this has to become evident. This is the best way to avoid bloodshed. Because if it is clear that every means possible will be employed, bloodshed will be avoided. This is the best solution. [...]

Finally, I would like to say the following: There are other effects in Hungary. I don't want to tell you what a depressed state of affairs we were in during the months from October to December 1956, thus during the decisive hours. We were very pessimistic but our foreign comrades supported us. Above all the Soviet comrades came to our help and told us-I well remember this, this is not just propaganda-you now need a reasonable policy. You are stronger than you think! And the Polish comrades should know this too: in reality, the forces of socialism in Poland are stronger than they appear at a first, superficial glance. Within a short time, positive decisions should be reached. Once again: you are stronger than you think. [...]

Erich Honecker:

Dear Comrades! [...]

These consultations were urgently necessary in view of the developments in the People's Republic of Poland. The events in our neighboring country Poland greatly worry the leadership of our Party, the Communists, the citizens of the German Democratic Republic. Nobody who cares for the cause of peace and socialism can be indifferent to what is happening in the PR Poland. [...]

We fully share the opinion that the survival of socialism in Poland is in acute danger. We recently spoke to comrades Kania, Żabiński, Olszowski and others about this and have pointed out that it was necessary to put an end to these developments. At the same time, we provided Poland in this difficult situation with major material support. [...] The citizens of our republic are also aware of the huge amount of aid for Poland from the Soviet Union, the CSSR and other socialist countries. Our people are well aware of this. But there are many questions as to what exactly has improved since the 6th Plenum of the CC of the PUWP. Workers, members of the intelligentsia and others have expressed their disappointment that the visit by comrades Kania and Pińkowski with Comrade Brezhnev has not lived up to their expectations.

We fully agreed with the results of this Moscow trip. Comrade Kania assured us on November 8 that the PUWP leadership would not withdraw one more step. But then there was the decision of the Supreme Court of the PR Poland which revised the decision of the Warsaw court. The Party and Government once more retreated from the counterrevolutionary forces. This resulted in a rapid escalation of counterrevolutionary activities and a massive deterioration of the situation. This was a major setback for all those who had hoped that the PUWP would master the problems. This is the main reason for the widespread discussions of the current situation in Poland within our Party and among our people and for the growing serious concerns about socialism in Poland which marks these

discussions.

There is obviously no disagreement among us about the fact that already the capitulation towards the strike committees in Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzębie was a mistake. But we don't want to judge this here. The fact is that following this capitulation, the enemy of the government sensed a chance to spread the strike and riots throughout the country. While weeks ago the strikes were confined above all to social demands, more recently political slogans have come increasingly to the fore.

The decision of the Supreme Court prevented a general strike, but "Solidarity" proved that it could initiate strikes at any time and thus blackmail the Party and Government. It even managed to force the liberation of people who had clearly been proved to have committed crimes. Yes, it even gained the assurance that it would be allowed to enter into negotiations on security matters. Such concessions inevitably will undermine the authority of the Party, other state and its organs. This has to worry everybody who is faithfully committed to the cause of socialism.

I was in Austria at the time of the Supreme Court deliberations. Kirchschläger and Kreisky asked my opinion about the events in Poland. We agreed, despite differing class positions, that Poland would be able to manage its affairs. Then, in the midst of a conversation with Kirchschläger, the news of the Supreme Court decision arrived. Honestly, I would never have been able to come up with such an idea: The Party becomes an appendix to the statute. I had gone to Vienna, basing my assumptions on what Comrade Kania had said. As many others, I never expected such as result.

As the current events show, the leadership of "Solidarity" and the forces behind it, especially KOR, consistently follow well-known counterrevolutionary strategy. Taking advantage of a wave of strikes, they established their organization in the shape of a union. Today they already have a legal political party. Their blackmail tactics have now resulted in a direct struggle for political power. The counterrevolutionary leaders—as Comrade Kania has stated-do not hide the fact that their objective is the elimination of the PUWP as the leading power [and] the elimination of socialist achievements. Initially, the strike organizations prevented anti-socialist and anti- Soviet slogans. Today they feel strong enough to pay homage to Piłsudski and to attack the Soviet Union, the GDR, the CSSR and the other fraternal socialist countries. As the facts prove, they are about to inflame a nationalist, anti-socialist hysteria.

Dear Comrades! One can hardly ignore that the events in Poland are for the main part the result of a coordinated plan of the internal and foreign counterrevolution. It is a part of the imperialist policy of confrontation and increased diversion against the socialist countries. It is important to recognize that the PUWP is confronted with an irreconcilable enemy. In order to defeat the counterrevolution, we think one needs an unambiguous

concept, an unambiguous policy of the Party, from top to the bottom.

You won't get anywhere with a boundless discussion of mistakes, to our mind. I would like to state that the damage of "propaganda of failures" is much higher than any "propaganda of success." In any case, you can't permit a situation in which the truth is suppressed in the public. This truth is that socialism, its shortcomings and mistakes notwithstanding, has brought the Polish nation great achievements, that not the Polish United Workers' Party but the leaders of "Solidarity" and the people who direct them are responsible for the current situation. Of course, one has to differentiate between a manipulated worker and the anti-socialist forces, but one also has to say clearly who the enemy is. [...]

Dear Comrades! We have to assume that, unfortunately, the situation in the PR Poland has developed to a point where administrative measures are necessary in addition to political measures, in order to destroy the counterrevolutionary conspiracy and stabilize the government. As you well know, we also had a difficult situation in the German Democratic Republic in 1953. Back then we still had an open border with the Federal Republic of Germany. The imperialists were instigating the fall of the workers-and-peasant power from without and counted on the counterrevolution from within. We therefore had to act quickly. We combined political with administrative measures. We made a public appeal to the party members and functionaries of our Party, to all who were committed to the defense and strengthening of the workers-and-peasants state. Within a short time we managed to isolate the counterrevolutionary forces from the workers and to defeat them.

It was stated here rightfully that the revolution could develop peacefully or in a non-peaceful manner, as we all know. As a Communist you have to be ready to consider both options as the situation demands and to act accordingly in the decisive moments. If the workers-andpeasants power, the government, is at risk, if it has to be protected from counterrevolutionary forces which are determined to go all the way, then there remains no other choice than to deploy the security organs of the workersand-peasants state. This was our experience in 1953. This became evident in the events of 1956 in Hungary, about which Comrade Kádár spoke, and [in the events] of 1968 in the CSSR.

The representatives of the various groups, which now are mushrooming in Poland, state as a cover-up of their true intentions that their objective was the "democratic renewal of socialism" in Poland. But the opposite is the case. NATO and the EC declare quite frankly that this was a matter that falls under their protection.

I can remember quite well the conversation with Dubček on the occasion of the Dresden meeting in 1968 when I got him from the airport and took him to his residence. In the course of one hour Dubček tried to convince me what was happening in the CSSR was not a

counterrevolution but a "process of democratic renewal of socialism." What happened later, everybody knows. The Czechoslovak comrades under the leadership of Comrade Husák have composed a document about this that taught us a lot.

We are of the opinion that PUWP has enough healthy forces to solve the urgent tasks, based on the announcement of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, its directives and a clear plan. As we know, the PUWP has available reliable forces in its security organs, and we are convinced that the army as well will fulfill its patriotic and internationalist duty. This is how we understood the declaration of the Military Council of the Ministry for National Defense of the PR Poland, which was published after the 7th Plenum of the CC of the PUWP. In addition, there is the possibility of arming the healthy forces, about which Comrade Kania spoke here, within the Party and among the workers. We agree with Comrade Kania that there can be no further steps in retreat in the current situation. Only through the struggle against the counterrevolution can the Party unite its members and functionaries, [and] all class-conscious workers and lead them to success.

We in the German Democratic Republic are situated along the line that separates us from the Federal Republic and NATO. On a daily basis, we feel how the imperialist enemy tries to transfer counterrevolutionary activities. from Poland to our country as well. The TV stations of the FRG, which can be received in our republic, have never previously reported so much about Poland and have never shown so much interest in the events in Polish factories. They have associated this for five months now with the call to do the same thing [in the GDR] as is now happening in Poland. They describe the developments in the PR Poland as an example of “democratic reform" and "necessary changes" in all socialist countries. That is why we were forced to tell our Party clearly what we thought of the developments in our socialist neighbor country. I stated in a speech before the party activists in Gera that insurmountable limits have been set on the counterrevolution west of the Elbe and Wera. This was not only understood well on our side [of the border]. Our Party takes a class-conscious view of the events in Poland. This also concerns the measures on the temporary limitation of the cross-border traffic.

Dear Comrades! We have gathered here in order to consult collectively on the possible support by the fraternal countries, which might be useful to Comrade Kania and all the comrades in the PUWP in strengthening the people's power in Poland. Our Party and our people have great expectations with regard to this meeting.

Never before has our Party felt so closely connected with the PUWP as in these difficult days and weeks. In this vein we have given orientation to the members of our Party. We remain in solidarity with the fraternal Polish people and its Party, the Polish United Workers' Party. And we are convinced: the cause of socialism will win.

There are difficulties in some socialist countries. This is true for the events in Poland. This ought to give us cause to analyze the situation very seriously, to solve all problems, the problems of socialist and Communist construction, through collaboration among the socialist countries, based on our own strength. This is all the more important now that we approach the conclusion of the five-year plans and are passing to a new phase of economic and social development for the years 1981 to 1985.

I think I am not wrong in assuming: if we had analyzed the problems of the construction of socialism in our countries more frequently and thoroughly, we would have been able to avoid even the events in Poland. One has to assume that the cooperation of the socialist countries, the successful construction of socialism and Communism, is of special importance to our countries, but at the same time to the maintenance of socialist principles throughout the world, the entire international situation, the policy of détente, peace, and national independence. The socialist countries should demonstrate that they can indeed solve complex problems in the appropriate manner, that socialism provides a firm basis for economic development. One can say that socialism is quite capable of overcoming the appearances of an economic crisis situation and of giving the people greater independence and economic stability.

In the context of our discussions, it was emphasized that the events in Poland stand at the center of attention of the Communist parties and of the people of our community of states as well as all communist parties and progressive forces in the world. The entire international public also watches these events. There is no doubt that differing interpretations exist [as well as] different possibilities of analyzing the events.

But one can only say one thing: There is the concern and indeed the desire to have these problems resolved by the Poles themselves and to avoid their damaging the policy of détente, peace and cooperation. [...]

I would like to state initially that the Romanian Communist Party, our Central Committee and the Romanian people, are of the opinion that the problems in Poland should be solved by the PUWP, the Polish working class, the Polish people in complete unity and based on the assumption that it is necessary to assure the socialist development of Poland, to strengthen the economic base of Poland's independence and sovereignty and the material wealth of the Polish people, and to strengthen the cooperation between the socialist countries.

It is not the time now (and there is no reason) to have a thorough discussion about the reasons for this development. One thing is clear: economic difficulties

have exerted a strong influence on developments. As is evident from the decisions of the Plenum, today's state of crisis was also caused by some mistakes which happened in implementing socialist principles and the leading role of the Party, in securing the unity of the working class and the broad masses of the people. [...]

Comrade Kania has correctly stated that-and this is also evident from the Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party-attention has been called to the intensification the activities of the anti-socialist, counterrevolutionary elements in the country. To our mind, today's state of affairs could have been avoided if greater determination had been demonstrated previously. Even if there is dissatisfaction, you could have prevented the current dangerous course of events by greater determination. [...]

We do not want to interfere here in the internal events of Poland. The PUWP, the Polish working class and the Polish people as well as all the progressive forces in Poland know that they have to find the appropriate ways to overcome this situation, develop the economy, increase the standard of living, based on socialist construction and according to conditions in Poland.

Everything should be done to have an unambiguous orientation, to develop a program which makes it clear how the problems are to be solved—a program which the broad masses of the people will understand well and which then becomes the action program of above all the working class. One cannot imagine overcoming the current crisis situation without such a political program, which involves the working class and the people. [...]

We also do not understand how it was possible for socalled independent free unions to be established. But they are a reality today, and you indeed have to take them into consideration. One ought to act in [such] a way [so] that the unity of the workers and the unity of the unions— based on socialism-are regained. But for this purpose, you will need a clear policy and an unambiguous program even in this area, and that will take some time. [...] I would like to underline again that the Polish comrades will have to do everything-it is their great international and national obligation to assure socialist construction on their own. One also can not neglect the fact that the possibility of an external intervention would pose a great danger for socialism in general, for the policy of détente, and for the policy of peace. That's why we should give the Polish comrades all-out support to allow them to fulfill the tasks of securing the socialist construction of Poland on their own and in their own ways, which they indeed have. [...]

Gustáv Husák:

Dear Comrades! [...]

You can sense great concern about the current events in Poland in our Party and our people. This is not just because we are immediate neighbors-we have a common

border line of some 1,300 km, and this is, by the way, our longest border-but also because the threat to socialism in Poland constitutes a threat to our joint interests.

We in Czechoslovakia underwent a complicated process of development as well, when the counterrevolution went on the counteroffensive in our country, when the danger of civil war in the CSSR arose, and when there was a deadly danger to socialism. Comrade Kádár has reminded us of the events in Hungary in 1956, and Comrade Honecker has spoken about the events in the GDR.

The events which took place 12 years ago in Czechoslovakia still live in our memories, and in watching the events unfold in Poland today, we compare them to our own experience, even though we, of course, recognize the differences in time and circumstances.

But all these events in Hungary, in the GDR, in Czechoslovakia and now in Poland are characterized by a common goal on the part of the anti-socialist,

counterrevolutionary forces of the forces which want to roll back socialism in Poland and detach these countries from the socialist camp. [...]

In our country, dissatisfaction also grew among the people, and we had to eliminate deformations, mistakes and shortcomings within the Party as well as within society.[...]

The imperialists quickly realized that an excellent opportunity had been given in Czechoslovakia to reach. their long-term goal of destabilizing socialism. What took place there in those summer months in 1968 had long been prepared by imperialist circles and various reactionary, anti-socialist forces. This is also what has happened this summer in Poland.

The enemy has drawn conclusions from the events in Poland and in the CSSR. He proceeded differently in the CSSR than in Hungary, and he drew his conclusions from the events in the CSSR. He now acts differently in Poland than he did in the CSSR. He takes advantage of social dissatisfaction, of economic shortcomings, and tries to win over the masses by social demagoguery and to direct them towards anti-socialist actions, towards actions against the Party.

As it was, in the bourgeois propaganda, the CSSR became the best model of the democratic reform of socialism, that is, socialism with a human face. The CSSR was held up to all other socialist countries as a model. Even the Pope prayed for this process, for the rebirth of Czechoslovakia, and for Dubček as well, and if anything bad was done in the socialist countries, our country was pointed out as an example. As Comrade Honecker said, the same thing happened in Czechoslovakia. Now they would like to export Poland's crisis to the CSSR, the GDR and the other countries. We, of course, have introduced all necessary measures against this, and as far as we are concerned, there is no reason to be concerned. [...]

The situation [in Czechoslovakia in 1968] culminated

to the point at which we could not fight off the attack of the counterrevolution by ourselves. In order to prevent a civil war and to defend socialism, the socialist fraternal countries were asked for internationalist support. This is our view of the situation back then. This support prevented the detachment of the CSSR from the socialist camp. It gave the Party the chance to solve the problems. The CSSR economy had been disrupted. The internal market, the economy and the entire structure of society had been shaken and shattered, and the Party had been torn apart.

It took great efforts to repair the damage that had been done. The CPCz managed to do this after 1969 thanks to the help by the other fraternal countries. I am not reminding you of our experience in order to argue for extreme and radical solutions, but I do this in order to demonstrate that due to the inconsistency of our previous leadership it was necessary to resort to an extreme solution in the interest of defending socialism.

Following the installation of the new leadership, it became clear that the enemy, which had maintained that it would completely support the people and the Party, actually had a petit-bourgeois attitude. We uncovered the counterrevolution and its representatives, precisely with the goal of showing the people what they had been after. We juxtaposed this with the progressive program of our Party. As a result, our people have completely supported the Marxist-Leninist program of our Party and have defeated the counterrevolution.

We know, dear comrades, that these problems of which I have spoken, were of a different sort. It seems to me that the PUWP has a better leadership today than we in the CSSR had back then. But the question of decisiveness and determination to solve the problems energetically remains acute.

With my contribution, dear comrades, I wanted to show the creeping manner that the counterrevolution acted in the CSSR and what experience our Party had. The development of recent years shows that you need a Marxist-Leninist party to defend socialism adequately and to defeat the opportunist, counterrevolutionary and revanchist forces. You need firm unity, courage, and determination for the solution of the most complicated problems and to avoid departing from the right point of view. One needs to have a clear, consistent program and on this basis mobilize the Communists. [...]

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

Permit me as well to make a few remarks. -Dear Comrades! [...]

The Polish events worry us in particular. We for the most part have talked about Poland. It pains us to see fraternal Poland going through a profound, difficult crisis. The crisis could have been avoided. It could have been suppressed and turned around in its initial phase, prior to the negative turn of events. But this did not happen.

In the course of the past four years, we have asked questions about the alarming tendencies in the People's Republic of Poland in our talks with Comrade Gierek. This summer in the Crimea, I emphasized again that a decisive political fight against the anti-socialist elements was necessary. In response, we were told that nothing of special concern was happening, that there was no opposition, and that the PPR and the Party were in control of the situation. What had happened? Was it carelessness, hubris? Were certain ambitions the cause? -I don't know.

And now the crisis, as we can see, has developed into a difficult question not for Poland and its Communists. alone. The crisis hurts the entire socialist community, the international Communist movement. It can have a negative impact on the general balance of power. [...]

The situation, which the comrades have described here, demands a different way of thinking and acting. One has to realize that the counterrevolution is oriented towards the real conditions as they exist today. It would not risk, and would not have risked, raising itself against the government, if the Polish United Workers' Party had been completely mobilized in the face of the events, if its actions had been characterized by determination and toughness.

This might sound too sharp or too harsh. But it would. be completely justified to say that the crisis throughout the country accords with the crisis within the Party. [...]

One month ago we spoke at length with comrades Kania and Pińkowski. The topic of conversation was the situation as it had developed. We completely agreed in the evaluation of the situation and our determination of ways to overcome the crisis. We assumed that there was no room for retreat. We have to turn the course of events around and should not wait until the enemy has the Party with its back against the wall. In one word: the Polish comrades themselves must go on the offensive against the counterrevolution and its intellectual heads. The Polish comrades and we were of the opinion that the core of the matter and the most important thing was to restore the fighting spirit of the Party, to restore unity in its ranks and to mobilize all units of the Party. We were all of the opinion that the PUWP could rely on the healthy forces within the nation, the army, the militia, and the state security organs as well as on that part of the union that has remained faithful to the Party.

As far as I know, the comrades of the other fraternal parties share our point of view.

As you know, Comrade Kania has explained that the situation has gotten worse and could not be stabilized.[...]

The comrades here have emphasized that a bitter class struggle is occurring in Poland. What is lacking? The objective is clear: Socialism must be defended! It is also clear from where the danger is emanating. The enemy's scheme has become fairly evident, and it is clear which positions he intends to take next. There is most likely a center which directs the actions of the counterrevolution

and which coordinates the various departments' tactics and strategy within and outside of Poland. [...]

Particularly acute is the problem of the mass media. Unfortunately one has to admit that the situation most recently has not worked out in favor of the PUWP.

As far as the army is concerned, it would be wrong to assume that the events have not left any traces there. Through various channels, among others the Polish Church, obstinate attempts are being made to neutralize and subvert the armed forces.

We are not exaggerating at all concerning the question of responsibility, but instead are basing our views on the information from the Polish friends. During the entire crisis we have shown complete understanding for the Polish comrades' [desire] to solve the crisis by political means. We do not favor taking extreme measures without extreme circumstances, and we understand the caution. But this is certain: should the enemy assume power, he would not hold back like that. From experience we know that the enemy, once in power, immediately takes extreme measures in order to eliminate the Party and destroy socialism. He is, after all, no longer discreet in his choice of weapons: Unauthorized occupation of plants, of universities, administrative buildings, the nerve centers of transport and media, which affect the vital interests of the Warsaw Pact organization. Are these legitimate weapons? And the dishonoring of honest workers, of Communists by forcing them to join "Solidarity", the increasing incidents of ridiculing people in military uniforms, the incidents of sabotage in the distribution of food stuffs and consumer goods, in the transport of Polish newspapers, the cases of hiding of food which further worsen the situation, and the uncontrolled import of foreign currencies, typewriters and TVs into Poland, not to speak of the threat to life to which Communists and their families have been subjected. One can certainly not say that the opposition has held back, and hence the ongoing confrontation.

The reserve of the Polish Party is interpreted by the opposition as a sign of weakness and indetermination, as a loss of faith in the [Party's] own capabilities and power. The Supreme Court has annulled the decision of the Warsaw court and registered "Solidarity". Wałęsa has drawn the conclusion that one can press further. I brought Gierek to power and I deposed him, and I can also bring the new leadership down, if I want to, he declared in an interview. This is the tone in which such things are already discussed!

It would be unforgivable not to draw any basic conclusions from such a difficult text. It is our duty not to mince words. A terrible danger hovers over socialism in Poland. The enemy has managed to open up a rift between the Party and a major part of the workers.

The Polish comrades have thus far not found a method to open the eyes of the masses, showing them that the counterrevolution intends to throw out not only the Communists but also the best elements of the entire nation.

The strategic point is that the Polish comrades have to