strength, it's a sounding out of positions."

Aside from forcing the West to the negotiating table by his ultimatum, and using the CFM for a "sounding out of positions," Khrushchev saw the CFM as a way to buy time during which to improve the GDR economy and its competitiveness with West Germany and West Berlin. Khrushchev believed that after one to one and a half years, "They will be weaker and we will be stronger." "In 1961 the GDR will start to surpass the FRG in standard of living. This will have very great political significance. This will be a bomb for them. Therefore, our position is to gain time." Ulbricht agreed that "it's clear that the signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would exacerbate the situation, for which we are not now prepared. Economically we still cannot exert influence on the West; therefore, we must win time.” GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl reminded those at the meeting that "in our conditions economic problems turn into political ones." The final communiqué of the meetings, published in Pravda on June 20, stated: "The delegations emphasize that the main influence on the situation in Germany and also to a significant extent in Europe, in the sense of the consolidation of peace and democracy, is exerted under the current circumstances by the successes of the workers of the German Democratic Republic in answering the economic tasks which were determined by the resolutions of the 5th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany." The Soviets and East Germans understood how important an improvement in the East German economic situation was.

Khrushchev wanted some sort of agreement with the Western Powers which would help legitimize the GDR regime in the international arena and thus also help stabilize the situation within the GDR by reducing the number of refugees fleeing the country for West Berlin and West Germany. Having both West Germany and East Germany participate at the CFM as observers was seen as a big step forward for the GDR and for Khrushchev's strategy. Khrushchev told Ulbricht at their meeting on June 9 that the West's "invitation of the GDR to the conference, which signifies de facto recognition of the GDR," was an indication that the Western strategy of "rollback" had been "unrealistic" and that the West now realized that its "efforts to subvert the countries of Eastern Europe from the socialist path of development had completely failed."

Now that Khrushchev had achieved what he called Western "de facto recognition of the GDR," however, he was not going to push for de jure recognition. As he told Ulbricht on June 9, “We don't think it's worth it now to push the West to the wall, so we won't give the impression that we are seeking the recognition of the GDR. The Americans don't want to recognize the GDR. They can't do this for prestige reasons. That, and we would be offended. They didn't recognize us for 16 years, and you want them to recognize you after 10 years. You need to wait at least 17 years. In any case, such a stating of the

issue, such an intention from our side, would hinder the relaxation of tensions." One wishes for a tape recording of this meeting to hear the tone of Khrushchev's voice as he said this to Ulbricht! Khrushchev keeps playing both sides in these summits with Ulbricht; on the one hand standing up for GDR interests, yet on the other hand, not wanting to place decent relations with the West too much in jeopardy. Similarly, on June 9 Khrushchev recounted a Russian expression to Ulbricht: "If you have thrown your adversary to the ground, you don't need to then kneel on his chest. We don't need to show that we won." But on June 18, he declared: "we must always understand with whom we are dealing. They are bandits. If we were weak, they would long ago have resolved the German question to their advantage... we must not forget that if we let down our guard, they will swallow us up." Thus, he blustered, "The more the Western powers know that there is a balance in the area of atomic weapons and rockets, the better it is for us." Perhaps emboldened by the USSR's 1957 achievements in orbiting a satellite (Sputnik) and testing long-range ballistic missiles to exaggerate Soviet nuclear strength, Khrushchev vacillated between pressuring the West and then pulling back.

Ulbricht, for his part, seemed more subdued than he became in meetings later in the Berlin Crisis. He did, however, as usual, push for more Soviet economic aid. At a certain point in the meeting on June 9, when Khrushchev seemed to think he has just ended the meeting by "summing up the exchange of views" and "expressing his sincere gratitude" for the "complete unity of views" between the East Germans and the Soviets, Ulbricht then went on "to speak more about the situation in the GDR" and the economic difficulties, which were particularly problematic, since the East Germans "compare the standard of living in the GDR with West Germany and West Berlin." Khrushchev promised to consider the GDR's requests, but clearly worried about how much the Soviets could afford to help the GDR. "We must reckon with our real capabilities. I would like to remind you that we began the competition with capitalism naked and with bare feet. The people believed us not only due to the promises of sausage and beer, but also due to the teachings of Marx and Lenin."

Beyond fishing for more economic aid, however, in these summits, Ulbricht was not really more militant than Khrushchev on the peace treaty or West Berlin. Instead, he seemed to agree that the GDR needed to "buy time" until it was in a better economic position to risk Western retaliation against a more hard-line strategy, such as signing a separate peace treaty and turning over to the GDR control of the West Berlin access routes.

In terms of reaching a settlement on Germany and/or Berlin among the Four Powers at the Geneva CFM, no real progress was made. Both sides talked of an interim agreement on Berlin and a reduction of Western troops in West Berlin, but the Soviets continued to insist that if no final agreement were made to change the status of West

Berlin, after the interim period of a year or a year-and-a-half, the Western troops would have to leave West Berlin and the latter must be transformed into a demilitarized international "free city" with no subversive and propaganda activities directed against the GDR or the Communist bloc. The West would not agree to most of this. The Soviets also continued to insist that a peace treaty be signed with both Germanys or a united Germany and called for an all-German committee, made up equally of East and West German representatives, to draw up plans for German unification. The West put forward a package deal of stages toward German unification (which would ultimately include free elections throughout Germany) which was incompatible with Soviet proposals. The West insisted on Four Power rights in Berlin, as guaranteed in the 1945 Potsdam agreements, and the Soviets insisted that those were no longer just.

After Gromyko announced on June 9 that the Western powers could maintain their rights in Berlin for one more year and Khrushchev announced on June 19 that an allGerman commission could have a year-and-a-half to come up with plans for reunification and a peace treaty, the West, feeling these were deadline threats, called a recess to the CFM. Given that the East German delegation was in the Soviet Union at this very time, as Michael Lemke points out, there was reason for the West to believe that they were meeting to plan "new measures in case there was no agreement on West Berlin at Geneva. One should increase the `pressure' on the Western Powers, urged Valerian Zorin, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR." As the transcripts from the two summit conversations indicate, Khrushchev was clearly following a strategy of keeping up pressure on the West on West Berlin and a German peace treaty, although his feeling of "not wanting to set a deadline" and wanting to be “more flexible" clearly was momentarily forgotten when he and Gromyko set renewed deadlines in June. And the final communiqué of the Soviet-East German meetings states, in the usual threatening way, that if no agreement is reached on a peaceful resolution on the German question, the Soviet Union and other interested countries will sign a peace treaty with the GDR."

In the meantime, in spite of President Eisenhower's vow that he would plan a summit meeting with Khrushchev only in the event of significant progress at the Geneva CFM, due to an apparent misunderstanding within the U.S. bureaucracy, an invitation for a summit meeting was issued to Khrushchev on July 11, and on August 3 it was announced that Khrushchev would visit the United States. Thus, when the CFM reassembled from July 13August 3, it was not surprising that no progress was made. Khrushchev had already received his invitation to the U.S., something far more important to him than a CFM.

Document No. 1

"Short Summary of the Talks with the GDR PartyGovernmental Delegation on 9 June 1959"

Secret. 4 July 1959.

Soviet officials taking part in the talks: N.S. Khrushchev [First Secretary, Presidium member, and head of delegation], A.I. Kirichenko [Presidium member and Central Committee Secretary], F.R. Kozlov [Presidium member and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers], A.I. Mikoian [Presidium member and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers], V.V. Kuznetsov [First Deputy Foreign Minister], V.S. Semenov [Deputy Foreign Minister], M.G. Pervukhin [Ambassador to the GDR].

The following assisted in the talks: Deputy Head of the CPSU CC Dept. N.T. Vinogradov, [and] heads of departments at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, N.M. Lun'kov, and A. Ya. Popov.

Taking part in the talks from the German side: the GDR party-governmental delegation. [The document does not list who was in the East German delegation. Minister President Grotewohl's files,' the published communiqué,8 and the records of the summits indicate that the delegation included W. Ulbricht (SED First Secretary, Politburo member and head of the delegation), O. Grotewohl (Minister President and Politburo member), F. Ebert (Mayor of Berlin and Politburo member), B. Leuschner (Politburo member, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the State Planning Commission), E. Correns (President of the National Council of the National Front), H. Loch (Deputy President of the Council of Ministers and Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany), J. König (Ambassador to the USSR), H. Homann (Vice President of the Volkskammer and Deputy Chairman of the National Democratic Party of Germany, A. Bach (Vice President of the Volkskammer and Chairman of the Christian Democratic Union, P. Scholz (Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Deputy Chairman of the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany), and R. Korb (Stasi official, Head of Central Information Groups).]

Assisting in the talks was also GDR Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Collegium member A. Kunderman [who was also the head of the Foreign Ministry's Department on the Soviet Union].

Khrushchev: Let me welcome the GDR partygovernmental delegation and give the first word to the guests.

Ulbricht: There is a series of issues which it is imperative for us to discuss.

I would like to start with the conference in Geneva. As is well known, the Soviet Union's proposal about a peace treaty at the Geneva conference was opposed by the Western powers' package of proposals. In sum, its core comes down to liquidating us not immediately, but step by step, in three stages.

Also in connection with the Geneva conference, the question is: what can our delegation do for the further development of initiatives[?] We would like to exchange views with you on this. We think that an important step for developing this initiative was Gromyko's proposal to create a commission of the representatives of the two German states. However, neither the West nor the Bonn government has responded to this proposal. Therefore, we should think about what we should undertake in this regard in the future.

Moreover, I would like to note that the proposals of the Western powers completely ignore the question of the prohibition of West German nuclear arms. Thus, our delegation in Geneva first of all raised the question of the prohibition of atomic arms and rocket installations in West Germany. This is the first issue which, in our view, must Occupy the commission.

We also proposed to the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany] to conclude a non-aggression pact, a treaty on the renunciation of the use of force between the two German states. Adenauer rejected this proposal, but it met with support among the West German population (in particular from the FDP [Free Democratic Party] and SPD [Social Democratic Party]). Our proposal was understood by all and accepted, because it demands that both sides renounce something. We gave you the draft of this treaty and would like to know your view on this issue.

However, in any case, the question of a peace treaty remains at the center of attention. As regards us, proceeding from the above considerations, we emphasize especially one part-the prohibition of West German nuclear arms, [a position] which has the understanding of the FRG population.

The second issue about which we would like to exchange views is West Berlin. As is well known, the Americans are raising the question of preserving their rights in West Berlin. But we think that the issue of the preservation of occupation rights can't be raised now. We think that since 14 years have passed since the end of the war, it is time for a peace treaty.

The USSR proposed keeping a symbolic force in West Berlin. For our part, we are prepared to give a guarantee of access to West Berlin.

So where are the disagreements?

In the fact that the Western powers don't want to carry out negotiations on guarantees with the GDR, although we already control them [i.e., guarantees of Western access to West Berlin] about 95%. Thus, the issue is the following: we must give a guarantee in the name of the GDR separately from four power agreements. Although in fact this will be an agreement of five powers. Gromyko is trying to achieve this at the conference [in Geneva]. But the West is not agreeing to it.

If an agreement of the four powers is reached at a summit on this question, we are prepared to publish a declaration on guarantees separately.

We also need to decide which tactics to follow on the

issue of reunification. Our delegation in Geneva raised the question of whether we should publish in Geneva our declaration concerning a confederation. This question was discussed in the Politburo. But doubts arose among us about the utility of such a step at the current moment, since the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is not especially suitable for this.

Maybe it would be better to do this at a summit conference?

At the conference in Geneva, Gromyko raised the question of having an all-German committee study the questions of the preparation and conclusion of a peace treaty and the reunification of the country. If the Soviet comrades don't object, maybe we could discuss with the Soviet side how an all-German committee could study the peaceful resolution of the German question, and could give an instruction to our [Foreign] Minister [Lothar] Bolz to make corresponding proposals in Geneva and announce that we are also ready to discuss the question of reunification in this commission.

The next issue is a summit conference. If at a summit conference the positions move closer together and if some sort of agreement is reached, we would welcome all this, because we think that this would facilitate a return to a discussion of the issue of a peace treaty. However, the details of this can be dealt with later.

This, in short, is what I wanted to say.

Khrushchev: We have discussed all of these questions and believe that Geneva has given good results. It showed the unrealistic policy of [U.S. Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles which is aimed at the so-called "liberation" of Eastern Europe. This policy, which is directed at a blockade of Eastern Europe, the subversion of these countries from within, etc., is completely bankrupt. And it was clearly shown that efforts to subvert the countries of Eastern Europe from the socialist path of development completely failed.

Instead of this, they came to the conference in Geneva [and] agreed to the invitation of the GDR to the conference, which signifies de facto recognition of the GDR. Thus, the situation as a whole has turned out favorably for us. As regards the question of the unification of Germany, this problem is now used by the West only for propagandistic goals. The information which we have completely supports this. When our responsible comrades spoke about this question with representatives of the West, the latter directly said that the reunification of Germany is impossible.

De Gaulle, for example, said: "We are not for two Germanys, but really for three and even four." Eisenhower implied to Gromyko that the USA considers unification impossible at the present time, remarking that, in his view, it is a long process.

Macmillan and Adenauer also think this way. The latter is especially afraid of German unification and as long as he is alive-there won't be reunification.

We correctly announced in Geneva that we are for

German reunification, but that this issue must be resolved by the Germans themselves, that is the main thing, that is the essence of our position.

Now we have prepared new proposals, which Gromyko will put forward today. These proposals don't change anything, but tactically it is advantageous for us to make them. The essence of these proposals is that we propose creating an all-German committee from the two German states on an equal basis (with a proportion of 1:1). This committee must be occupied with issues of bringing together the two German governments, developing contacts between them, and preparing a peace treaty. The four great powers have no responsibility for the activity of this committee and will not give them any instructions. The Germans themselves must resolve all issues connected with the activity of this committee.

Aside from this, we don't think it's worth it now to push the West to the wall, so that we will not give the impression that we are seeking the recognition of the GDR.

The Americans don't want to recognize the GDR. They can't do this for prestige reasons. That, and we would be offended. They didn't recognize us for 16 years [until 1933-ed.], and you want them to recognize you after 10 years. You need to wait at least 17 years. In any case, such a stating of the issue, such an intention from our side, would hinder the relaxation of tensions.

You know that there is a demagogic system in the USA, there are 2 parties, but both are charlatans. They have said so much against the socialist camp, that they can't now recognize the GDR. And if [new U.S. Secretary of State Christian] Herter agreed to it, he would quickly be fired. So we have to reckon with such a situation. In such a situation, we must work out our tactics carefully. We need not Bolz but the Western representatives themselves to put forward proposals advantageous to us. We must make our proposals in such a way that they move them forward like their own, and we will support them. We don't need to rush, we must wait. We cannot show that we are in a hurry to get acceptance of our proposals in rough form.

Regarding the future of the Geneva conference, we can already say now that it won't have any tangible results. We spoke about this earlier also, since the situation itself still doesn't have a basis for positive resolutions.

In addition, in my opinion, not one self-respecting prime minister will allow his minister of foreign affairs, due to prestige considerations, to sign an agreement on concrete issues. You don't think de Gaulle will allow his minister to sign an important decision? Neither Eisenhower nor Macmillan would allow this either.

Geneva-it's a test of strength, it's a sounding out of positions.

Therefore, our proposals must be put in such a form that they will be attractive to the population.

However, on the whole we must notice that the situation now has become so difficult that the Americans must find a way out. But prestige considerations strongly

pin them down. The USA recognizes that the situation in West Berlin is abnormal, and that it is necessary to normalize it. They are talking, for example, about an agreement now on reducing the number of their troops in West Berlin from 10,000 to 7,500. But the issue of the number of troops in Berlin has no significance for the correlation of forces. We even spoke about this with Macmillan during his visit to Moscow. We told him: send 100,000 troops to West Berlin, but this will be worse only for you, and for us it will be easier, since in the event of an aggravation of the situation, these troops actually would find themselves surrounded, in a trap.

Currently the USA is also proposing to agree on the liquidation of espionage centers and radio stations, the cessation of propaganda, [and] the liquidation of subversive activities on the condition that we guarantee their rights in West Berlin.

We told them that we can't do that, since already more than 14 years have passed since the end of the war. However, we don't want to make an ultimatum, but we want to show that we are looking for real possibilities for the resolution of these problems.

They also proposed freezing the number of forces in West Berlin [and] agreeing that there won't be any rocket or atomic weapons there before German unification. And Gromyko is currently waiting for instructions from us on this issue.

Now the question of the peace treaty. Earlier we said that in the event of the Western powers' refusal to sign a peace treaty with the two German governments, we would sign a peace treaty with the GDR. But now it is necessary to create a safety-valve. Therefore we are proposing the creation of an all-German committee. Without us, but on our recommendation, the committee would deal with the issue of the preparation of a peace treaty and the reunification of the country. We are proposing a concrete period of activity for this committee-for example, 1-1 1/2 years, that is, until 1961. If the Germans don't come to an agreement among themselves in this period, we will be free from any obligations and we will look for the possibility of concluding a peace treaty with the two German governments or with one German government.

But during this period, that is, until 1961, they must reduce their forces in West Berlin, stop subversive activity [and] propaganda, [and] liquidate espionage centers. This is the main thing. We agree to the temporary preservation of the occupation regime until 1961.

Why are we doing this? It would be very attractive to all pacifists, since we will show them that we are acting without an ultimatum, but searching for a way for the resolution of these issues.

On the other hand, it is necessary to allow time so that the Western powers can move away from their old position.

The situation in this case is complicated in the following way: we are giving the Germans time to find at way out, but if they can't find it, then how can we help?

This is a very advantageous position. And what will we lose? Nothing. The resolution of the issue is only put off for a year or a year-and-a-half. And what will happen in this time? They will be weaker, and we will be stronger. Therefore, I think that we don't need to force the pace of events on this issue, since then the neutral states and many proponents of peace in the whole world won't understand us. We must not alienate our friends and neutral states.

The fact of the GDR's existence and development has already been recognized by Eisenhower and Macmillan, and public opinion understands and supports the GDR

even more.

There is also a process of evolution among the German people. The progressive forces support the GDR and this process will be strengthened in the future. This is why Adenauer is enraged. And so, he doesn't want the liquidation of the "cold war."

The question is: will they accept our new proposals? One can say with 70% certainty that they won't.

So then it will be even more necessary to have a summit meeting.

Speaking as a whole, the essence of our differences of opinion on this question are that they want to drag out the occupation regime, and we want to limit it. Therefore, on the one hand, we will allegedly concede to them, but at the same [time] limit their time, giving them the possibility to reform.

Last year, we raised these issues. Now already almost a year has gone by, but in this time we have already turned around the core of public opinion. Therefore I would like to recall here a Russian saying, which says that if you have thrown the adversary to the ground, you don't need to then kneel on his chest. We don't need to show that we won. We should give the impression that both sides won. Let them yell about their victory, but we will say that it was also our victory.

In 1961 the GDR will start to surpass the FRG in standard of living. This will have very great political significance. This will be a bomb for them. Therefore, our position is to gain time.

Grotewohl: We could hardly reckon that they would agree with our proposals in Geneva. At the current time, the conference is in a decisive stage. It is possible that the Soviet proposals will be rejected. But this can't mean that there won't be a summit conference. Our goal is to win time. Any time which we win for negotiations, any negotiations is better than a "cold war." Precisely from this position, we must come to an appreciation of the worldwide historical scene, including the German question, which has subordinate significance.

Sometimes among us Germans, is seems that for us only Germany exists. But as a whole in international politics, the German question must take up only as much space as it merits.

We, as representatives of Germany, must have the possibility of freely appearing before the whole German people on issues which are of vital importance to them.

In reference to Comrade Khrushchev, the Soviet proposals don't have any limitations for us in this regard, therefore I support these proposals.

If it is possible to reach some sort of compromise, that is, if the Germans will be forced to carry out negotiations between themselves, then this already will be an enormous step forward, it will mean recognition of the GDR. If West Germany refuses this, then this too will be a big plus for us, it will give us the opportunity to activate our work in the West. But the strength of this influence on the West will depend on taking some sort of positive step. For example, the renunciation of arming the German government with atomic weapons. We think that we must achieve this. This will give a new impetus.

Other positive steps would be the liquidation of all subversive centers.

The situation for us is clear, and if the subversive centers aren't liquidated, then we ourselves will undertake measures for the guarantee of our security.

The main thing is that people in the whole world see that a step forward has been made in the safeguarding of peace. And this step could be the prohibition of atomic weapons in Germany. From the point of view of German policy [Deutschlandpolitik], these proposals are acceptable.

We must discuss together the situation in Geneva. And it would be desirable if the representatives of the National Front and other parties who are present here would express their point of view on these questions.

Khrushchev: Our proposals are not connected with an initiative of the German comrades. The proposals which have been made by the German comrades are very good. But I think that you shouldn't appeal directly to the West.

Ulbricht: (rejoinder) They still aren't used to us. Khrushchev: We are ready to listen to the opinions of all comrades who want to speak here on the issues we have touched upon.

Bach: I am certain that the new proposals of the Soviet government will find a positive response among the German people, because they correspond not only to the wishes of the GDR but also to the interests of the peaceloving forces of the FRG. Those sections of the population of West Germany who have been afraid until now to enter into contact with representatives of the GDR will now be activated. We must bear in mind that if the proposal for the creation of an all-German committee is accepted, it will help to encourage those forces in West Germany which have shown indecisiveness until now. In my opinion, it is also important that the work of the committee will be for a limited time.

Among the population, there has been a growing view that the conference didn't deal much with the issue of German unification. Insofar as the entire package of the Western Powers skirted around the question of the unification of Germany, our new proposals in which the issue of unification is raised will allow us to take back the initiative.