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four Category 2 divisions, which could be mobilized very rapidly when necessary. Because Category 3 forces normally took at least one to three months to bring up to full readiness, it is doubtful that any were included in the initial mobilization on 28-29 August. The allocation of Category 2 tank divisions within the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts did not quite correspond to the numbers stipulated in the Suslov Commission's directive (the Baltic Military District had two Category 2 tank divisions and one Category 2 motorized division, whereas the Belorussian Military District had only one Category 2 tank division and one Category 2 motorized division), but the discrepancy was undoubtedly resolved by a slight adjustment in the geographic origin of the tank divisions (i.e., two came from the Baltic Military District and one from the Belorussian). Using the lower figure of 50 percent as the manpower strength of the four Category 2 divisions, one can see that some 22,000 reservists would have been needed to bring the four up to full strength. The other 3,000 reservists presumably would have been allocated to various support and logistical roles. Hence, the total number of mobilized reservists in this initial phase on 28-29 August 1980—that is, 25,000—seems perfectly plausible.
Soviet Line Divisions in the Western USSR, Late 1980
Readiness Category Tank Divisions Motorized Rifle
Two possible factors may account for this gap.
First, it might be argued that some or all of the five to seven extra divisions would have been Category 3 forces (so-called “cadre divisions” or “inactive divisions”) rather than Category 2. If all seven were Category 3 motorized rifle divisions (of the fifteen that were available), roughly 70,000 reservists would have been needed to bring them up to full strength. The other 5,000 reservists could then have been assigned to support and logistical functions.22 This explanation may seem plausible at first glance, but it actually is problematic. It is true that all three of the Soviet motorized rifle divisions that were brought up to full strength as of December 1980 were originally Category 3 divisions. The weeks that passed in the autumn of 1980 had permitted enough time for all the pre-mobilization training and preparations of those units to be completed. But there is no evidence that Category 3 forces were slated for a potential second stage of mobilization (whose planning was authorized by the 28 August directive). On the contrary, there is strong reason to believe that the “constantly ready divisions” designated for a hypothetical second stage were Category 2 forces (of which at least eight were available, as shown in Table 1) rather than Category 3. Soviet military commanders were willing to draw on Category 3 forces when they had ample time in the fall of 1980 to carry out pre-mobilization training and preparations for the projected Soyuz-80“exercises." (scheduled for early December); but because they were not actually mobilizing any of the additional five to seven Soviet divisions needed for a possible second stage, they would have wanted to be able to mobilize the extra divisions very rapidly if circumstances so warranted. Hence, it is highly unlikely that they would have relied on anything other than Category 2 forces for a second-stage mobilization if such a mobilization had been deemed necessary. The much more numerous Category 3 forces were useful when sufficient lead-time was available to mobilize for the first stage of Soyuz-80, but if a second
a stage had been necessary at short notice, the Soviet Army would have wanted to rely on the eight Category 2 forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts, supplemented perhaps by Category 2 forces in other parts of the western USSR and by combat-ready units from the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe.
A more plausible explanation for the high number of reserves in the projected second phase is that Soviet military planners wanted a margin of safety in case they needed to mobilize more than seven extra divisions. Authorization to plan for the mobilization of just five to seven extra divisions, as stipulated in the directive, may have seemed enough for an initial request. But Soviet planners undoubtedly wanted leeway to proceed with a larger mobilization if circumstances so warranted. They could have mobilized at least eight Category 2 divisions in the western USSR (as shown in Table 1), and they might have wanted additional reservists to fill out Category 2 divisions that could have been brought in from elsewhere.
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Note: These forces potentially could have been supplemented by other forces in the western USSR outside the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts.
The authorized numbers for the hypothetical second phase, however, are somewhat less easy to reconcile. If the additional 75,000 reservists were designated to flesh out five to seven more Category 2 divisions, the number of reservists was considerably higher than it should have been. Even if one assumes that seven (rather than five) additional Category 2 divisions would have been mobilized and that all seven were motorized divisions (with higher troop strength), only 43,750 reservists would have been needed to bring the seven divisions up to full strength. Some of the remaining 31,250 reservists might have been assigned to support and logistical roles, but it is unlikely that this would have accounted for more than about 8,000 to 10,000. Hence, a gap of well over 20.000 remains.
Indeed, it seems likely that by December 1980 the Soviet three mobilized Soviet divisions rather than four (the Army was planning for the possible mobilization of
number specified in the East German documents and the another eleven divisions rather than just five to seven. initial number mobilized on 28 August under the Suslov East German military documents and the testimony of a Commission's directive), the difference is readily former Polish General Staff officer, Colonel Ryszard explained by East German military charts prepared for Kukliński, both refer to a total of as many as fifteen Soviet Soyuz-81.2 These charts reveal that after four Soviet divisions that would have taken part in a two-stage
divisions were mobilized on 28-29 August and then process.23 (Four would have come in initially, and eleven demobilized, and after pre-mobilization training got under could have served as reinforcements in a second stage.)
way in the fall of 1980 for three Category 3 motorized rifle Clearly, the planning that began in late August 1980 for divisions, the complexion of the scenario was altered the possible mobilization of an additional 75,000 reservists somewhat. Instead of three tank divisions and one - the level stipulated in the Suslov Commission's
motorized rifle division, the contingent of four Soviet memorandum — enabled Soviet military officials to divisions was supposed to include an airborne division to expand their efforts very quickly so that a second-stage go with three motorized rifle divisions. Because Soviet mobilization might have covered as many as eleven extra airborne divisions were always maintained at full combat divisions. Although some of the extra divisions might readiness, one of these divisions could have immediately have come from the combat-ready divisions in the USSR's joined the three full-strength Soviet motorized rifle Northern Group of Forces (which had two) and the Group divisions in early December 1980 to move into Poland of Soviet Forces in Germany (which had nineteen), Soviet under the guise of an "exercise." (U.S. intelligence sources planners undoubtedly wanted to minimize their drawdown at the time detected unusual preparations by a Soviet of the Groups of Soviet Forces. Hence, they would have airborne division in the Baltic Military District, which wanted to be ready to rely on as many Category 2
presumably would have been the unit sent in.) divisions as possible.
Thus, the fundamental scenario for the entry of Soviet Whatever the precise explanation may be, there is no forces into Poland, adjusted for the types of divisions doubt that the numbers in the memorandum pertaining to a included, is corroborated by evidence from all the newly second phase of troop mobilization were large enough to available sources. give Soviet military planners a substantial degree of
To the extent that this scenario was intended as a real latitude.
option and not just a means of exerting pressure, these Fifth, the projected size of each of the two stages of findings suggest that Soviet leaders in late November 1980 mobilization, as laid out in the memorandum, sheds
were seriously preparing to send troops to Poland in early valuable light on Soviet military options vis-a-vis Poland. December to help the authorities there impose martial law. The initial mobilization, on 28-29 August, applied to four It is crucial to note, however, that any such intervention Soviet divisions in the western USSR: three tank divisions would have been intended to support the regime, not to and one motorized rifle division. These four divisions dislodge it. In that sense, the scenario was fundamentally were soon demobilized, but the scenario outlined in the 28 different from the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August August directive, as noted above, was largely preserved. 1968, which was intended to eliminate the reform-minded Top-secret East German military documents regarding Communists led by Alexander Dubcek and bring in a units slated to take part in the Soyuz-80 "exercises" in hardline regime. Poland in early December 1980 mentioned four Soviet
The reason that this option ultimately was not carried divisions.24 According to the East German documents, the out is that by early December 1980 both Jaruzelski and four Soviet divisions were supposed to join two
Kania had made clear to Soviet leaders that they were not Czechoslovak tank divisions, one East German tank
yet ready to impose martial law. Under those division, and four Polish mechanized divisions in the first circumstances, they warned, the entry of Soviet, East stage of “exercises.” (The four Polish divisions were German, and Czechoslovak troops would greatly included only after Jaruzelski insisted on it.) Because the aggravate the situation. The result, according to Kania and numbers of Soviet divisions cited in the East German Jaruzelski, might be large-scale violence, which could documents are identical to figures in the Suslov
spiral out of control. The two Polish leaders promised that Commission's directive, this implies that the option of a if they were given a bit more time, they could resolve the limited Soviet intervention in Poland, as envisaged in the crisis without having to rely on intervention by Soviet directive for late August 1980, was basically the same troops. If Kania and Jaruzelski had instead been amenable option under consideration in early December.
to the entry of Soviet forces on 8 December (the scheduled The numbers in the East German materials and the starting date for the "exercises”), the scenario undoubtedly Suslov Commission's directive are fully in line with would have been carried out as planned. But because the evidence from U.S. photoreconnaissance satellites, which Polish leaders were not yet ready to accept allied troops, in mid- to late December 1980 revealed that three Soviet Moscow's plans had to be put on hold. motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were
The second stage of troop mobilizations, involving combat-ready. Even though the satellites detected only another five to seven Soviet divisions, would have been
Our common goal should be to resolve the crisis without having to send allied armies into Poland. All socialist states should strive toward this end. Unless the Polish state security organs and Polish army are deployed, outside support cannot be expected, since it would cause international complications. The Polish comrades must try first to solve their problems on their own. But if they cannot manage on their own and appeal for help, that type of situation would be very different from one in which (Soviet) troops had been deployed in Poland from the outset.28
It is far from clear that Soviet intervention under these circumstances would have made much sense. Polish officials had discreetly warned Kulikov that “it is even possible that if other Warsaw Pact troops move into Poland, certain units (of the Polish army) might rebel." Because Soviet troops were already deeply embroiled in Afghanistan, the last thing the Soviet Politburo wanted was to provoke a large-scale conflict in Europe, which might drag on for months. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union went to such great lengths in 198081 to ensure that any prospective intervention by allied forces would be fully supported by Polish leaders.
* * *
carried out only if “the situation in Poland deteriorates further” and “the main forces of the Polish Army go over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces.” These rather vague formulations do not shed much light on the prospective timing of a second-phase mobilization, but even if the second phase were fully implemented, the numbers involved do not suggest that Soviet leaders were ever seriously planning to invade Poland in the same way they intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The numbers in question were simply too small. Judging from the size of the invading force deployed in Czechoslovakia in 1968, it seems likely that Soviet leaders would have wanted to mobilize at least 30 Soviet divisions if they were contemplating an invasion of Poland that would have been aimed at neutralizing the Polish army, crushing all armed resistance, and establishing a pro-Soviet regime. Secret estimates by U.S. military intelligence analysts in the fall of 1980 predicted that Soviet leaders would want to mobilize at least 30 divisions for a full-scale invasion of Poland.26 Some U.S. intelligence cables from Eastern Europe put the figure even higher, at around 45.27 These numbers would have made sense if the Soviet Politburo had been contemplating an invasion of Poland similar to the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But the numbers given in the 28 August memorandum fall so far short of that level that they could not possibly be for the same type of contingency.
It is conceivable, of course, that the 28 August memorandum was superseded by other documents that authorized the Soviet defense ministry to plan for the mobilization of some 15 to 20 further divisions, making a total of at least 30. There is no evidence, however, that this was the case. Following the demobilization of the four Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions that were briefly mobilized on 28-29 August 1980, only three Soviet motorized rifle divisions in the western USSR were fully mobilized during the crisis. The figures provided by East German military sources and by Ryszard Kukliński indicate that as many as fifteen Soviet divisions might eventually have been brought up to full combat readiness if the situation had deteriorated. However, that figure, which was never attained, was still vastly short of 30 (not to mention 45, a figure that many U.S. intelligence officials were wont to cite all through the crisis). No documentation or other evidence gives any reason to believe that the Soviet defense ministry at any time was planning for a Czechoslovak-style operation.
On the other hand, the new evidence does suggest that, at least for a while, Soviet leaders were seriously considering the option of a limited military intervention in Poland. This option loomed large in late August 1980 and again in early December 1980. The Soviet leadership's preference all along was to have the Polish authorities implement martial law on their own as soon as possible. But if that goal proved infeasible, the Soviet Politburo was willing to provide help, at least during the first several months of the crisis. Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, emphasized this point when he spoke with Kania and Jaruzelski in Warsaw in early April 1981:
Even though a good deal of new evidence shows that the Soviet Union made extensive plans and preparations for military intervention in Poland in 1980-81, this does not necessarily mean that there was ever a firm intention in Moscow to send in troops, especially if the Polish Communist regime was actively opposed to such a step. There is still not—and may never be—any way to know whether the Soviet Union would have invaded Poland if Polish leaders had openly refused to impose martial law or if the martial law operation in December 1981 had collapsed and widespread violence had broken out. None of the new evidence has resolved that question, and perhaps none ever will. Nevertheless, three things do now seem clear: first, that Soviet leaders for some time were willing to send in a limited number of Soviet divisions to help the Polish authorities impose martial law; second, that this option would have been pursued only if Polish leaders had supported it and been willing to make good use of the incoming forces; and third, that Soviet leaders wanted to give themselves fall-back options for other military contingencies in case the situation in Poland took a disastrous turn.
Not until mid- to late 1981 did the situation in Poland change enough to permit Soviet leaders to deemphasize the military option. Once Kania was gone from the scene and Jaruzelski was ensconced in all the top posts, Soviet officials had much greater confidence that martial law could be introduced in Poland without outside help. Some form of military option was still present, but the scenarios that loomed so large in late August and early December 1980 had largely receded by late 1981. Even so, the Suslov Commission's operational directive of 28 August 1980 is a telling reminder of how close the Polish crisis came to escalating into a much wider conflict.
Mark Kramer, a frequent contributor to the Bulletin, is the director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies at the Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University.
The situation in the PPR remains tense. The strike movement is operating on a countrywide scale.
Taking account of the emerging situation, the Ministry of Defense requests permission, in the first instance, to bring three tank divisions (1 in the Baltic MD, 2 in the Beloruss. MD) and one mechanized rifle division (Transcarp. MD) up to full combat readiness as of 6:00 p.m. on 29 August to form a group of forces in case military assistance is provided to the PPR.
To fill out these divisions, it will be necessary to requisition from the national economy up to 25 thous. military reservists and 6 thous. vehicles, including 3 thous. to replace the vehicles taken from these troops to help out with the harvest. Without the extra vehicles, the divisions cannot bring their mobile reserves up to full readiness. The necessity to fill out the divisions at the expense of resources from the national economy arises because they are maintained at a reduced level in peacetime. The successful fulfillment of tasks during the entry of these divisions into the territory of the PPR requires combat arrangements to be established some 5-7 days in advance.
If the situation in Poland deteriorates further, we will also have to fill out the constantly ready divisions of the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military Districts up to wartime level. If the main forces of the Polish Army go over to the side of the counterrevolutionary forces, we must increase the group of our own forces by another fiveseven divisions. To these ends, the Ministry of Defense should be permitted to plan the call-up of as many as 75 thous. additional military reservists and 9 thous, additional vehicles.
In this case, it would mean that a total of up to 100 thous, military reservists and 15 thous, vehicles would have to be requisitioned from the national economy.
!"Vypiska iz protokola No. 210 zasedaniya Politbyuro Tsk KPSS ot 25 avgusta 1980 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol’skoi Narodnoi Respublike,” No. P210/II (Top Secret), 25 August 1980, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD) Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 66, Delo (D.) 1, List (L.) 1.
?The length of the draft resolution can be gauged from a handwritten notation at the bottom of the memorandum, which indicates that the document is a total of three pages.
'Among the countless other documents composed in this way were dozens of memoranda outlining the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles and other weaponry in Cuba in 1962 and the vast quantity of forms filled out by the Soviet Committee on State Security (KGB) to supply arms, intelligence equipment, and combat training to Communist and pro-Soviet guerrillas in the Third World. A good sample of these latter documents are available in Fond 89 of TsKhSD.
*Of particular relevance to this article is an item by Kevin Klose that appeared on 2 December 1980 in The Washington Post under the title “Soviet Reservists Activated Since August” (pp. A-1, A-14). Klose reported that “according to stories circulating here (in Moscow), reservists in the Carpathian Military District were activated in great haste in August (and will) remain on duty until the end of the year.” The Suslov Commission memorandum corroborates this report. is interesting to see that even a limited call-up of reservists eventually became known to wellsituated observers.
A. I. Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva’ i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9 (September 1992), pp. 55, 57.
"Several such maps are available from the former East German military archive, all of which deal with the same general scenario discussed below. Some of the relevant East German military documents, from the Militärisches Zwischenarchiv in Potsdam, are cited below.
See, e.g., several clear-cut references to the Polish leaders' objections in the Soviet Politburo transcripts I have translated for publication by CWIHP. See also “Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsubung ‘SOJUS 81',” Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in Militarisches Zwischenarchiv-Potsdam (MZA-P), Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32642, Bl. 54. See translation in this Bulletin.
8On Jaruzelski's change of heart, see my article, “Jaruzelski, the Soviet Union, and the Imposition of Martial Law in Poland," in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.
'U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), “Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion,” 30 June 1981 (Top Secret), declassified in December 1998; and CIA, NFAC, “Approaching the Brink: Moscow and the Polish Crisis, November-December 1980,” Intelligence Memorandum (Top Secret), January 1981; declassified in December 1998. I am grateful to Douglas J. MacEachin for
The draft of a CPSU CC directive is attached.
(signed) (signed) (signed) M. SUSLOV A.GROMYKO Yu. ANDROPOV
(signed) D. USTINOV K. CHERNENKO
28 August 1980
No. 682-op (3 pp.)
providing me with a copy of these valuable documents, which, among other things, contain maps showing the location of Soviet divisions in the western USSR.
TASS dispatch, 27 August 1980, reprinted as "Ksobytiyam v Pol'she,” Pravda (Moscow), 28 August 1980, p. 4.
"Gierek discussed this letter at the PUWP Politburo meeting on August 28. See “Protokół Nr. 27 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 28 sierpnia 1980 r.,” 28 August 1980 (Secret), reproduced in Zbigniew Włodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a “Solidarność" 1980-1981 (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 78-82.
12See the account by Stanisław Kania, Zatrzymac konfrontacje (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 33-34.
13"Posiedzenie Sztabu MSW, 29.VIII.1980 r.,” 29 August 1980 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Urzędu Ochrony Państwa (AUOP), Sygnatura (Sygn.) 2309/IV, Tom (T.) 2. See also the contributions by Janusz Krupski and Jarema Maciszewski in Kancelaria Sejmu, Ostanie wojennym: w Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzia hosci Konstytucynej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 108-110 and 126-128, respectively.
14“Posiedzenie Szabu MSW, 29. VIII. 1980r.," Stronica (S.)1.
15See Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 183-185.
16"Protokol Nr. 28 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 29 sierpnia 1980 r.," 29 August 1980 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego, pp. 84-90.
18CIA, “Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion,” pp. 2-3; CIA, “Approaching the Brink,” p. 5. These preparations were first reported by the CIA in a “Special Analysis" on 24 December 1980.
19The problems posed by the cloud cover are noted in Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 163 and 168. The Special Analysis issued by the CIA on 24 December 1980, based on the imagery obtained between 16 and 18 December, marked the first solid determination since the cloud cover had receded over the western USSR that only three Soviet divisions were on full alert. For further information, see CIA “Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion,” pp. 1-5; and CIA, “Approaching the Brink,” pp. 2, 4–5.
20CIA, “Polish Reaction to a Soviet Invasion,” pp. 2-4. For further comments on the state of Soviet line divisions, see U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1986, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1986), pp. 98-99, which indicates that 40 percent, not 25 percent, of Soviet forces in the “western USSR” were Category 2. The discrepancy presumably arises because of different definitions of what the “western USSR” comprises.
21 All Soviet line divisions other than depot divisions were officially described as “constantly ready.” In Soviet parlance, “constant readiness” was the lowest of four levels of combat readiness: constant, increased, “threat of war," and full.
21aIt is also possible, though less likely, that one Category 3 tank division (from the Belorussian Military District) was mobilized along with three Category 2 divisions. Bringing a single Category 3 tank division up to full strength could potentially be done quickly, though it would be a much less desirable approach than relying on a Category 2 division. Hence, it seems likely that the allocation stipulated in the Suslov Commission's directive was adjusted slightly. On the distribution of Soviet Forces, see the map in CIA, “Approaching the Brink,” p. 4.
22This proportion of reservists for support and logistical roles may seem low, but two factors may account for that. First, the support requirements for “exercises,” involving mainly rations and transportation, would have been lower than those for “war," which would entailed much more demanding requirements for ammunition and the like. Second, logistical preparations do not proceed in a strictly linear fashion. Once a certain threshold has been reached, it is possible to expand logisitical/support effectiveness without a commensurate increase in the number of support personnel.
23"Einweisung," early December 1980 (Strictly Secret), in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 16; no date is marked on this document, but the content indicates that it was prepared on 1 or 2 December. The lengthy interview with Colonel Kukliński is in "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 3-55. Kukliński was one of the officers on the Polish General Staff responsible for drafting the martial law plans. He also had long been working for the CIA. He had to escape from Poland in November 1981. See my article in this Bulletin.
24See, for example, “Erlauterungen,” Memorandum No. A:265991 (Strictly Secret), early December 1980, in MZA-P, VA-01/40593, Bl. 7-12. No precise date is given for this document, but the content makes clear that it was composed on either 2 or 3 December 1980 (or possibly on the evening of the 1st). See also “Einweisung," Bl. 16.
25See the two documents cited in the previous note. 20Gates, From the Shadows, pp. 163-164.
2?U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “Soviet Estimates on Polish Intervention Forces," Cable No. 14933, 7 November 1980, in National Security Archive, Flashpoints Collection, Polish Crisis 1980-1981. This cable evidently is based on comments by a high-ranking Romanian military officer.
8"Bericht über ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA,” Bl. 54.
2oIbid., Bl. 55.
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