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Document No. 11

Report by Four Chinese Marshals-Chen Yi, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian-to the CCP Central Committee, “Our Views about the Current Situation" (excerpt), 17 September 1969

The international class struggle is intricate and complex, and its core is the struggle between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. At present a question of overwhelming importance is whether or not the Soviet revisionists will launch a large-scale attack on China. Just at the time when the Soviet revisionists have daggers drawn, the U.S. imperialists are fanning the flames, and China is making war preparations, Kosygin suddenly made a detour to Beijing, expressing to us a willingness to relax border tensions, as well as to improve the relations between our two countries. 62 What is his purpose? This is a question worth analyzing.

1. The Soviet revisionists indeed intend to wage a war of aggression against China. Their strategic goal is to redivide the world with the U.S. imperialists. They vainly hope to bring China into the orbit of social-imperialism. Recently the Soviet revisionists have intensified whipping up public opinion for a war against China, openly threatening us with a nuclear strike, and conspiring to launch a surprise attack on our nuclear facilities. The Cultural Revolution in our country is still under way, our nuclear weapons are still under development, and the Vietnam War has not ended. A group of adventurers in the Soviet revisionist leadership want to seize this opportunity to use missiles and tanks to launch a quick war against China and thoroughly destroy China, so that a “mortal danger" for them will be removed.

2. Although the Soviet revisionists intend to wage a war of aggression against China and, accordingly, have made war deployments, they cannot reach a final decision because of political considerations. Launching a war against China is a matter of life and death importance, and the Soviet revisionists are not certain that they can win the war. To a large extent, the Soviet revisionists' decision to launch a war of aggression against China depends on the attitude of the U.S. imperialists, which is far from satisfactory to them so far, and is their utmost worry in a strategic sense. The last thing the U.S. imperialists are willing to see is a victory by the Soviet revisionists in a Sino-Soviet war, as this would [allow the Soviets] to build up a big empire more powerful than the American empire in resources and manpower. Several times the U.S. imperialists have expressed a willingness to improve relations with China, which reached a peak during Nixon's recent trip to Asia.63 The Soviet revisionists are scared by the prospect that we might ally ourselves with the U.S. imperialists to confront them. On July 26, the first day of Nixon's trip to Asia, the Soviet revisionists hurriedly handed to our side the statement issued by the Soviet Council of Ministers to our government. This move fully revealed the anxiousness on the part of the Soviet

revisionists. The Soviet revisionists' fears about possible Sino-American unity makes it more difficult for them to launch an all-out attack on China. Considering several other factors, it can be concluded that the Soviet revisionists dare not start a major war against China.

3. Kosygin's trip to Beijing reflected [the Soviet revisionists'] reactionary pragmatism. The Soviet revisionists want to get out of difficulties at home and abroad by attempting to modify a brink-of-war policy toward China and hoisting the banner of peace. It was also aimed at exploring our intentions to provide the Soviet revisionists with a basis for their decision-making. It is estimated that the Soviet revisionists might enter negotiations with us, and to ask us to adopt their stand to either maintain the status quo of the border or solve the border problem. While maintaining an anti-China policy, the Soviet revisionists hope to relax, or to improve, the state-to-state relations with our country in order to gain a respite to stabilize their domestic situation and the situation in East Europe, while at the same time consolidating and expanding their interests in the Middle East, Asia, and other areas. They especially hope to take advantage through adopting a reactionary two-faced policy toward China, thus gaining strength and winning initiative in the conflict with the U.S. imperialists.

4. Premier Zhou Enlai's meeting with Kosygin has shocked the whole world, and has caused confusion in the strategic thinking of the U.S. imperialists, the Soviet revisionists, and the reactionaries in other countries. Though we have never retreated from the stand of beating down U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism, Kosygin still visited Beijing in person. All of this is China's great victory. In the struggle between China, the United States, and the Soviet Union, the United States hopes to utilize China and the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union hopes to exploit China and the United States, so that one of them will gain the utmost strategic advantages. We must wage a tit-for-tat struggle against both the United States and the Soviet Union, including using negotiation as a means of fighting against them. We should be firm on principles and flexible on tactics. The Soviet revisionists have requested holding negotiations on the border issue, to which we have agreed. The U.S. imperialists have suggested resuming the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, to which we should respond positively when the timing is proper. Such tactical actions may bring about results of strategic significance.

[Source: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 84-86.]

Document No. 12

Further Thoughts by Marshal Chen Yi on SinoAmerican Relations

This report [the report by the four marshals] mainly deals with Kosygin's trip to China and the possibility for the Soviet revisionists to launch a large-scale attack on

China, and it thus fails to provide a detailed analysis of whether or not the Sino-American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw should be resumed. I have considered for a long time on how to achieve a breakthrough in Sino-American relations. The talks in Warsaw have been conducted for more than ten years without producing anything. Even if the talks are resumed now, they will not bring about breakthrough in Sino-American relations. I have read relevant reference materials. On 27 October 1955, we suggested that China and the United States hold talks at the foreign minister's level to relax and eliminate tension in the Taiwan region. On 18 and 24 January 1956, our Foreign Ministry spokesman issued two statements, pointing out that the Taiwan problem had proven too serious to be solved by the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, and that only talks at the foreign minister's level could relax and eliminate tension in the Taiwan region. This suggestion, though with great significance, was rejected by the United States. The situation has changed today. Because of the strategic need for dealing with the Soviet revisionists, Nixon hopes to win over China. It is necessary for us to utilize the contradiction between the United States and the Soviet Union in a strategic sense, and pursue a breakthrough in the Sino-American relations. Thus, we must adopt due measures, about which I have some "wild" ideas. First, when the meetings in Warsaw are resumed, we may take the initiative in proposing to hold Sino-American talks at the ministerial or even higher levels, so that basic and related problems in SinoAmerican relations can be solved. We should only make suggestion about at which level and on which topics talks should be held. In my judgment, the Americans may accept the suggestion. It is possible that if we do not take the initiative, the Americans may make such a suggestion. If that is the case, we should accept it. Second, a SinoAmerican meeting at higher levels holds strategic significance. We should not raise any prerequisite, which does not mean that we have departed from our previous stand on the Taiwan question. The Taiwan question can be gradually solved by talks at higher levels. Furthermore, we may discuss with the Americans other questions of strategic significance. These tasks cannot be fulfilled with talks at the ambassadorial level. Third, when the talks in Warsaw are resumed, we do not need to use the meeting place provided by the Polish government. To keep the meetings secret, the talks should be held at the Chinese embassy.

[Source: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, no. 42 (June 1992), pp. 86-87.]

Document No. 13

Letter, Zhou Enlai to Alexei Kosygin, 18 September 1969

Chairman Alexei Kosygin

The Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

On 11 September 1969, our two sides agreed during our meeting at the Beijing airport: that the long-existing Sino-Soviet border disputes should be settled though peaceful negotiation without threats of any kind; and that before the settlement has been reached the two sides should take temporary measures to maintain the status quo of the borders and to avoid armed conflict. The two sides have also exchanged opinions upon the measures that should be taken. They are as follows:

I. The two sides agree that until the border dispute is settled, the status quo of the border should be strictly maintained.

1. Taking the maps exchanged in the 1964 SinoSoviet border negotiations as the basis, in the sections of the border where the two sides have identical opinions on the maps, the two sides promise to observe strictly the border line as set up by the treaty, and will not cross the border line.

2. In the sections of the border where the two sides have different opinions on the map, that is, the areas under dispute, the two sides promise: the residents of the two sides should live, conduct productive activity (including plowing, digging irrigation ditches, grazing, cutting grass, and cutting firewood both on land and on island, and fishing in the river), and pass though, only in the area where they used to live, conduct productive activity, and pass through. Neither side should advance into the other side's area, or should interfere with each other. In the area where no one lived, conducted productive activity, or passed through in the past, neither side should enter now.

The coverage of the above (1) and (2) areas should be defined by the border administrations of the two sides through discussion and negotiation, and should be defined in one decision, saving the need to inform the other side repeatedly in the future. This agreement will be in effect until the border dispute is settled.

II. The two sides agree to avoid armed conflict.

1. The two sides promise that the armed forces of each side, including nuclear forces, will not attack and open fire on the other side.

2. The two sides promise that the planes of each side will not violate the air space of the other side.

3. The two sides promise that the military ships and vessels and other ships and vessels, while navigating in the main channel of a border river, should strictly observe the existing navigation rules, and should not hinder the normal navigation of the ships of the other side and menace the safety of the ships of the other side.

III. The armed forces of the two sides should be separated from direct contact in the border area under dispute.

1. All armed forces of the two sides should withdraw from, or should not enter, all border areas under dispute, so that they will be separated from direct contact.

2. In the areas where the armed forces of the two sides have been separated from direct dispute, if there are existing places of residence, necessary unarmed civil

service personnel may be maintained.

IV. The two sides agree that in case a dispute occurs on the border, the relative agencies of the two sides should follow a spirit of equality and mutual respect to pursue reasonable solution through discussion. If a solution cannot be reached, each side should report to its superior to pursue solution by discussion through diplomatic channels.

V. The two sides agree that the above temporary measures are designed to maintain the status quo of the border and to avoid armed conflict, and that they do not change each side's stand toward the border, as well as toward the sovereignty of the area under dispute.

If you confirm the above temporary measures in writing, I will treat them as the agreement between the governments of China and the Soviet Union. These measures thus will be effective immediately, and should be put into execution.

It is my belief that this agreement, if it can be reached, will contribute to the relaxation of the situation on the border between our two countries, as well as the convening of Sino-Soviet border negotiations."

With Respect

Zhou Enlai

Premier of the State Council The People's Republic of China

[Source: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai], (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1990), pp. 462-464.]

Document No. 14

Mao Zedong's Conversation with North Korean Official Choi Yong Kun“ (Excerpt), 1 October 1969, at the Tiananmen Gate

Mao Zedong: The relations between our two countries are special, and we should improve our relations. Our aims are identical. During the years of resistance against Japan, the Korean comrades fought against the enemy together with us for a long time. During the war against the Americans, we also fought side by side with the Korean comrades. In the future, it is possible that we will do the same thing again. In opposing Khrushchev's revisionism, we stood together on the same side! Toward the Soviet revisionists, we may not condemn them every day. It does not necessarily work if we condemn them every day. But we will continuously condemn them.... We have been old friends. We both opposed de-Stalinization, and we reached a consensus on this issue a long time ago. Stalin did commit mistakes, I cannot say that he did not commit any mistakes, but basically he was a good person. Stalin made big contributions to the revolution in the Soviet Union and to world revolution. Opposing Stalin was in fact for the purpose of refusing to carry out the Leninist policy line

after the October Revolution.... The United States is happy to see the split between China and the Soviet Union. In the past ten days or so, there has been no fighting along the Chinese-Soviet borders. So long as there is no fighting, we are anxious to see it. We do not want to fight a war.

[Source: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu, vol. 3, part 1, p. 522.]

Document No. 15

Zhou Enlai's talk at a Meeting of the Chinese Delegation Attending the Sino-Soviet Border Negotiation (Excerpt), 7 October 1969

Zhou Enlai: The governments of China and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement to begin negotiations on the border dispute on October 20.

(Zhou Enlai then announced the composition of the Chinese governmental delegation with Qiao Guanhua as the head, and Yu Zhan67 and Chai Chengwen68 as the deputy heads.)

Zhou Enlai: During the meeting of the heads of the two governments on September 11, the two sides agreed that they should not go to war because of the border dispute. I told Kosygin seriously and sincerely that we do not want to fight a war. We even cannot fully take care of our own business now, why should we go to a war? But we will never be scared by war threats, including nuclear war threats. In the statement issued by our government today, we publicly announced this attitude to the whole world. The negotiation can only be carried out smoothly without being placed under any threat. This is also one of the lessons we have learned from the 1964 negotiations. The understandings that were reached at the meeting at the airport were clearly defined and should be put into execution. However, when we followed the procedures that had been agreed upon by the two sides to list the understandings in writing on September 18 to get their confirmation,69 in their letter of reply, they only mentioned that they had issued the order to their border forces, without mentioning the mutual understandings that had been reached. Therefore, the number one task for this delegation is to reach an agreement on the temporary measures [to relax the border tension]. Otherwise, it is impossible for the situation to be relaxed.

(Concerning the Soviet government's statement on June 13) We have made it clear during the meeting by the heads of the two governments [on September 11] that we will respond to that statement. But, before beginning the border negotiation, we do not want to let this issue jeopardize the already tense atmosphere. Therefore, together with the Foreign Ministry, we have decided that the statement will be issued as a Foreign Ministry document, rather than a statement by the [Chinese] government. From a diplomatic perspective, this response is not made on an equal level; but from a political perspective, this is more reasonable and advantageous.

(Concerning the leadership of the negotiation delegation) It should be divided into the first, the second, and third lines. Qiao Guanhua and Chai Chengwen belong to the first line Ji Pengfei,70 Huang Yongsheng" belong to the second line. The third line is the Party's Central Committee.

(Concerning the preparations for the negotiation:) All members of the delegation should put down all other work and be concentrated, and should go all out to prepare for the negotiation. They should first get familiar with the statements of, as well as notes, between the two governments. They should also get familiar with the history and current status of the [Sino-Soviet] border. The temporary measures, which should be solved as the first step in handling the negotiation, are closely related to the whole situation. You are not just negotiating to settle the border dispute; you are negotiating about the relationship between the two countries."

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[Source: Zhonghua renmin gongheguo shilu, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 523-524.]

Chen Jian, an associate professor of history at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, is the author of China's Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) and a frequent contributor to the Cold War International History Project Bulletin. David L. Wilson is professor of history at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

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1 [Editor's note: See John H. Holdrige, Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), p. 25. Thanks to William Burr (National Security Archive) for drawing attention to this source.]

2 Beqir Balluku was defense minister of the Albanian People's Republic and a Politburo member of the Albanian Labor Party. Later the Albanian dictator Enver Hoxha charged Balluku as a "Chinese spy" and ordered his execution.

3 Liu Shaoqi was the People's Republic of China's second most important leader from 1949 to 1966. Labeled as China's "largest Khrushchev❞ during the Cultural Revolution, he was purged and died in disgrace in 1969.

4

* Deng Xiaoping served as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary from 1956 to 1966, but was then purged and labeled as China's "second largest Khrushchev" during the Cultural Revolution. However, he reemerged in China's political scene in the 1970s. For a discussion of Deng's purge and his reemergence, see Chen Jian, “Deng Xiaoping, Mao's 'Continuous Revolution,' and the Sino-Soviet Split," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 10 (March 1998), pp. 162-165.

5 Hysni Kapo was a member of the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat of the Albanian Labor Party.

"During the Cultural Revolution, a process of "seizing the power" by the revolutionaries swept cross the country between early 1967 and late 1968. During this process, the “old” Party

and administrative authorities were replaced by new Revolutionary Committees in China's cities and countryside. The composition of the Revolutionary Committee usually adopted a "three-in-one" formula, meaning that it should include representatives of the revolutionary masses, the leading revolutionary cadres, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). 7 Todor Zhivkov served as first secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party from 1954 to 1989.

8 Alexander Dubček, first secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party in 1968, initiated a wide-ranging program to liberalize and democratize all aspects of communism in Czechoslovakia. This reform effort ended abruptly when Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968.

9 Joseph Tito, the communist leader of Yugoslavia from 1944 until his death in 1980, was famous for his independent stand against Soviet domination.

10 E. F. Hill, chairman of the Australian Communist Party (Marxism-Leninism) Central Committee (CC), frequently visited China during the Cultural Revolution.

Yao Wenyuan was then a member of the Central Cultural Group. He would be elected a member of the CCP Politburo at the Party's Ninth Congress in April 1969. As one of the "Gang of Four" (together with Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong's wife), he was arrested in October 1976.

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12 Mao Zedong alluded to the period from 1912 to 1928. 13 Zhou Enlai was the premier of the PRC State Council and, then, a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Kang Sheng was then a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and an advisor to the Cultural Revolution Group. He had been in charge of the CCP's external liaison affairs, as well as the Party's secret service for many years.

15 Harold Holt was Australia's prime minister from January 1966 to December 1967. On 17 December 1967, while swimming at Portsea, Victoria, he disappeared and was presumed to have drowned.

16 John Gorton was Australia's prime minister from December 1967 to March 1971.

17 Lin Biao was then vice chairman of the CCP CC, defense minister, and Mao Zedong's designated successor. In September 1971, after the failure of an alleged coup attempt aimed at assassinating Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, together with his wife and son, escaped by plane from China. They all died, however, when the plane crashed in Outer Mongolia after failing to make an emergency landing.

18 China tested its first atomic (fission) bomb in October 1964 and the first hydrogen bomb in May 1967.

19 Chen Boda was then a member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and head of the Cultural Revolution Group. He would be purged by Mao Zedong in 1970 and disappeared from China's political arena.

20 Yang Chengwu, acting PLA chief of staff from early 1966 to March 1968, was purged in March 1968 for alleged involvement in activities against Lin Biao. After Lin Biao's death, he was "rehabilitated" in the 1970s. Mao Zedong here referred to an article, published in Yang Chengwu's name, entitled "Thoroughly Establish the Absolute Authority of the Great Supreme Commander Chairman Mao and His Great Thought." For an English translation, see Peking Review, 10 November 1967, pp. 17-24.

21 Yao, Shun, and Da Yu were all legendary figures in predawn Chinese history.

22 King Zhou, an infamous tyrant, was the last king of the Yin

dynasty, which existed in the middle-reach of the Yellow River from around the 17th to 11th centuries BC.

23 Mao refers to the Chinese civil war between the CCP and the Guomindang in 1946-1949, ending with the CCP's victory. 24 The Northern Expedition occurred in 1926-1927, and the Land Revolution War lasted from 1927 to 1936.

25

On 20 January 1969, Richard M. Nixon delivered his inaugural address, in which he suggested American willingness to develop relations with all countries in the world. When Renmin ribao and Hongqi, both CCP's mouthpieces, planned to publish a commentator's article, entitled "Confession in an Impasse A Comment on Nixon's Inaugural Address and the Contemptible Applause by the Soviet Revisionist Renegade Clique," and sent it to Mao for approval for publication, Mao wrote down these comments. Following Mao's instructions, all major Chinese newspapers published the complete text of Nixon's speech. For Nixon's speech see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 1-4.

26 On 2 March 1969, a bloody armed conflict occurred between Chinese and Soviet border garrison forces on Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island in Russian), a small island located near the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River on the Chinese-Soviet border. According to the Xinhua News Agency: “At 9:17 AM on March 2, large numbers of fully armed soldiers, together with four armored vehicles and cars, dispatched by the Soviet border authorities, flagrantly intruded into the area of Zhenbao Island, which is indisputably China's territory, to carry out blatant provocation against the Chinese border garrisons on normal patrol duty. They first opened cannon and gun fire, killing and wounding many Chinese soldiers. The Chinese border garrisons were compelled to fight back in self-defense when they reached the end of their tolerance. The grave incident was entirely and solely created by the Soviet authorities.” (See Renmin ribao [People's Daily], 3 March 1969). [Editor's note: For the Soviet version of the 2 March 1969 incident as related to the East German leadership, see Christian F. Ostermann, “New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 6/7 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 189-90.]

27 On March 15, a second bloody battle occurred between Chinese and Soviet troops on Zhenbao Island.

28 [Editor's Note: For more information on the refusal to receive phone calls from the Soviet side, see Ostermann, “New Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Border Dispute, 1969-71,” pp. 19091 (Telegram from GDR Ambassador to PRC to East German Foreign Ministry, 2 April 1969).]

29 Mao Zedong added these sentences to the text of Lin Biao's political report to the CCP's Ninth Congress. Lin Biao's report was published by Renmin ribao [People's Daily] on 28 April 1969.

30 Mao Zedong commented on the report: "This is fine.”

31 Based on a different version of the Chinese original of the speech, Stuart Schram translated the speech into English and included it in his Chairman Mao Talks to the People (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 282-289.

32 Wang Ming (Chen Shaoyu) was one of the leaders of the "international section" within the CCP in the 1930s. Since 1956, he had lived in the Soviet Union and frequently published books and articles criticizing Mao Zedong. He died in Moscow in 1974. 33 Mao Zedong refers to the new Central Committee elected at the CCP's Ninth National Congress, held from 1 April to 24 April 1969.

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40 Xu Shiyou commanded the PLA's Nanjing Military Region and served as chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Jiangsu Province. At the Party's Ninth Congress, he was elected a member of the Politburo.

41 The "Red Headquarters” was a “revolutionary rebel organization" in Jiangsu Province.

42 The "August 27th" was another "revolutionary rebel organization" in Jiangsu Province, opposed to the “Red Headquarters."

43 Xie Fuzhi, then chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of the Beijing City, was elected a member of the Politburo at the CCP's Ninth Congress. He died in 1973 of cancer.

44 Pi Dingjun, then vice chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Fujian province, vice commander of the PLA's Fuzhou Military Region, was a member of the CCP CC.

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47

Wang Li, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu were all members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group during the early stage of the Cultural Revolution. Wang and Guan were arrested in August 1967, and Qi was arrested in February 1968.

48 Yu Lijin was political commissar of the Chinese air force until his purge, together with Yang Chengwu and Fu Chongbi, in March 1968. He would be rehabilitated after Lin Biao's death. 49 Fu Chongbi was commander of the People's Liberation Army's Beijing garrison headquarters until his purge, together with Yang Chengwu and Yu Lijin, in March 1968. He would be rehabilitated after Lin Biao's death.

50 Chen Yi was one of China's ten marshals in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1969, he was China's foreign minister and a member of the CCP CC. He had been a member of the CCP Politburo from 1956 to 1969. During the Cultural Revolution, he was repeatedly criticized for his "rightist tendencies and mistakes,” and, after summer 1967, his position as China's foreign minister became no more than nominal.

51 Ye Jianying, a member of the CCP Politburo and vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission (which did not have a single meeting between March 1968 and early 1972), was another one of the ten marshals. During the Cultural Revolution, he was also criticized, especially for the leading role he played in challenging the Central Cultural Revolution Group in February 1967, known as the "February Counter Current" (eryue niliu).

52 Xu Xiangqian, another one of the ten marshals, was then a member of the CCP CC and vice chairman of the CCP Central

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