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Khrushchev. For that the CC Presidium reprimanded its own fault, the Yugoslav party ended up practically in you...

isolation from the other communist parties. After this, the (Break)

Yugoslav leadership began to speak out in conversations Mikoian. Comrades, first of all I want to talk about with our comrades and made known its desire to improve some facts which have brought the party leadership chosen relations with us in its open statements. after the 20th party congress to its present state, when the On com. Khrushchev’s suggestion, we discussed this plenum meets amidst the crisis of the party leadership. issue in the CC Presidium and decided to instruct (Soviet Now we have a crisis in the party leadership; that must be Ambassador to Yugoslavia) com. (Nikolai) Firiubin to frankly stated.

engage in an appropriate conversation with com. Tito at Voice. No, there is no crisis.

the instructions of the CC Presidium. Mikoian. I am talking about the crisis in the CC

Several days before this, information about the fact Presidium.

that one Yugoslav diplomat tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to (Averki] Aristov. But the CC Presidium is not the win over one important leader of the Hungarian Socialist leadership of our party. The leadership is the CC.

Workers' Party (HSWP) to the Yugoslav side, was sent Mikoian. Com. Aristov has spoken correctly.

around to the members of the CC Presidium. Thus, in After the 20th party congress showed ideological connection with a discussion of measures to improve unity, we considered that collective leadership was the relations with Yugoslavia, com. Molotov introduced a guarantee of the success of our party, and tried in every proposal that the CC CPSU inform all fraternal parties that way to uphold that unity. It seemed that everyone tried. Yugoslav diplomats were engaging in the recruitment of There were disagreements on separate issues, disputes, but communists in fraternal parties. The adoption of com. insofar as they did not turn into a system, they did not Molotov's proposal would have led, of course, to the harm the cause...

disruption of the improvement of relations with YugoslaThe events in Poland and Hungary were a great test via, because such an appeal by us to all parties could not for our party and our leadership, (and) for the CC Pre- be hidden from the Yugoslav leadership, and, in this, it sidium. I was very glad, (and) everyone else was very would see duplicity in our policies and the absence of a happy that in those days our CC Presidium was wholly true wish to reconcile. This was, in essence, Molotov's unified and firm. On such serious issues, unity was

wish to put a fly in the ointment (vlit' lozhku degtia v gratifying. It was pleasant for me that the comrades with bochku meda). whom we disagreed, like Molotov, Kaganovich, (and)

Then they talked very calmly about this; there were no Malenkov, in this matter behaved as was appropriate, insults. Khrushchev said: Viacheslav, you again want to although it should be noted that on the issue of the new continue your line on disputes with Yugoslavia. I also Hungarian leadership, com. Molotov did not agree. calmly spoke twice, criticizing com. Molotov; com. Malenkov behaved well in Hungary, and it was believed Bulganin criticized him. Malenkov sat opposite and that he had come into line (voshel v obshchuiu koleiu). stayed silent. I know that Malenkov was against this; on That is how it was until recently.

many political issues he was not close to the views of After the February 1957 CC Plenum, from the point Molotov and Kaganovich, but he sat and kept silent... where the issue of the organization of the sovnarkhoz [large collective farms) was decided, the atmosphere began Mikoian. Generally there was unity in the Presidium to worsen; an unstated dissatisfaction on the part of some on the Hungarian issue, but I must say that com. Molotov members of the Presidium was evident; disagreement was held an incorrect line in relation to the new Hungarian noted, [and] it was felt that some people were not saying leaders. everything (they thought). Then it was still bearable, but Imagine that tomorrow, on 4 November, our troops the atmosphere continued to poison the situation...

had to move out (vystuplenie) all over Hungary, but by this Until recently there was no sign of the formation of a evening it was still unclear who would be at the head of group in the CC Presidium, but there was some impression the new government of Hungary, by whose summons and that com. Molotov (and) com. Kaganovich were some- in support of whom our troops were mobilizing. Why? times silent, as if they had come to an understanding. Khrushchev and Malenkov were in Yugoslavia meeting They avoided arguing with one another. For instance, I did with the Romanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, and not avoid argument with Molotov or Kaganovich, but they Yugoslavs over the course of two days in order to obtain avoided argument between themselves. Perhaps there their agreement for the use of our troops. I was busy with were no grounds for disagreement? There were. Recently, getting (Janos] Kadar, [Ferenc) Muennich, and others out Malenkov also began avoiding arguments with them. of Budapest; there was still no government, (and) they There was one case in which he agreed that he had not were discussing whom to move into the government. We acted entirely properly; that was in relation to Yugoslavia. proposed Kadar. Molotov insisted that (Andras) Hegedus In connection with the incorrect speech by com Tito in be at the head—the former prime minister. He asked: who Pula, Soviet communists and the communist parties of is this Kadar? We, he implied (mol), did not know him other countries delivered a dignified rebuff. As a result, by and were slighting him. We could not agree on the

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this we told him: do not live in Moscow; live in another city, and don't mess things up (ne port' dela).

Khrushchev. When the Hungarian government delegation visited us, Molotov said to Kadar: why are you not taking Rakosi with you? This question once again upset the Hungarian leaders. They thought that we were supporting them (only) on a temporary basis, and that then Rakosi would once again come to power in Hungary.

Mikoian. It's true; during the reception, com. Molotov scolded Kadar (as to] why they weren't taking Rakosi back to work in Hungary. Such behavior by com. Molotov was incorrect.

Molotov. We were talking not about Rakosi, but about Hegedus.

Mikoian. You were talking about Rakosi.

composition of the government. Zhukov said: I cannot put off the operation; there is already an order to our troops to move out. Molotov insisted on reinstating the old leadership.

Molotov. That's not correct; we spoke about Muennich.

Mikoian. You proposed Hegedus; before his departure to Yugoslavia, Khrushchev proposed Muennich; others proposed Kadar—we argued all day. If there had been no argument, why not agree right away on the composition of the government? We had it out [rugalis ') with you, argued fiercely. Bulganin and other comrades should remember.

Khrushchev. Anastas Ivanovich (Mikoian), when, during the Hungarian events, Malenkov and I returned from our trip to a series of people's democratic countries and Yugoslavia, we had formed the opinion that we must support Kadar's candidacy. Some called for Muennich's candidacy. He is an honorable comrade who likes us; I did military training together with him in the Proletarian Division. He is an excellent comrade, but in the given situation, com. Kadar is the best candidate.

Mikoian. Only after com. Khrushchev's arrival was it possible to specify the composition of the government headed by Kadar. Com. Kadar is from the working class and is a serious person, and that has now been justified. It is good that com. Khrushchev reminded [us]. There was the following case: Molotov calls and proposes a meeting. On what topic? [Matyas) Rakosi wrote a letter to the HSWP, (saying] that they were not allowing him back into Hungary and requested that he remain here. Molotov asked: who decided, how, why? He considered that the convocation of a special session of the CC Presidium was called for. And when we met at the next regular meeting [i.e., no special session had been called), he insisted that Rakosi and [Erno] Gero be given the chance to work.

Molotov. Who insisted? That is not exact.

Mikoian. After all, you demanded the convocation of a special session of the CC Presidium in order to discuss Rakosi's letter, which came to the CC CPSU Presidium with an accusation against the new leadership of the HSWP. Two days later (cherez den'), at the next meeting of the CC Presidium, you spoke with a criticism of the resolution of the CC Plenum of the HSWP that at present and in the near future, the interests of the HSWP demanded that Rakosi, Gero, Hegedus [be prevented from working) in Hungary, but remain in the Soviet Union for a specified period. You demanded that Rakosi, Gero, and Hegedus return to Hungary. If we had heeded Molotov['s advice], we would have lost the trust of the Hungarian party; the Hungarians would have thought that we were playing a double game. We argued with Molotov: Rakosi did not see what was happening, became detached from reality and led the party into a catastrophe. While located in Moscow, he called certain of his supporters in Budapest on the telephone and, essentially, led a group struggle against the new Hungarian leadership. In connection with

Mikoian. In relation to the [Presidium] Saturday meeting, at which Bulganin said that Khrushchev acted incorrectly. What does that consist of?

The people's democratic countries request that, when we order equipment for the next year, the orders be given out at least six months' in advance, so that blueprints can be drawn up and inventories can be ordered. Otherwise, it is impossible—to order in January and receive the products in January. This is an elementary thing. Not only our friends, but also the capitalists demand this.

This is an indisputable issue, but arguments have begun around it: will we be able to pay for the equipment? Here we order, but what will we pay with? I provide information: in all, we buy 16 billion rubles in goods, and now we are talking about a preliminary order for 3 billion rubles in equipment, and these are needed goods. Why should we not be able to pay? We will be able to. There is no issue here. The total volume of trade will be approximately the same as last year's.

Finally, what does this mean politically? On the whole, equipment is being supplied by the GDR and Czechoslovakia. If we do not strengthen East Germany, where workers are supporting their communist government, our army will end up in the fire. And, after all, there is an army of a half million (men) there. We cannot lose the sympathy of the German populace. If we lose their sympathy and trust that will mean the loss of East Germany. And what would the loss of East Germany mean? We know what that would be, and for that reason operate on the basis that we must use the capacity of East German industry in full. Then the workers of the GDR will have work and will give us what we need; otherwise we will have to give the GDR both goods and food, without receiving equipment in return. I consider that our position is absolutely correct.

Voice. Correct.

Mikoian. But we are told: you will order, but will we be able to pay? This is an issue unto itself—a great political issue. I kept calm, although I am also a quicktempered person, but Nikita Sergeevich caught the scent of the whole political edge of the issue. Seeing that a

majority against the draft was forming, he said the following phrase: “I would like on this issue in particular to hold a vote and to remain in the minority.” The socialist camp has been created because it is important to strengthen it and not to permit wavering. If East Germany and Czechoslovakia today are left without orders, the whole socialist camp will crack. Who needs such a camp if we cannot ensure orders? After all, the issue stands as such: either feed the workers of the GDR for free, or provide orders, or otherwise lose the GDR entirely. That is why Nikita Sergeevich blew up (vzorvalsia). I also almost blew up.

Voices. Blew up.

Khrushchev. Now it is clear that they had an understanding to fight us on this issue.

Mikoian. I also think so...

Comrades, after the Hungarian and Polish events, our prestige abroad temporarily weakened somewhat. First, we bared our teeth to the enemies, the Americans, for Hungary, and bared our teeth for Egypt and achieved a halt to the war which had started there.

Then they again conducted a policy of disarmament in order to turn the sympathy of the petty-bourgeois elements toward them. Molotov says that the Leninist policy of using the contradictions of the imperialist camp is not being put into practice. But he makes (only) one citation. First of all, he incorrectly interprets it. But even so, let us assume that he is correctly interpreting it. Look at our party's policy on splitting the bourgeois world. Our comrades went to India and to Burma, and managed to undermine the influence of the imperialist powers on the countries of Asia.

Voices. Correct.

Mikoian. Earlier we had no access to the Arab countries; English influence had such a hold on the Muslim religion, that we had no access there. Three imperialist powers gathered together and decided all of the issues of the Near East without us. But when we sold arms to Egypt, we bared our teeth to our enemies, and Nasser turned out to be a strong leader, so that now they cannot any longer resolve the issues of the Near East without us. Is that not a realization of the Leninist policy on using the contradictions of the imperialist camp? In the given case we are supporting bourgeois nationalists against the imperialists.

Voices. Correct.

Mikoian. Com. Voroshilov went to Indonesia. Indonesia is a bourgeois state, in many ways feudal, even, which only recently won its political independence. They met Voroshilov triumphantly not only because he is a good person, but because he represents the Soviet Union. Remember the age we are living in, and the strength we have. The Indonesians are a 70-million-strong people; they have a smart President, Sukarno, but in order to strengthen his power with the people, he needs a visit from Voroshilov, in order to strengthen his influence through him. What strength we have and communism has...

They accuse com. Khrushchev of being hot-tempered and harsh (goriach i rezok). But there they went and met without him. You can't imagine the precipitousness and fervor of coms. Molotov and Kaganovich at the meeting of the Presidium! In the course of less than 10 days at three sessions of the CC Presidium on the three foreign-trade issues this now open grouping held trial battles, specifically on trade with Austria, on orders for equipment in people's democratic countries, on trade with Finland. After this, an attack started along the whole front. It is true, Finland is a bourgeois country and borders us, but is that really important to us? We know this through war with the Finns and the Germans. The Finnish people knows how to make war, and our task, not to make war, is the greatest task for our state. For that very reason coms. Khrushchev and Bulganin travelled to Finland and succeeded there...

Further, what did we do in foreign policy? Com. Khrushchev proposed that a letter be written from com. Bulganin to the Norwegians. At that time we had been arguing with the Norwegians after the Hungarian events, so let's now write a letter to the Norwegians, but say politely that if you meddle in military affairs, we will wipe you off the face of the earth (sotrem s litsa zemli). We approved this, and it turned out to be a good idea.

Khrushchev. To speak about serious issues in a friendly tone.

Mikoian. The people from MID (Midovisy) have now begun to write drafts of notes and letters. Well before, they put together documents very badly, in a criminal, crude way of speaking, stereotypically; it was impossible to read them.

That has made a huge impression. They sent letters to the English as well. They were influential. They addressed the French people. They didn't write to Eisenhower, not to everyone, but only to those of whom I have talked. Does this mean that we know how to see and use contradictions? We have been using the contradictions of capitalism everywhere in our foreign policy.

Molotov has picked on one sentence of com. Khrushchev's: the USSR and the USA are the only possessors of atomic weapons, and now decide the questions of war and peace.

Khrushchev. Or the following fact: when we proposed to the President of the USA, Eisenhower, to call England and France to order during the English and French attack on Egypt. Was that not a use of contradictions?

Mikoian. I am concerned about time, and for that reason do not talk about that. Remember the circumstances: there was an uprising in Hungary; our troops occupied Budapest, and the Anglo-French decided: the Russians are stuck in Hungary, (so) let's hit Egypt; they can't help; they can't fight on two fronts. We'll pour dirt on the Russians, they say, and we will thump Egypt; we will deprive the Soviet Union of influence in the Near East. That is what they decided, and we found both the

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strength to keep troops in Hungary and to threaten the imperialists that if they do not end the war in Egypt, it could lead to the use of missile weapons by us. Everyone recognizes that with that we decided the fate of Egypt. Even before that, we made a move that com. Khrushchev talked about. Since the Americans were conducting a different policy from the English, and did not want to dirty themselves with a colonial war, [or] that their “friends” be so dirtied, but to do in Egypt themselves (a samim ukhlopat'Egipet). We said the following to the Americans: let's introduce American-Soviet troops together in order to restore peace in Egypt, which would accord with the goals of the United Nations. This produced a huge effect.

From the point of view of using the contradictions of imperialism in the interests of communist policy, there has never been such a broad practice, such rich results, as in recent years in our Central Committee with the participation of com. Khrushchev...

Voice. Correct (Applause).

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(Source: Istoricheskii arkhiv 3-6(1993) and 1-2 (1994) Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie)

| Ed. Note: It is especially ironic to hear Mikoian praise the opposition's unity in 1956, since he himself was the main dissenter from the decision to invade Hungary. Unanimity of decision was only formally maintained because Mikoian was in Budapest, protesting long-distance, when the actual decision to intervene was made on 30-31 October 1956. For more on this, see “The Malin Notes on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956" Translated, annotated and introduced by Mark Kramer, CWIHP Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997) pp. 385-410.

17 June 1953—the events in the GDR. They can say to us: fine, the Russian people have shown that more than once in complicated circumstances they close ranks; the leadership also closes ranks, and victory is assured thereby

It is true, history has shown that both the people and the leadership close ranks when the dark hour tolls. The people closed ranks even when the tsars were in our country. But at what price would the defense of our great cause of socialism come, if the hopes of the enemy were realized, if our leadership were shattered!

Comrades, I cannot agree with some of the statements that there is only an embryonic political platform here so far, but not a platform. I think that if one analyzes

, everything that has been said by the troika, above all by Molotov as well as those who formed a bloc with him, then one must come to the conclusion that politically—if a political assessment is to be given—a real revisionist platform was present. It affected both the political and the economic life of our country, as well as the issue of cadres.

As for cadres, I think that no one would disagree that if the troika and their accomplices had taken control of the leadership, the shadow of Shatalin or some equivalent of him would have reappeared. And these people don't have to be taught how to make short work of cadres.

The comrades who spoke correctly said that we were talking about people who had lost touch with life, with the people, with practical work, having buried themselves in paperwork [zashlisv bumagakh). But I would like as far as possible to emphasize one side of the affair, which has not been been sufficiently emphasized. These people for a long time put themselves in a position where they lecture members of the CC Presidium who are taking the correct position, CC members, and so on, left and right. They regard everyone sitting here, as a rule, as adolescents who, as they say, walk under the table like a pawn (pod stol peshkom khodiat).

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. It is true that many of us are ten or perhaps fifteen years younger than some of the participants of the anti-party group. But that is not our fault. If that is anyone's fault, it is our mothers' and fathers'.

Voice. That is only by age.

Gromyko. They do not notice that people have grown up both literally and politically. They are not the same people who they were ten or fifteen years ago. The present plenum has confirmed this well. Our CC is the full master of the situation.

The participants in the anti-party group have put themselves in the position of some sort of priests (zhretsy). Even in ancient Greece where there were priests, they existed when their existence corresponded to the needs of the ruling class. I think that something similar must be said now. Approximately the same conclusion should be made: there is no need at all for these priests. (Laughter, applause.)

Comrades, even the bourgeoisie, including the

Evening, 25 June 1957

Gromyko. Comrades! Our foreign enemies are at present betting on and placing their main hopes on disorder and collapse in our leadership. Let us ask one question: what would happen if this anti-party group seized the leadership; how would that be seen abroad, above all by the American bourgeoisie—our main enemy? They would see it as their victory.

Voices. Without a doubt.

Voice. They would thank Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov.

Gromyko. They would see it in the following way, that Dulles' policy, the policy of the “cold war,” the policy of squeezing, of pressure on the Soviet Union, had won out. Let coms. Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, and those who made a bloc with them, look at the situation they have put themselves in. I think that it would not be a mistake to say that they have put themselves in a certain sense in the position of Dulles' allies.

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. And in the absence of unity, it is easier for enemies to slip us another Hungary and a second edition of

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American and English [bourgeoisie), cannot permit themselves the luxury of keeping a person who has lost all value for the state leadership in his job. An example: Churchill. He did not serve badly in the interests of the colonial British empire, but when he lost his value, they sent him to paint landscapes. (Laughter in the hall.)

Voice. Correct.

Gromyko. When Eden lost his value, although he was a bit younger, they sent him on an indefinite vacation. I think that the troika, and perhaps some of those who formed a bloc with the troika, should also be sent to paint landscapes. (Laughter in the hall.)

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. Comrades, I wanted to emphasize with all decisiveness one more point, since it relates to many of the actions of our foreign policy. In my opinion, the Central Committee should know some facts which the previous speakers could not talk about simply because they are not involved in this business, while our brother (Molotov] sits on [nash brat sidit na) foreign policy affairs.

From all of the practical work of the CC Presidium over the course of at least the last two years, it has become clear that these priests are trying to present com. Khrushchev's role in the CC as that of an agronomist. That is a definite line. You see, they say, he knows agriculture and runs it. In this way they want to cancel out the huge contributions which the First Secretary of the CC, com. Khrushchev, has made to the country and the party.

I want to touch on another area in the political and economic leadership of the country, and also in the area of foreign policy.

Here com. Mikoian has touched on one issue of foreign policy—our serious warning which was made to England and France when these countries launched into military adventurism against Egypt. It is well known that that action was appreciated abroad, and it is correct, that the way the ultimatum put an end to the military actions against Egypt in 28 hours after com. Bulganin's message was sent to Eisenhower, the English and French premiers and the Israeli premier, Ben Gurion, was in our interests.

Malik. Eden broke out crying when he received the message.

Gromyko. There were reasons to cry.

Comrades, I consider myself a person who is economical with words, but I should report to the Central Committee that the dispatch of that message was the initiative of com. Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee. (Applause). Shepilov was minister of foreign affairs then. He spoke here, but his tongue could not move to note that fact. He loses the gift of speech in such cases.

Shepilov. At dozens of meetings, including at MID meetings, I said that this aided our rapprochement with the Arabs, that this was com. Khrushchev's initiative.

Gromyko. Why did you not say so to the Central Committee?

Shepilov. I agree.

Gromyko. Why am I talking about this? I want to emphasize that the CC Presidium, and above all the First Secretary, has led on issues of the USSR's foreign policy. Unfortunately, not so many foreign policy issues were discussed at plenums. It would be good if we correct this in the future; we must correct this situation.

And so, speaking about the leadership of our foreign policy, I do not want to create the impression that merits in this matter fall proportionately to all in the CC Presidium, including from the troika. Nothing of the sort.

The main, if one can express oneself this way, impulses on issues of foreign policy came from the First Secretary of the party Central Committee (Applause).

Voices. Correct.

Gromyko. I do not hesitate to say this, although at present I head our diplomatic department. If I did not want and did not desire to speak about this, I would be misunderstanding slozhno ponimal by] the prestige of the MID.

Second issue. I will only mention it—the Austrian treaty. That is not only a decision by the CC Presidium. Com. Khrushchev insisted on the necessity of making a decision. You all know the positive significance of that whole affair.

The Trieste issue—that is also his proposal.

The issue of normalizing relations with West Germany—that is also his initiative. As a result, we received a huge lever of influence on the internal conditions in West Germany. Without this, it is possible that the Bundeswehr would be armed with atomic weapons. The plans to expand the West German army were disrupted and in any case delayed in large part because we, by establishing our embassy in Bonn, provided the Social Democratic opposition in West Germany with a rich line of argument. I repeat, the normalization of relations with West Germany has in large part aided this.

This was adopted on the insistence, not only by the proposal, but on the insistence of com. Khrushchev in the face of opposition from com. Molotov.

Voices. Yes.

Gromyko. The normalization of relations with Japan...

Molotov. I did not oppose, but on the contrary, supported...

Gromyko. When, Viacheslav Mikhailovich?

Molotov. I supported the establishment of relations with West Germany as well.

Gromyko. I will remind you of the facts: You came back from the conference in San Francisco. The day before, the issue was discussed in the CC Presidium. There was a decision at com. Khrushchev’s suggestion to normalize relations with West Germany and to send an open note to the Adenauer government. We at MID prepared such a note in keeping with com. Khrushchev's proposal. Against this, as far as I remember, there were no objections in the Presidium.

Com. Molotov returned. I did not physically have the

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