網頁圖片
PDF
ePub 版

77 The report, published in excerpt by the Cold War International History Project in 1995, was completed and most likely sent on 24 June. See Christian Ostermann, “New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953," 10-21. Semenov maintains that the report was sent 25 June. Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 297.

78

Sokolovskii, Semenov and Iudin to Molotov and Bulganin, 24 June 1953, AVP RF, f. 06, op. 12a, p. 5, d. 301, II. 1-51. See Ostermann, "New Documents on the East German Uprising of 1953;" Faina Nowik, "Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik, 1953-1955," Die sowjetische Deutschland-Politik in der Ära Adenauer, ed. Gerhard Wettig, (Bonn 1997), 57. In his memoirs, Semenov points out that the report also described the role Karl Schirdewan, the head of the important Central Committee department "Leitende Organe and Massenorganisationen der Partei" and later an outspoken critic of Ulbricht, had played. Semenov seemed to have favored Schirdewan's promotion to the Politburo at this time (Schirdewan was eventually promoted to the top party organ in at the 15th plenum).

79 Semjonow, Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow, 297.

80 Semenov was probably in Moscow for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum 2-7 July 1953.

81 Printed below.

82 See Ulbricht's final speech at the 15th Plenum, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (12 June 1957), 364-370.

MASTNY WINS

1997 GEORGE Louis BEER PRIZE

CWIHP is pleased to note that Dr. Vojtech Mastny has been awarded the George Louis Beer Prize of the American Historical Association for his book The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford University Press, 1996). The prize is given for the best book on European international history in the 20th century. A close collaborator of

CWIHP and the National Security Archive for many years, Dr. Mastny is currently in Europe as a fellow of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities in Essen, Germany, as well as the Manfred Woerner Fellow of NATO. In the fall of 1998, he plans to return to Washington to resume work on his next book about the origins of détente in the 1960s.

II.

Soviet Foreign Ministry Memorandum "On Further Soviet Measures on the German Question," ca. 28 April 1953

Top Secret Copy # 1

ON FURTHER SOVIET MEASURES ON THE GERMAN QUESTION

Considering that lately a number of important events have taken place concerning Germany (the Bundestag's ratification of the Bonn and Paris "agreements," the "1 intensification of militarization and fascism in Western Germany, Adenauer's trip to France, England, and the United States), and also stemming from the necessity for the USSR to retain the initiative on the German question, we should plan our further measures concerning Germany. These measures should promote the increase of Soviet Union's authority among the German people and contribute to further development of the movement of German democratic forces for the unification of Germany, against the Bonn and Paris "agreements," against the militarization and fascization of Western Germany.

For these purposes it is necessary:

1. To advance a proposal for the formation of a [unified] German Provisional Government, by the parliaments of both the German Democratic Republic and Western Germany, while preserving the existing governments of the GDR and Western Germany, with the aim of reunifying Germany on a democratic and peaceful basis.

The chief task of the all-German Provisional Government should be the preparation and carrying out of free allGerman elections without foreign interference. The Provisional Government will work out a draft of the allGerman electoral law on the basis of the electoral laws of the GDR and Western Germany and also bearing in mind the electoral law of the Weimar Republic. The Provisional Government will organize, if it deems necessary, an inspection of available conditions for carrying out democratic all-German elections, and it will also take the necessary measures to create the requisite conditions for carrying out such elections.

The Provisional Government will represent Germany in quadripartite negotiations on the question of concluding a peace treaty with Germany, which should begin without further delay.

Furthermore, the Provisional Government should be entrusted with discussing and resolving questions touching upon common interests of Germany, namely: representation of Germany in international organizations, questions of German citizenship, trade between the GDR and West Germany, postal and telegraph communications, railway and water communications [transportation links], scientific and technical collaboration, and other issues of an allGerman character.

After carrying out all-German democratic elections, the National Assembly of Germany, elected by the people, will ratify the German Constitution and will form the permanent Government of a united and independent Germany. With this in mind, the united democratic Germany will be allowed to field its own national armed forces, necessary for the defense of the country.

The proposal on the formation of an all-German Provisional Government will represent a new concrete step by the Soviet Government towards the national reunification of Germany, which will evoke a broad positive response among the German people. This proposal will help expose the position of the [other] three great powers [i.e., USA, Great Britain and France] on the German issue, directed at preventing German unification on a democratic and peaceful basis. The three great powers will have difficulty objecting to the formation of an all-German Provisional Government, since the existing governments of Western Germany and the GDR will be retained, and the Provisional Government, as its main task, will be responsible for preparing and carrying out all-German elections.

If the United States, England and France object to the proposal on the formation of an all-German Provisional Government by the parliaments of both the GDR and Western Germany, we, on our part, should offer to conduct a referendum amongst the entire population of Germany on this issue.

2. In order to create conditions that provide for the realization of truly equal and democratic elections without foreign interference on the whole territory of Germany, [we should] advance a proposal on the simultaneous withdrawal of all armed forces of the occupying powers, immediately after forming the all-German Provisional Government. At the same time, all foreign military bases located on German territory should be liquidated and the armed forces of any foreign power or a group of great powers, should be prohibited on German soil. Also prohibited should be the use, in any form, of human and material resources, of the German territory or any of its parts for purposes of war by one or another of the great powers or a coalition of great powers.

The proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of all occupation troops out of Germany in order to provide freedom for the all-German democratic elections will thoroughly undermine the slogan advanced in first order by the three great powers to carry out free all-German elections under international control. The great powers are very likely to decline the proposal to withdraw troops, but this would place them in a difficult situation in front of the German people. Accepting this offer would mean the withdrawal of American troops back across the ocean and the effective derailment of the aggressive plans of the North Atlantic [NATO] bloc in Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Government proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of occupation troops out of Germany, following the formation of an All-German Provisional Government, would find warm approval among the people of Germany,

including Western Germany and amongst certain parts of the German bourgeoisie.

3. For the purpose of further strengthening the German Democratic Republic, raising its own all-German and international prestige, as well as for the purpose of strengthening the USSR's influence on the German people and equally emphasizing the peaceful and friendly character of mutual relations between Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, it is advisable to carry out the following measures:

a.) To remove the control exercised by Soviet occupation authorities over the activities of GDR government organs and accordingly liquidate the Soviet Control Commission in Germany2 with its central and local agencies.

b.) Instead of the currently existing Soviet diplomatic mission in Berlin, establish an Embassy of the Soviet Union in the German Democratic Republic, entrusting it with functions of an all-German nature, stemming from the quadripartite agreements on Germany as a whole. In large cities of the GDR [we should] establish 7-8 Soviet consulates, to serve the needs of Soviet citizens and troops and to carry out other consular functions.

c.) To declare amnesty and return to their homeland the [German] prisoners of war, held in the USSR, [including those] convicted for crimes against the Soviet people, except those who have committed particularly grave crimes.

Removing control over the activity of governmental bodies of the GDR would promote the normalization of our relations with the GDR as a people's democracy, and strengthen the position of the Soviet government on the all-German question, described above in articles 1 and 2. The German population would see that the Soviet Union, not only in its diplomatic speeches but also in practice, adheres in its relations with Germany to a policy that takes into account the fundamental national interests of the German people.

4. For the purpose of rendering assistance to the German Democratic Republic for further development of its peaceful economy, building the basis of socialism, and raising the well-being of the working people, it is advisable to carry out the following measures:

a.) To reduce by half the remaining sum of reparation payments from the GDR;

b.) To transfer to the government of the GDR, on favorable terms and for the appropriate recompensation, all enterprises of GUSIMZ,3 located on GDR territory.

c.) To enter into negotiations with the GDR government on establishing a joint Soviet - German joint-stock company "Wismut," on the basis of [the] already existing enterprise of "Wismut."4

d.) To establish an official exchange rate for the German mark of the GDR in terms of the Soviet ruble.

5. To invite in the near future a government delegation from the GDR for an official visit to Moscow. To discuss with this delegation the aforementioned questions,

including the proposal for the formation of an all-German Provisional Government, and look into questions of an economic character, presented in article 4, as well as questions of broadening scientific-technical collaboration and exchange of specialists between the USSR and GDR, of the education of German students in higher educational establishments, etc.

[Source: AVP RF f. 6, op. 12, p.16, d. 259, ll.45-46. Provided by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive). Translated by Daniel Rozas (Johns Hopkins University)]

6

Memorandum, V. Chuikov, 5 P. Iudin, L. Il'ichey7 to G. M. Malenkov,8

18 May 1953

Soviet Control Commission in Germany

18 May 1953

population from the GDR to West Germany is growing, as is confirmed by the data furnished [in the box] below: Detailed data on social and age composition are contained in Appendix No. 1.10

Of this number, 320 persons exited across maritime and zonal borders during the [first] four months of 1953; the rest left through Berlin.

The increase in the number of persons moving from the GDR to West Germany can be explained by an intensification of the class struggle in the city and the countryside, and also by the fact that in the practical work of implementing major economic and political measures, administration often is substituted for political mass work, and certain ministries [and] local party and state organs commit gross errors and excesses in regard to different strata of the population.

After the second conference of the SED [in 1952], the government of the GDR and the SED CC took a number of Secret important decisions aimed at limiting capitalist elements in industry and trade, as well as the kulak class in the

copy No. pg. 00195 countryside.

In the Presidium of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union

to comrade G.M. MALENKOV

In keeping with instructions from the CPSU C[entral] C[ommittee], the Soviet Control Commission in Germany presents this report on the reasons for the departure of the population from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, and also on proposals to end these departures.

In its note to the CPSU CC of 15 March 1953, the Soviet Control Commission in Germany delivered a detailed analysis of the economic and political situation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite the general economic improvements and political strengthening of the GDR, the departure of the

All of this led to the fact that a portion of the peasantry, chiefly large [peasants], began to give up their land. On 1 April 1953, 442,8 thousand ha., or 7.3% of the entire arable agricultural area of all peasant farms, including 393,0 thousand ha. from farms having over 20 ha. land, or 26% of the agricultural area of these sorts of farms, were abandoned and vacant.

It should be noted that the measures to limit capitalist elements in the city and the countryside in many cases are implemented without sufficient political and economic preparation, as a result of which some party and governmental measures have found insufficient support among a significant portion of the populace.

II

With the general rise in the standard of living of the

[blocks in formation]

By social composition, those who have left the GDR fall into the following categories:

[blocks in formation]

populace, a disjunction between the growth of the populace's income and the growth of commodity circulation developed toward the beginning of 1953. The fund of wages paid out in the first quarter of 1953 was 17.3% greater than that of the first quarter of the previous year; the volume of commodity circulation over this period rose by only 10% at comparable prices, while commodity circulation in the first quarter of 1953 compared with the fourth quarter of 1952 shrank and consisted of 6.030 million marks against 7.361 million marks in the fourth quarter of 1952.

The under-fulfillment of the production plan of consumer goods in the absence of corresponding reserves and the non-fulfillment of the export-import plan, led to a sharp shortage of goods in the commercial network. In this way, the elevated requirements of the population were not wholly satisfied.

The autumn and winter of 1952-1953, which were difficult for the GDR, and the weak organization of harvest work led to a significant drop in the harvest of sugar beets, oil crops, potatoes and vegetables. Besides this, the unsatisfactory fulfillment of the plan for stockpiles and purchases of agricultural goods in 1952 led to difficulties in the supply of food to the populace.

This made it necessary to halt commercial sales of fats and sugar in the first quarter of 1953, to substitute partially rationed fats and sugar with other goods, to abolish ration cards for private-capitalist elements and persons of free professions (this affected about 500 thousand people), to abolish some additional ration cards for the intelligentsia, and also to raise the prices for meat given out through ration cards by 10-15%, and for commercially sold confectioneries by 12-50%.

With the cancellation of ration cards for footwear and for knitted goods, the general price level was left close to the previously effective commercial prices. Prices were raised on a significant portion of imported consumer goods.

During the entire winter, interruptions in the supply of coal and electricity to the populace in the republic occurred, as a result of which many schools, residential buildings, and socio-cultural [kul'turno-bytovye] establishments often went unheated.

III

Recently the government of the GDR made a series of decisions on strengthening punitive policy in the struggle against the theft of the people's property, on criminal sanctions for evading state agricultural quotas and taxes, on limiting the activity of private wholesale firms, and on purging certain regions of dubious elements of questionable class.11 These decisions are basically correct. However, during the implementation of these decisions manifold excesses are being committed, as is expressed in the intensification of different sorts of repressive measures in relation to the populace. As a result of this the arrest of citizens and convicted persons significantly increased: if in

the first half-year of 1952, 11,346 arrests were carried out, [and] in the second half-year – 17,471, then during just the first quarter of 1953, 14,348 arrests were carried out.

By the directive adopted by the GEC12 on 23 September 1948, "On punishments for violations of economic order," which is currently in effect, the police are given the right broadly to carry out arrests and searches only on the grounds of suspicion of economic crimes. On the basis of this directive, in 1952, 16,482 proceedings were instituted and 4,185 persons were arrested. In 1953, in only the first quarter, 5,094 proceedings were instituted and 2,548 persons were arrested.

There are many cases of incorrect arrests, unlawful and groundless searches in apartments and offices, [and] violations of the established arrest and custody procedure. On 1 April 1953, there were 54,876 persons in the jails of the GDR; of these, up to 13,141 had not yet had their cases reviewed by the courts.

IV

In the SED CC and in local party organs, there is an underestimation of the political significance of the populace's departure from the GDR to West Germany. This underestimation has manifested itself, in particular, in the SED CC directives. Thus, in letters from 6 January and 30 April of this year, no political evaluation was made of the issue and no measures are planned which would help bring about a fundamental change in the situation. In CC directives, the departure of party members from the GDR is not characterized as a party crime. Meanwhile, 2,718 members and candidates of the SED, and of these, 175 functionaries, were counted among those who left the GDR during the [first] four months of 1953. In addition, in that period, 2,610 members of the Union of Youth left. Party organs exert almost no influence over the mass democratic organs-labor unions, the Union of Youth, and the Women's League-in inducing them to carry out work to prevent the departure of the population from the GDR. The press and radio of the GDR weakly expose the slanderous propaganda emanating from West Germany about the refugees, weakly publicize the measures taken by the government of the GDR to accommodate refugees who have returned to the Republic, by giving them work [and] living quarters, and guaranteeing other rights to them, [and they] rarely organize statements by persons who have returned from West Germany. Newspapers, as a rule, remain silent about the facts of the migration of residents of West Germany to the GDR, and do not use their statements for propaganda purposes.

Party and governmental organs commit serious distortions in the implementation of the SED's policy with regard to the intelligentsia.

In the second half of 1952, the SED CC and the GDR government undertook a series of economic and political measures aimed at drawing the intelligentsia into active participation in cultural and economic construction. From 1 July 1952, the pay for engineering-technical and

scientific workers was significantly increased, and for the most outstanding scientific and technical personnel, high personal salaries of up to 15 thousand marks a month were established.

Despite this, the role of the intelligentsia in building the Republic and the necessity of involving the old intelligentsia is still underestimated within the party and the country. In a significant portion of enterprises, a sectarian relationship to the intelligentsia has still not been overcome. The intelligentsia is not drawn into active participation in the productive and social life of the enterprises.

There are serious drawbacks in the way ideological work with the intelligentsia is handled. In a crude and clumsy manner, demands are made for the reconstruction of all scientific work on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Due to this, scientists of the old school consider that, insofar as they are not Marxists, they have no prospects in the GDR.

Little attention is paid by the SED to organizing scientific discussions, to the free exchange of opinions, [and] the discussion of different problems in advanced science and practice, in the intelligentsia's milieu.

To date, the linking and exchange of scientific activity between scientists of the GDR and scientists of the Soviet Union and social democratic countries is still insufficiently developed.

A feeling of anxiety for their personal safety is evident among broad circles of the intelligentsia and most of all among the technical intelligentsia. 13 The instances of groundless accusations of sabotage constitute the reason for this sort of mood. The absence of the necessary explanatory work on this issue creates favorable conditions for the activity of enemies and the broad dissemination of all sorts of slanders.

V

West German and Anglo-American authorities are carrying out economic and political diversion aimed at disrupting the five-year plan and at discrediting the policy of the GDR government before the populace. They have worked out a system of measures to entice engineeringtechnical, scientific and highly-qualified workers from the enterprises and establishments of the GDR.

In West Berlin, a high exchange rate of the Western mark in relation to the Eastern mark is being artificially maintained, making it profitable for the West Berlin population to buy food in the GDR. On the other hand, the acute shortage of high-quality consumer goods in the GDR and their presence in West Berlin attracts a large mass of the residents of the GDR into the Western sector of Berlin. Providing West Berlin with a high level of supply of every imaginable good and lower prices for goods compared to the rest of West Germany has the aim of creating the impression among the population that a high standard of living in West Germany exists in comparison with the GDR.

One of the methods of enemy activity is to dispatch special recruiters to the GDR who engage in the enticement of qualified workers, engineers and technicians, and teachers of secondary and higher schools, to the West.

The West German authorities, the Americans, English, and French, systematically conduct propaganda on the radio in favor of the GDR population's departure for the West, send large quantities of provocative letters, and give provocative telephone warnings of allegedly imminent. arrests of GDR citizens.

VI

The church, especially of late, is displaying an active role in enemy propaganda against the GDR. The leaders of the Protestant and Catholic Churches located in West Germany have taken the path of open struggle against the GDR; in sermons and in multiple letters, the clergy calls upon the populace to flee to the West.

The SED CC is committing some mistakes in its relations with the Church.

On 27 January 1953, the SED CC made a decision on exposing the anti-democratic activity of the church youth organization "Junge Gemeinde."14 It was proposed not to start the exposure of the reactionary activity of "Junge Gemeinde" with broad propaganda work among the populace, but with the organization of trials. In connection with this instruction, the organs of the MfS carried out the arrests of some clergymen and members of "Junge Gemeinde" in February and March. Due to the inadequacy and unconvincing character of the material, however, the trials have not yet been held. Then the SED CC gave an order to begin unmasking "Junge Gemeinde" in the youth press. During the implementation of these instructions, the accusation was made across-the-board that all of the members of "Junge Gemeinde" were members of the terrorist West German youth organization (BDJ). 15 As a result of this, the campaign to expose the reactionary activity of "Junge Gemeinde" has currently aggravated relations between the church and the state.

At one of the meetings with the first secretaries of the

SED district committees, W. Ulbricht 16 gave the order that

open meetings were to be held in all institutions of higher learning and 12-grade schools of the League of FGU17 to expose the "Junge Gemeinde," in the course of which the expulsion of the leaders and most active members of "Junge Gemeinde" from schools and educational institutions was to be demanded. In certain schools the number of those expelled reaches 20-30 persons, and in each institution of higher education, the number of expelled students ranges from 5 to 20 persons, this in particular, has led to the fact that in March and April of this year alone, 250 people from 39 twelve-grade schools have fled to the West.

VII

In the interest of halting the departure of the population to West Germany, it seems expedient to recommend

« 上一頁繼續 »