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Moon also noted, however, that:

[1]ike all allegations, they have never been completely exorcised; doubts persist to today... What this case reveals... is that allegations live on. . . . Once an allegation is made, it is impossible to disprove it completely, since the nature of the weapon makes it almost invisible. If it is difficult to prove that it has been used, it is impossible to prove that it has not been used. Doubt is never totally exorcised. 63

The Soviet Documents

Twelve Soviet-era documents (or excerpts from them) on the BW controversy have become available. The first, dated 21 February 1952, appears to be no more than a fragment. All the rest date from 13 April 1953 to 2 June 1953, in the months following Stalin's death. Obviously all the rest-decisions and communications relating to the BW allegations between 21 February 1952 (or earlier) and April 1953-is still missing. It is also evident that other relevant documents dating from late April are missing from the available material.

The first document (21 February 1952), a message from Mao to Stalin, states that the US has used BW, delivered by aircraft and artillery.

The second document (13 April 1953) is a memo to Lavrenti Beria from Glukhov of the MVD, formerly a Soviet advisor to the DPRK Ministry of Public Security. It states that the Chinese government informed the North Korean government in February 1952 that the US was using BW in Korea and in China, and that China would publicize this. The North Koreans insisted on being the first to make a statement, and "the North Koreans, with the assistance of our advisors, created false areas of exposure." In advance of the ISC's arrival, "[t]wo false areas of exposure were prepared." Cholera bacteria were obtained from corpses in China. So that the ISC delegation would not remain on site overly long, “an unworkable situation was created for them in order to frighten them and force them to leave:" This was achieved by Soviet advisors with the KPA setting off explosions near the location of the ISC.

The third document (14 April 1953) is a memo to Beria from Lt. Selivanov, an advisor to the MilitaryMedical Department of the Korean People's Army until April 1952. He informs Beria that he had been the one to help North Korean medical personnel to compose the statement in 1951 alleging that the US had spread smallpox. He says that the North Koreans felt that the BW allegations were necessary to compromise the Americans, and that they had asked three Soviet advisors, Smirnov, Malov, and himself, to help in "creating sites of infection," which they feared they had not succeeded in doing before the arrival of the lawyer's commission. (No mention is made of the Chinese "Commission" which should be present in North Korea at this time.) Selivanov also reports that he responded in March 1952 to a query from Gen. Shtemenko, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed

Forces, and from the Soviet General Staff, that he reported that there have been no outbreaks of plague and cholera in China, no examples of bacteriological weapons, and that if any were found, they would be sent to Moscow immediately.

The fourth document (18 April 1953) is a memo to Beria from Lt. Gen. Razuvaev, the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK and Chief Soviet Military Advisor to the KPA. Razuvaev claims that when the North Korean government consulted him about the BW allegation information they had received from China, Soviet advisors had been unable to confirm the information and that he informed Kim IlSung of this, but nevertheless the North Koreans and Chinese went ahead with their public statements. He says that General Shtemenko did not inform the Soviet Foreign Ministry of the information that he received. Despite Razuvaev's skepticism about the Chinese material, the North Koreans pressed him for advice, and with the cooperation of Soviet advisers a plan was worked out for action by the Ministry of Health. False plague regions were created, burials of bodies of those who died and their disclosure were organized, measures were taken to receive the plague and cholera bacillus. The adviser of the DPRK MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] proposed to infect with the cholera and plague bacilli persons sentenced to execution.

Further details are provided as to what was done in advance of the arrival of the commission of jurists and the ISC. Razuvaev also adds that a Soviet investigation of Chinese allegations that the US was using poison gas disproved the charges.

The fifth document (21 April 1953) is a memo from Beria to Malenkov and to the CPSU CC Presidium. It states that Smirnov and Glukhov had reported in March 1952 to USSR Minister of State Security S.D. Ignatiev "that with the help of General ... Razuvaev two false regions of infection were simulated for the purpose of accusing the Americans of using bacteriological weapons in Korea and China," and that "Ignatiev did not report this memorandum, which had special political importance, to anyone. As a result, the Soviet Union suffered real political damage in the international arena. I discovered this document in the archive of the MGB USSR...at the beginning of April 1953."

The sixth document (21 April 1953) is from V. Molotov to the CPSU CC Presidium and is identifiably incomplete. It begins with the opening line: "[On] 22 February 1952, the DPRK received an intentionally false statement from the Chinese about the use of bacteriological weapons by the Americans." It further suggests that the Soviet embassy in North Korea may have informed Vyshinsky that the BW allegations were not true. Molotov proposes that the Central Committee direct Vyshinsky, now in late April 1953, that "it is inadvisable to show interest in discussing this question or even more in 'fanning the flames' of this question" at the ongoing session of the UN General Assembly. (This is, however,

after the USSR had already offered to withdraw their BW allegations in the UN Political Committee on 7 April 1953, a date that preceeds any of the documents in this latter group.)

The seventh document (2 May 1953) is the message to Mao Zedong, brusquely informing the Chinese leader that the USSR and CPSU had been “misled" (implicitly by the Chinese themselves) about the "false" and "fictitious" charges of BW use that had been lodged against the Americans, and recommending that the international antiAmerican campaign on the subject be immediately dropped.

The eighth document (undated, but subsequent to reports by Glukhov and Smirnov indicated as having been given on April 24) is a protocol of the CPSU CC Presidium, recommending that "for unauthorized actions of a provocatory character which caused significant damage to the interests of the state," Gen. Razuvaev be relieved of his ambassadorship, stripped of rank, and prosecuted; Ignatiev to be dropped from the CPSU CC and investigated; the USSR to draft its subsequent position on the allegations of BW use by the US, and to prepare a report on the subject to be sent to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung.

The ninth document is a telegram to Molotov reporting on the conversation of the Soviet ambassador in Beijing with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on 12 May 1953. Mao blames the allegations on reports from Chinese front line commanders in Korea, whose authenticity it would now be difficult to verify, and says that "[i]f falsification is discovered, then these reports from below should not be believed." (The suggestion that the elaborate preparations and falsification-a BW "Potemkin village"-the extraordinary media campaign, the international commissions, etc. could have been organized "from below" in either the China or the USSR governed by Mao and by Stalin is highly implausible.)

The tenth document (17 May 1953) concerns the CPSU's internal investigations of Ignatiev. Ignatiev claims that he showed the message from Glukhov and Smirnov to Stalin in July or August 1952, and that since he believed "the published material," he did not believe the information contained in their message and “did not attach any significance” to it.

The eleventh document (1 June 1953) is the telegram to Molotov from the Soviet ambassador in North Korea on the discussions with the Secretary of the DPRK Central Committee, Pak Chang-ok, who "expressed great surprise at the actions and positions of V.N. Razuvaev.... We were convinced that everything was known in Moscow. We thought that setting off this campaign would give great assistance to the cause of the struggle against American imperialism. In his turn, Pak Chang-ok did not exclude the possibility that the bombs and containers were thrown from Chinese planes, and [that] there were no infections." The twelfth document (2 June 1953) indicts Ignatiev, the former Minister of State Security of the USSR.

What Remains to be Disclosed?

A great deal still remains to be revealed, including: 1. All of the Chinese documentation, which would demonstrate just how the entire affair was decided upon, organized, and carried out.

2. The Soviet documentation between 21 February 1952 and 13 April 1953, and even before the February 21 cable from Mao to Stalin. These documents would establish exactly whose idea the false allegations were— the USSR's or China's—and provide a more detailed understanding of the nature and degree of the technical assistance that Soviet advisers contributed to the entire process.

The available documents imply a Chinese and then North Korean initiative, with Soviet personnel as collaborators. This should remain an open question until it is possible to understand the operations of the USSR Ministry of State Security at the time, its collaboration with analogous Chinese government organs, their elaboration of "active measures" and so forth. It is clear that there is a chain in the allegations that even preceded the onset of the Korean War, although the decision to charge the U.S. with using BW could only have been made in the context of the war. The all-important question is the degree of consultation and cooperation in the area of propaganda between the USSR and China in the period not covered by the documents-between February 1952 and April 1953, and while Stalin was alive.

Milton Leitenberg, a senior research fellow at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, is a scientist and expert on biological warfare.

'Yasuro Naito, "The Use of Bacteriological Weapons by US Forces During the Korean War Was Fabrication by China and Korea: Uncovered by Classified Documents of the Former Soviet Union" [in Japanese], Sankei Shimbun, 8 January 1998; translation in FBIS-EAS-98-011 (11 January 1998). The Japanese newspaper printed additional excerpts from seven documents which FBIS did not translate.

These charges and the events related to them were summarized in two separate sections of the six volume study, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell and New York: Humanities Press) in 1971:

-Milton Leitenberg, "Allegations of the Biological Warfare in China and Korea: 1951-1952," pp. 238-258, appendix 4, vol. 5, The Prevention of CBW; and

-Jozef Goldblat, “Allegations of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons in Korea and China,” pp. 196-223, vol. 4, CB Disarmament Negotiations, 1920-1970.

3"Letter From the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, President of the Security Council, Dated 30 June 1952; Annexes I, II and III, International

Association of Democratic Lawyers,” United Nations Security Council, S/2684/Add. 1, 30 June 1952.

"The reports of the two commissions are analyzed in detail in Leitenberg, "Allegations of the Biological Warfare in China and Korea: 1951-1952.”

"G.P. Thompson, Letter to the Editor, “Germ Warfare,” New Statesman and Nation, 5 December 1953. In a 1984 interview with a Japanese academic, Needham said: "Of course, it is entirely true that the members of the Commission never actually saw any incident. What we did see were specimens of the containers that had been used and of the vectors as well as victims of the attacks. I must say that I did not gain the impression that the methods being used were very successful. . . . My judgement was never based on anything which the downed airmen had said, but rather entirely on the circumstantial evidence." Quoted in Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: The Japanese Army's Secret of Secrets (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1989), p. 255. Despite Needham's statement, the confessions of the US pilots comprise 117 pages of the 667 page ISC report, 18 percent of the total.

❝Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-Up (London: Routledge, 1994). See also Williams and Wallace, Unit 731: The Japanese Army's Secret of Secrets.

'In addition to Harris's book, see two shorter accounts that stress in particular Washington's postwar role in covering up Japan's BW program in China and obtaining its research results: -John W. Powell, "A Hidden Chapter in History," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 37:8 (October 1981), pp. 44-52, and

—John W. Powell, “Japan's Germ Warfare: The US Cover-Up of a War Crime," Bulletin of the Concerned Asian Scholars 12:4 (October-December 1980), pp. 2-17.

The decision by US intelligence agencies was also one that made very little sense-or none whatsoever. The information derived from the Japanese program, particularly on human pathology, which was the only aspect otherwise unavailable, was of no use to the US BW program. The joint US-UK-Canadian World War II BW R&D program had already taken a different path, and it was that path on which the postwar US BW program continued. Powell was a fervent and persistent believer in the Chinese and North Korean BW allegations, and the logic of his position required him to assume great benefit to the US BW R&D effort for having protected Ishii and his collaborators. That was not the case, but it was something that Powell's argumentation could never comprehend.

“Russians Accuse US of Readying Germ War,” Associated Press dispatch, Moscow, 29 December 1949.

'Materials on the Trial of Former Servicemen of the Japanese Army Charged with Manufacturing and Employing Bacteriological Weapons (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950).

19The best summary of the Chinese charges in the spring of 1951, as well as of the simultaneous campaign that charged the United States with using chemical weapons in the Korean War, appears in A.M. Halpern, "Bacteriological Warfare Accusations in Two Asian Communist Propaganda Campaigns," RAND RM796, 25 April 1952.

"The dates of the statements charging the US with chemical warfare were March 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, April 7, and May 13. See Halpern, "Bacteriological Warfare Accusations," pp. 1-7.

12Quoted in Halpern, "Bacteriological Warfare Accusations,"

Pp. 6-7.

13

A report prepared by the U.S. Department of State in June 1952 stated, "[i]n the beginning of May, ... the Soviet representatives in Korea reprimanded in severe terms the north Koreans and Chinese Communists for failing to produce a better propaganda case on bacteriological warfare. This occurred after the north Koreans and Chinese communists were unable to produce enough 'evidence' for the international jurists commission 'investigating' the charges. Reportedly, all the north Koreans and Chinese did was to conduct the standard tours of bombed areas in Pyongang and give the jurists the standard propaganda photos of women and children killed in air raids. As as a consequence of the Soviet reprimand, a conference was called of the interested parties in Sop'o. At that time the Russians instructed the north Koreans and Chinese Communists to provide propaganda material for meetings of the national 'peace councils' scheduled during the summer of this year." Communist Bacteriological Warfare Propaganda, OIR/CPI Special Paper no. 4, 16 June 1952, Unclassified.

14"Statement by Secretary Dean Acheson, March 4, 1952," Department of State Bulletin (DoSB), 26:664 (1952), pp. 427428.

Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, "Report of the U.N. Command Operations in Korea: Forty-first Report, For the Period March 115, 1952,” DoSB 26:679 (1952), p. 1040.

16Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, "A Report on the Far East," DoSB 26:676 (1952), p. 926.

17In noting official U.S. denials of the charges, the historian should address the issue of relevant American covert operations during the Korean War. There were unquestionably covert, "black," operations during the Korean War as there have been in every other war, and it is important to attempt to establish that none of these might have involved BW. In the early 1980s, an American reporter was told by former US military service personnel that a "Joint Technical Advisory Group" had been stationed at Atsugi Air Force Base until some time in 1951 or 1952, and that Gen. Ishii had been affiliated with it in some way. After the signing of the US-Japanese Peace Treaty, the group had allegedly been moved to Okinawa and renamed the "US Army Composite Services Group,” and in some way operated together with the US Central Intelligence Agency. These informants stated that the work of this unit was in some way related to BW, and possibly in relation to plant diseases. (Communications to another by William Triplett, 1989.) A series of Freedom of Information Act declassification requests failed to yield any information whatsoever about the above. Two small items marginally relevant to the Korean War BW story, however, can be explained. US covert operations were mounted behind Chinese and North Korean lines to obtain prisoners in order to ascertain what diseases they were suffering from. The motive for these operations was reportedly to be able to mount preventive measures against the respective diseases for US and other UN forces. These operations were known to the Chinese and used as part of the "proof" of the allegations: Beijing claimed that the US had mounted the operations to determine the efficacy of their BW efforts. There was also large-scale aerial pesticide spraying over the positions of UN combat forces to suppress disease vectors. Although herbicides ready for use were not approved for use by the President during the Korean War, there was apparently experimental defoliation of small tracts in Korea in 1951-1952. See William M. Leary, chap. 8, "The Korean War," and chap. 9, "Covert Operations," Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 113-153; Ed Evanhoe,

Darkmoon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995); Arthur W. Galston, "Science and Social Responsibility: A Case Study," Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 196:4 (1972), pp. 223-35; and Arthur W. Galston, personal communication to author.

18U.S. Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. 15, Korea, part I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 844.

19 Ibid.

20Quoted in John Ellis Van Courtland Moon, “Biological Warfare Allegations: The Korean War Case." The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research: Ethics, Politics and International Security, R.A. Zilinskas, ed., Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 666 (1992): 53-83.1992, p. 69.

21 See The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, vol. 1: The Rise of CB Weapons, (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1971), esp. pp. 162 and 210; vol. 2: CB Weapons Today (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1973); The Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam: Part A: Summary and Conclusions (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1974); Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, 91 Congress (1 st Session), ed., Report: 1st Session, 8 August 1969 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1969); J.B. Nieland et al., Harvest of Death: Chemical Warfare in Vietnam and Cambodia (New York: The Free Press, 1972).

22"Le Comité International de la Croix Rouge et le Conflit de Corée," Recueil de Documents, vol. II: January 1-June 30, 1952 (Geneva: ICRC, 1952), pp. 84-109.

23Quoted in Moon, "Biological Warfare Allegations," p. 69. 24The resolution “requested the International Committee of the Red Cross, with the aid of such scientists of international reputation and such other experts as it may select, to investigate the charges and to report the results to the Security Council as soon as possible; called upon all governments and authorities concerned to accord to the International Committee of the Red Cross full cooperation, including the right of entry to, and free movement in, such areas as the Committee may deem necessary in the performance of its task; requested the Secretary-General to furnish the Committee with such assistance and facilities as it might require." Goldblatt "Allegations of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons in Korea and China,” p.

214.

25 These are summarized in some detail in the Goldblat, "Allegations of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Weapons in Korea and China.”

26 Maarten Schneider, "Bacteria As Propaganda Weapon," International Spectator (Netherlands Institute of International Affairs), 8 May 1957.

27 Mose Harvey, "Briefing on Soviet Developments Following the Death of Stalin (April 24, 1953),” p. 459, in US House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee, 1952-56, vol. 14 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980).

28 Novosti Press Agency and Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 September 1982 and 12 February 1983.

29 Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons, International Sanctions, and Proliferation," Asian Perspective 21:3 (Winter 1997), pp. 7-39, especially pp. 23-27; Milton Leitenberg, "The Desirability of International Sanctions Against False Allegations of Use of Biological Weapons," The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization, and Arms Control 3:4/4:1 (Fall/Winter 1997

1998), pp. 39-46.

30Report of the [United Nations] Secretary General, Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use (New York: United Nations, 1969).

31A problem of judgment is introduced, however, by the fact that even official Soviet government statements at the very highest level exist that run counter to unquestionable fact regarding instances of CBW use: In an official Soviet comment on President Dwight D. Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace" speech at the United Nations on 8 December 1953, the Soviet government drew attention to the 1925 Geneva Protocol by stating: "The fact that not a single Government engaged in the Second World War dared to use chemical and bacteriological weapons proves that the aforesaid agreement of the States against chemical and bacteriological weapons had positive significance." US Department of State, ed., Documents on Disarmament: 19451959, vol. I: 1945-1956 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1960) p. 402. That contention was unquestionably wrong: Japan had used both chemical and biological weapons in China during World War II, which the USSR knew, not least through the trial it had held in Khabarovsk in 1949.

32A.M. Arkhangel`skiy et al., Bacteriological Weapons and How to Defend Against Them (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1967), JPRS Translation #42,361, 28 August 1967.

33 In 1985, on the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Novosti Press Agency published a small book, Recalling the Past for the Sake of the Future: The Causes, Results and Lessons of World War II. Pages 112-113 of the book reviews Japan's wartime BW program and the use of BW by Japan "in China and Mongolia." No mention is made of the Korean War at all.

34 E.I.Smirnov et al., Voini i epidemii [Wars and Epidemics] (Moscow: Moscow-Medicine, 1988).

35 China Mulls Toxic Arms Ban, "Washington Times, 20 September 1984, p. 5.

36 Chen Jian, "China's Strategies to End the Korean War," conference paper, CWIHP Conference on New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia, University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996, quoting from Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohai, A History of the Chinese People's Volunteers' War to Resist America and Assist Korea (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 1988), p. 7, and Qi Dexue, Chaoxian Zhanzheng Neimu [The Inside Story of the Korean War], p. 280-no source or date. The author would like to thank Hang Zhou for the translation of the Chinese documents.

37 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995); Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

38Telegram, CPV Headquarters to the CMC, 28 January 1952, cited in Yang Dezhi Memoirs, p. 101, and in Jiang Yonghui Memoirs, p. 465; quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, p. 181; Chen, China's Strategies.

39Memorandum, Nie Rongzhen to Mao and Zhou Enlai, 18 February 1952, cited in Qi Dexue, Chaixian Zhanzheng Neimu, pp. 280-282; quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, p. 182.

40 "Mao Zedong Comments on Nie Rongzhen's Report About the Large-Scale Airdropping of Insects Carrying Bacteria by the Enemy in the Korean Battlefield," 19 February 1952, Jianquo Yilai Mao Zedong [Anthology of Mao Zedong's Manuscripts Since the 1949 Founding of the People's Republic], vol. 3 [1/ 1952 to 12/1952] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1989), p. 239.

41Memorandum, Zhou Enlai to Mao, cited in Qi Dexue, Chaixian Zhanzheng Neimu, p. 282; quoted in Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, pp. 182-183.

42Nie Rongzhen, "Report on American Invaders Using Bacteria Weapons and Our Responsive Actions, "Nie Rongzhen junshi wen xuan [Selected Military Papers of Nie Rongzhen], (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1992), pp. 365-366. Most of the memorandum actually deals with other issues, such as pre-planned vaccines and gas defense for Chinese troops, anticipation of nuclear weapons use by the United States.

43Halpern, "Bacteriological Warfare Accusations," p. 43. 44Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: The Unknown War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 184-185.

45 Quoted in Cookson and Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare, p. 62.

46Theodor Rosebury, "Biological Warfare: Some Historical Considerations," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 16:6 (June 1960), pp. 227-236.

47Halpern, “Bacteriological Warfare Accusations," pp. iv, 2630, 71-79.

48Communist Bacteriological Warfare Propaganda, OIR/CPI Special Paper No. 4, June 16, 1952, Unclassified, pp. 24-25. 49Schneider, "Bacteria as Propaganda-Weapon."

50Stephen L. Endicott, "Germ Warfare and 'Plausible Denial:' The Korean War, 1952-1953," Modern China 5:1 (January 1979), pp. 79-104. Rev. Endicott's judgment was that his "Personal investigations reveal undeniable evidence [of] largescale continuing American germ warfare on [the] Chinese Mainland," and that "[t]he evidence can readily convince any impartial and unbiased person."

51Descriptions of both men appear in Chapter 17, "Korean War," in Williams and Wallace, Unit 731, esp. pp. 255-263.

52Leitenberg, "Allegations of the Biological Warfare in China and Korea: 1951-1952," p. 258.

53 Cookson and Nottingham, A Survey of Chemical and Biological Warfare, pp. 307 and 62.

54 Jaap van Ginneken, "Bacteriological Warfare," Journal of Contemporary Asia 7:2 (1977), pp. 130-152.

55Halliday and Cumings, Korea, p. 185.

56.

Letter from Joseph Needham to Jeanne McDermott, quoted in The Killing Winds: The Menace of Biological Warfare (New York: Arbor House, 1986), p. 169. In a letter to Stephen Endicott in 1979 (Endicott, "Germ Warfare and 'Plausible Denial,"" p. 86), Needham also repeated that he maintained his earlier position on the allegations.

57Williams and Wallace, Unit 731, pp. 235-285.

58 Albert E. Cowdrey, "Germ Warfare' and Public Health in the Korean Conflict," Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 39 (April 1984), pp. 153-172.

59 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957), p. 376.

60 Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 4. 61 Mark A. Ryan, "Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Allegations of Chemical and Biological Warfare," Chinese Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States During the Korean War (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), pp. 104-138. Ryan probably exaggerated the number of individuals in China that need to have been involved in the deception in the field (and was so advised by this author in 1988 after reading his manuscript).

62 Ibid., p. 104.

63 Van Courtland Moon, "Biological Warfare Allegations: The Korean War Case," pp. 53-83.

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