ePub 版



declared martial law. In the evening, Berlin's citywide Most Politburo members agreed that the announce- traffic was interrupted and the East sector sealed off. ment of the New Course program warranted careful

The reaction to the crisis by Soviet diplomatic and preparation of the party and the population at large, but military observers in East Germany can now be docuSemenov urged speedy implementation of Moscow's mented in detail.63 What is striking about the reports is instructions. When, on the evening of June 10, Herrnstadt how quickly the Soviet representatives assumed that the pleaded with Semenov to give the SED two week's time to uprising had been instigated by the West. As early as the prepare the policy change, the High Commissioner evening of June 16, High Commissioner Semenov and insisted that the communiqué has to be in the paper General Grechko, in reporting on the day's events, pointed tomorrow, warning the Neues Deutschland editor that "you to the fact that persons from West Berlin participated in the may not have a state for much longer.”:58

demonstrations in increasing numbers. According to Heeding Semenov's order, the Politburo announced Semenov and Grechko, "large crowds started arriving from the “New Course” liberalization program in Neues

West (Berlin)" late on June 16, and it was “mainly West Deutschland on June 11. As expected by Herrnstadt and Berliners” who were rioting in the streets of Berlin. Citing others, the communiqué with its frank admission of past the evening edition of the local newspaper Der Abend, mistakes came as a surprise to many in and out of the they concluded that it was “clear from the reports of the party. Reports from local party organizations, carefully West German press and radio that the above-mentioned monitored by the SED headquarters in Berlin indicated hostile actions have been organized from West Berlin.""64 with great candor the widespread disappointment, disbe- The next day, Grechko cabled to Bulganin that “[i]t may lief, confusion and shock within party ranks as well as the be considered that a special organization based in West populace. To many, the communiqué signaled the SED's Berlin has directed the strikes in East Berlin." "Analyzing final bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise. Party the situation," Grechko continued, “I have also come to the members felt betrayed and “panicky," others even called conclusion that the provocation was prepared in advance, for Ulbricht's resignation. Many thought the SED retreat organized and directed from the Western sectors of Berlin. from crash socialization resulted from pressure by the The simultaneous actions in the majority of the big cities West German government under Konrad Adenauer and the of the GDR, the same demands of the rebels everywhere as Western powers, evidenced by such reports as the one well as the same anti-state and anti-Soviet slogans have from the small town of Seehausen where “the entire proved such a conclusion.”65 KGB sources soon provided village is in the bar, drinking to the health of Adenauer." details on alleged Western subversion, mentioning in To make matters worse, the only segment of the population particular the activities of the Berlin-based anti-Commuwhich seemed to have been excluded from the New nist organization “Fighting Group Against Inhumanity." Course liberalization were — paradoxically — the

General Vasilii Sokolovskii, deputy USSR defense workers: the raised work norms arbitrarily imposed on minister confirmed this judgement the day after his arrival May 28 remained in force. Labor dissatisfaction was in Berlin. Given that the disorders had erupted simultafurther fueled when the SED regime, groping to maintain neously in Berlin and other major cities and that the same its authority, confirmed the controversial norm increases tactics of action were used everywhere," the uprising had

to have been "prepared beforehand on the entire territory The internal events in East Germany from the New of the German Democratic Republic and aimed at making Course announcement through the first days of the uprising have been treated elsewhere. 60 Suffice it to say

Considering the perception that the West had instithat the riots and demonstrations, which climaxed on 17 gated the crisis, Soviet authorities in Berlin as well as June, eventually engulfed more than 350 cities and villages the Soviet leadership in Moscow — were carefully in the GDR, and more than 500,000 people throughout the monitoring Western troop movements on the GDR border. GDR marched in defiance of the regime. Both the SED Semenov remembers that during those days, "the teleleaders and the Soviets were surprised by the extent of the phones kept ringing. Khrushchev called several times, uprising. Underestimating the crisis situation and eager not even more often did Molotov and others.”68 The Soviets to precipitate bloodshed, the Soviet Berlin commandant, knew that U.S., British and French troops in the Western General Dibrova, balked when East Berlin police chief sectors of Berlin had been put on higher alert status on Waldemar Schmidt requested authority on the morning of June 17. In the early morning hours of June 18, Soviet June 16 to clamp down on the demonstrators.61 Complain-military intelligence learned that the 7th U.S. Army and ing about the hesitant, even passive, initial response on the the 12th Air Force unit in Western Germany, as well as part of the Soviets, Schmidt later charged that “if we had NATO headquarters, were put on alert. Within three hours, taken strong action immediately, the whole thing would however, Grechko could reassure Moscow: The alert of have been forgotten.'

Fearful of wider unrest the next

U.S. forces had been cancelled. 69 Given the restrained day and a statewide general strike, Soviet troops did and passive Western sponse to the events in the East finally, in the early morning hours of June 17, enter East sector, it must have been evident to Soviet authorities that Berlin, and by 1 p.m. that day, Soviet military authorities Western troop alerts had likely been defensive in nature.


on June 13.59

a coup d'état.”:67

[ocr errors]

According to Semenov, Sokolovskii in turn ordered the state of alert for Soviet border troops canceled and took precautions to avoid unintended incidents, which could have caused a military confrontation with the West. As Semenov put it in his memoirs in rather dramatic terms: "The danger of events developing into a Third World War had been banished.”

For days if not weeks Soviet military authorities remained concerned about continuing signs of resistance – in particular continuing strikes -- throughout the GDR, and arrests continued in high numbers through the end of June. Yet as early as June 19, Moscow was receiving clear signals that the immediate danger to the SED regime had passed. That day, Grechko informed the Soviet leadership that “street disorders on the territory of the GDR have ended everywhere.” A growing number of workers were resuming work, and SED activists were back in the factories, propagandizing the SED's interpretation of the riots. Much to the Soviet observers' satisfaction, more and more people were distancing themselves from the disturbances. By July 4, the Soviet High Commission was even considering easing travel restrictions between the Eastern and Western sectors in Berlin and reopening the sector

border 71

While for the Soviet observers, the peak of the crisis seemed to have passed by June 19-20, tensions were mounting within the SED regime. “This is not a Politburo, but a madhouse," one GDR minister had characterized the situation within the top party committee as early as June 9. 72

The uprising paralyzed the SED leadership and froze the discussion on internal renewal. In the early morning hours of June 17, Semenov ordered the SED Politburo to evacuate to the more secure Soviet headquarters, cynically commenting that it is almost true" when RIAS allegedly reported that the GDR government had fallen apart.

73 After the acute crisis had passed, dissensions within the SED leadership heightened dramatically. Key SED functionaries, such as Fred Oelsner, who had just accompanied Ulbricht and Grotewohl to Moscow, now mounted criticism against the party chief. According to Fadeikin's report, Oelßner stated in conversations with Soviet officials on July 1 that “Ulbricht most of all has not understood the erroneousness of his conduct. He has not understood that as a matter of fact he lost touch with the masses and that his methods of dictatorial leadership were one of the serious reasons that errors were committed.” Despite Moscow's New Course instructions, “Ulbricht had not changed and continued to work as before," though Oelßner noted that he had become somewhat more passive. But he was still inclined to create an atmosphere of pomp around his person.” With telling understatement, Oelsner revealed to his Soviet interlocutors that “no complete unity of views existed in the Politburo."74

Another one of Ulbricht's close collaborators, Hermann Matern, registered his views with the MVD [KGB predecessor) the next day. Reflecting the paralysis and catharsis prevalent within the SED in the aftermath of

the uprising, Matern argued that the party was lacking militant leadership. Politburo meetings were “disorganized" and not well attended, and the body had “made almost no practical decisions." The work of the secretariat had come to a standstill after Ulbricht left for Moscow in early June and left much wanting in general. In Matern's opinion, the "secretariat has been turned from a political organ into Ulbricht's personal office, and its members “nodded their heads in agreement with all the proposals of the secretary-general.” Matern also complained about the state of local and regional party leadership, which, not used to independent decision-making, totally depended on direction from above. Communications with the central leadership were difficult since, as Matern explained, on Ulbricht's orders, telephone operators did not connect them (the local party leaders) with him." All of this was the result of the defective leadership methods on the part of Ulbricht whose motto was “No one can do anything without me.'” Matern announced that he would speak out against Ulbricht at the forthcoming Central Committee Plenum.75

The opposition to Ulbricht within the Politburo crystallized around the issue of the leadership structure. On June 25, the “organization commission," set up on June 6 to improve the workings of the Politburo, met for the first time and discussed key issues such as the dualism of Politburo and Secretariat, collective decision-making, and Ulbricht's leadership methods. The results of the discussion, tabled at the second meeting on July 2, called for an elimination of the post of secretary general — Ulbricht's position - and an enlargement of the Politburo which, following the Soviet model, would henceforth be called the “Presidium of the Central Committee.” While the secretariat of the Central Committee would be dissolved, a 4-man “Permanent Commission of the Presidium” would direct the implementation of the New Course according to Soviet instructions.76

The organization commission's recommendations were similar to proposals which Semenov, Sokolovskii and ludin sent to Moscow on June 24/25.77 Besides calling for additional aid to the GDR to improve the food supply of the population, a sharp reduction of GDR exports and occupation expenses, and greater internal party democracy, the Soviet representatives in Germany also favored a reorganization of the GDR government. The Soviet High Commissioner and his colleagues considered it necessary to “liquidate the Ministry of State Security” and to “relieve com[rade] Ulbricht of the responsibility of deputy prime minister of the GDR so as to enable him to concentrate his attention on the work of the C[entral] C[ommittee of the] SED." At the same time, the position of general-secretary should be abolished, the secretariat itself should be limited in its functions, re-staffed, and reduced in size. The proposals suggested to “radically renew the personnel of the Politburo,” removing from it those who do not “demonstrate the necessary capabilities” required for the leadership of the party and state in the current circum

stances. The People's Chamber should take on the

fessed that he did not have to be first secretary: “This takes responsibility for dismissing “less capable and less popular confidence which has to be renewed.”

” ministers" and replacing them with more popular person

Yet Ulbricht called the elimination of the secretariat alities, drawing more widely from among representatives "dangerous" and considered Zaisser's nomination of of other parties." Semenov, Sokolovskii, and ludin also Herrnstadt as first secretary "the logical consequence," called for investigations into the union leadership, a

thus reneging on the agreement" that had been reached in strengthening of the People's Police and changes in the the organization commission. Moreover, some members Free German Youth. In order to raise its international and now spoke up in his defense. Arguing that Ulbricht's domestic prestige, the new GDR regime should be invited resignation would cause damage to the party,” Erich to Moscow for an “official visit.”78 According to

Honecker objected to blaming Ulbricht alone for the Semenov's memoirs, Molotov's overall reaction to the situation, and Hermann Matern flatly stated that “U. must report was positive," but as far as Ulbricht is concerned, be first secretary." Playing for time, Ulbricht announced Semenov has drifted to the right."


that he would take a stand in the C[entral] C[ommittee]" Molotov's reaction, if reported correctly, spoke not plenum scheduled for later that month. only of his commitment to Ulbricht but also might have

In Moscow on July 8, Ulbricht and Grotewohl indicated the shifting balance of forces in Moscow in the apparently learned about Beriia's arrest and his alleged latter's favor. The day after the organization commission's plans for the GDR. It is likely that Ulbricht turned the meeting, on June 26, Beriia was arrested in Moscow. Most Beriia affair to his advantage, using his short presence in likely, the arrest had little to do with Beriia's views on Moscow to garner support for his position. It may not have Germany, but his more flexible position on socialism in been by accident that on the following day, Vyshinskii was the GDR, if he indeed had taken such a position, was informed of the cancellation of several of Semenov's, quickly seized by his opponents within the Kremlin to Sokolovskii's and ludin's recommendations. In any case, justify the action. Beriia's arrest probably brought any upon his return to Berlin, Ulbricht, probably backed by the discussion and reassessment of Soviet policy towards Soviets, went on the offensive, turning first against Zaisser Germany to an abrupt halt. By the second meeting of the and Herrnstadt. Ulbricht used the resolution on “The New organization commission on July 2, B. Miroshnishchenko, Course and the Renewal of the Party," drafted in June by who was participating in the meeting on Semenov's Herrnstadt in preparation of the forthcoming 15th SED behalf,80 objected to any immediate changes to the Plenum, to launch a massive attack against both Herrnstadt secretariat structure, thus indirectly reinforcing Ulbricht's and Zaisser when the Central Committee met on July 24position. Semenov himself apparently withdrew some of 26. Accusing Herrnstadt and Zaisser of behavior "hostile his earlier recommendations. About the same time,

to the Party" and alleging a connection between both of moreover, a Foreign Ministry subcommittee headed by them and Berija, Ulbricht managed to achieve the expulfirst deputy Foreign Minister Andrej Vishinskii, "can- sion of his two opponents from the Politburo. 82 celed" or postponed the implementation of key measures July, Ulbricht had weathered the most dangerous challenge in the Semenov-Sokolovskii-Iudin report, particularly to his leadership thus far. those which affected Ulbricht's control of state and party. Ulbricht's survival did not only mean the survival of

Grotewohl's notes on the night session of the Polit- his hard-line policies and Stalinist practices, many of buro on July 7-8, shortly before he and Ulbricht were to which were gradually reintroduced in the following leave for Moscow, reflect the volatile balance of forces months. With the decision to continue the support for within the SED Politburo.81 There was still considerable Ulbricht and the East German regime, Moscow shed the criticism of Ulbricht, led by Zaisser's statement that, while last ambiguities in its German policy. In the following Ulbricht was “no more responsible for the wrong course months, the Soviets took steps to boost the East German than we all," he was to blame for the brutal administrative regime's economic viability and internal support, first by methods which had "spoiled the Party." To leave the party agreeing to provide East Berlin with an extensive ecoapparatus in Ulbricht's hands, Zaisser argued, would "be nomic aid package, and later by an official termination of catastrophic for the new course.” Several Politburo

the reparations' payments. In the international arena as members sided with Zaisser. Hermann Rau, for example, well, Moscow sought to raise the prestige of its client doubted that Ulbricht had the will to change his working regime. In August, the Soviet leadership announced its methods and favored a change at the top. Anton

decision to turn the High Commission into an embassy. In Ackermann argued that the party had to recover but could March 1954, Moscow officially announced the GDR to be not do so with Ulbricht in the leadership. Alluding to the a “sovereign state.” The road was set for the “twodivisions within the Politburo, Fred Oelßner stated that “U. Germany doctrine,” espoused by Khrushchev in 1955, has considered all of us as stupid. W. has not learned his which guided Soviet policy in Germany until 1989. lessons." There would not be “any need for a first secre

Although the documents presented below shed much tary." Faced with such criticism, Ulbricht acknowledged new light on the 1953 crisis, the documentary record is that the criticism was correct and his behavior regarding fragmentary at best. While we have a pretty clear sense of

a the ostentatious birthday celebration mistaken. He pro- what went on in the SED Politburo, the decision-making

By late

process in Moscow still remains elusive. Key documents, such as the transcripts of the May 27 USSR Presidium meeting or the June 2-4 meeting with the SED leadership, have not yet been declassified by Russian archival authorities. Little is yet known about Malenkov's, Beriia's or Khrushchev's reaction to the events of June 16-17 or their conversations (if any took place) with Ulbricht and Grotewohl in early July. What role exactly did Semenov or Sokolovskii play? Fuller documentation from the Russian archives might allow for more conclusive answers to these questions.

1 Kurt Gregor, GDR Minister for Foreign and Inner-German Trade, during the 9 June 1953 SED Politburo meeting. See Note from S. Kruglov to Malenkov with an accompanying communication from the representatives of the MIA USSR P. Fedotov and 1. Fadeikin (printed below). 2.

Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter, Stefan Wolle (eds.). Der Tag X. 17. Juni 1953 (Berlin, 1995).

See the path-breaking work by Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989 (Chapel Hill, 1997), 36-38. 4

Armin Mitter/Stefan Wolle, Untergang auf Raten (Berlin, 1993). 5.

See D.M. Stickle (ed.), The Beriia Affair (New York, 1992); Delo Beriia. Plenum Ts KPSS. Ijul’ 1953 goda. Stenograficeskij otcet, Izvestija Ts KPSS 1 (1991), 139-214; 2 (1991), 141-208. 6

Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity. The Stalin Years (New York, 1996), 180. 7

On Churchill's initiative. see Klaus Larres, Politik der Illusionen (Göttingen, 1996). 8

Christian F. Ostermann, “Keeping the Pot Simmering, the United States and the East German Uprising of 1953,German Studies Review 19:1 (March 1996), 61-89. 9

"Stenographic transcript of the meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders on 5 December 1980 in Moscow," Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch), DY 30 J IV 2/2 A-2368; Michael Kubina/Manfred Wilke (ed.), Hart und kompromißlos durchgreifenDie SED contra Polen 1980/81 (Berlin, 1995),170.

The best surveys to date are Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Armin Mitter, Stefan Wolle (eds.). Der Tag X. 17. Juni 1953 (Berlin, 1995) and Manfred Hagen, DDR. Juni '53. Die erste Volkserhebung im Stalinismus (Stuttgart, 1992). 11 For a survey of the current state of the debate, see IlkoSascha Kowalczuk, “Die Ereignisse von 1953 in der DDR,” Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung (1996), 181186; and Torsten Diedrich, “Zwischen Arbeitererhebung und gescheiterter Revolution in der DDR,Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung (1994), 288-305. 12

Amy Knight, “Beria the Reformer," New York Times, 3 November 1993. 13

For a report on the conference, see Ruud van Dijk, “Der 17. Juni als Krise im Kalten Krieg,Deutschland Archiv 1 (1997), 291-293; CWIHP Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996/97), 355-357. 14 Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation (Cambridge, MA, 1995). 15 Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt? Die Reparationsleistungen der SBZ/DDR 1945-53 (Berlin:1993). 16 See CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 34-35, 48, for an English

translation of both Russian and German versions of the 7 April 1952 conversation. For an excellent recent treatment of this problem, Stefan Creuzberger, “Abschirmungspolitik gegenüber dem westlichen Deutschland im Jahre 1952,Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik in der Ära Adenauer, ed. Gerhard Wettig, (Bonn, 1997), 12-36. 17 See SED leader Wilhelm Pieck’s notes on the meeting with Stalin, as published in Wilfried Loth/Rolf Badstübner (eds.), Wilhelm Pieck Aufzeichnungen zur Deutschlandpolitik 19451953 (Berlin, 1994), 396-397. 18 Vladislav Zubok, “Unacceptably Rude and Blatant on the German Question.” The Succession Struggle after Stalin's death, Beriia and the significance of the debate on the GDR in Moscow in April-May 1953.” Paper presented at the conference on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996, 5. 19

Hope Harrison, “Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe,” Potsdam, November 1996; Gerhard Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung, ber Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953,Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins (Berlin, 1994), 190; James Richter, “Reexamining Soviet Policy Towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum,Europe-Asia Studies 4 (1993), 677. 20 Printed below. 21

Wladimir S. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow. Ein halbes Jahrhundert in diplomatischer Mission 1939-1991 (Berlin: 1995), 290. 22

AVP RF, f. 6, op. 12, p. 16, por. 261, 11. 6-7. The document was provided and translated by Hope Harrison (Lafayette College) for the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe,” Potsdam, November 1996. See the conference document reader The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17 June 1953 Uprising in East Germany: The Hidden History, ed. Christian F. Ostermann (Washington, DC, 1996). On 28 May, the Soviet Control Commission was indeed dissolved and replaced by a Soviet High Commission, which, at least in name, resembled its Western counterparts. Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 291. 23 Zubok, “Unacceptably Rude and Blatant on the German Question,” 5-6. 24

Gerhard Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953,Die Deutschlandfrage von der staatlichen Teilung Deutschlands bis zum Tode Stalins (Berlin, 1994), 183-197. 25

Report is quoted, without source reference, by David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin (New Haven, CT, 1997), 156.

Refugee numbers had significantly declined from 1950 to 1952 but almost doubled in 1953 (1953 total: 408,100). For an in-depth analysis of the East-West German migration see Helge Heidemeyer, Flucht und Zuwanderung aus der SBZDDR 1945/ 1949-1961 (Düsseldorf, 1994). 27

Report No. 44/B, Beria to CPSU Presidium, 6 May 1953, Archives of Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki (SVRA), file 3581, vol. 7, quoted in David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin, 157-158. 28 Printed below. 29

Semenov hints at his uneasy relationship with Chuikov in his Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 293. 30

Radio in the American Sector.




31 Printed below.

On the succession struggle, see the remarkable presentation by Mark Kramer on “The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Soviet Bloc: New Courses, Upheavals and the Beriia Affair” at the conference “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," Potsdam, November 1996. A revised published version of the presentation is forthcoming. 33

See “Delo Beriia,” 2 (1991), 144. 34 Nikita Khrushchev, “Die Aktion,” in Vladimir F. Nekrassow (ed.), Berija. Henker in Stalins Diensten. Ende einer Karriere (Berlin, 1992), 323-324; Albert Resis (ed.), Molotov Remembers. Inside Kremlin Politics. Conversations with Felix Chuev (Chicago, 1993), 334-335. 35

Resis, Molotov Remembers, 335. See also Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 180. 36 James Richter, Reexamining Soviet Policy towards Germany During the Beria Interregnum. CWIHP Working Paper No.3 (Washington, DC, 1992), 15-16 37 Vladislav Zubok, “Soviet Intelligence: The ‘Small Committee of Information, 1952-1953,Diplomatic History 19 (1995), 45372 (first published as CWIHP Working Paper No. 4 (Washington, DC, 1992)). 38

Vladislav Zubok/Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War (Cambridge, MA 1996), 159-162. 39 Printed below. 40

Stenographic Report of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, 31 January 1955, TsKhSD, f. 2, op.1, d. 127, 11. 6566. Other excerpts from this and other CC CPSU plenums appear in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin. 41 Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, with Gerold L. and Leona P. Schecter, Special Tasks, The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness A Soviet Spymaster (New York, 1994), 363-365. For a review of Sudopltov's memoirs see Wettig, “Zum Stand der Forschung über Berijas Deutschland-Politik im Frühjahr 1953,” 196-197; and Valdislav Zubok, “Atomic Espionage and Its Soviet “Witnesses””” CWIAP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), 50, 52-53. 42 Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 290-291. SED functionary Karl Schirdewan, who headed the Department of "Leading Organs of the Party and the Mass Organizations," writes in his 1995 memoirs that at that time, "Soviet comrades” told him that “your party will have to solve a great and difficult task and prepare for free and secret elections.” Aufstand gegen Ulbricht (Berlin, 47-48. 43 For details on Beriia's arrest, see Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant. (Princeton, 1993). 44 See statements by A. Filitov at the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe,” Potsdam, November 1996. 45 Rolf Stöckigt, “Ein Dokument von großer historischer Bedeutung vom Mai 1953,Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 32:5 (1990), 648-654. 46

Document printed in full below. 47 Herrnstadt, Herrnstadt-Dokument, 59. 48 Document printed in full below. 49

Document printed in full below. 50 Enver Hoxha, The Artful Albanian, ed. Jon Holliday (London, 1986), 147-151. 51 Printed below. 52 Unfortunately, it is still hard to follow exactly the dialogue, as for political reasons, the statements by the Soviet leaders were recorded separately from those of the Hungarians. 53 György Litvan, The Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Reform, Revolt and Repression 1953-1963 (London, 1996), 24-25.

Curiously, the East German crisis was not mentioned in the talks with the Hungarian leadership. 54 Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, 65. 55

Hope Harrison, “Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe,” Potsdam, November 1996. 56

Grotewohl Notes, SAPMO-BArch, NY 90/699; “Protokoll Nr. 33/35 der außerordentlichen Sitzung des Politbüros des Zentralkomitees am 6. Juni 1953," SAPMO-Barch J IV 2/2/287; Elke Scherstjanoi, “Wollen wir den Sozialismus?' Dokumente aus der Sitzung des Politbüros des ZK der SED am 6. Juni 1953," in Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 33:5 (1991), 658-680; Nadja Stulz-Herrnstadt, Das HerrnstadtDokument. Das Politbüro der SED und die Geschichte des 17. Juni 1953 (Hamburg, 1990), 74. 57 Printed below. 58 Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, 74. 59 One the events leading up to the June 16/17 uprising, see Christian Ostermann (ed.), “New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953,” CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 10-20. 60

See note 1. 61 Heinz Brandt, The Search for a Third Way, (Garden City, NY, 1970), 212; Fritz Schenk, Im Vorzimmer der Diktatur (Cologne, 1962), 203-204; see Harrison, “Politics in East Germany and Soviet Policy Towards East Germany Leading Up to and Following the June 1953 Uprising. Summary of Paper Prepared for the conference on “The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe," 7. 62 Brandt, The Search for a Third Way, 225. 63

See the documentation printed below. 64

Semenov and Grechko to Malenkov, Berija, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 16 June 1953, Archives of the Russian General Staff (AGSh], f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, 11. 1-3. 65

Grechko and Tarasov to Malenkov, Beriia, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 17 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, 11. 12-14. 66

Report by Col. Fadeikin to Sokolovskii, 19 June 1953, AGSh, f.16. o. 3139, d. 155, 11. 217-222. 67 Sokolovskii and Govorov to Malenkov, Berija, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 18 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16. op. 3139, d. 155, 1. 4-5. 68

Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 294. 69

Grechko and Tarasov to Malenkov, Beriia, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoian and Bulganin, 18 June 1953, AGSh, f. 16. op. 3139, d. 155, 11. 19-20.

Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 295. 71 Memorandum, Miroshnichenko and Lun’kov to Semenov, 4 July 1953, courtesy National Security Archive (Washington, D.C.). 72

Note from S. Kruglov to Malenkov with an accompanying communication from the representatives of the MIA USSR P. Fedotov and I. Fadeikin, AP RF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 925, 11. 156-165. (Printed in full below.) 73 Herrnstadt, Das Herrnstadt-Dokument, 74. 74 Printed below. 75

See also the memoirs of SED leader Karl Schirdewan, Aufstand gegen Ulbricht (Berlin, 1995), 49. 76 Wilfriede Otto, “Dokumente zur Auseinandersetzung in der SED,Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 5:32 (1990), 655-672


« 上一頁繼續 »