Among those executed, there was DARCH, Alfred, born in 1910, a non-Party man and resident of Magdeburg, who, armed (with a reconnaissance rifle) and jointly with other rebels, had burst into the House of Justice in Magdeburg, took part in its devastation and had fired from there at the arriving units of the German People's Police and Soviet troops.

There was STRAUCH, Gerbert, owner of a private firm, also executed in Magdeburg, who had taken an active part in devastating the prison and releasing state criminals. GÖTTLING, Willi, the resident of West Berlin, born in 1918, was executed in Berlin. He confessed under interrogation that he had been recruited by American intelligence on 16 June while he was repeatedly visiting the West Berlin Labor Exchange and had received the order from the latter to drive to the Democratic Sector of Berlin and take an active part in the planned riots there. Joining with other rebels during the clashes with German People's Police units in the center of Berlin, GÖTTLING attacked a propaganda-vehicle of the German People's Police, which was calling for an end to the strike with a radio loud-speaker, threw the driver and the announcer out of the vehicle and brutally assaulted them. He called on the crowd to attack police and Soviet troops.

REPRESENTATIVE OF MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF USSR IN GERMANY

Colonel FADEIKIN

19 June 1953

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 217-222. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev]

Report from A. Grechko and Tarasov to N. A. Bulganin,

20 June 1953, 11:40 a.m.

OPERATIONS DIVISION,

MAIN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION
GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

Top Secret (Declassified)

To Comrade N.A. BULGANIN

I am reporting on the situation in the GDR and

Berlin at 10.00 a.m.(Moscow time), 20 June 1953

1. No riots were observed in Berlin and the GDR last night.

2. Enterprises in Berlin have resumed their routine operations since the morning of 20 June. There is still a pocket of strike movement in Magdeburg, where some enterprises have not resumed their operations yet. For instance, the workers of Electric Motor Plant in Wernigerode have entered the grounds of the plant but have not resumed their work. Moreover, the night and morning shifts at some plants and factories have not resumed their work in the following towns: Staßfurt (a plant), Halberstadt (furniture factory) and Ilsenburg

(veneer and furniture factories, Rail-Wheels Plant).

3. Exposure of provocateurs and instigators of street riots and strikes is continuing.

Overall, 8,029 provocateurs, rebels, suspicious persons, [and] offenders of the Soviet military authorities' orders were arrested and detained in the GDR; 33 rebels were killed, and 132 wounded. After sentencing by court martial, 6 active provocateurs were shot.

Seventeen supporters of the democratic power, government and party officers, were killed, and 166 wounded.

4. The state and disposition of the units of the Group are unchanged. There have been no losses. GRECHKO TARASOV Correctly." GENERAL OF THE ARMY SHTEMENKO 20 June 1953, 11.40 a.m. 65

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 34-35. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

[The following excerpt is from a telephonogram sent by V. Semenov and V. Sokolovskii in Berlin to V. Molotov and N. A. Bulganin, on 20 June 1953 at 5:50 p.m., describing the situation in the GDR that day.]

"We report on the situation in Berlin in the GDR at 12 o'clock, Berlin time, June 20.

The situation in the GDR and in East Berlin is generally peaceful. The partial strikes which took place at night in the cities of Staßfurt, Halberstadt and in the Stralsund shipyard have ceased. In the morning, provocative elements managed to conduct short meetings and strikes at the railway car repair factory in the city of Halberstadt, in the Helsford shipyard (Rostock district), at the medicine factory in the city of Wernigerode (Magdeburg district). In addition, demands for the liberation of the arrested ring-leaders of the disturbances have surfaced. The strikes which began yesterday at several small enterprises in the city of Ilsenburg in the region of Magdeburg (about 2,500 workers in all) are continuing.

From the villages we are informed that among many workers who took part in the strikes of June 17-18, a sobering-up is taking place. These workers are stating regrets about the disturbances which arose and are distancing themselves from the provocateurs. But at the same time they often state that the discontent of the workers should not be mixed with the actions of provocateurs, as, allegedly, the government of the GDR is doing. A leading article written by us and published in today's Neues Deutschland provides the necessary orientation on this issue.

According to the SED agitators, a majority of the Berlin workers with whom they spoke have a negative opinion of the actions of the provocateurs, but some of

them are still pleased that the demonstration occurred. A readiness to work off the time lost because of the strikes is universally voiced.

The workers who did not take part in the strikes sharply condemn the strikers and demand severe punishment for the provocateurs. In many enterprises the workers adopt resolutions which express trust in the government of the GDR and state the necessity of raising vigilance.

Mass purchases of produce by the population, as was evident on June 16-17, is not observed. In a numbers of cities a certain increase in withdrawals from savings banks can be noted. The payment of money from accounts is taking place without restrictions.

A series of cases has been noted in which provocateurs agitate among the workers to the effect that the decision of the Politburo of the SED CC, which was published in connection with the new political course in the GDR, is directed at defending the interests of the private sector [and] the kulaks and not those of the workers. They say that the SED has been reborn, having taken the path of supporting the bourgeoisie. In the districts of Neubrandenburg and Suhl, the withdrawal of several hundred peasants from [agricultural] collective [production] cooperatives has been noted.

In the district of Steglitz, in the American sector of Berlin the regional committee of the SED has been broken up. The first secretary of the regional committee, Pirsch, and regional committee employee Firman were arrested and taken away in an undisclosed direction.

West Berlin newspapers speak of the arrival in West Berlin of the American High Commissioner, Conant, and the deputies of the English and French High Commissioners. The exchange rate of the Eastern mark has remained stable throughout all of these days and has stood at 1:5.40. On June 20, the Berlin military commandants permitted theatre and movie operations until 9 p.m."

on 17 June 269,460, including 66,000 in Berlin; There were minor demonstrations in some localities. There were no demonstrations in Berlin.

The organizers of riots and strikes intended to seize power and abolish the democratic regime in GDR.

The demonstrators, headed and instigated by provocateurs, broke into premises occupied by the SED and units of the Ministry of State Security of GDR as well as stateowned shops, released convicts from the prisons, attempted to capture some administrative buildings and important municipal facilities such as banks, post offices, telegraph offices, [and] power stations. There were some beatings and dispersals of the units of people's police and workers who went on with their work and did not want to take part in the strikes.

The attitude of [the East] German people towards the events of 17-19 June 1953 has varied. The most progressive part of German population has been outraged by the actions of the West Berlin provocateurs. Some Germans have been indifferent to the events. Others have welcomed them. A significant strata of society are satisfied with the most recent decisions of the GDR government aimed at improving the living standard of German people.

The bourgeois parties have responded very coldly to the events. The reactionary elements of the Christian Democratic Union have demanded that the current government, as the one that made some mistakes, resign and let the Christian-Democratic Union become the governing party.

The occupation (US, British, French) forces in West Berlin have been on higher alert since 17 June 1953, guarding military facilities, government and administrative buildings as well as the borders with the Soviet sector of Berlin. The Commandant of the British sector of Berlin declared martial law on 17 June 1953.

No fresh military units were observed arriving in West Berlin from 17 to 24 June 1953.

27 June 1953

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL F. FEDENKO

[Source: AGSh, f. 16, op. 3139, d. 155, ll. 31-33. Provided and translated by Viktor Gobarev.]

Letter, L. Beriia to G. Malenkov, 1 July 1953

To the CC CPSU Comrade Malenkov

Dear Georgii!

During all these four days and nights that were hard for me, I gave considerable thought to everything, concerning the activity on my side during the last months after the plenum of the CC CPSU, concerning [our] work as well as you personally - and some comrades of the CC Presidium and I subjected my actions to severest criticism, disapproved of myself strongly. Particularly grave and inexcusable is my behavior towards you, where I am a guilty party one hundred percent. Along with other comrades, I also strongly and energetically got down to work with the sole idea to do everything possible and not to let all of us flop without comrade Stalin and to maintain the new leadership of the CC and the government by action. According to the existing instructions of the CC and the government, building up the leadership of the MVD and its local organs, the MVD proposed to the CC and the government on your advice and on some issues on the advice of com. Khrushchev N.S. a number of worthwhile political and practical initiatives, such as: on the rehabilitation of the doctors, rehabilitation of the arrested of the so-called Mingrel Nationalist Center in Georgia and the return of the falsely-exiled from Georgia. On [sic] the Amnesty, on liquidation of the passport regime, on correction of the deviation of the party line in nationality policy and in the repressive measures in Lithuanian SSR, Western Ukraine [sic] and western Belorussia [sic], but the criticism is completely justified, the criticism by com. Khrushchev N.S. and the criticism by the other comrades at [the session of] the CC Presidium; with my last participation, to my erroneous wish to send along with the decisions of the CC also the information memoranda of the MVD. Of course, one reduced to a certain degree the significance of these very resolutions of the CC and, that an inadmissible situation emerged, that the MVD, as if it corrects Central Committees of Commun. [sic] parties of Ukraine, Lithuania and Belorussia, while the role of the MVD was limited to implementation of the resolutions of the CC CPSU and the government. I would frankly admit that my insisting on the dispatch of the memoranda was stupidity and political short-sightedness, particularly since you advised me not to do it. My behavior at the session of the Presidium of the CC, and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, very often incorrect and inadmissible [behavior] that introduced nervousness and excessive harshness, I would say, as I have thought well about it and realized, [this behavior] went so far as to [constitute] inadmissible rudeness and insolence on my part toward comrade Khrushchev N.S. and Bulganin N.A. during the discussion on the German question [sic], of course, here I am guilty without question and have to be denounced thoroughly. At the same time, along with all of you, I tried

to introduce initiatives at the Presidium [sic] aimed at the correct solution of issues, such as the Korean, the German, the responses to Eisenhower and Churchill, the Turkish, the Iranian, etc.

My behavior during the reception of the Hungarian comrades [was] untactful, nothing could justify it.66 The proposals about Nagy Imre should not have been introduced by me, but you should have done it, but at that moment I sprang up idiotically, and besides, along with correct remarks I made some loose remarks and was overly familiar, for which, of course, I should be given a good rap [vzgret]. But I must say in all sincerity that I thoroughly prepared myself and made all my assistants prepare themselves for the sessions of the CC and the government, so that within the limits of my strength and abilities [I tried] to assist in [finding a] correct solution of the issues under discussion. If and when I introduced initiatives, I revised them several times, together with the comrades collaborating with me, so as not to make a mistake and not to let the CC and the government down. In the Council of Ministers I left and had no time to introduce a report and draft resolution on reorganizing the award procedures [nagradnikh del], for I busily worked on that during about two months. As you know, we mulled over [vynashivaly] this question for a long time even while comrade Stalin was [still] alive. Concerning the comrades I work with, I always sought to be a man of principles, of party norms, demanding, so that the orders given to them were fulfilled, as it was required in the interests of our party and our government. I have never had any other kinds of relations with the above-mentioned comrades. You can take, for instance, the leading officials in the MVD. Coms. [Sergei] Kruglov, [Amaiak Zakharivich] Kobulov, [Ivan A.] Serov, Maslennikov, [Piotr] Fedotov,67 Stakhanov, [Yevgeny] Pitovranov, [Vitalii V.] Korotkov, Sazykin, Gorlinsky, [Sergei A.] Goglidze, Ryasnoy, [Pavel] Sudoplatov, Savchenko, Raykhman, Obruchnikov, Meshik, Zyryanov and many others, nothing else they had from me other than my demands, how to better organize the struggle with the enemies of the Soviet state, within the country as well as outside. When comrade Stalin passed away, I named you, without thinking, as did other comrades, to be the chairman of the government and that I always considered and consider to be the only right choice. Subsequently I became even more convinced that it is you who will successfully lead together with the ruling collective of the CC and the government. Therefore, my tragedy is that as I have already said earlier, during more than ten years we have been true Bolshevik friends, worked with all our soul under various complicated conditions and were together in [one] mind and nobody disrupted our friendship, so valuable and necessary for me and now exclusively on my own fault, [sic] I lost everything that held us together.

Lavrentii Beriia 1 July 1953

[Source: AP RF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 463, l. 163-174. Published in Istochnik, 4 (1994), 4-8. Translated by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

lated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie.]

[The following excerpt is from a 4 July 1953 telephonogram from Soviet High Commission officials Miroshnichenko and Lun’kov to High Commissioner V. Semenov. 168

"In connection with the events of June 17, the movement of all types of transport and pedestrians across the sector border between East and West Berlin, as well as between the GDR and East Berlin through West Berlin, was halted.

At present in East and West Berlin, the metro, the city railroad and the tramway run separately, which causes dissatisfaction on the part of the GDR and East Berlin population. Up to June 17, 83 thousand workers and white-collar workers, who live on GDR territory adjacent to the western sector of Berlin but work in East Berlin, used the city railway. Now they use a bus, steam train or some other form of transport to get to their place of work, making several stops on the way. Such trips, which previously took 30-40 minutes, now require up to 2 or 3 hours one-way.

Workers and white-collar workers and other strata of the population express serious discontent with these circumstances, and turn to the government of the GDR with the request that it change the existing transport system. In connection with this we consider it expedient to carry out the following measures on the morning of July 6:

1. In the morning and evening hours, to organize electric train traffic from the GDR to East Berlin and back without stops in the western sectors of the city.

2. In order to improve the travel of the populace living in western sectors and working in the eastern sector of Berlin, and vice versa, to open five check-points on the sector boundary in addition to the existing three points.

3. For the residents who live in communities in the GDR located close to the western sectors of Berlin but work in West Berlin, to organize electric train traffic from the GDR to certain stations of West Berlin.

[Our] friends (com. Ulbricht) fully agree with the measures we are proposing and request that they be informed about the decision taken on these proposals today, in order for them to be able to announce the decision on the radio and to calm the population.

In relation to the decision by the SED Politburo to request the High Commissioner of the USSR in Germany to open the sector border, Ulbricht stated that this issue could be examined after the implementation of the aforementioned measures.

We ask for your instructions."

[Source: AVP RF, f. 82, op. 41, por. 93, p.280, ll.61-62. Trans

O. Grotewohl's Handwritten Notes on the SED CC Politburo Meeting 8 July 1953

Politburo 7/8/53

Grotewohl: reports on 2 commission sessions of the reorganization commission

Herrnstadt: refuses to take office of first secretary Honecker: one cannot blame Ulbricht alone. It would damage the Party if U[lbricht] would resign as Gen[eral] Sec[retary] and as First Secretary. Proposal for supplementing Wandel-Winzer.

Zaisser: my suggestion [is] Herrnstadt since he was more in tune with the people than we [were]. Proposal is not an ideal solution. My argument is: W.U. is no more responsible for the wrong course (2nd Party Conference) than we all are. His fault is the rigid administering-wrong education of the cadres etc. That has spoiled the Party, the New Course cannot be implemented with this attitude. He therefore has to be kept at a distance from the party apparatus. [To leave] the apparatus in the hands of W.U. would be catastrophic for the New Course.

Ulbricht: The proposal by Herrnstadt + Zaisser for the elimination of the secretariat is dangerous. The proposal by Zaisser to name Herrnstadt as First Sec[retary] is the logical consequence.

Zaisser: protests against [this]. U. had agreed on the elimination of the Secretariat.

Herrnstadt: likewise

Rau: U.'s work methods inhibit the Party. Does U. have the will to change this? The past weeks have not shown this. If somebody other than Walter takes over the party organization and becomes first secretary, this would be better.

Ackermann: one also has to change the cabinet. Gr[otewohl] has to be obligated to express in [illegible] that no decisions had yet been made.

The Party has to recover but not with W.U. Ebert: for secretaries. It would be a gain for the Party if Com. W.U. would state himself that somebody else had to be first secretary.

E. Schmidt: I was completely frightened, welcome the free and serious presentation by Zaisser. You [Ulbricht] cannot remain any longer at the top of the party.

Matern: U. must be first secretary.

Oelẞner: H[errnstadt]'s and Zaisser's appearance signifies the existence of factions. U. has considered all of us stupid. W. has not learned his lessons. One has to work as a collective. There is no need for a first secretary. Instead collective decision-[making].

Jendretzky: W. has learned nothing.

Mückenberger: there was no central leadership for the districts. Everybody is overworked.

Gr[otewohl]: I can not make a final statement in

Moscow

W.U.: To acknowledge the criticism was correct. My behavior [regarding the ostentatious celebration of my] birthday [was] mistaken. I will take the stand in the C[entral] C[ommittee]. I am not of the opinion that I have to be first secr[retary]. This takes confidence which has to be renewed again.

U: Proposals by H[errnstadt] and Zai[sser] i[n] [the] committee were an experiment. I will make a statement before the CC.

In the last few days, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply, Com. Wach, [and] the members of the Politburo of the SED CC, Coms. Oelẞner and Matern 71 in conversations with the executives of the apparatus of the MIA of the USSR in Germany, informed them on their own initiative of several noteworthy facts about the situation in the Politburo of the SED CC after the June events in the GDR.

1. In a 30 June conversation with the head of the apparatus division, representative com. Popov, com. Wach shared his impressions about the meeting of the Politburo of the SED CC of 9 June 1953, at which the report of the deputy prime-minister Rau72 on the redistribution of capital investment was presented.

Rau proposed to save 1,300 million marks of capital investment in heavy industry and to direct them toward the financing of light and other branches of industry which supply the needs of the populace, but he stated at the same time that he personally disagreed with cutting expenditures on capital investment in heavy industry.

said:

Speaking at the meeting of the Politburo, Ulbricht

"I do not agree with the planned sum of 1,300 million

marks. We cannot free up such resources. Rau's plan disorganizes the national economy, and our economy is already disorganized as it is. I have been to a series of enterprises and have established that the workers are worried not so much by rises in the output norms as by the disorganization of the economy, [and] the lack of a normal food supply. Industrial enterprises cannot work normally if they are supplied with raw materials and materials to [only] 40% of their needs. Rau's project must be reexamined, in particular on the issues of external trade." In his address, the chairman of the State Planing Commission, Leuschner73 also noted that Rau's plan was unrealistic. This plan, he pointed out, relied on the resources that were supposed to be freed up as a result of limiting expenditures on heavy industry, but all of these resources had already been used to meet other needs and there were practically no funds available. Leuschner also pointed out that Rau, in introducing his proposals, did not agree on them with the members of the commission created to locate resources for financing the measures projected in the government decree of 25 June.

At the meeting, the Minister of Ore-Mining Industry Selbmann 74 stated:

"I believe that we must not curtail expenditures on heavy industry. It is incomprehensible to me why it is necessary to close down the construction of enterprises temporarily if 50% of the work is not yet completed. If resources are refused to me, I will have to reduce the output of steel, and that will be reflected in light industry: the output of machines will be reduced, mines will stop working, workers will have to be laid off, not to mention that stopping work in some mines will lead to their flooding with water."

The Minister for Machine Construction, Ziller75, sharply objected to the withdrawal of 100 million marks previously designated for capital investment in energy production. "I ask,” he said, “who is supposed to, and at the cost of what resources, carry out the Republic's program of energy-supply? You yourselves have said a lot about the necessity of carrying out this program. Such a plan as that proposed by Rau cannot be carried out. If it is taken as a basis [for action], then I cannot deliver the necessary machines for light industry and am not in a condition to fulfill the plan on the supply of electrical equipment."

Oelßner, Elli Schmidt,76 Ackermann,77 Strassenberger,78 and others also spoke in opposition to Rau's plan.

The Minister of State Security Zaisser noted on the subject: "From listening to the statements by our comrades, one gets the impression that capital investment in heavy industry not only must not be cut, but, quite the opposite, must be further increased. But where can the resources be taken from? Rau gave no answer on this issue."

Ulbricht spoke a second time, saying: "In my opinion, we should turn to the Soviet government with the request