became even more pronounced after the exchanges on 11 December. At Jaruzelski's behest, Siwicki met with Kulikov on the evening of the 11th and warned him that “we cannot embark on any adventurist actions [avantyura] if the Soviet comrades will not support us." Siwicki noted that Jaruzelski seemed “very upset and very nervous," and that "psychologically, ... Jaruzelski has gone to pieces [rasstroen]." Siwicki emphasized that Jaruzelski would rather "postpone the introduction of [martial law] by a day" than proceed without Soviet military backing.

The possibility of delaying the crackdown had already been broached by Jaruzelski the previous day in an exchange with Konstantin Rusakov. Rusakov informed. the Soviet Politburo on 10 December that Jaruzelski was "not presenting a clear, straightforward line" about the date of "Operation X,” the code name in Moscow for the martial law operation:

No one knows what will happen over the next few days. There was a conversation about “Operation X." At first, they said it would be on the night of 11-12 December, and then this was changed to the night of the 12th and 13th. And now they're already saying it won't be until around the 20th.43

Actually, Siwicki was proposing to defer the martial law crackdown by only a day—indeed, he emphasized several times that a delay of more than a day would be infeasible-but Rusakov may have suspected that a daylong postponement would be extended indefinitely.

In any case, Kulikov's discussion with Siwicki reveals that Jaruzelski's motivation for a possible delay, of whatever length, was to persuade Soviet leaders to send troops to Poland. The implication was that if the Soviet Union failed to respond, the whole operation might have to be called off. Underscoring this point, Siwicki declared: "[I]f there will be no . . . military support from the USSR, our country might be lost for the Warsaw Pact. Without the support of the USSR we cannot go forward or take this step [of imposing martial law]." All these statements are essentially identical to comments recorded by Gribkov in his 1992 article.44

In response, Kulikov argued that the martial law operation would succeed if Jaruzelski implemented it as planned, and he sought to disabuse Siwicki of the idea of postponing the operation. The Soviet marshal pointed out that Polish leaders had repeatedly "insisted that Poland is able to resolve its problems on its own," and that Soviet officials had accepted and agreed with that view. Kulikov expressed dismay that Jaruzelski's position had now changed: "Why has this question of military assistance arisen? We already went over all aspects of the introduction of martial law." Kulikov added that “you carried out a great deal of work in preparing for the introduction of martial law" and "you have enough strength" to succeed. "It's now time to act," he argued. "The date should not be postponed, and indeed a

postponement is now impossible." Kulikov also expressed concern that the talk about a postponement and about the need for Soviet military support might signify that Jaruzelski was backing away from his "final decision" to impose martial law. "If that is so,” Kulikov declared, “we would like to know about it.”

Siwicki assured Kulikov that "the decision has been made," and that Jaruzelski was not going to renege on his plans to introduce martial law. At the same time, he emphasized, once again, that “without [military] help from outside, it will be difficult for us, the Poles," to sustain martial law. Siwicki said that both he and Jaruzelski hoped that Soviet leaders would “look upon these matters with understanding" and would "consider [our] requests," but Kulikov displayed no inclination to consider any changes in the earlier arrangements, which stipulated that Polish units would introduce martial law on their own. By the time the meeting ended, Siwicki had pledged to embark on "a resolute struggle against the counterrevolution," as Soviet leaders had long demanded. Even so, Anoshkin could tell that "Siwicki left here dissatisfied because he got nothing new and heard nothing new from [Kulikov].”

The extent of the Polish leaders' continued nervousness and dissatisfaction became clear the following day (12 December) as the hour approached for the introduction of martial law. Despite what had happened over the previous two days, Jaruzelski was still urging the Soviet Union to "provide military help." So insistent were Jaruzelski's pleas that Kulikov began to suspect that the Polish leader was trying to "make the introduction of martial law dependent on the fulfillment of [his demand for Soviet intervention]." Although Soviet officials eventually were able to convince Jaruzelski that no direct military support would be forthcoming, the fate of the martial law operation seemed in doubt just hours before the crackdown was due to begin. Arrangements had even been made for a high-level Soviet delegation, led by Suslov, to fly to Warsaw for urgent consultations at Jaruzelski's request, but at the last minute this visit was called off, apparently because Suslov's phone conversation with Jaruzelski obviated the need for a direct visit.

Anoshkin's notebook continues after 12 December into early 1982, reporting on the martial law crackdown and the various units involved. But on the specific question of what Jaruzelski was seeking in the lead-up to martial law, the crucial entries are the ones Anoshkin jotted down on 11 and 12 December, as translated below. These notes, combined with the other evidence mentioned above, overwhelmingly suggest that Jaruzelski's role in December 1981 was very different from the portrayal he offers in his memoirs. Far from having "saved" Poland from a Soviet invasion, Jaruzelski was desperately promoting the very thing he now claims to have prevented.

None of this is meant to gloss over the excruciating pressure that Jaruzelski had been encountering throughout

the crisis. From the fall of 1980 on, Soviet leaders had kept up a relentless campaign of intimidation and belligerent reproaches. It would have taken enormous strength and courage to withstand that pressure. Kania was not a particularly strong leader, but somehow he was continually able to defer the implementation of martial law. He repeatedly assured Brezhnev that "decisive measures" would soon be imposed, but invariably he refrained from carrying out his pledges. Jaruzelski in some ways was a stronger figure than Kania, but, unlike Kania, he was willing in the end to comply with Moscow's demands. His compliance initially gave rise to final preparations for the "lesser of two evils"—that is, martial law-but when the critical moment came in late 1981, he seems to have embraced the "greater of two evils," Soviet military intervention. By December 1981 (and perhaps earlier), Jaruzelski was pleading with Soviet leaders to send troops into Poland to assist with the martial law operation, and by all indications he was devastated when his requests were turned down. For Jaruzelski, it seems, Soviet interests ultimately took precedence over all else.

The evidence provided by the Anoshkin notebook and by the other materials cited above will serve an especially useful purpose if it prompts Jaruzelski and Siwicki to seek the declassification of Polish documents that would shed additional light on the events of December 1981. Jaruzelski's and Siwicki's own contemporaneous records of their meetings and conversations with Soviet officials during that crucial period have not yet been made. available (assuming they still exist and have not been tampered with). It is at least remotely possible that such materials, if they exist, would result in a more favorable assessment of the Polish leaders' actions.

Jaruzelski, in particular, should have a strong incentive to pursue the release of new documents, for he is well aware that the issue is of more than purely historical or scholarly interest. Since leaving office in December 1990, Jaruzelski has been viewed with respect, even admiration, by a majority of Poles. Although charges were filed against him in the early 1990s for his role in imposing martial law, and although he was required to testify a number of times before the Polish Sejm's Commission for Constitutional Oversight, the last of the charges relating to the 1980-81 crisis were dropped in 1996, when the Sejm voted to pardon Jaruzelski and other former leaders who had been due to go on trial for violating the constitution.45 (Separate charges were retained against Kiszczak and 22 former members of the security forces for one specific incident-the deaths of miners in Katowice on 13 December 1981-but all the defendants were eventually acquitted.) After the September 1997 parliamentary elections in Poland, a court in Gdansk proposed to resume its proceedings against Jaruzelski and four other former officials, but this case pertained only to the shootings of workers in December 1970. No suggestion was made of reinstating charges related to the 1981 crackdown.

No doubt, the lenient treatment of Jaruzelski has been based primarily on a widespread belief that he did indeed. choose the "lesser of two evils" in December 1981 and spared his country great bloodshed and a military occupation. That view may yet be borne out. But if, as the evidence above suggests, Jaruzelski was actually urging, rather than opposing, Soviet military intervention in late 1981, his status in Poland today—not to mention his place in history deserves a full-scale reassessment.

Mark Kramer is the director of the Harvard Project on Cold War Studies, Harvard University. He is grateful to Richard T. Davies for his valuable advice.

1 A preliminary discussion of the new evidence is Mark Kramer, "Poland, 1980-81: Soviet Policy During the Polish Crisis," Cold War International History Project Bulletin No.5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 116-126. A much more extensive analysis will be presented in my forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper. 2 For example, at a Soviet Politburo meeting in January 1981, Soviet defense minister Dmitrii Ustinov argued that "constant pressure on the Polish leadership" would not work unless "we make clear that we have forces ready" to move in at short notice. Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 22 yanvarya 1981 g.: Ob itogakh poezdki delegatsii partiinykh rabotnikov KPSS vo glave L. M. Zamyatinym v Pol'shu," 22 January 1981 (Top Secret), in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 42, Delo (D.), 36, List (L.) 5. Similarly, at a Politburo meeting on 16 April 1981, the Soviet Communist Party leader, Leonid Brezhnev, said it was "necessary to exert constant pressure" on the Polish authorities through political contacts and the staging of military exercises, though he added that “we should not harass them needlessly or increase the level of tension so much that they would just give up.” Cited from "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 16 aprelya 1981 g.: O razgovore L. I. Brezhneva s Pervym sekretarem TsK PORP S. Kanei (po telefonu),” 16 April 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 41, Ll. 1-3.

3 This has been the basic theme of all of Jaruzelski's comments on the subject since late 1991, including his two volumes of memoirs: Stan wojenny dlaczego (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); and Les chaines et le refuge (Paris: Lattes, 1992). Until 1990, Jaruzelski staunchly denied that the Soviet Union had intended to invade Poland in 1981; and even as late as September 1991, in an interview in Novoe vremya (Moscow), No. 38 (21 September 1991), pp. 26-30, he was evasive about the matter. No doubt, his discretion prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union was attributable to his long-standing deference to Soviet wishes.

4 Army-General A. I. Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1992), p. 52.

5 Ibid.

"Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej, Opinie o generalu Jaruzelskim i pulkowniku Kuklinskim (Warsaw: CBOS, October 1992), pp. 1-4. See also Leonid Kornilov, “Dlya bol'shinstva polyakov Yaruzel'skii ostaetsya patriotom," Izvestiya (Moscow), 30 October 1992, p. 5.

7 "Ironiczny grymas historii," Prawo i zycie (Warsaw), No. 49 (December 1992), p. 11.

12

Among the interviews, see "Dostep do wszystkiego," Polityka (Warsaw), No. 8 (20 February 1993), p. 15; and Leon Bojko, “A wejsc nie chcieli?” Gazeta wyborcza (Warsaw), 10 February 1993, p. 6. The Polish version of Pavlov's memoirs is Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce (Warsaw: BGW, 1994); the Russian version is Rukovoditeli Pol’shi glazami razvedchika (Moscow: Terra, 1998). Pavlov published a second volume of memoirs in Russia, which also features some coverage of the Polish crisis, Operatsiya "Sneg": Polveka vo vneshnei razvedke KGB (Moscow: TOO-Geya, 1996).

13 Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce, p. 185.

14

4 "Gen. Czeslaw Kiszczak," Polityka (Warsaw), No. 8 (20 February 1993), p. 15.

15 Witold Beres and Jerzy Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi: Prawie wszystko (Warsaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 129-130.

16 'Most, but not all, of the declassified transcripts are stored in Fond 89 at TsKhSD. My annotated translations of an initial batch (as well as my translations of some East German documents) appeared in “Declassified Documents on the Polish Crisis," Cold War International History Project Bulletin No.5 (Spring 1995), pp. 117, 129-139.

17 A sample of these documents was included in a briefing book edited by Malcolm Byrne, Pawel Machcewicz and Christian Ostermann, for the conference on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," in Jachranka, Poland in November 1997, which was co-organized by the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), and the Institute for Political Studies (ISP) in Warsaw. Many other documents pertaining to the 1980-81 Polish crisis are stored in the Magyar Orszagos Leveltar (MOL) in Budapest, the Statni Ustredni Archiv (SUA) in Prague, the Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) in Prague, the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv der SED (SAPMDB/ZPA) in Berlin, the Bundesbeauftragte fur die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheits-dienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit Zentralarchiv (BUS-MSZ) in Berlin, the Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (MZA) in Potsdam, the Tsentralen Durzhaven Arkhiv (TSDA) in Sofia, and the Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman (Arh. CCPCR) in Bucharest. A useful selection of relevant documents from the former East German archives can be found in Michael Kubina and Manfred Wilke, eds., "Hart und kompromisslos durchgreifen:" Die SED contra Polen 1980/81 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995).

18 For a complete record of the KOK meeting on 13 September 1981, see the handwritten notes by General Tadeusz Tuczapski, the secretary of KOK, “Protokol No. 002/81 posiedzenia Komitetu Obrony Kraju z dnia wrzesnia 1981 r.," 13 September 1981, now stored in Centralne Archywum Wojskowe (CAW), Posiedzenia Kok, Teczka Sygn. 48. A translation of this document was published as an appendix in Andrzej Paczkowski and Andrzej Werblan, On The Decision To Introduce Martial Law In Poland In 1981: Two Historians Report to the Commission on Constitutional Oversight of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, Cold War

International History Project Working Paper 21 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997). Tuczapski was the only one at the meeting who was permitted to take notes. Until his 10-page account was released at the Jachranka conference in November 1997, it was generally thought that no formal record of the meeting had been kept. The importance of the KOK meeting was first disclosed by Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski in his lengthy interview, "Wojna z narodem widziana od srodka,” Kultura (Paris), 4/475 (April 1987), pp. 32-33. Kuklinski, a senior officer on the Polish General Staff and a top aide to Jaruzelski in 1980-81, was part of a small group responsible for planning the martial law operation. He also was a crucial intelligence source for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), having provided invaluable information to the West since the early 1970s about Warsaw Pact military developments. (He had to escape from Poland in early November 1981, and now lives in the United States.) Several years after the interview with Kuklinski appeared, Stanislaw Kania briefly discussed the KOK meeting in his memoirs (after being asked about it by the interviewer who compiled the book); see Zatrzymac konfrontacje (Wroclaw: BGW, 1991), pp. 110-111. More recently, it has come to light that Kuklinski sent a long cable to the CIA on 15 September 1981-two days after the KOK meeting-outlining the plans for martial law and warning that Operation "Wiosna" (the codename of the martial law crackdown) would soon follow. In May 1997, with help from Richard T. Davies, the former U.S. ambassador to Poland, I obtained a copy of the Polish text of Kuklinski's cable and then translated it for the briefing book for the Jachranka conference and this issue of the Bulletin.

19 "Jelentes a MSZMP Politikai Bizottsagnak," memorandum from Jozsef Garamvolgyi, Hungarian ambassador in Poland, to the Politburo of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, 19 September 1981 (Top Secret), in MOL, 288, F. 11/4400, o.e., fol. 128-134. This document records a conversation with Kania and exchanges between Kania and the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar.

20 Ibid., fol. 133-134.

21 "Oswiadczenie KC KPZR i rzadu ZSRR przedstawione kierownictwu KC PZPR i rzadu PRL," Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), 18 September 1981, p. 1.

22 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 29 oktyabrya 1981 g.: Ob itogakh poezdki K. V. Rusakova v GDR, ChSSR, VNR i BPR," 29 October 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 42, D. 48, LI. 3-4.

23

A contingency plan devised in 1980 would have brought up to fifteen Soviet divisions into Poland to "provide military assistance." Ostensibly, the Soviet troops would have been taking part in military exercises, but in reality they would have joined with the Polish army and security forces to impose a crackdown. The plan evidently was conceived as early as August 1980 (see my translation below of a key Soviet document from 28 August 1980), and preparations for it gained momentum in early December 1980, as is evident from the cable that Kuklinski sent to the United States at that point (which I also have translated below). Subsequently, the contingency plan was updated and refined, becoming a full-fledged operational plan. In mid-1981, according to Vitalii Pavlov (in Bylem rezydentem KGB w Polsce, p. 219), the operational plan was largely set aside; but as late as the fall of 1981 Soviet military planners evidently retained—at least on paper-the option of sending Soviet troops into Polish territory under the guise of military exercises scheduled for November 1981. The existence of the updated plan was divulged to the U.S. government in the fall of 1981 by two high-ranking Polish military intelligence officials who defected, Colonel Jerzy Suminski and Colonel Wladyslaw

Ostaszewicz. See the comments of General Czeslaw Kiszczak, who had been head of Polish military intelligence until he became minister of internal affairs in 1981, in Beres and Skoczylas, eds., General Kiszczak mowi, pp. 65, 173, 178-180. Gribkov reports that the operational plan existed until well into December 1981, though he emphasizes that Soviet leaders never decided whether they would implement it if martial law collapsed. See “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 54-56.

24 "'Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," p. 56.

25 "Notatka w sprawie najwazniejszych przedsięwziec wykonanych w Silach Zbrojnych od lipca br. w sferze przygotowan do ewentualnego wprowadzenia stanu wojennego," 23 November 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygnatura (Sygn.) 1813/92/1 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Andrzej Paczkowski for providing me with a copy of this document and the next two documents cited here. See Paczkowski's own brief but illuminating discussion in O Stanie Wojennym: W Sejmowej Komisji Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 1997), pp. 134-152.

26 "Zalacznik Nr. 2: Zamierzenia resortu spraw wewnetrzych," attachment to Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnetrznych, “Ocena aktualnej sytuacji w kraju wg. stanu na dzien 25 listopada br.,” 25 November 1981 (Secret/Special Dossier), in Centralne Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrznych (CA/MSW), Sygn. 228/1B, L. 19.

27 Comments by Miroslaw Milewski, then-Minister of Internal Affairs, transcribed in "Ocena sytuacji operacyjno-politycznej," 12 June 1981 (Top Secret), in CAW, Sygn. 2308/IV.

28 Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80kh godov," pp. 50-51. A more detailed, contemporaneous account of this meeting is available in "Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau," GVS-Nr. A 465 831 (Strictly Secret/ Special Classification), 5 December 1981, from Army-General Heinz Hoffmann, East German minister of defense, to Erich Honecker, in MZA, Archivzugangsnummer (AZN) 32641, Bl. 313-316.

29 See "Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 1— Vorschlag, der am 03.12.1981 beraten wurde” and “Inhalt der zur komplizierten Lage in der Volksrepublik vorgesehenen Entwurfstexte: Variante 2—Vorschlag, der am 04.12.1981 beraten wurde,” 3 December 1981 and 4 December 1981, respectively, attached as appendices to Hoffmann's report cited in the previous note.

30 "Bericht uber die wichtigsten Ergebnisse der 14. Sitzung des Komitees der Verteidigungsminister der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages in Moskau." See also Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 50-51.

31 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 378-379. See also the comments by Siwicki and Jaruzelski in “Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.,” 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Zbigniew Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego: PZPR a "Solidarnosc," 19801981 (London: Aneks, 1992), pp. 555, 567-568.

32 Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 379.

33 "Zasedanie Politbyuro TsK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda: K voprosu o polozhenii v Pol'she," 10 December 1981 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 66, D. 6, L. 5 (emphasis added). 34 'Ibid. On both 7 and 8 December 1981, Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev, who assured the Polish leader that "the Soviet Union will not leave Poland in the lurch" (Sovetskii Soyuz

ne ostavit v bede Pol'shu), a formulation that Soviet officials had frequently used during the crisis (along with the nearly identical formulation of Sovetskii Soyuz ne dast v obidu Pol'shu—that is, "the Soviet Union will stick up for Poland."). On 9 December, Jaruzelski and other high-ranking Polish military officers, including all the top General Staff officers, deputy defense ministers, military district commanders, and service commanders, held a late-night meeting in the Polish General Staff building, where they reached a final decision to proceed with martial law. Evidently, Brezhnev's rather vague statement of the previous day had been viewed—at least temporarily as a sufficient basis on which to act. See Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 387394; and the entries for 8 and 9 December 1981 in "Rabochaya tetrad"" No. 5, by Lieutenant-General V. I. Anoshkin, adjutant to Marshal Kulikov. (This document will be discussed and cited at greater length below.)

35 Quoted from "Bericht uber ein vertrauliches Gesprach mit dem Oberkommandierenden der Vereinten Streitkrafte der Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages am 07.04.1981 in LEGNICA (VP Polen) nach der Auswertung der gemeinsamen operativ-strategischen Kommandostabsubung ‘SOJUS 81'," Report No. A-142888 (Top Secret), 9 April 1981, in MZAPotsdam, AZN 32642, Bl. 54.

38 Each "working notebook” (rabochaya tetrad') that Anoshkin kept was given a number, reflecting the chronological order of a particular theme. The relevant notebook for December 1981 and early 1982 was No. 5. Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations in the next ten paragraphs are from that notebook.

39 This entry for 10 December is not translated below because Anoshkin did not permit me to photocopy the relevant page. However, he did permit me to take brief notes of what appeared there. The final decision on martial law was prefigured at meetings of the PUWP Politburo on 5 December and of the Polish Council of Ministers on 7 December, but the actual decision was adopted by the top military command, not by the PUWP Politburo. The session of the PUWP Politburo on 5 December (No. 18) was the last one before the imposition of martial law. In his adjourning comments at the meeting, Jaruzelski affirmed that “at today's session of the Politburo we will not make any final decision." See "Protokol Nr. 18 z posiedzenia Biura Politycznego KC PZPR 5 grudnia 1981 r.," 5 December 1981 (Secret), in Wlodek, ed., Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego, p. 568. The meeting of the Polish Council of Ministers two days later also left the final decision to be approved by the military High Command on 9 December. When Jaruzelski spoke by phone with Brezhnev on the evening of 7 December, he acknowledged that “a final decision has not yet been adopted." See Jaruzelski, Stan wojenny dlaczego, pp. 387388, as well as Jaruzelski's first-hand account of the meeting on 9 December in ibid., pp. 391-394. See also the entries in Anoshkin's notebook for 7-10 December. Interestingly enough, after Jaruzelski informed Soviet leaders on 10 December about the "final decision," they mistakenly inferred that it had been approved by the PUWP Politburo. See "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 5-7.

40 This same statement is recorded, word for word, in Gribkov, "Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov,” p. 55.

41 Conversation in Jachranka, Poland, 10 November 1997, between Kania and Thomas S. Blanton of the National Security Archive. No doubt, one of the reasons for Jaruzelski's lack of

confidence was his concern about the impact of Colonel Kuklinski's defection. According to Gribkov, Kuklinski's departure "forced the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to set about hurriedly reworking some aspects of the plans for martial law” (“Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80kh godov,” p. 49), but even after these changes were made, Jaruzelski feared that Solidarity would be fully tipped off about the details and timing of the operation, and would be ready to put up armed resistance. Soviet leaders shared some of Jaruzelski's concerns, but they believed that the martial law operation could still succeed if it were implemented forcefully enough. As it turned out, the concerns about a tip-off to Solidarity were largely unfounded. Even if the U.S. government had provided greater information to Solidarity, the timetable of the operation was not finalized until 9 December 1981, five weeks after Kuklinski left. 42Comments by Nikolai Baibakov, Andrei Gromyko, and

Dmitrii Ustinov, recorded in "Zasedanie Politbyuro TSK KPSS 10 dekabrya 1981 goda,” Ll. 4, 10, 12.

43 Ibid., L. 6.

See, in particular, Gribkov, “Doktrina Brezhneva' i pol'skii krizis nachala 80-kh godov," pp. 55-56.

45 For intriguing excerpts from the opening rounds of testimony by Jaruzelski and other former officials, see Anna Karas, ed., Sad nad autorami stanu wojennego: Oskarzenia/wyjasnienia/ obrona przed Komisja Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej (Warsaw: BGW, 1993). On the parliament's extension of a pardon, see "Komisja rozgrzesza autorow stanu wojennego: Wiekszosc rzadowa PSL-SLD przeglosowala mniejszosc opozycyjna UW, KPN, UP," Rzeczpospolita (Warsaw), 14 February 1996, pp. 1-2. The measure was approved by the full Sejm several months later.

By Mark Kramer

What had not been known until very recently, however, is that Anoshkin kept notebooks with records of Kulikov's meetings, phone calls, and conversations in 1981.

The existence of these notebooks was first disclosed at the conference on "Poland 1980-1982: Internal Crisis, International Dimensions," which was co-organized in Jachranka, Poland on 8-10 November 1997 by the Cold War International History Project, the National Security Archive, and the Institute for Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Kulikov and Anoshkin were among the participants. At one point during the conference, Kulikov referred in passing to Anoshkin's notebooks. As soon as the session ended, I went over to Anoshkin and asked him whether I could see the notebook that Kulikov had mentioned. Anoshkin took a red, hardbound volume out of his briefcase and turned to the page with notes of events that Kulikov had been discussing. Anoshkin pointed out the significance of a few phrases and explained when particular entries had been recorded. He answered questions I had about the different types of ink and

different handwriting.

When I asked Anoshkin for permission to photocopy the notebook, he initially demurred, but we then spoke with Marshal Kulikov, who gave his consent. I am grateful to Anoshkin and Kulikov for allowing me to photocopy pages from the notebook. I am also grateful to them for allowing me to publish the translation of those pages. Unfortunately, the aging photocopy machine at the Jachranka facility was too slow for me to copy all the pages, but I was able to look through the entire notebook and ask Anoshkin questions about it. I asked him a few additional questions about it when I was in Moscow in March 1998.

Both in Jachranka and after returning to the United States, I went carefully over the notebook (including the pages I was unable to photocopy) to ensure that it was authentic. I cross-checked the entries with other newly declassified materials, and I asked Anoshkin several questions about specific points in the notes. In no case did I find even the slightest reason to doubt the authenticity of the document. Based on my scrutiny of the notebook and Anoshkin's extreme reluctance to let me photocopy it, I am fully confident that the document is precisely what it purports to be, namely a record of Kulikov's dealings in Poland in December 1981.

Anoshkin's notebook was very difficult to translate because of the frequent illegibility of his handwriting, the idiosyncratic abbreviations he used, and the enigmatic quality of some of his transliterations of Polish surnames and place names. At times I was forced to spend many hours poring over a few lines. Even after I became accustomed to Anoshkin's handwriting, the translation was onerous work. The finished product below is the result of more than ten preliminary drafts, which I extensively revised and smoothed out. I have tried to replicate the style and flavor of the original as best as possible, but for clarity's sake I have used full words to