit

Hitler?

Voice. Better to go to a steam bath than to engage in conspiratorial activities.

Suslov. Com. Molotov, you reduced questions in international relations to a steam bath. It's possible to say that the CC reached correct foreign policy despite you. Molotov. A lie [nepravda].

Pospelov. The July 1955 plenum recorded this.
Voice. On Yugoslavia

Molotov. That was discussed; there was a CC resolution; I voted for it. Comrades, on the Yugoslav issue I want to dwell on one point. At one point in the heat of polemics on the Yugoslav issue, com. Khrushchev imputed that I did not understand that on some issues the Chinese comrades could correct us. I understand this and recognize it. But I maintain that in the given case and in a series of other cases, things were ascribed to me that I did not say. I said something else. Once, when, on the basis of a ciphered communication from Beijing, I referred to the fact that com. Mao Zedong, criticizing the Yugoslav comrades, pointed out that they were behaving like Laborites and not like communists-on the basis of that case, I asked the question: why do we not understand what the Chinese comrades understand? On the given issue we should have figured it out earlier than them. That is what I said on the subject

Pospelov. You said: you are going to the fascists cap in hand [na poklon].

Molotov. There were exaggerations in relation to

Yugoslavia, but not that sort. In a CC resolution in the summer of 1953, we wrote that the Yugoslavs should be treated like other bourgeois governments. You can find that resolution of the CC Presidium. Comrades, you must not say something that hasn't happened. But it was said by me, although the resolution was mistaken...

Molotov. Does our press, the selfsame Pravda, ever mention the name of Stalin? No, it modestly remains silent about Stalin, as if for 30 years Stalin did not play a prominent role in the history of our party and of the Soviet

state.

We recognized his mistakes, but one must also talk about his achievements. Otherwise, the party itself is injured.

Voice. Why did you not made a statement about that at the 20th party congress?

Molotov. It was after the 20th congress, what I am saying to you. Of course, when com. Zhou Enlai came, we began to attest that Stalin was such a communist that, God grant, every one should be; but after Zhou Enlai left, we stopped doing so. This does not increase the authority of our party, since we are not giving a firm, clear answer; but that is what is demanded of us, and we should not permit anything else.

Khrushchev. You want to turn everything back, in order then to take up the axe yourself.

Molotov. No, that is not so, com. Khrushchev. I hope that that is not what you want, and moreover, that is not what I want.

Note the following fact. There is a decree of the CC Presidium of 28 April 1955 on the archive of I.V. Stalin: "To confirm a commission to examine the documents from the archive of Stalin, staffed by coms. Khrushchev (chairman), Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Pospelov, and Suslov." And, all the same, after 28 April 1955, the commission has not once met. They do not want to meet, and, after all, more than two years have gone by... [Dmitrii] Shepilov. Bulganin already said that he did not meet with me at any meetings.

Voice. The members of the CC Presidium told what assessment you made, your approach to this issue.

Voice. Why is your surname in particular in this group, and not another, if you are not privy [to this matter]?

Khrushchev. You are against the cult of personality, and I, no less, have fought and fight against the cult of personality. But if you are such a fighter, then why did you, after Stalin's death, as editor of Pravda, falsify the photograph and place a shot of Malenkov next to Mao Zedong in the newspaper, when this did not actually happen [v prirode etogo ne bylo]?

Shepilov. It is true, that happened, and I was punished for doing so. I considered that the basic problem was our friendship with China, the closeness of the two heads of government-the symbol of this eternal friendship, and I did it in those interests; that was my mistake.

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